North Korea!
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I'm sure everyone has seen the clips of a ' medium' range NK missile being launched in a cloud of red smoke. The red smoke is a clue to thde propellant combination bering used. red fuming nitric acid and some form of a mixed amine fuel ( hydrazine ? ) . Similar to that used on the first nuke amed ballistic missile in the US called the Corporal- basically a updated version of the german A4/( V2), and similar to the titan missiles. Fuels ignite on contact ( hypergolic) - Which means very vunerable before launch or in storage. Along with cooling issues for long range. While the NK missiles may not be very accurate- the question becomes how close to guam consists of an ' attack". IMHO- those particular missiles can be very easily stopped even with a near miss by almost any anti missile detonated within a few hundred yards due to required thin tanks and very touchy fuel pumps or pressurization systems- almost any leak or inadvertant mixing of fuel and oxidizer would be sufficient.
break out the popcorn
break out the popcorn
It's why Aegis is a post-boost defence system.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
With an unknown CEP a firing of 4 ICBMs aimed to bracket Guam it would have to be considered an ICBM attack on US territory and invite an immediate retaliatory launch in response before impact.
I 'd guess not.
Satellites: Vectors predictable days in advance.
ICBMs: Not so much. Launch will come as a surprise (partly the point)
Different problem.
Also, I'd think F-15s unlikely to be in range unless a 24/7/365 CAP (where?).
Finally, the ASAT programme was cancelled by the Reagan administration nearly 30 years ago.
Satellites: Vectors predictable days in advance.
ICBMs: Not so much. Launch will come as a surprise (partly the point)
Different problem.
Also, I'd think F-15s unlikely to be in range unless a 24/7/365 CAP (where?).
Finally, the ASAT programme was cancelled by the Reagan administration nearly 30 years ago.
However, it will set a precedent and answer a question.
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If he brackets Guam it isn't a direct attack on US territory as long as they fall miles away and the zones are announced in advance
BUT he's taking a hell of risk of a stray hitting the married quarters at Andersen......................
BUT he's taking a hell of risk of a stray hitting the married quarters at Andersen......................
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[QUOTE=Heathrow Harry;9858123]If he brackets Guam it isn't a direct attack on US territory as long as they fall miles away and the zones are announced in advance
.........QUOTE]
"Announced in advance" are the key words and the point where the problem is.
Fat Un did not bother to warn anybody when he was dropping previous missiles in the sea near Japan. Shall we expect him to point out some neutral zones around Guam?
.........QUOTE]
"Announced in advance" are the key words and the point where the problem is.
Fat Un did not bother to warn anybody when he was dropping previous missiles in the sea near Japan. Shall we expect him to point out some neutral zones around Guam?
Go ahead and Google the excerpt form the Governor of Guam who responded to some fool on Fox news who asserted that there are only about 3000 Americans on Guam. There are over 100,000 American citizens in Guam, a Territory of the US.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
If he brackets Guam it isn't a direct attack on US territory as long as they fall miles away and the zones are announced in advance
Once you take start playing the game of first and second strikes, preemption and decapitation you take the consequences of your actions. Best to read the rule book first.
Presumably the B1 crews in Guam will be at a very high state of alert at the moment? RS5 equivalent in old V Force terms?
There seems to be a plan involving their use should NK launch.
There seems to be a plan involving their use should NK launch.
If someone fires an ICBM at you don't wait to see if and where it lands and what it's carrying before you respond.
So let's just imagine this.
The Norks fire a Hwasong 12 on a high lofting trajectory (similar to their most recent tests) on a bearing SE towards Guam.
It's clear from that trajectory that it will land well short... lets say for arguments sake a good 100 km out from Guam rather than just the tens of kilometres short that Kim Jong-Un has been talking about.
Is that grounds enough to launch a few Bones and strike?
What if they drop one even further out - into the water halfway across the Philippine Sea on the same bearing?
Or just South East of Yakushima?
Pretty tricky tactical calculus in response; where's your red line?
The Norks fire a Hwasong 12 on a high lofting trajectory (similar to their most recent tests) on a bearing SE towards Guam.
It's clear from that trajectory that it will land well short... lets say for arguments sake a good 100 km out from Guam rather than just the tens of kilometres short that Kim Jong-Un has been talking about.
Is that grounds enough to launch a few Bones and strike?
What if they drop one even further out - into the water halfway across the Philippine Sea on the same bearing?
Or just South East of Yakushima?
Pretty tricky tactical calculus in response; where's your red line?
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So let's just imagine this.
The Norks fire a Hwasong 12 on a high lofting trajectory (similar to their most recent tests) on a bearing SE towards Guam.
It's clear from that trajectory that it will land well short... lets say for arguments sake a good 100 km out from Guam rather than just the tens of kilometres short that Kim Jong-Un has been talking about.
Is that grounds enough to launch a few Bones and strike?
What if they drop one even further out - into the water halfway across the Philippine Sea on the same bearing?
Or just South East of Yakushima?
