F-22 Prang at NAS Fallon, Nevada
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F-22 Prang at NAS Fallon, Nevada
With a picture in the article below provided by an anonymous Hornet driver.
F-22 Raptor Came To A Rest On Its Belly During Major Mishap Friday At NAS Fallon - The Drive
The Topgun adversary pilot was last seen filling out a Cathay Cargo application to fly rubber dogs**t out of HKG.
F-22 Raptor Came To A Rest On Its Belly During Major Mishap Friday At NAS Fallon
Few solid details are available regarding this incident but USAF officials have confirmed that it did indeed occur and the damage is extensive.
By Tyler Rogoway April 14, 2018
An F-22A Raptor belonging to Elmendorf Air Force Base's 3rd Wing was involved in a major mishap this weekend. Details remain sketchy and are likely to change, but a source told The War Zone that the jet may have retracted its gear too early during takeoff, with the aircraft slamming back down on the runway at relatively high speed and skidding its way to a stop. Thankfully the pilot was able to egress from the aircraft without major injuries.
We contact[ed] the public affairs office at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson who jumped right on the story and quickly confirmed that the aircraft had been involved in a mishap at Fallon and although the damage is extensive, it is hoped that it can be repaired at this time. An investigation into the incident is currently underway.
The F-22 was at NAS Fallon to support the Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program, better known as Topgun, providing a dissimilar adversary for students to fight against as part of a class graduation exercise. This is a widely known event in which Topgun students take part in a 1v1 fight against an unknown 'surprise' enemy aircraft. Aircraft of all types, from warbirds to foreign fighters, have been brought in to take part in the exercise over the decades.
For a relatively small cadre of fighter aircraft—roughly just 125 out of 183 jets are combat coded at any given time—the F-22 community has experienced a number of gear-up and runway mishaps over the last half-decade or so.
On May 31st, 2012 a student pilot on his second solo flight in the F-22 didn't apply enough power before retracting the jet's landing gear during departure. The F-22 sunk down and careened its way across the runway on its belly before coming to a stop. The cost to repair that jet was a whopping $35M and took six years to accomplish the task.
Few solid details are available regarding this incident but USAF officials have confirmed that it did indeed occur and the damage is extensive.
By Tyler Rogoway April 14, 2018
An F-22A Raptor belonging to Elmendorf Air Force Base's 3rd Wing was involved in a major mishap this weekend. Details remain sketchy and are likely to change, but a source told The War Zone that the jet may have retracted its gear too early during takeoff, with the aircraft slamming back down on the runway at relatively high speed and skidding its way to a stop. Thankfully the pilot was able to egress from the aircraft without major injuries.
We contact[ed] the public affairs office at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson who jumped right on the story and quickly confirmed that the aircraft had been involved in a mishap at Fallon and although the damage is extensive, it is hoped that it can be repaired at this time. An investigation into the incident is currently underway.
The F-22 was at NAS Fallon to support the Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor program, better known as Topgun, providing a dissimilar adversary for students to fight against as part of a class graduation exercise. This is a widely known event in which Topgun students take part in a 1v1 fight against an unknown 'surprise' enemy aircraft. Aircraft of all types, from warbirds to foreign fighters, have been brought in to take part in the exercise over the decades.
For a relatively small cadre of fighter aircraft—roughly just 125 out of 183 jets are combat coded at any given time—the F-22 community has experienced a number of gear-up and runway mishaps over the last half-decade or so.
On May 31st, 2012 a student pilot on his second solo flight in the F-22 didn't apply enough power before retracting the jet's landing gear during departure. The F-22 sunk down and careened its way across the runway on its belly before coming to a stop. The cost to repair that jet was a whopping $35M and took six years to accomplish the task.
The Topgun adversary pilot was last seen filling out a Cathay Cargo application to fly rubber dogs**t out of HKG.
After the interview with no coffee:
https://getyarn.io/yarn-clip/2f122ab...8-e74cca318037
"Maybe I could learn how to be a truck driver.
