Why don't we buy our military aircraft from....
...but the destroyers are the topical example. They don't even work as oceangoing vehicles, let alone as warfighting machines.
My understanding is that they are or soon will be effectively unarmed against any target other than (radar-observable) aircraft or stationary targets on land.
As far as I know once Harpoon goes out of service, the UK will have no ability to attack enemy shipping other than bombing it, which rather assumes a lack of anti-aircraft capability on the part of the enemy, or or torpedoing it.
And there are only seven attack submarines in the navy.
I honestly don't want to come off as an unqualified whiner, but when this is the case, and the government attitude is constantly "no problem, BAE, have another couple of hundred million," questions have to be asked.
Have Boeing yet paid up for the Chinnook FADEC issue? Have the Chinnook IPT staff paid for their incompetence in taking in the DA and TA roles and then procuring a helicopter which could not be certified for use in the UK? Have LM paid any compensation for slips in the F35 programme?
I'm not sure there is much actual evidence to support your position!
PDR
Have Boeing yet paid up for the Chinnook FADEC issue? Have the Chinnook IPT staff paid for their incompetence in taking in the DA and TA roles and then procuring a helicopter which could not be certified for use in the UK?
To be fair to the Chinook IPT, it was formed in 1999 and the decisions regarding the Mk3 were made at least 3 years earlier. The individuals concerned did not transfer to the IPT in 99. Someone in DHP was indeed the TA, and this is proper; but one should ask if he was suitably qualified and experienced (or even knew what a TA is). DHP did not declare themselves DA, but did make decisions that normally rest with the DA. The key question is - did anyone in DHP see the Director of Flight Safety's 1992 report which called into question Boeing's ability to act as a DA? Their boss, the Chief of Defence Procurement has stated he didn't see the report, as it was concealed by the Chief Engineer, ACAS and CAS.
If one wanted to point a finger at Boeing, the ZA721 accident in the Falklands in 1987 is the obvious case.
Good points, and I'm not really looking to point a finger at anyone. I'm just countering the apparent belief that BAES is responsible for every disaster since the Romans invaded. Unfortunately the facts don't really align with Phil_R's rant.
PDR
PDR
My intention is not particularly to point the finger at BAE. In order for these things to happen, someone had to order it, design it, and build it, and someone had to pay for it.
My understanding of the relative level of involvement of politicians, the military, and contractors in the decision-making process is hazy, and presumably somewhat variable on a case by case basis anyway. What irks me is that an absolutely staggering series of cock-ups has been perpetrated, on a scale so vast that it defies easy description - and it's happened so much that it's now pretty much accepted as normal procedure.
I couldn't possibly care less about the intercine squabbling of the organisations involved. Hideous, unforgivable incompetence has been committed, again and again, and those responsible should be punished -and more to the point replaced, to minimise the likelihood of any further billion quid dropped bricks. I don't care who they work for.
My understanding of the relative level of involvement of politicians, the military, and contractors in the decision-making process is hazy, and presumably somewhat variable on a case by case basis anyway. What irks me is that an absolutely staggering series of cock-ups has been perpetrated, on a scale so vast that it defies easy description - and it's happened so much that it's now pretty much accepted as normal procedure.
I couldn't possibly care less about the intercine squabbling of the organisations involved. Hideous, unforgivable incompetence has been committed, again and again, and those responsible should be punished -and more to the point replaced, to minimise the likelihood of any further billion quid dropped bricks. I don't care who they work for.
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: UK on a crosswind
Posts: 262
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
“Operational sovereignty depends on indigenous industrial capacity,” said Iain McNicoll, former chairman of the RAS’s Air Power Group and a former Air Marshall in the RAF.
“The defence aerospace sector should be treated the same as nuclear, shipbuilding and complex weapons are – ie it is vital to sustain UK industry in this sector. Without a high-end design-and-build capacity in aerospace, we would lose a critical national capability.”
He accepts the UK is “unlikely” to build another manned combat aircraft alone and that “any high-end project requires European collaboration”. However, he warns that a reliance on being part of US-led programmes could hit the UK’s sovereignty because of America’s ITAR scheme, which controls sharing technology.
McNicoll believes one of the best hopes for Britain retaining high-end aerospace skills and technology is the £1.5bn that the UK and France have committed to developing a prototype Future Combat Air System (FCAS) – an unmanned warplane that could be the basis of future European air forces.
“The defence aerospace sector should be treated the same as nuclear, shipbuilding and complex weapons are – ie it is vital to sustain UK industry in this sector. Without a high-end design-and-build capacity in aerospace, we would lose a critical national capability.”
