British Army - Delusional About Air Power
British Army - Delusional About Air Power
General Carter on the BBC:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-40534771
Leaving aside his missed opportunity to explain why we need a regular army beyond the "armies are the business" explanation I do sense that the British Army has a rather closed view of modern warfare.
Gen Carter points to history as a reason why we need a regular army but appears to overlook modern history where air power has been either the lead or sole power used. In equal regards he failed to explain what the 2 recent regular army 'boots on the ground' campaigns have achieved. We are rapidly approaching 16 years of conflict in AFG and 14 years in Iraq.
Worryingly this attitude is reflected at lower levels in the British Army. Indeed, at a recent symposium I endured a brief by a Colonel and his team expressing the weakness of air power by using Kosovo as an example. He seemed to take great pride in the fact that the campaign took many more weeks than expected. Yep, he used the term 'weeks' without a hint of irony.
Of more concern was the boundless optimism in the ability of the British Army to operate under an air threat or against modern stand-off weapons launched from the air/land/sea environment.
The British Army finds itself at a crossroads, admittedly not of its own making. Recent history has not definitively shown the value of 'boots on the ground' and perhaps more specifically, not shown the value of relativity low numbers of 'boots'. Turning to General Carter's history books it is impossible to find a land-centric campaign that achieved enduring success with a force as small as that currently fielded by the British Army. If you need 'boots on the ground' you need lots of them and this is simply beyond the gift of the current force structure.
Right now General Carter has only one regular army operational deployment located on the eastern fringe of Europe. Beyond operating as political trip-wire, should Russia flex its muscles again, I am not sure what military effect these 'boots' would offer. General Carter needs to use his time more effectively to explain why a regular army is needed and what numbers and capabilities are required to keep them relevant.
Some people argue that the modern, Western way of war is at arm's-length - exemplified by armed drones and stand-off weapons fired at great distances from their intended targets.
By such readings the traditional army - leaving aside maybe the special forces - seems strangely out of step with the apparent new reality.
But General Carter disagrees.
"I don't subscribe to the view that we find ourselves in a new era of warfare where you can do it all with stand-off; you can do it all with bombing; you can do it all with special forces and you can do it all with proxies," he tells me emphatically.
"Those are all simply fallacies. The bottom line in all of this is that, in the final analysis, people live on land and it is ultimately the land component that has to 'mix it' where people live. History proves that that is a requirement.
"Our policy makers absolutely understand that you have an army because, in the final analysis, armies are the business when it comes to a decision, and ultimately it's about a decision."
By such readings the traditional army - leaving aside maybe the special forces - seems strangely out of step with the apparent new reality.
But General Carter disagrees.
"I don't subscribe to the view that we find ourselves in a new era of warfare where you can do it all with stand-off; you can do it all with bombing; you can do it all with special forces and you can do it all with proxies," he tells me emphatically.
"Those are all simply fallacies. The bottom line in all of this is that, in the final analysis, people live on land and it is ultimately the land component that has to 'mix it' where people live. History proves that that is a requirement.
"Our policy makers absolutely understand that you have an army because, in the final analysis, armies are the business when it comes to a decision, and ultimately it's about a decision."
Leaving aside his missed opportunity to explain why we need a regular army beyond the "armies are the business" explanation I do sense that the British Army has a rather closed view of modern warfare.
Gen Carter points to history as a reason why we need a regular army but appears to overlook modern history where air power has been either the lead or sole power used. In equal regards he failed to explain what the 2 recent regular army 'boots on the ground' campaigns have achieved. We are rapidly approaching 16 years of conflict in AFG and 14 years in Iraq.
Worryingly this attitude is reflected at lower levels in the British Army. Indeed, at a recent symposium I endured a brief by a Colonel and his team expressing the weakness of air power by using Kosovo as an example. He seemed to take great pride in the fact that the campaign took many more weeks than expected. Yep, he used the term 'weeks' without a hint of irony.
Of more concern was the boundless optimism in the ability of the British Army to operate under an air threat or against modern stand-off weapons launched from the air/land/sea environment.