Mav, you got the number of that truck driving school we saw on TV - Truckmaster I think it is ?
I might need that !"
https://getyarn.io/yarn-clip/2f122ab...8-e74cca318037
"Maybe I could learn how to be a truck driver.
Mav, you got the number of that truck driving school we saw on TV - Truckmaster I think it is ?
I might need that !"
At least they've got a team fully up to speed in fixing this sort of thing....
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...air-jo-444022/
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/ar...air-jo-444022/
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Looks like a flameout on takeoff and an airborne reject from this unofficial social media report:
More pictures in this Aviationist article:
https://theaviationist.com/?p=53286
UPDATE from sources: "Info on the Raptor mishap at Fallon: The slide happened on takeoff. Appears to have been a left engine flameout when the pilot throttled up to take off. By the time he realized the engine was dead, he had already been airborne for a few seconds and raised the gear. The jet bounched for around 1500 feet, and then slide for about 5000 feet. They got it off the ground and on its landing gear last night, so the runway is clear. Chain is wanting it to be quiet still. It's very fresh obviously. But it's looking like the second engine failure on Elmo jets in a 7 day period."
https://theaviationist.com/?p=53286
Of possible interest, from way back in 1992 with the YF-22 belly landing- an 8,000 foot slide cited there. Not inferring any link to the 2018 incident, but interesting comments about pitch changes with gear retraction, PIO, and thrust vectoring. In the photos of the Fallon bird one engine does look vectored down. A flame out may have presented a real hand full.
AW&ST Articles on YF-22 Crash
Report Pinpoints Factors Leading to YF-22 Crash
Aviation Week and Space Technology / November 9, 1992
Michael A. Dornheim / Los Angeles
The Lockheed/Boeing/General Dynamics YF-22A advanced tactical fighter prototype that crashed early this year was operating in a condition that was very prone to pilot-induced oscillation (PIO), according to Air Force accident investigators.
The airplane was performing a planned go-around using afterburner with thrust vectoring activated when it entered a pitch oscillation at 175 kt. and an altitude of 40 ft. After a severe series of pitch oscillations, the YF-22 crashed onto the runway and slid to a stop in flames (AW&ST May 4, p. 20).
Gen. Ronald W. Yates, commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, delayed release of the public "collateral board" investigation report to Oct. 22 to add segments from the confidential safety mishap report, including an engineering evaluation headed by David J. Moorhouse, currently the chief engineer for the F-15 STOL/MTD test program.
The report concluded there were no aircraft malfunctions and that it performed as designed. The investigation was aided by extensive telemetry data that were recorded during the accident.
In brief, the report stated the YF-22A was operating in a regime that was susceptible to PIO. The PIO was stimulated by retracting the landing gear during a pulse of full forward stick, which increased aircraft sensitivity. This, along with a nose-up bias from trim and software, started the PIO as Lockheed test pilot Thomas A. Morgenfeld briefly tried to fly a smooth climb-out.
Control surface actuators become rate limited, introducing further control log and worsening the oscillation. Morgenfeld was not aware he was in a PIO and thought the aircraft had malfunctioned. At 40 ft., he did not have many options and bellied the aircraft onto the Edwards AFB concrete Runway 22. The aircraft slid 8,000 ft. before stopping 185 ft. left of centerline.
The PIO-sensitive flight condition was "thrust vectoring on" at low altitudes and the lower airspeeds. The main contributor was not the thrust vectoring itself, but the flight control system gains that are in effect when thrust vectoring is activated. The aircraft would still be PIO-sensitive if these gains were used and the vectoring nozzles were disconnected.
At low airspeeds, YF-22A stick deflection basically commands a pitch rate, with zero deflection ideally giving a constant body attitude. From 200-260 kt. calibrated airspeed (KCAS), the pitch command blends to a g-command. The airspeed in the accident varied between 175 and 215 KCAS, so the aircraft was largely in the pitch command mode.
The accident investigators applied the "Ralph Smith PIO prediction criteria" to data from the accident go-around and four prior go-arounds, all using thrust vectoring. Smith is a consultant in Tehachapi, Calif. His criteria are not universally accepted but "they've been validated a lot," Moorhouse said.