He accepts the UK is “unlikely” to build another manned combat aircraft alone and that “any high-end project requires European collaboration”. However, he warns that a reliance on being part of US-led programmes could hit the UK’s sovereignty because of America’s ITAR scheme, which controls sharing technology.
McNicoll believes one of the best hopes for Britain retaining high-end aerospace skills and technology is the £1.5bn that the UK and France have committed to developing a prototype Future Combat Air System (FCAS) – an unmanned warplane that could be the basis of future European air forces.
What is often portrayed as an "overspend" (so the Daily Wail fraternity can have their daily dose of hurrumph) is in most cases either one or more of:
1. The increased cost associated with changes in the requirement which are themselves simply the result of the facts that (a) we do not live in a static world, and (b) even the most dedicated servicemen and women do not have calibrated crystal balls. These costs are identified, challenged and justified in a pretty rigorous manner as a matter of course.
2. The detail that the original cost has been taken by the press (and cynical people with axes to grind) to be "firm fixed prices" when they are usually either ROM prices or the raw cost before Risk. As a project progresses some of the risks occur and so the *spend* rises above the baseline *cost*, but only in so far as the original risk cost was not included in the press report. This is all understood by the people who matter - the contractors, the MOD (uniformed and civilian) and the Treasury, but is frequently wilfully misrepresented to the public by people with axes to grind.
3. The consequence of naive contracting - there have been cases where to reduce the "headline price" the MOD has elected to take ownership of all risks and only contract for the minimum baseline cost. This approach is actually allowed by the guidelines, but only where the contract has an initial "Risk Reduction" Phase before the full funding is committed. There have been times where this approach was taken but the MOD refused to have a Risk Reduction phase - MRA4 was a classical example. In this case the "cost overrun" would actually be more accurately described as "the true cost of what they were trying to achieve becoming apparent after contract award". If the contract has not been sold the risk content then the costs of those risks occuring vest firmly with the MOD - that's kinda the way it works.
4. Someone somewhere screws up. It happens, but in my experience it's comparatively rare. Even in these cases it's usually someone trying to do something for what they perceive to be the best of reasons, but not appreciating the magniotude of the task or its ramifications. The glass-cockpit Chinook and one service-engineered weapon system upgrade on the Jag would be examples of this. BAES screwed up to some extent on the MRA4 and Astute programmes, which is why they took those £800m losses on those projects.
But I would contend, based on experience from the inside, that in >>95% of the times where Something Goes Wrong in the UK it is the result of people trying to do the right thing but failing rather than neglect, incompetence, fraud or shady dealing. And even in those cases it is very often the case that the "Error" is only "obvious" with 20/20 hindsight - a detail which is invariably glossed over by the hecklers who criticise the work of others but have never actually delivered anything themselves.
€6.66 supplied, YMMV,
PDR
1. The increased cost associated with changes in the requirement which are themselves simply the result of the facts that (a) we do not live in a static world, and (b) even the most dedicated servicemen and women do not have calibrated crystal balls. These costs are identified, challenged and justified in a pretty rigorous manner as a matter of course.
2. The detail that the original cost has been taken by the press (and cynical people with axes to grind) to be "firm fixed prices" when they are usually either ROM prices or the raw cost before Risk. As a project progresses some of the risks occur and so the *spend* rises above the baseline *cost*, but only in so far as the original risk cost was not included in the press report. This is all understood by the people who matter - the contractors, the MOD (uniformed and civilian) and the Treasury, but is frequently wilfully misrepresented to the public by people with axes to grind.
3. The consequence of naive contracting - there have been cases where to reduce the "headline price" the MOD has elected to take ownership of all risks and only contract for the minimum baseline cost. This approach is actually allowed by the guidelines, but only where the contract has an initial "Risk Reduction" Phase before the full funding is committed. There have been times where this approach was taken but the MOD refused to have a Risk Reduction phase - MRA4 was a classical example. In this case the "cost overrun" would actually be more accurately described as "the true cost of what they were trying to achieve becoming apparent after contract award". If the contract has not been sold the risk content then the costs of those risks occuring vest firmly with the MOD - that's kinda the way it works.
4. Someone somewhere screws up. It happens, but in my experience it's comparatively rare. Even in these cases it's usually someone trying to do something for what they perceive to be the best of reasons, but not appreciating the magniotude of the task or its ramifications. The glass-cockpit Chinook and one service-engineered weapon system upgrade on the Jag would be examples of this. BAES screwed up to some extent on the MRA4 and Astute programmes, which is why they took those £800m losses on those projects.
