Cuba Crisis 1962
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I think that this and V-Force Deterrent Targets threads should be merged.
What were your SOP's wrt having the enemy home in onto your NBS/Green Satin transmissions? Even your Orange Putter/Red Steer tail warning kit was a double edged sword that made you a target.
Back in WWII the Germans had night fighters that could home onto H2S transmissions.
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PN,
What were your SOP's wrt having the enemy home in onto your NBS/Green Satin transmissions? Even your Orange Putter/Red Steer tail warning kit was a double edged sword that made you a target.
Back in WWII the Germans had night fighters that could home onto H2S transmissions.
What were your SOP's wrt having the enemy home in onto your NBS/Green Satin transmissions? Even your Orange Putter/Red Steer tail warning kit was a double edged sword that made you a target.
Back in WWII the Germans had night fighters that could home onto H2S transmissions.
For H2S we would use sector scan initially radiating away from enemy territory and only radiate when within predicted range of the fix point. At low level JARIC provided fix points and a predicted box, about 20-24 miles (3-4 minutes) where we could see the fix point. Again we would use sector scan and probably away from the enemy. Once on the target run, too late she cried.
TFR, narrow beam, 7 degrees and depressed, J-band and low power.
Red Steer 1/2 ON, a risk yes, but thought to be lower than if it was off.
Tacan, IFF and radios off.
ECM off until climbing out.
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... and home for Bacon and Eggs and medals.
Gawd, what a prospect
Gawd, what a prospect
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Green Satin or DD 62 M had fairly narrow downward pointing beams and were not believed to pose a significant detection opportunity. We were told.
It would have worked at its best if the transmissions were dead ahead and the a/c was flying towards a cliff face.
If it had transmitted straight down, it wouldn't have worked.
So there was a compromise was reached at about 30 degrees.
The worst conditions were when the a/c was flying over smooth water, such as the Med an a quiet day. The signal hit the water and bounced off away from the a/c.
This was a problem for 13 Sqdn PR9's at Akrotiri.
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Ian, thanks for that. There was also a difference between the two equipments. The GS aerial would hunt until the aerial was aligned along track, Twp beams forward, left and right and two astern. Around 8.9 GHz, IIRC. The DD 62 M was different. Fixed aerial, two beams radiating with side of heading and one abeam or maybe slightly abaft the beam. Each on a discrete J-band freq around 13.2 GHz. The DD 62 M was in use from 1970.
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Just please I could find a use for my 1958 notes!
After nearly 4 years of box swapping on the 214 Valiant's, on posting to Akrotiri I was 'given' the GS bench to look after for 2 years. I became quite an expert on its innards.
The main user of GS at Akrotiri was 13 Sqdn and transient a/c. So I became familiar with Mediterranean conditions.
I also had to remind some of the Navs on 13 that the operational spec of GS was up to 60,000 feet! They were too keen to snag the kit for 'Unlocking at height'!
Their concept of high was different to the Valiant Navs.
Aren't I an anorak?
As for DD62, I'd never heard of it. Obviously after my time.
After nearly 4 years of box swapping on the 214 Valiant's, on posting to Akrotiri I was 'given' the GS bench to look after for 2 years. I became quite an expert on its innards.
The main user of GS at Akrotiri was 13 Sqdn and transient a/c. So I became familiar with Mediterranean conditions.
I also had to remind some of the Navs on 13 that the operational spec of GS was up to 60,000 feet! They were too keen to snag the kit for 'Unlocking at height'!
Their concept of high was different to the Valiant Navs.
Aren't I an anorak?
As for DD62, I'd never heard of it. Obviously after my time.
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During the Cuban Missile Crisis I was a 20 year old Jnr Tech Aircraft Electrical Fitter embedded with a bombing up team in the Armoury at RAF Cottesmore. We serviced aircraft from both 10 and 15 Squadrons.
We fitted YS2s to every serviceable aircraft on day 1 and then as aircraft were recovered from maintenance they were immediately bombed up. The next step should have been dispersal to Boscombe Down or St Mawgan but that never happened . We were told afterwards that Harold Macmillan would not give the order to disperse in case it aggravated the situation.He knew that the Russians would have been aware that we were bombed up ready and were taking it seriously. When things calmed down it took nearly 2 weeks to remove the bombs that we had fitted in a couple of days mainly because the Bomb Dump could not cope with so many assembled bombs
We fitted YS2s to every serviceable aircraft on day 1 and then as aircraft were recovered from maintenance they were immediately bombed up. The next step should have been dispersal to Boscombe Down or St Mawgan but that never happened . We were told afterwards that Harold Macmillan would not give the order to disperse in case it aggravated the situation.He knew that the Russians would have been aware that we were bombed up ready and were taking it seriously. When things calmed down it took nearly 2 weeks to remove the bombs that we had fitted in a couple of days mainly because the Bomb Dump could not cope with so many assembled bombs
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Ozleckie, I would guess things were tightened up after that as we did two Mick's per year. Incidentally, par time for a YS2 loading was 7 minutes with team chief doing the final checks overseen by the nav rad doing his acceptance checks - not quite WST procedures.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
ORAC, indeed but while I used the Type B I had never seen the Type A that Joe FBS has. Interesting to know its origin, ie time period and which V its owner served on.