Analysis of the early part of the accident PIO showed the pilot stick input was lagging pitch rate by 0.15 sec, the stabilator lagging the stick by 0.05 sec., and the pitch rate lagging the stabilator by 0.35 sec., for a total of 0.55 sec. lag in the pilot control loop. The period of oscillation was twice that -- 1.1 sec -- meaning that the lag was 180 deg. out of phase, making the aircraft "extremely susceptible to a PIO," the report found.
Analysis of the four previous go-arounds using military thrust gave similar results, predicting moderate PIO when the pilot attempts to closely track pitch angle.
From the time the gear was retracted in the accident, the stabilator was moving at its software rate limit of 60 deg./sec. and the vectoring nozzles were closely tracking the stabilator, with 0-0.2-sec. lag. Because the surfaces were rate-limited, they introduced a further 0.3-sec. lag in the pilot control loop, making the aircraft more difficult to control.
The Smith criteria assume the pilot tries to control load factor instead of pitch or pitch rate when in a PIO. "It's controversial, but Smith assumes the pilot switches to what he feels instead of what he sees," Moorhouse said. The accident data showed a 1.2-sec. delay in the control loop between pilot and load factor response while the oscillation was occurring with a 1.85-sec. period, for a phase lag of 234 deg. "Given the magnitude of the control inputs [full up/down deflections], this suggests a well-developed PIO in which it would be impossible for the pilot to recover unless he got out of the control loop," the report concluded.
The YF-22A had made a smooth go-around with thrust vectoring at military power 2 min. before the accident, and the report investigated the differences between them:
At full 0.26-in. nose-down stick deflection, a pitch rate of -2.6 deg./sec. is commanded in the power approach mode, while -10.5 deg./sec.-- four times greater -- is commanded with gear up and vectoring on, when at 205 KCAS. Similarly, at full 0.52-in. aft stick deflection, the power approach mode commands a 5.25-deg./sec. pitch rate, while gear up and vectoring on gives 17.1 deg./sec.
Stick force for the YF-22A's sidestick controller is 31 lb. full aft and 16 lb. full forward. It has a ± 0.03-in. deadband. The pitch rate curves are nonlinear and intermediate stick force gradients vary.
When other factors are included, analysis shows the YF-22A became 23-155% more sensitive when the gear handle was raised in the accident go-around, depending upon commanded pitch rate.
However, the control surfaces did not twitch instantly to follow the new gains because of anti-transient logic, called a "sump," located between the flight control laws and the surfaces. The sump adds an opposing bias to the control surface inputs equal to the amount of the transient due to the change in control laws. This bias washes out in 4 sec.
With the stick pressed full forward when the gear handle changed the control laws, the sump added an airplane nose-up bias initially worth about 8 deg./sec. pitch rate to prevent the stabilator from twitching further nose down. The aircraft also had some nose-up trim. When the pilot released the stick 0.2 sec. later, the 6-7-deg./sec. sump bias made the aircraft unexpectedly rotate nose up. That bias is worth more than full aft stick in power approach mode. The pilot countered with 0.3-sec. full down stick with the high-gain control laws freshly in effect, the control surfaces became rate-limited, and the PIO was underway as the pilot briefly tried to maintain a shallow climb-out.
"You can't predict when PIO will happen," Moorhouse said, explaining why PIO had not shown up before. "You can predict that an aircraft is susceptible to PIO, that at some time circumstances will make it happen."
Moorhouse said that the Smith criteria and other PIO measures are in Mil-Std-1797 handling specifications, but that "it's typical to not check for PIO during design," particularly if the aircraft is designed to have good Level 1 handling qualities.
The YF-22A thrust-vectoring system is intended mainly to enhance control at high AOA and to improve "g" capability at high supersonic speeds, both of which were tested at high altitude. "We did not do a lot of thrust-vectoring work on the simulator at sea level," Gerald T. Joyce, General Dynamics lead engineer for F-22A control laws development, told investigators.