But I would contend, based on experience from the inside, that in >>95% of the times where Something Goes Wrong in the UK it is the result of people trying to do the right thing but failing rather than neglect, incompetence, fraud or shady dealing. And even in those cases it is very often the case that the "Error" is only "obvious" with 20/20 hindsight - a detail which is invariably glossed over by the hecklers who criticise the work of others but have never actually delivered anything themselves.
€6.66 supplied, YMMV,
PDR
I agree it is annoying when people talk of overspends. In my experience the two most common issues are:
I agree with most of what is said, but a couple of the examples chosen are poor. The reasons why Nimrod failed, and Chinook Mk3 was delayed for 10 years, were well known, and advised to senior staff – Nimrod in 1995, Chinook a year or so later after the job was split Mk2/Mk3. 20/20 hindsight doesn’t apply when MoD’s own auditors, and the RAF’s Director of Flight Safety, have flagged the precise problems years before the programmes were approved. And then the latter again, in 1997/8. And one must always bear in mind the role of the Chief Scientific Advisor, who advises the Chief of Defence Procurement on technical risk. Any inquiry should start with what this advice said and, if different to the advice from MoD(PE) and RAF engineers, why did CDP heed CSA?
I’ve never known anyone in procurement set out to screw up. But I’ve known plenty who were told they were about to screw up, but hubris made them carry on. I’d say Nimrod and Chinook are classic examples, and the people who had to deal with the fallout have been castigated ever since, when one should be looking a little farther back in time at those charged with management oversight and scrutiny.
- Failure on the part of the Service to quantify the requirement. To cost, one must first quantify. On one of my last projects before retiring, the Service (Army) actually articulated the technical requirement very well. They’d costed the unit cost accurately, at £xM. I was given £xM. But the “requirement” spoke of multiple users so I asked “How many do you want?”. “20”. One of the programme elements was a 9 month development task, yet the required ISD was 3 weeks after approval. By the time I added in little things like systems integration, training, spares, demonstrating it actually worked, vehicles to hump it around, buildings, etc. the actual endorsed funding was about 2% of the fair and reasonable cost. Yet it got through every level of so-called scrutiny (and given the requirement, CDS would have been tea boy at the approval meeting, which is why we were kept out of it until after approval); but of course we were to blame.
- Resourcing projects or programmes to cost, not content. The RN once had an aircraft programme that was just under the Cat A limit of £400M. Had it succeeded in getting one more aircraft upgraded, it would have been over £400M and the job would have been afforded a honking great team. As it was under, it was allocated as a minor task. The extra aircraft would have made no difference to workload, the only difference being an extra cab fed in to Fleetlands for conversion, long after the procurer’s job was finished. This failure to differentiate between volume and non-volume related tasks is common.
I agree with most of what is said, but a couple of the examples chosen are poor. The reasons why Nimrod failed, and Chinook Mk3 was delayed for 10 years, were well known, and advised to senior staff – Nimrod in 1995, Chinook a year or so later after the job was split Mk2/Mk3. 20/20 hindsight doesn’t apply when MoD’s own auditors, and the RAF’s Director of Flight Safety, have flagged the precise problems years before the programmes were approved. And then the latter again, in 1997/8. And one must always bear in mind the role of the Chief Scientific Advisor, who advises the Chief of Defence Procurement on technical risk. Any inquiry should start with what this advice said and, if different to the advice from MoD(PE) and RAF engineers, why did CDP heed CSA?
I’ve never known anyone in procurement set out to screw up. But I’ve known plenty who were told they were about to screw up, but hubris made them carry on. I’d say Nimrod and Chinook are classic examples, and the people who had to deal with the fallout have been castigated ever since, when one should be looking a little farther back in time at those charged with management oversight and scrutiny.
Changes in the requirement: well, yes. They should stop doing that, it's really expensive if you start messing a contractor around after they've started work on something. This applies to everything from combat aircraft to wallpaper. The argument I would have with this is that trying to predict what's going to happen in the future has been shown (by the problems we're discussing) to be effectively impossible. So, don't try: instead, build something reasonably general-purpose. I saw an interview with someone involved with Tornado operations recently in which it was pointed out that the thing has never actually done what it was intended do - interdict the Warsaw Pact - but had been successful nevertheless. To some extent, yes, if all you have is a hammer everything looks like a nail, but at least make it a flexible hammer and don't keep messing the spec about.
