F-22 Prang at NAS Fallon, Nevada
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Accident report link
https://www.kunsan.af.mil/Portals/6/...-15-200849-187
Alert 5:
On Apr. 20, an F-22A assigned to the 90th Fighter Squadron had failed to take off and the jet slid about 6,514 feet down the runway before coming to a stop. Investigators determined that the pilot had incorrect Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) for the take off and he failed to apply any corrections to the incorrect TOLD. He had prematurely retracted the landing gear while the jet had insufficient speed to maintain level flight.
The board also found that other F-22 pilots are rotating their aircraft during take off at a lower speed than that calculated by the TOLD. And there is an organizational acceptance to this incorrect technique.
Investigators also found that the F-22 community is overconfident in the aircraft’s ability to take off due to the high thrust generated by the engines. This lead to a decreased emphasis on the take off data.
https://www.kunsan.af.mil/Portals/6/...-15-200849-187
Alert 5:
On Apr. 20, an F-22A assigned to the 90th Fighter Squadron had failed to take off and the jet slid about 6,514 feet down the runway before coming to a stop. Investigators determined that the pilot had incorrect Takeoff and Landing Data (TOLD) for the take off and he failed to apply any corrections to the incorrect TOLD. He had prematurely retracted the landing gear while the jet had insufficient speed to maintain level flight.
The board also found that other F-22 pilots are rotating their aircraft during take off at a lower speed than that calculated by the TOLD. And there is an organizational acceptance to this incorrect technique.
Investigators also found that the F-22 community is overconfident in the aircraft’s ability to take off due to the high thrust generated by the engines. This lead to a decreased emphasis on the take off data.
Surprisingly sort of gash way to get your F-22 airborn, or more precisely NOT airborn:
“There is a technique that I heard from somewhere (I don't know where, whether it was at the B-Course or the 90th) to initiate [rotation] – if you have a 136 [rotation speed], kind of standard below 2,000 feet – that you initiate aft stick pressure at 120 so that the nose is up at that rotation speed, and that has been my habit pattern” (Tab V-1.10).
But this guy is only doing what he has been "taught". Just look at these statistics! These are worthy of a third-rate rubber dog-**** freight outfit in S.America!
Data from five sorties flown over a five-month period prior to the mishap clearly shows that the MP initiated rotation at 120±5 KCAS (Tab CC-3 to CC-4). This technique of rotating early does not appear to be limited to the MP. Data from multiple sorties flown by 90 FS pilots are presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The data shows that in 64.3% of sorties, rotation was initiated greater than 5 knots prior to the calculated rotation speed; in 52.1%, rotation occurs at 120±5 KCAS (Tab CC-3, Figure 1). In 80.4% of these sorties, takeoff was accomplished greater than 5 knots prior to takeoff speed (Tab CC-3, Figure 1). All pilots who were interviewed noted that they check their TOLD before takeoff (See, e.g., Tab V5.1, V-9.1, V-13.1). After the mishap, at a pilot meeting attended by 20 to 30 F-22 pilots, about half noted that they consistently use an early rotation technique (Tab V-2.16, V-4.14, V-4.17). There is a clear trend of rotating early among a significant number of F-22 pilots, including the MP, despite being aware of computed TOLD.
Is this the best the USAF can do today? Unbelievable
OAP
“There is a technique that I heard from somewhere (I don't know where, whether it was at the B-Course or the 90th) to initiate [rotation] – if you have a 136 [rotation speed], kind of standard below 2,000 feet – that you initiate aft stick pressure at 120 so that the nose is up at that rotation speed, and that has been my habit pattern” (Tab V-1.10).
But this guy is only doing what he has been "taught". Just look at these statistics! These are worthy of a third-rate rubber dog-**** freight outfit in S.America!
Data from five sorties flown over a five-month period prior to the mishap clearly shows that the MP initiated rotation at 120±5 KCAS (Tab CC-3 to CC-4). This technique of rotating early does not appear to be limited to the MP. Data from multiple sorties flown by 90 FS pilots are presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The data shows that in 64.3% of sorties, rotation was initiated greater than 5 knots prior to the calculated rotation speed; in 52.1%, rotation occurs at 120±5 KCAS (Tab CC-3, Figure 1). In 80.4% of these sorties, takeoff was accomplished greater than 5 knots prior to takeoff speed (Tab CC-3, Figure 1). All pilots who were interviewed noted that they check their TOLD before takeoff (See, e.g., Tab V5.1, V-9.1, V-13.1). After the mishap, at a pilot meeting attended by 20 to 30 F-22 pilots, about half noted that they consistently use an early rotation technique (Tab V-2.16, V-4.14, V-4.17). There is a clear trend of rotating early among a significant number of F-22 pilots, including the MP, despite being aware of computed TOLD.
Is this the best the USAF can do today? Unbelievable
OAP
Join Date: Mar 2010
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OAP ... agreed. And very evocative language you used there!!
That presents a dismal picture of USAF fighter operations, despite all their briefings and form-filling. I found it very uncomfotable reading. Gash, casual, ignorant and gung-ho arrogant are other adjectives that spring to mind.