Pretty tricky tactical calculus in response; where's your red line?
The Norks fire a Hwasong 12 on a high lofting trajectory (similar to their most recent tests) on a bearing SE towards Guam.
It's clear from that trajectory that it will land well short... lets say for arguments sake a good 100 km out from Guam rather than just the tens of kilometres short that Kim Jong-Un has been talking about.
Is that grounds enough to launch a few Bones and strike?
What if they drop one even further out - into the water halfway across the Philippine Sea on the same bearing?
Or just South East of Yakushima?
Pretty tricky tactical calculus in response; where's your red line?
Ditto for S korea
MY guess Bones on defcon 3 - 15 minutes- can be launched and recalled.
But here's the point.
Even with guided missile ships, THAAD and AEGIS, shooting down a North Korean missile is not an absolute certainty.
This article speculates the US and Japan may just watch for that very reason.
Its 96 percent prediction of a successful shootdown however appears optimistic. Tests of AEGIS have been highly engineered. AFAIK it hasn't been subject to a `real-world' test yet? I may be wrong. THAAD tests to date appear to be repleat with failures.
I realise that B-1s can be launched and retrieved within 15 minutes - all a crewman has to do is hit the Alert Start button on the nosewheel oleo and the APU will begin to power up all four engines as the crew climb the ladder.
To be clearer, my question was when does the US launch and strike. Is the mere firing of a missile in your general direction to land relatively close to territory of yours provocation enough?
In Japan's case, no.
Is Guam different...?
Even with guided missile ships, THAAD and AEGIS, shooting down a North Korean missile is not an absolute certainty.
This article speculates the US and Japan may just watch for that very reason.
Its 96 percent prediction of a successful shootdown however appears optimistic. Tests of AEGIS have been highly engineered. AFAIK it hasn't been subject to a `real-world' test yet? I may be wrong. THAAD tests to date appear to be repleat with failures.
I realise that B-1s can be launched and retrieved within 15 minutes - all a crewman has to do is hit the Alert Start button on the nosewheel oleo and the APU will begin to power up all four engines as the crew climb the ladder.
To be clearer, my question was when does the US launch and strike. Is the mere firing of a missile in your general direction to land relatively close to territory of yours provocation enough?
In Japan's case, no.
Is Guam different...?
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Our Commander in Chief is cut from the same cloth as Fat Wun. Don't bother asking logical questions.
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But here's the point.
Even with guided missile ships, THAAD and AEGIS, shooting down a North Korean missile is not an absolute certainty.
This article speculates the US and Japan may just watch for that very reason.
Its 96 percent prediction of a successful shootdown however appears optimistic. Tests of AEGIS have been highly engineered. AFAIK it hasn't been subject to a `real-world' test yet? I may be wrong. THAAD tests to date appear to be repleat with failures.
I realise that B-1s can be launched and retrieved within 15 minutes - all a crewman has to do is hit the Alert Start button on the nosewheel oleo and the APU will begin to power up all four engines as the crew climb the ladder.
To be clearer, my question was when does the US launch and strike. Is the mere firing of a missile in your general direction to land relatively close to territory of yours provocation enough?
In Japan's case, no.
Is Guam different...?
Even with guided missile ships, THAAD and AEGIS, shooting down a North Korean missile is not an absolute certainty.
This article speculates the US and Japan may just watch for that very reason.
Its 96 percent prediction of a successful shootdown however appears optimistic. Tests of AEGIS have been highly engineered. AFAIK it hasn't been subject to a `real-world' test yet? I may be wrong. THAAD tests to date appear to be repleat with failures.
I realise that B-1s can be launched and retrieved within 15 minutes - all a crewman has to do is hit the Alert Start button on the nosewheel oleo and the APU will begin to power up all four engines as the crew climb the ladder.
To be clearer, my question was when does the US launch and strike. Is the mere firing of a missile in your general direction to land relatively close to territory of yours provocation enough?
In Japan's case, no.
Is Guam different...?
IMHO- U.S will first try to intercept- and even if successful- will most likely launch a impressive fireworks display over a certain palace - sort of a " gotcha " whenever we want you notice.
And by the way the start button on nosegear was first planned for the B-70 in the late 50's, but planned to use a wheeled apu " cart" to be dropped just as plane started to takeoff.
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Even the WWII V2 had a terminal velocity of 1,790 mph. According to one expert's opinion on the Hwasong-12, "In the simulation ... the velocity during the re-entry peaks at 5.4 km/s. [nearly Mach 16] ... The velocity is a lot higher than the peak velocity reached by the Musudan, however, and is closer to ICBM velocities." I couldn't find an estimate of the terminal velocity, but surely it is much higher than that of a V2.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Launch on Warning is still official policy. In that context the following reflects the current reality. Without guessing what the preplanned response to aNK launch would be, waiting to see where the landed (and he estimated CEP of the Hwasong-14 is around 30Km, about the distance they claim to miss by), waiting for impact is not in line with how the system is designed to react and respond.