The British Army finds itself at a crossroads, admittedly not of its own making. Recent history has not definitively shown the value of 'boots on the ground' and perhaps more specifically, not shown the value of relativity low numbers of 'boots'. Turning to General Carter's history books it is impossible to find a land-centric campaign that achieved enduring success with a force as small as that currently fielded by the British Army. If you need 'boots on the ground' you need lots of them and this is simply beyond the gift of the current force structure.
Right now General Carter has only one regular army operational deployment located on the eastern fringe of Europe. Beyond operating as political trip-wire, should Russia flex its muscles again, I am not sure what military effect these 'boots' would offer. General Carter needs to use his time more effectively to explain why a regular army is needed and what numbers and capabilities are required to keep them relevant.
We need all three. Navy, Army and Air Force. They all do a great job in their own arena.
Budgetary restraints aside, I can't believe we still engage in discussions about which is better than the other.
BV
Budgetary restraints aside, I can't believe we still engage in discussions about which is better than the other.
BV
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
I think it is more a comment on the delusion that the UK still has an "army" as opposed to a large Home Guard with insufficient numbers to deploy to attempt more than a police action - and as proved in both Basra and Helmand province.
The truism that "quantity has a quality all of its own" applies in much greater force to the PBI than airframes.
The truism that "quantity has a quality all of its own" applies in much greater force to the PBI than airframes.
Maybe Sir Nick needs to go to the cinema this month and watch this:
It always amazes me whenever it starts going wrong for LAND that they start exclaiming "Where's bloody Air Force". Dunkirk is a classic example of this. The RAF were taking the Germans on well inside the German lines to try and stop the Luftwaffe from getting to our lines. Just because the RAF weren't visible overhead Dunkirk then their tiny minds told them that they didn't turn up. Indeed, some of those unfortunate to get shot down and survive were excluded by the Navy and Army from being allowed from getting on a boat back to Blighty. It's reported that fighter ace Al Deere, a RAF Boxing Champ, had to chin the boarding officer to get on a boat as they were not letting the RAF board (w-anchors). Deere became a fighter ace in ONE day at Dunkirk and went on to command during the Battle of Britain. As an indicator of the quality of his character he was one RAF Halton's most popular commandants, inspiring young men who went on to serve in the 50s, 60s and 70s. If it wasn't for the RAF then the rescue of so many at Dunkirk just would not have been possible - maybe Sir Nick and his subordinates should remember that...
LJ
It always amazes me whenever it starts going wrong for LAND that they start exclaiming "Where's bloody Air Force". Dunkirk is a classic example of this. The RAF were taking the Germans on well inside the German lines to try and stop the Luftwaffe from getting to our lines. Just because the RAF weren't visible overhead Dunkirk then their tiny minds told them that they didn't turn up. Indeed, some of those unfortunate to get shot down and survive were excluded by the Navy and Army from being allowed from getting on a boat back to Blighty. It's reported that fighter ace Al Deere, a RAF Boxing Champ, had to chin the boarding officer to get on a boat as they were not letting the RAF board (w-anchors). Deere became a fighter ace in ONE day at Dunkirk and went on to command during the Battle of Britain. As an indicator of the quality of his character he was one RAF Halton's most popular commandants, inspiring young men who went on to serve in the 50s, 60s and 70s. If it wasn't for the RAF then the rescue of so many at Dunkirk just would not have been possible - maybe Sir Nick and his subordinates should remember that...
LJ
As a committed civilian , albeit one borne int he 1950s when we really did have armed forces on a large scale (but then so did everyone else) it does seem to me that we could get rid of the tri service approach and just have a defence forces approach. That might get rid of some of the sqaubbles?? and would get rid of the 3 admirals per ship allegations wouldnt it? It wouldn't affect front line folks but logistical and admin functions could be streamlined. After all they all report to a defence ministry even if they a have been the aggressor more often than not lately and might have to invade Spain over Gibraltar if the Daily Mail is correct .