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Cuba and Dispersal
A.Horne, Macmillan/II,1989,P.366: Mac 22/10/62 "rejected urgings from (Saceur) to place Br.Forces on a higher state of readiness. (Mac,) with his own tragic personal memories {i.e of 8/1914 mobilisation and Fleet-to war stations, before Declaration} pointed out {?presumably to Gen.Norstad?} that mobilisation sometimes leads to war".
Others have similarly stated that Mac refused to disperse MBF...but why would AM Cross wish to do so? We had some Warning (limited to 1,500nm) from BMEWS I (Thule) and II (Alaska) but not yet from III (Fylingdales), so Shyster IRBMs from E.Germany would first be detected aurally. MBF Launch must be on Command. Best done from Main Base.
PM Macmillan already had ample nuclear "provocation" at hand, 10/62:
- (some) of 5 George Washington SSBNs out of Holy Loch,
- 45 USAF/SAC Reflex Action B-47E armed and at high states of Alert in S. Midlands,
- 75 USAFE F-101A/C and 150 F-100D, 6 and 12 constantly at Victor Alert, with tactical Bombs in E.Anglia,
- 24 TBF Valiants (US Bombs), 4 on QRA, at Marham,
- 10 MBF Vulcan 1/2, Victor 1 on QRA and 65 more U/E, with Yellow Sun 2,
- many of SMF's 59 Thors, erect 27/10/62,
- RAFG had 8 Canberra B(I)6/8 (US Bombs) on QRA and 56 more U/E,
- BAOR had 16 Corporal SSM launchers, US warheads,
- Ark Royal was on FE Station with 5 Scimitar/Red Beard,
- NEAF/Akrotiri had 32 U/E Canberra B.15/Red Beard.
The brain goes into an endless loop on First or Second Strike - Thor clearly First Strike, provocative exactly as US saw Cuban SS-4.
Logic could be presented that dispersal would have been un-provocative, by complicating any First Strike - Sovs. in target multiplication, UK in rapid "generation" (messy in Machrihanish!)
(added 13/11/16: http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/Cub...5_Oct_1962.htm has JCS msgs to White House, 25/10/62:
- 3 alert Valiant
- 4 alert (me: RAFG) Canberra
- (me: no Thor but) 37 Jupiter (me: Italy+Turkey: somewhere I have seen suggestion: never opnl. in Turkey)
- no SIOP RAFBC; 61 airborne B-52, 304 ground alert B-52, 340 alert B-47; 9 alert F-101 (me: in UK), 27 alert F-100 (me: UK+France).
- 112 alert Polaris out of Holy Loch - 16x5 A1, plus 16x2 A2.
Others have similarly stated that Mac refused to disperse MBF...but why would AM Cross wish to do so? We had some Warning (limited to 1,500nm) from BMEWS I (Thule) and II (Alaska) but not yet from III (Fylingdales), so Shyster IRBMs from E.Germany would first be detected aurally. MBF Launch must be on Command. Best done from Main Base.
PM Macmillan already had ample nuclear "provocation" at hand, 10/62:
- (some) of 5 George Washington SSBNs out of Holy Loch,
- 45 USAF/SAC Reflex Action B-47E armed and at high states of Alert in S. Midlands,
- 75 USAFE F-101A/C and 150 F-100D, 6 and 12 constantly at Victor Alert, with tactical Bombs in E.Anglia,
- 24 TBF Valiants (US Bombs), 4 on QRA, at Marham,
- 10 MBF Vulcan 1/2, Victor 1 on QRA and 65 more U/E, with Yellow Sun 2,
- many of SMF's 59 Thors, erect 27/10/62,
- RAFG had 8 Canberra B(I)6/8 (US Bombs) on QRA and 56 more U/E,
- BAOR had 16 Corporal SSM launchers, US warheads,
- Ark Royal was on FE Station with 5 Scimitar/Red Beard,
- NEAF/Akrotiri had 32 U/E Canberra B.15/Red Beard.
The brain goes into an endless loop on First or Second Strike - Thor clearly First Strike, provocative exactly as US saw Cuban SS-4.