Cost before risk: sorry, this is just balls. Heads the contractor wins, tails the taxpayer loses? That's exactly the sort of madness I'm talking about. I know BAE is effectively a monopoly, but that's what this thread is about. It's their problem to characterise the risks and contract accordingly. Deals where they make all the money but the taxpayer shoulders the risks are insane (and typical of PFI, and PFI-style contacts in general.)
But as I say, the argument is not only with the contractor. The argument is with the decision to omit catapults and arrestor gear from the carriers, making the air wing more expensive but much less effective. The argument is with ignoring engineering advice on Type 45. These are not normal contractual issues, if any of these are (they're not.) These are stupid decisions made by idiots and it is not okay.
Cost before risk: sorry, this is just balls. Heads the contractor wins, tails the taxpayer loses? That's exactly the sort of madness I'm talking about. I know BAE is effectively a monopoly, but that's what this thread is about. It's their problem to characterise the risks and contract accordingly. Deals where they make all the money but the taxpayer shoulders the risks are insane (and typical of PFI, and PFI-style contacts in general.)
But as I say, the argument is not only with the contractor. The argument is with the decision to omit catapults and arrestor gear from the carriers, making the air wing more expensive but much less effective. The argument is with ignoring engineering advice on Type 45. These are not normal contractual issues, if any of these are (they're not.) These are stupid decisions made by idiots and it is not okay.
For the extreme case of a requirement for a flexible hammer, I offer you the F-35.
...and flexibility or "general purposeness" in mission capability isn't the only cost driver. It has to fit within the operations and support infrastructure which has both physical and organisational constraints. And these constraints keep changing.
And the more you use off the shelf products (or parts of products,or technologies) the more you have to compromise your organisation and infrastructure and the more yyou become exposed to risks of obsolescence.
I'm genuinely mystified as to what you're trying to say here - could you expand on that?
Well they would be if they existed - I've never seen one. The core problem is that defence contracting caps profit at a level that barely provides a meaningful return on the cashflow, let alone the investment. Any excess profit must be handed back (it's a thing called "QMAC"). But while the MOD cap profits they generously allow losses to be of any size. This asymmetry means that the normal business process (where in a well run business the losses on one project will be balanced by the profits on another) cannot happen.
But Risk management and risk pricing is a normal approach to business in any contract bigger than the procurement of a big mac with fries. These are the aspects that keep planning in the real world and costs to a minimum, so I'd be very interested to see your clarification here.
PDR
PS - there is no field in which BAES is a monopoly, even in the UK.
And the more you use off the shelf products (or parts of products,or technologies) the more you have to compromise your organisation and infrastructure and the more yyou become exposed to risks of obsolescence.
Cost before risk: sorry, this is just balls. Heads the contractor wins, tails the taxpayer loses? That's exactly the sort of madness I'm talking about.
Deals where they make all the money but the taxpayer shoulders the risks are insane
But Risk management and risk pricing is a normal approach to business in any contract bigger than the procurement of a big mac with fries. These are the aspects that keep planning in the real world and costs to a minimum, so I'd be very interested to see your clarification here.
PDR
PS - there is no field in which BAES is a monopoly, even in the UK.
Any excess profit must be handed back (it's a thing called "QMAC"). But while the MOD cap profits they generously allow losses to be of any size.
Well said. I recall, in 1999, we were gathered together and told that CDP's favourite contractor was anticipating a loss that year, so stop applying pressure to meet contractual commitments, let them deliver crap (or nothing at all), sign the invoices (i.e. commit fraud) and money would be made available to contract someone else to fix it (again, fraud).
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: Just south of the Keevil gap.
Posts: 308
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
PDR1.
The QMAC ( Questionaire on the Method of Allocation of Costs) is only part of the issue. It would be great if every contract had a properly processed one, or even one at all in some cases.
I'm retired now, so shouldn't really give a stuff.
The QMAC ( Questionaire on the Method of Allocation of Costs) is only part of the issue. It would be great if every contract had a properly processed one, or even one at all in some cases.
I'm retired now, so shouldn't really give a stuff.
As to flexibility, I'm not proposing that designs should attempt to be a solution to all problems simulateously. Instead, I'm proposing that over-specialisation should be avoided because it provokes frequent, late specification changes that cost time and money and probably don't yield results which stay finely-tuned for long.
Fine. That's a much less serious risk than the current situation, which provides warships that aren't ships and can barely make war.
I think that might be a bit of a generalisation, but that's not the problem. The problem is that, again, this is being used as an excuse to practically guarantee a terrible deal for the UK.