Join Date: Apr 2003
Location: SWAPS Inner
Posts: 567
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Suggesting you can win a war with just air power is a basically flawed idea. You can bomb all you like but you will never 'connect' with the people you seek to subdue in anything other than a kinetic way. Yes, you may make short term gains but you won't achieve the long term objective. for that, you need boots on the ground and he is correct.
The problem with Afghanistan is that nobody knew/could define or more importantly agree on what the final objective is/was.
The problem with Afghanistan is that nobody knew/could define or more importantly agree on what the final objective is/was.
BV: you cannot dismiss 'budgetary restraints' so easily. Committing to an Army of 82,000 in his 2015 election campaign probably seemed like an easy decision for David Cameron when it was put to him, but with the Forces' overall manpower not similarly defined it effectively hobbled the Navy and Air Force and prevented them manning capabilities that were and are in much greater demand. The RAF leadership's policy in recent years has been to make their representations privately, but that didn't build any public or media pressure on the Government to announce an Air Force manpower floor in 2015. Part of the distasteful Whitehall game this all may be, but that doesn't mean it is unimportant or inconsequential and it's unreasonable to expect us not to take a view.
On the actual question, the General needs to explain what British troops are specifically needed to do. Land warfare is a messy business: close, personal, often among the people. Soldiers are killed. Deploying them is the greatest sign of commitment a leader can make, in contrast to air power, which by comparison can almost be turned on and off like a tap. We saw our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan encumbered with ridiculous armour, using TTPs designed for own-force protection ahead of mission success, being outmanoeuvred by enemies who were prepared to bide their time and sometimes to die in great number because it was their battle, their territory, their people being fought for. We are unlikely to face battles of our own sufficiently visceral to free British regular troops from the political bubble-wrap in which they inevitably operate. In Afghanistan pre-2005, Libya 2011 (which was a military if not political success) and Iraq 2015-date we used handfuls of soldiers with significant air and naval power to propel indigenous ground forces to success - and the achievement of our military objectives - at practically no political cost. That is the model which has found favour and against which the General appears to be mounting a defence, dismissing its success with the politically-charged word "proxies". I'm sure the Iraqi Security Forces don't see themselves that way...
On the actual question, the General needs to explain what British troops are specifically needed to do. Land warfare is a messy business: close, personal, often among the people. Soldiers are killed. Deploying them is the greatest sign of commitment a leader can make, in contrast to air power, which by comparison can almost be turned on and off like a tap. We saw our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan encumbered with ridiculous armour, using TTPs designed for own-force protection ahead of mission success, being outmanoeuvred by enemies who were prepared to bide their time and sometimes to die in great number because it was their battle, their territory, their people being fought for. We are unlikely to face battles of our own sufficiently visceral to free British regular troops from the political bubble-wrap in which they inevitably operate. In Afghanistan pre-2005, Libya 2011 (which was a military if not political success) and Iraq 2015-date we used handfuls of soldiers with significant air and naval power to propel indigenous ground forces to success - and the achievement of our military objectives - at practically no political cost. That is the model which has found favour and against which the General appears to be mounting a defence, dismissing its success with the politically-charged word "proxies". I'm sure the Iraqi Security Forces don't see themselves that way...
Last edited by Easy Street; 8th Jul 2017 at 11:50.
TB7
I beg to differ old stick. You can win wars immediately with air power, or latterly sea power, alone. You just need the resolve to make the consequences of continuing seem so bleak that your enemy is forced to make unconditional surrender...
...a lesson we seem to have forgotten having fought Bliar's little skirmishes in the past 20 years. Maybe if our backs go to the wall again in a total war and big strategic weapons are used again then those with memories of the little land-based skirmishes will be re-educated.
LJ
Suggesting you can win a war with just air power is a basically flawed idea. You can bomb all you like but you will never 'connect' with the people you seek to subdue in anything other than a kinetic way. Yes, you may make short term gains but you won't achieve the long term objective. for that, you need boots on the ground and he is correct.