Logic could be presented that dispersal would have been un-provocative, by complicating any First Strike - Sovs. in target multiplication, UK in rapid "generation" (messy in Machrihanish!)
(added 13/11/16: http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/Cub...5_Oct_1962.htm has JCS msgs to White House, 25/10/62:
- 3 alert Valiant
- 4 alert (me: RAFG) Canberra
- (me: no Thor but) 37 Jupiter (me: Italy+Turkey: somewhere I have seen suggestion: never opnl. in Turkey)
- no SIOP RAFBC; 61 airborne B-52, 304 ground alert B-52, 340 alert B-47; 9 alert F-101 (me: in UK), 27 alert F-100 (me: UK+France).
- 112 alert Polaris out of Holy Loch - 16x5 A1, plus 16x2 A2.
Last edited by tornadoken; 13th Nov 2016 at 07:45.
Has any thing ever been published about hpw the Russians planned for and trained to conduct their nuclear mission? I wonder given the very tight control of their system if they had the same level of mission prep as us, and how they planned to go about it?
Nice
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Has any thing ever been published about hpw the Russians planned for and trained to conduct their nuclear mission? I wonder given the very tight control of their system if they had the same level of mission prep as us, and how they planned to go about it?
lay a stick of weapons down the North Sea therefore drenching the East of the country with radioactive blast
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You just beat me to it, Fareastdriver 
Allow me to tell a tale of weapon loading at a major airbase south of Lincoln. It was one of those no-notice aircraft generation exercises, and involved the old familiar bomb convoys making their way to the various dispersals with their assorted escort vehicles. You may recall that once the convoy was moving, nothing must impede its progress. Unfortunately, on this particular morning there was dense fog. I really do mean dense - visibility was effectively 0>10 yards. ATC Local thus found itself in the 'interesting' role of providing a full IFR service to the convoys, using Storno on the Police channel. Non-standard phraseology was involved, such as "Have you passed the PAR building yet?", as we tried to keep the convoys moving without conflictions.
At one point the Stn Cdr called on our private Ops/ATC Exercise field telephone asking why the loading was taking so long. SATCO thought of inviting the Stn Cdr to look out of the window, but realised that Ops didn't have one ... so explained, as gently as possible, the circumstances under which everyone was operating. The generation exercise inevitably took much longer than usual, although things improved when the fog cleared ... a bit.
Allow me to tell a tale of weapon loading at a major airbase south of Lincoln. It was one of those no-notice aircraft generation exercises, and involved the old familiar bomb convoys making their way to the various dispersals with their assorted escort vehicles. You may recall that once the convoy was moving, nothing must impede its progress. Unfortunately, on this particular morning there was dense fog. I really do mean dense - visibility was effectively 0>10 yards. ATC Local thus found itself in the 'interesting' role of providing a full IFR service to the convoys, using Storno on the Police channel. Non-standard phraseology was involved, such as "Have you passed the PAR building yet?", as we tried to keep the convoys moving without conflictions.
At one point the Stn Cdr called on our private Ops/ATC Exercise field telephone asking why the loading was taking so long. SATCO thought of inviting the Stn Cdr to look out of the window, but realised that Ops didn't have one ... so explained, as gently as possible, the circumstances under which everyone was operating. The generation exercise inevitably took much longer than usual, although things improved when the fog cleared ... a bit.
Last edited by MPN11; 6th Nov 2016 at 09:12.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
MPN 11, you forget the giraffe lights that were put to red for the convoy. A smart motorist, calculating correctly that no aircraft would be flying deduced incorrectly that ATC had once again got it wrong and ignored the lights.
There, but for blind luck, could have been the ultimate safety test of a nuclear weapon.
There, but for blind luck, could have been the ultimate safety test of a nuclear weapon.
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Paracab/FED, that thought had crossed my mind too until I thought of a tsunami rolling across the Fens.
Nice
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Calm down and don't shoot the messenger, no need. I'm only repeating something I read on here some years ago, possibly on the 'Did you fly the Vulcan' thread. Nor did I say it would be effective. But a deluge would have been created I'm sure. Whatever the prevailing wind was doing that particular day, none of us were going to do very well out of an exchange were we?
Fascinating accounts, for which many thanks. Believe this as you will: as a young Metman at RAF Nicosia, i was as near totally unaware of impending doom as you can get.
Nice job, gorgeous wife very pregnant, boss not insufferable, RAF customers good blokes .......... not a care in the world.
Easy to miss Armageddon even with the right connections.
Cuba was it?
Nice job, gorgeous wife very pregnant, boss not insufferable, RAF customers good blokes .......... not a care in the world.
Easy to miss Armageddon even with the right connections.
Cuba was it?