Ultimately the argument PDR seems to be advancing is that it's normal and acceptable for more or less everything to be many times overbudget, years or decades late and borderline nonfunctional, because... er... excuses.
This is, literally, incredible. It is not credible that any organisation (by which I mean the UK military-industrial complex as a whole) could foul anything up this badly, this obviously, this publicly, for so long, so many times, and have it not be an issue of either incompetence or malfeasance.
P
And the more you use off the shelf products (or parts of products,or technologies) the more you have to compromise your organisation and infrastructure and the more yyou become exposed to risks of obsolescence.
But Risk management and risk pricing is a normal approach to business in any contract bigger than the procurement of a big mac with fries.
Ultimately the argument PDR seems to be advancing is that it's normal and acceptable for more or less everything to be many times overbudget, years or decades late and borderline nonfunctional, because... er... excuses.
This is, literally, incredible. It is not credible that any organisation (by which I mean the UK military-industrial complex as a whole) could foul anything up this badly, this obviously, this publicly, for so long, so many times, and have it not be an issue of either incompetence or malfeasance.
P
Phil
Does MoD follow its own rules for making material and financial provision, and ensuring it matches the stated requirement?
Are the procedures for scrutiny adhered to and enforced?
Does MoD learn from the many projects that are delivered with effortless competence?
No! A possible solution emerges.
Does MoD follow its own rules for making material and financial provision, and ensuring it matches the stated requirement?
Are the procedures for scrutiny adhered to and enforced?
Does MoD learn from the many projects that are delivered with effortless competence?
No! A possible solution emerges.
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: Just south of the Keevil gap.
Posts: 308
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To pick up from Tucs post above, just one of the procurement rules is that all projects should have a Post Project Evaluation (PPE) conducted, and that resource provision should be made at the start of the project for the collection of the appropriate data to enable this.
In fact this is seldom done, unless a lot has changed in the last four years.
In fact this is seldom done, unless a lot has changed in the last four years.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
The argument I would have with this is that trying to predict what's going to happen in the future has been shown (by the problems we're discussing) to be effectively impossible
Move on a couple of decades and for virtually pocket money you could buy a pocket GPS, plenty of colour, track up an option and text automatically oriented.
Do you freeze with obsolescent technology or hand in there and try and keep it at the bleeding edge?
just one of the procurement rules is that all projects should have a Post Project Evaluation (PPE) conducted
Pontius. As Phil says, there are many answers, one of which is the Defence Scientific Advisory Council, whose reports direct to Secy of State are usually secret; except when quietly handed to favoured contractors to "help" them with bids. People look at it different ways. At least your example is only obsolescent, not obsolete. The latter is common, so be thankful for the former!
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: Just south of the Keevil gap.
Posts: 308
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Precisely. It is (allegedly) the way MoD learns from experience. The rule also says you prepare the PPE around 2 years after ISD, by which time anyone who knows anything about the project is long gone. Not once did I get any feedback about a PPE."
The point I was trying to make is that PMs know that a PPE is required, and the good ones make provision for it right at the outset, allocating resources for data collection,storage and evaluation, as the project progresses, so that all the information needed to compile the report is available, even when personnel have changed. Sadly, good PMs are few and far between, since the training and development which used to take place no longer happens and procurement posts are seen as stepping stones to higher things.
One other thing, I have seen some good PPEs and a lot of useless ones, clearly cobbled together at the last minute by people who didn't know the project. One of the good ones was drawn to the attention of a particular PM, a graduate, new in post and keen to make his mark. He discounted the previous projects PPE as not relevant, so just a touch of Schadenfreude when his project didn't make the first hurdle, for a reason outlined in that earlier PPE.
The point I was trying to make is that PMs know that a PPE is required, and the good ones make provision for it right at the outset, allocating resources for data collection,storage and evaluation, as the project progresses, so that all the information needed to compile the report is available, even when personnel have changed. Sadly, good PMs are few and far between, since the training and development which used to take place no longer happens and procurement posts are seen as stepping stones to higher things.
One other thing, I have seen some good PPEs and a lot of useless ones, clearly cobbled together at the last minute by people who didn't know the project. One of the good ones was drawn to the attention of a particular PM, a graduate, new in post and keen to make his mark. He discounted the previous projects PPE as not relevant, so just a touch of Schadenfreude when his project didn't make the first hurdle, for a reason outlined in that earlier PPE.
Last edited by Cpt_Pugwash; 9th Dec 2016 at 15:31.