That presents a dismal picture of USAF fighter operations, despite all their briefings and form-filling. I found it very uncomfotable reading. Gash, casual, ignorant and gung-ho arrogant are other adjectives that spring to mind.
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
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Received 135 Likes
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
In fairness, I do believe the occasional RAF FJ pilot has committed a similar 'Oh sh*t"
In truth, however, I remember the 8 Sqn Shackleton crash and what it revealed about supervision.
Is the F-22 for e so small that the same flaws apply?
There was a reason for the C-130 CB to be pulled. Whether it was appropriate or not is another issue.
Can anyone give a reason as to why they are rotating early outside of thoughts of being “punchy”? Are they concerned about acceleration and gear limiting speeds? Something else that is deemed to be a greater threat that leads the pilots to thinking rotating early is better than the alternative?
Can anyone give a reason as to why they are rotating early outside of thoughts of being “punchy”? Are they concerned about acceleration and gear limiting speeds? Something else that is deemed to be a greater threat that leads the pilots to thinking rotating early is better than the alternative?
The rotate at 120 knots thing may have come over from the Eagle community, where that was the standard number for decades.
beardy
FDRs are there for accident purposes. I assume you’re actually talking about some form of useage monitoring system.
Whilst these systems are monitored they are looking for levels and exceedances for fatigue reasons. In this case there was no fatigue issue (until the jet settled onto the runway!) so no ‘flags’ would have been raised.
Also, consider who would be looking at the data. Pilots don’t sit down after flights and pore over fatigue statistics. That’s an engineers job. Can we honestly say that an engineer would know if the pilot had rotated at too slow a speed?
There are many issues here but sadly I think it is the collective responsibility of the pilots that could have prevented it.
In the UK we have a Sqn QFI role to ensure flying skills are kept well honed. I suspect (I do not know for sure) based on knowledge of the USAF that this role may have been lacking.
On the Raptor fleet I wouldn’t be surprised to find a culture based around tactics and aircraft awesomeness and a lack of focus on flying skills due to a belief that the aircraft ‘flies itself’.
I fear similar mistakes could be made on other fleets with ‘awesome’ aircraft. Even in this day and age the Sqn QFI role still has its benefits despite what many might think.
BV
Whilst these systems are monitored they are looking for levels and exceedances for fatigue reasons. In this case there was no fatigue issue (until the jet settled onto the runway!) so no ‘flags’ would have been raised.
Also, consider who would be looking at the data. Pilots don’t sit down after flights and pore over fatigue statistics. That’s an engineers job. Can we honestly say that an engineer would know if the pilot had rotated at too slow a speed?
There are many issues here but sadly I think it is the collective responsibility of the pilots that could have prevented it.
In the UK we have a Sqn QFI role to ensure flying skills are kept well honed. I suspect (I do not know for sure) based on knowledge of the USAF that this role may have been lacking.
On the Raptor fleet I wouldn’t be surprised to find a culture based around tactics and aircraft awesomeness and a lack of focus on flying skills due to a belief that the aircraft ‘flies itself’.
I fear similar mistakes could be made on other fleets with ‘awesome’ aircraft. Even in this day and age the Sqn QFI role still has its benefits despite what many might think.
BV
In the civil world FDR is used to flag non SOP events to highlight any developing trends. Machines scour the data, not people. People decide which events to look for and interpret the results.
Using FDR solely for post accident investigation is a waste of a resource
Using FDR solely for post accident investigation is a waste of a resource
Well, unless someone who knows can tell us, I do not know what the level of skills supervision or evaluation is used to monitor F-22 Pilot skills. Likewise, I do not know what parameters the F-22 on board data recording can cover? However, I can read an accident report that reveals fleet wide routine mishandling of the F-22. 
Certainly, the RAF has had superb multiple parameter FDR available for diagnostic analysis in the Widebody tanker/transport fleet for over 30 years. Notwithstanding the support of well structured continuous assessment and recurrent crew training, the unbiased filtering of flight parameters provides early awareness of unwanted trends or problems with aircraft operation. The parameters generally include all parameters of flight, configuration and engine performance. Software filters the records for instances where tolerances or exceedance levels are reached. This might include fast rotation, configuration speed limits, angle of bank or, events such as EGPWS and TCAS, etc,etc... Such tools should be used within a supportive training environment, to avoid alienation of crews or the "spy in the cab" response. Professional aircrew will however, respond positively where the monitoring is used in a positive manner. Obviously, the flight profile of a modern FJ will differ somewhat from that of a large transport. Off the cuff, I would guess that the F-22 fleet does use this kind of tool but, has somehow failed to pick-up this dangerous handling trend? 