World War Three, by Mistake | The New Yorker
".......The launch-on-warning policy became controversial during the nineteen-seventies, once it was publicly known. The hundreds of missiles based on American submarines, almost impossible to find in the depths of the ocean, seemed more than adequate to deter a Soviet attack. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 1979, Fred Iklé, a conservative Republican who later became a top Pentagon official during the Reagan Administration, said, “If any witness should come here and tell you that a totally reliable and safe launch-on-warning posture can be designed and implemented, that man is a fool.” The Pentagon repeatedly denied that launch-on-warning was American policy, claiming that it was simply one of many options for the President to consider. A recent memoir, “Uncommon Cause,” written by General George Lee Butler, reveals that the Pentagon was not telling the truth. Butler was the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, responsible for all of America’s nuclear weapons, during the Administration of President George H. W. Bush.
According to Butler and Franklin Miller, a former director of strategic-forces policy at the Pentagon, launch-on-warning was an essential part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (siop), the nation’s nuclear-war plan. Land-based missiles like the Minuteman III were aimed at some of the most important targets in the Soviet Union, including its anti-aircraft sites. If the Minuteman missiles were destroyed before liftoff, the siop would go awry, and American bombers might be shot down before reaching their targets. In order to prevail in a nuclear war, the siop had become dependent on getting Minuteman missiles off the ground immediately. Butler’s immersion in the details of the nuclear command-and-control system left him dismayed. “With the possible exception of the Soviet nuclear war plan, [the siop] was the single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life,” Butler concluded. “We escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion.” The siop called for the destruction of twelve thousand targets within the Soviet Union. Moscow would be struck by four hundred nuclear weapons; Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, by about forty.
After the end of the Cold War, a Russian surprise attack became extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, hundreds of Minuteman III missiles remained on alert. The Cold War strategy endured because, in theory, it deterred a Russian attack on the missiles. McNamara called the policy “insane,” arguing that “there’s no military requirement for it.” George W. Bush, while running for President in 2000, criticized launch-on-warning, citing the “unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.” Barack Obama, while running for President in 2008, promised to take Minuteman missiles off alert, warning that policies like launch-on-warning “increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation.” Twenty scientists who have won the Nobel Prize, as well as the Union of Concerned Scientists, have expressed strong opposition to retaining a launch-on-warning capability. It has also been opposed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and former Senator Sam Nunn. And yet the Minuteman III missiles still sit in their silos today, armed with warheads, ready to go......"
World War Three, by Mistake | The New Yorker
".......The launch-on-warning policy became controversial during the nineteen-seventies, once it was publicly known. The hundreds of missiles based on American submarines, almost impossible to find in the depths of the ocean, seemed more than adequate to deter a Soviet attack. During testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 1979, Fred Iklé, a conservative Republican who later became a top Pentagon official during the Reagan Administration, said, “If any witness should come here and tell you that a totally reliable and safe launch-on-warning posture can be designed and implemented, that man is a fool.” The Pentagon repeatedly denied that launch-on-warning was American policy, claiming that it was simply one of many options for the President to consider. A recent memoir, “Uncommon Cause,” written by General George Lee Butler, reveals that the Pentagon was not telling the truth. Butler was the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, responsible for all of America’s nuclear weapons, during the Administration of President George H. W. Bush.
According to Butler and Franklin Miller, a former director of strategic-forces policy at the Pentagon, launch-on-warning was an essential part of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (siop), the nation’s nuclear-war plan. Land-based missiles like the Minuteman III were aimed at some of the most important targets in the Soviet Union, including its anti-aircraft sites. If the Minuteman missiles were destroyed before liftoff, the siop would go awry, and American bombers might be shot down before reaching their targets. In order to prevail in a nuclear war, the siop had become dependent on getting Minuteman missiles off the ground immediately. Butler’s immersion in the details of the nuclear command-and-control system left him dismayed. “With the possible exception of the Soviet nuclear war plan, [the siop] was the single most absurd and irresponsible document I had ever reviewed in my life,” Butler concluded. “We escaped the Cold War without a nuclear holocaust by some combination of skill, luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest proportion.” The siop called for the destruction of twelve thousand targets within the Soviet Union. Moscow would be struck by four hundred nuclear weapons; Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, by about forty.
After the end of the Cold War, a Russian surprise attack became extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, hundreds of Minuteman III missiles remained on alert. The Cold War strategy endured because, in theory, it deterred a Russian attack on the missiles. McNamara called the policy “insane,” arguing that “there’s no military requirement for it.” George W. Bush, while running for President in 2000, criticized launch-on-warning, citing the “unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch.” Barack Obama, while running for President in 2008, promised to take Minuteman missiles off alert, warning that policies like launch-on-warning “increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation.” Twenty scientists who have won the Nobel Prize, as well as the Union of Concerned Scientists, have expressed strong opposition to retaining a launch-on-warning capability. It has also been opposed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and former Senator Sam Nunn. And yet the Minuteman III missiles still sit in their silos today, armed with warheads, ready to go......"