The fixed-base YF-22A simulator was used to evaluate PIO under the accident conditions. When starting at 14 deg. to capture a 10-deg. attitude with the vectoring-on control laws, "the initial pitch down ... was very rapid and ... startling to the pilot," the report said. "Attempts to aggressively capture the desired pitch attitude always resulted in a large amplitude, undamped pitch oscillation with a period of 1.4 sec. Again, [control surface] rate limiting was apparently largely responsible."
But when the pilot was less aggressive, "the response was much different. The pitch down rate was smooth, but not abrupt, and capture easily performed." And when in a large PIO, "the oscillations died [rapidly] if the pilot let go of the stick."
The oscillations started about 1 sec. after the gear handle was raised, and the aircraft hit the ground 7.5 sec. later. Morgenfeld told investigators he did not understand what the problem was. "[I lit] the afterburner, gear up ... I thought I felt maybe a little bit of a bob," he said.
"The first time I knew something really was wrong, I felt a very strong nose-over pitch. [I was] looking at a lot of runway and the airplane had never done anything like that before. It surprised me, it really shocked me .... I thought something had broken and I didn't see any [warning] lights .... I'll undo the only thing that was different between this pass and the other, I snatched it back out of burner, come back to low [thrust]."
"[I started] thinking about coming back on up with the power now to mil and continue the go-around and get this thing away from the ground. And at about that time it made another big nose-down plunge ... and then at the next strong nose-down movement I thought, boy, that's it, something's drastically wrong here .... I just tried to get the nose up so I didn't do the lawn dart trick in the runway." The aircraft hit the ground at about 205 KCAS.
During the investigation several days later, Morgenfeld said he "was extremely surprised to see that I had used so much forward stick." However, "almost by definition, a pilot is not aware he is in a PIO," Moorhouse said. He also noted that sidestick controllers tend to be used more in a full-displacement pulsed manner than large-throw center sticks do.
The airplane flight manual and operating limits had no restriction on the use of thrust vectoring, but the flight test card called for it to be off for landing. The two lead flight test engineers said this card instruction was a carryover from earlier testing and was to protect against a failure of the vectoring system at low altitude. Since the vectoring system had been reliable, they said they would have eliminated the card item if requested.
However, flight control engineers said vectoring should be off at low altitudes for "flight control reasons," but they did not issue an operating limit "because they had no known or suspected reason to do so," Not all individuals in the YF-22A program were aware of the card instruction, and whether it was being obeyed
AW&ST Articles on YF-22 Crash
Report Pinpoints Factors Leading to YF-22 Crash
Aviation Week and Space Technology / November 9, 1992
Michael A. Dornheim / Los Angeles
The Lockheed/Boeing/General Dynamics YF-22A advanced tactical fighter prototype that crashed early this year was operating in a condition that was very prone to pilot-induced oscillation (PIO), according to Air Force accident investigators.
The airplane was performing a planned go-around using afterburner with thrust vectoring activated when it entered a pitch oscillation at 175 kt. and an altitude of 40 ft. After a severe series of pitch oscillations, the YF-22 crashed onto the runway and slid to a stop in flames (AW&ST May 4, p. 20).
Gen. Ronald W. Yates, commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, delayed release of the public "collateral board" investigation report to Oct. 22 to add segments from the confidential safety mishap report, including an engineering evaluation headed by David J. Moorhouse, currently the chief engineer for the F-15 STOL/MTD test program.
The report concluded there were no aircraft malfunctions and that it performed as designed. The investigation was aided by extensive telemetry data that were recorded during the accident.
In brief, the report stated the YF-22A was operating in a regime that was susceptible to PIO. The PIO was stimulated by retracting the landing gear during a pulse of full forward stick, which increased aircraft sensitivity. This, along with a nose-up bias from trim and software, started the PIO as Lockheed test pilot Thomas A. Morgenfeld briefly tried to fly a smooth climb-out.