OAP
Certainly, the RAF has had superb multiple parameter FDR available for diagnostic analysis in the Widebody tanker/transport fleet for over 30 years. Notwithstanding the support of well structured continuous assessment and recurrent crew training, the unbiased filtering of flight parameters provides early awareness of unwanted trends or problems with aircraft operation. The parameters generally include all parameters of flight, configuration and engine performance. Software filters the records for instances where tolerances or exceedance levels are reached. This might include fast rotation, configuration speed limits, angle of bank or, events such as EGPWS and TCAS, etc,etc... Such tools should be used within a supportive training environment, to avoid alienation of crews or the "spy in the cab" response. Professional aircrew will however, respond positively where the monitoring is used in a positive manner. Obviously, the flight profile of a modern FJ will differ somewhat from that of a large transport. Off the cuff, I would guess that the F-22 fleet does use this kind of tool but, has somehow failed to pick-up this dangerous handling trend? OAP
Firstly my point about not using FDR is more of a nomenclature point. My current aircraft has an FDR, CAR and HUMS. It is the HUMS that would provide this sort of routine data, not the FDR. I think the spirit of what we are saying is essentially the same.
Secondly, I don’t think you can read across everything from widebody to FJs but I understand your point.
I’m thinking about how a unit might have caught the slow speed rotation problem. On my FJ unit we would not be using HUMS (or call it FDR if you wish) for handling issues. It is great for catching overstresses though. Handling issues could either be debriefed in cockpit or using post fight debrief. But the F22 is a single seat jet. How would anyone know to even look for the problem? FDR wouldn’t help in that regard. What parameter would someone be looking for to discover a slow speed rotation unless they knew they were looking for it?
There are many important lessons to come out of this accident but using FDR (on a FJ) isn’t one of them.
Just my opinion of course.
BV
Secondly, I don’t think you can read across everything from widebody to FJs but I understand your point.
I’m thinking about how a unit might have caught the slow speed rotation problem. On my FJ unit we would not be using HUMS (or call it FDR if you wish) for handling issues. It is great for catching overstresses though. Handling issues could either be debriefed in cockpit or using post fight debrief. But the F22 is a single seat jet. How would anyone know to even look for the problem? FDR wouldn’t help in that regard. What parameter would someone be looking for to discover a slow speed rotation unless they knew they were looking for it?
There are many important lessons to come out of this accident but using FDR (on a FJ) isn’t one of them.
Just my opinion of course.
BV
Can't comment on the specifics for F-22 units, but in general USAF fighter squadrons have safety evaluators (SEFE) who are supposed to take on the equivalent role of a QFI.
Hi BV,
I am using FDR as a generic term, as in Flight Data Recording. Yes, there are different systems.
As I read the report, this was an early rotation issue, leading to unstick well below target speeds. How would anyone know you ask? Same as any other pilot skills...look for what is done on line ops. I am not going to describe how they should do that on your jet, or any other, that comes down to specific types. However, the routine flight data recording will include control inputs, AOA, speeds etc. It is not difficult.
Do I detect a little resistance to data capture and monitoring? I strongly suspect that it will come more widely into FJ ops, if dudes keep throwing $400,000,000 jets on their bellies. Cheers
OAP
I am using FDR as a generic term, as in Flight Data Recording. Yes, there are different systems.
As I read the report, this was an early rotation issue, leading to unstick well below target speeds. How would anyone know you ask? Same as any other pilot skills...look for what is done on line ops. I am not going to describe how they should do that on your jet, or any other, that comes down to specific types. However, the routine flight data recording will include control inputs, AOA, speeds etc. It is not difficult.Do I detect a little resistance to data capture and monitoring? I strongly suspect that it will come more widely into FJ ops, if dudes keep throwing $400,000,000 jets on their bellies. Cheers
OAP
OAP
There is no resistance on my part.
I understand how these things may be pored over on bigger aircraft but I am struggling to see how this level of monitoring will make it onto FJ fleets.
If a jet is not overstressed I don’t see anyone paying any interest. Honestly I wouldn’t expect anyone to sit down and look at an FDR trace for an entire sortie to detect any anomalies.
The kind of detail we are talking about (rotate speed) would require a pilot’s input to detect. We already debrief at great length for every sortie. There aren’t enough hours in the day to look at FDR traces as well as everything else.
HUMS data (what I’m used to calling it) is already monitored and would pick up anything untoward. With the best will in the world what engineering team would correlate rotate speeds with control inputs unless specifically asked to look for it?
FDRs are great for a lot of things but I still can’t see any FJ unit in existence catching this particular trend by monitoring FDR traces.
BV
I understand how these things may be pored over on bigger aircraft but I am struggling to see how this level of monitoring will make it onto FJ fleets.
If a jet is not overstressed I don’t see anyone paying any interest. Honestly I wouldn’t expect anyone to sit down and look at an FDR trace for an entire sortie to detect any anomalies.
The kind of detail we are talking about (rotate speed) would require a pilot’s input to detect. We already debrief at great length for every sortie. There aren’t enough hours in the day to look at FDR traces as well as everything else.
HUMS data (what I’m used to calling it) is already monitored and would pick up anything untoward. With the best will in the world what engineering team would correlate rotate speeds with control inputs unless specifically asked to look for it?
FDRs are great for a lot of things but I still can’t see any FJ unit in existence catching this particular trend by monitoring FDR traces.
BV