...a lesson we seem to have forgotten having fought Bliar's little skirmishes in the past 20 years. Maybe if our backs go to the wall again in a total war and big strategic weapons are used again then those with memories of the little land-based skirmishes will be re-educated.
LJ
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Pax Britannia, Mountbatten set that process in motion when he had the MOD created from the individual ministries, then it was stalled. Seconding RAF aircrew to the RN as the FAA ran down and more recently creation of Joint Commands was in vogue. Creation of a single staff college is another step. The problem is that everyone comes from a single service background with a better ethos than the other services.
You need real leadership to surmount single service prejudices. Ultimately a single initial training centre subsuming Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Sleaford Tech would be needed.
Then remember, the Canadians went the whole hog and now back again.
You need real leadership to surmount single service prejudices. Ultimately a single initial training centre subsuming Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Sleaford Tech would be needed.
Then remember, the Canadians went the whole hog and now back again.
PN
I suspect we are very nearly there and in a similar way to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) we will see the UK's Joint Forces Command (JFC) and PJHQ take a more leading role over the single services - just like the ADF or the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). There are other similar models outside of the Commonwealth.
However, I am deeply opposed to 'single gateways' as they really are flawed on so many levels. Each Service has an ethos it needs to develop and nuture - those differences makes us who we are and more effective in our lead environments. Also, the idiotic notions of training officers, NCOs and Other Ranks on the same establsihments have been proven to be a bad idea many times over. As ever, we ignore the lessons of others at our peril.
LJ
I suspect we are very nearly there and in a similar way to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) we will see the UK's Joint Forces Command (JFC) and PJHQ take a more leading role over the single services - just like the ADF or the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). There are other similar models outside of the Commonwealth.
However, I am deeply opposed to 'single gateways' as they really are flawed on so many levels. Each Service has an ethos it needs to develop and nuture - those differences makes us who we are and more effective in our lead environments. Also, the idiotic notions of training officers, NCOs and Other Ranks on the same establsihments have been proven to be a bad idea many times over. As ever, we ignore the lessons of others at our peril.
LJ
Join Date: Sep 2014
Location: Erewhon
Posts: 474
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I'll third that.
Remember well the resistance to CAF and its eventual demise back into three discreet services - each with its particular strengths and weaknesses.
At a time of ever-increasing threat both localised and globally, I just CANNOT understand the reduction in both military and civil security forces.
Beancounters rule the world. There'll be tears before bed time.
Remember well the resistance to CAF and its eventual demise back into three discreet services - each with its particular strengths and weaknesses.
At a time of ever-increasing threat both localised and globally, I just CANNOT understand the reduction in both military and civil security forces.
Beancounters rule the world. There'll be tears before bed time.
The RAF seem to get upset when they aren't the centre of attention.
The reality is that the teeth arms only come across air power when it is in support of them, cementing their perception that everyone is there to enable them to close with and kill the enemy. There are still twitches amongst non aviation aware people when AH request kill boxes and type 3 controls to mop up armour on exercises.
The reality is that the teeth arms only come across air power when it is in support of them, cementing their perception that everyone is there to enable them to close with and kill the enemy. There are still twitches amongst non aviation aware people when AH request kill boxes and type 3 controls to mop up armour on exercises.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The reality is that the teeth arms only come across air power when it is in support of them
I have a paper I used in my last Uni paper on warfare which has a map which shows the 20+ drone sites the US (not USAF) has deployed throughout Africa supported by civil company recce business jets (surprising resembling those used by the UK and others) and conducting armed operations in support of their host nations. I would imagine the same is true in Asia.
Last edited by ORAC; 8th Jul 2017 at 21:39. Reason: Sp
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
LB, i quite ageee, I was responding to PB, a committed civilian.
The problem with Joint is that the lead command often thinks Green and not Purple. Two shades of blue seems to work apart from the regular argument over ownership of fixed wing air.
Didn't Green think the Harrier was a Brigade level asset?