Control surface actuators become rate limited, introducing further control log and worsening the oscillation. Morgenfeld was not aware he was in a PIO and thought the aircraft had malfunctioned. At 40 ft., he did not have many options and bellied the aircraft onto the Edwards AFB concrete Runway 22. The aircraft slid 8,000 ft. before stopping 185 ft. left of centerline.
The PIO-sensitive flight condition was "thrust vectoring on" at low altitudes and the lower airspeeds. The main contributor was not the thrust vectoring itself, but the flight control system gains that are in effect when thrust vectoring is activated. The aircraft would still be PIO-sensitive if these gains were used and the vectoring nozzles were disconnected.
At low airspeeds, YF-22A stick deflection basically commands a pitch rate, with zero deflection ideally giving a constant body attitude. From 200-260 kt. calibrated airspeed (KCAS), the pitch command blends to a g-command. The airspeed in the accident varied between 175 and 215 KCAS, so the aircraft was largely in the pitch command mode.
The accident investigators applied the "Ralph Smith PIO prediction criteria" to data from the accident go-around and four prior go-arounds, all using thrust vectoring. Smith is a consultant in Tehachapi, Calif. His criteria are not universally accepted but "they've been validated a lot," Moorhouse said.
Analysis of the early part of the accident PIO showed the pilot stick input was lagging pitch rate by 0.15 sec, the stabilator lagging the stick by 0.05 sec., and the pitch rate lagging the stabilator by 0.35 sec., for a total of 0.55 sec. lag in the pilot control loop. The period of oscillation was twice that -- 1.1 sec -- meaning that the lag was 180 deg. out of phase, making the aircraft "extremely susceptible to a PIO," the report found.
Analysis of the four previous go-arounds using military thrust gave similar results, predicting moderate PIO when the pilot attempts to closely track pitch angle.
From the time the gear was retracted in the accident, the stabilator was moving at its software rate limit of 60 deg./sec. and the vectoring nozzles were closely tracking the stabilator, with 0-0.2-sec. lag. Because the surfaces were rate-limited, they introduced a further 0.3-sec. lag in the pilot control loop, making the aircraft more difficult to control.
The Smith criteria assume the pilot tries to control load factor instead of pitch or pitch rate when in a PIO. "It's controversial, but Smith assumes the pilot switches to what he feels instead of what he sees," Moorhouse said. The accident data showed a 1.2-sec. delay in the control loop between pilot and load factor response while the oscillation was occurring with a 1.85-sec. period, for a phase lag of 234 deg. "Given the magnitude of the control inputs [full up/down deflections], this suggests a well-developed PIO in which it would be impossible for the pilot to recover unless he got out of the control loop," the report concluded.
The YF-22A had made a smooth go-around with thrust vectoring at military power 2 min. before the accident, and the report investigated the differences between them:
- Afterburner was used in the accident go-around. The report judged this to not be a factor because afterburner only adds 14% pitching moment authority compared with military thrust.
- The gear handle was raised while the stick was in the full down position for 0.2 sec. The gear transient with full stick deflection is the key item that stimulated the PIO at a 40-ft. altitude where there was little room for recovery. This is because the gear handle commands a large instantaneous change in the flight control laws, and because of the anti-transient logic for the control surfaces.
At full 0.26-in. nose-down stick deflection, a pitch rate of -2.6 deg./sec. is commanded in the power approach mode, while -10.5 deg./sec.-- four times greater -- is commanded with gear up and vectoring on, when at 205 KCAS. Similarly, at full 0.52-in. aft stick deflection, the power approach mode commands a 5.25-deg./sec. pitch rate, while gear up and vectoring on gives 17.1 deg./sec.
Stick force for the YF-22A's sidestick controller is 31 lb. full aft and 16 lb. full forward. It has a ± 0.03-in. deadband. The pitch rate curves are nonlinear and intermediate stick force gradients vary.
When other factors are included, analysis shows the YF-22A became 23-155% more sensitive when the gear handle was raised in the accident go-around, depending upon commanded pitch rate.
However, the control surfaces did not twitch instantly to follow the new gains because of anti-transient logic, called a "sump," located between the flight control laws and the surfaces. The sump adds an opposing bias to the control surface inputs equal to the amount of the transient due to the change in control laws. This bias washes out in 4 sec.
With the stick pressed full forward when the gear handle changed the control laws, the sump added an airplane nose-up bias initially worth about 8 deg./sec. pitch rate to prevent the stabilator from twitching further nose down. The aircraft also had some nose-up trim. When the pilot released the stick 0.2 sec. later, the 6-7-deg./sec. sump bias made the aircraft unexpectedly rotate nose up. That bias is worth more than full aft stick in power approach mode. The pilot countered with 0.3-sec. full down stick with the high-gain control laws freshly in effect, the control surfaces became rate-limited, and the PIO was underway as the pilot briefly tried to maintain a shallow climb-out.
"You can't predict when PIO will happen," Moorhouse said, explaining why PIO had not shown up before. "You can predict that an aircraft is susceptible to PIO, that at some time circumstances will make it happen."
Moorhouse said that the Smith criteria and other PIO measures are in Mil-Std-1797 handling specifications, but that "it's typical to not check for PIO during design," particularly if the aircraft is designed to have good Level 1 handling qualities.
The YF-22A thrust-vectoring system is intended mainly to enhance control at high AOA and to improve "g" capability at high supersonic speeds, both of which were tested at high altitude. "We did not do a lot of thrust-vectoring work on the simulator at sea level," Gerald T. Joyce, General Dynamics lead engineer for F-22A control laws development, told investigators.
The fixed-base YF-22A simulator was used to evaluate PIO under the accident conditions. When starting at 14 deg. to capture a 10-deg. attitude with the vectoring-on control laws, "the initial pitch down ... was very rapid and ... startling to the pilot," the report said. "Attempts to aggressively capture the desired pitch attitude always resulted in a large amplitude, undamped pitch oscillation with a period of 1.4 sec. Again, [control surface] rate limiting was apparently largely responsible."
But when the pilot was less aggressive, "the response was much different. The pitch down rate was smooth, but not abrupt, and capture easily performed." And when in a large PIO, "the oscillations died [rapidly] if the pilot let go of the stick."
The oscillations started about 1 sec. after the gear handle was raised, and the aircraft hit the ground 7.5 sec. later. Morgenfeld told investigators he did not understand what the problem was. "[I lit] the afterburner, gear up ... I thought I felt maybe a little bit of a bob," he said.
"The first time I knew something really was wrong, I felt a very strong nose-over pitch. [I was] looking at a lot of runway and the airplane had never done anything like that before. It surprised me, it really shocked me .... I thought something had broken and I didn't see any [warning] lights .... I'll undo the only thing that was different between this pass and the other, I snatched it back out of burner, come back to low [thrust]."
"[I started] thinking about coming back on up with the power now to mil and continue the go-around and get this thing away from the ground. And at about that time it made another big nose-down plunge ... and then at the next strong nose-down movement I thought, boy, that's it, something's drastically wrong here .... I just tried to get the nose up so I didn't do the lawn dart trick in the runway." The aircraft hit the ground at about 205 KCAS.
During the investigation several days later, Morgenfeld said he "was extremely surprised to see that I had used so much forward stick." However, "almost by definition, a pilot is not aware he is in a PIO," Moorhouse said. He also noted that sidestick controllers tend to be used more in a full-displacement pulsed manner than large-throw center sticks do.
The airplane flight manual and operating limits had no restriction on the use of thrust vectoring, but the flight test card called for it to be off for landing. The two lead flight test engineers said this card instruction was a carryover from earlier testing and was to protect against a failure of the vectoring system at low altitude. Since the vectoring system had been reliable, they said they would have eliminated the card item if requested.
However, flight control engineers said vectoring should be off at low altitudes for "flight control reasons," but they did not issue an operating limit "because they had no known or suspected reason to do so," Not all individuals in the YF-22A program were aware of the card instruction, and whether it was being obeyed