The problem with Joint is that the lead command often thinks Green and not Purple. Two shades of blue seems to work apart from the regular argument over ownership of fixed wing air.
Didn't Green think the Harrier was a Brigade level asset?
Suggesting you can win a war with just air power is a basically flawed idea. You can bomb all you like but you will never 'connect' with the people you seek to subdue in anything other than a kinetic way. Yes, you may make short term gains but you won't achieve the long term objective. for that, you need boots on the ground and he is correct.
The problem with Afghanistan is that nobody knew/could define or more importantly agree on what the final objective is/was.
The problem with Afghanistan is that nobody knew/could define or more importantly agree on what the final objective is/was.
7/7 and attacks since show that doesn't seems to be working that well.
The hiding of the report done by Home Office on funders of UK Terrorism tell us what we need to know.
If it was Iran funding it then it would be headline news with demand for sanctions and bombing raids.
Instead UK is acting as someone's bitch so we can sell billions in arms to them while committing men to do their bidding overseas so the wealthy of said country can come and buy more lush property in central London.
In 2001 I kept asking a simple question................... What was purpose of invading Afghanistan................... 16 years on and thousands of death later there is still no response.
What does the willingness of successive Prime Ministers to carry on perpetual war on people amount to.
Sadly politicians have been bought and paid for.
Racedo,
Your comments are, to my mind, right to the heart of the current problem. In recent years and recent conflicts the most senior members of the armed services have not, to my thinking, done their jobs well.
Ultimately, their task is to ask 'Why?' and also 'What do we do after defeating the opposition- what is the follow on plan for the peace?'
ONLY when they have satisfactory answers to those questions should they agree to deploy troops.
Neither of those questions were satisfactorily answered or even asked, evidently, in either Afghanistan or the Iraq case. My view is that as a result those senior servicemen were acquiescing to what were in effect illegal orders.
Politicians are always being bought and paid for, that it seems the Chiefs of Staff effectively have been as well - or are too worried about job security to stand up and be counted - is very disheartening. They above all must never be 'yes men' - or women. At one time they would have stood up to idiotic political follies.
As for the rest of the discussion - dear lord - the folly that 'wars can be won by air power alone' has been disproved many times by now. Without air power, winning is going to be 'challenging', to say the least. All three services are typically necessary, but ultimately only 'boots on the ground' can take and HOLD ground. That is why the Army - or the Marines - are always necessary in the end.
On another note - what do the Canadians think/say went wrong with the single service concept?
Your comments are, to my mind, right to the heart of the current problem. In recent years and recent conflicts the most senior members of the armed services have not, to my thinking, done their jobs well.
Ultimately, their task is to ask 'Why?' and also 'What do we do after defeating the opposition- what is the follow on plan for the peace?'
ONLY when they have satisfactory answers to those questions should they agree to deploy troops.
Neither of those questions were satisfactorily answered or even asked, evidently, in either Afghanistan or the Iraq case. My view is that as a result those senior servicemen were acquiescing to what were in effect illegal orders.
Politicians are always being bought and paid for, that it seems the Chiefs of Staff effectively have been as well - or are too worried about job security to stand up and be counted - is very disheartening. They above all must never be 'yes men' - or women. At one time they would have stood up to idiotic political follies.
As for the rest of the discussion - dear lord - the folly that 'wars can be won by air power alone' has been disproved many times by now. Without air power, winning is going to be 'challenging', to say the least. All three services are typically necessary, but ultimately only 'boots on the ground' can take and HOLD ground. That is why the Army - or the Marines - are always necessary in the end.
On another note - what do the Canadians think/say went wrong with the single service concept?
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,573
Received 415 Likes
on
218 Posts
asking a simple question................... What was purpose of invading Afghanistan................... 16 years on and thousands of death later there is still no response.
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: Derbyshire, England.
Posts: 4,091
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In 2001 I kept asking a simple question................... What was purpose of invading Afghanistan................... 16 years on and thousands of death later there is still no response.
If nothing else racedo, an entire generation of Afghanis have achieved a full education without too much interference of the Taliban.