F-18 Crash Deemed Pilot Error After FOD'd Engine Failure on Cat Shot
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F-18 Crash Deemed Pilot Error After FOD'd Engine Failure on Cat Shot
Here's another one for you....Engine Failure on Takeoff following a Cat Shot.....Pilots survived but wrote off 86 Million US Dollars worth of F-18.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/m/6eaf270...or-caused.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/m/6eaf270...or-caused.html
Surely the error was the FOD, not pilot error. Unless they recovered the airframe and do USN aircraft have FDR/CVRs how can the come to this judgement. Sounds like the Chinook crash on Kintyre. Blame the aircrew.
I believe that the board concluded that the aircraft still ought to have been able to recover to the deck, but that pilot error exacerbated the problem, which in turn led to the loss of the airframe.
There is some more detail in this story
There is some more detail in this story
Airpig, sure the FOD started the chain of events, but crew actions contributed. A very unforgiving situation. A few quotes from the linked article:
"The investigation faults the pilot for not being patient enough to use the correct flap configuration, angle of bank and engine throttle speed to safely land with one engine.."
"After a rapid descent, dumping of munitions and fuel, and an uncontrollable deviation to the left as the jet started to regain lift, the weapons system officer made the decision to eject about 2 miles from the ship. It had been less than two minutes since takeoff.."
"During this mishap, there was a rush to initiate a landing sequence with an aircraft that still needed significant time to be properly configured for a single-engine landing."
Debris, Pilot Error Caused 2015 Jet Crash in Persian Gulf: Navy | Military.com
"The investigation faults the pilot for not being patient enough to use the correct flap configuration, angle of bank and engine throttle speed to safely land with one engine.."
"After a rapid descent, dumping of munitions and fuel, and an uncontrollable deviation to the left as the jet started to regain lift, the weapons system officer made the decision to eject about 2 miles from the ship. It had been less than two minutes since takeoff.."
"During this mishap, there was a rush to initiate a landing sequence with an aircraft that still needed significant time to be properly configured for a single-engine landing."
Debris, Pilot Error Caused 2015 Jet Crash in Persian Gulf: Navy | Military.com
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The investigation faults the pilot for not being patient enough to use the correct flap configuration, angle of bank and engine throttle speed to safely land with one engine.
After a rapid descent, dumping of munitions and fuel, and an uncontrollable deviation to the left as the jet started to regain lift, the weapons system officer made the decision to eject about 2 miles from the ship. It had been less than two minutes since takeoff.
The pilot’s parachute fully opened just before he hit the water. His crewmate’s did not.
After a rapid descent, dumping of munitions and fuel, and an uncontrollable deviation to the left as the jet started to regain lift, the weapons system officer made the decision to eject about 2 miles from the ship. It had been less than two minutes since takeoff.
The pilot’s parachute fully opened just before he hit the water. His crewmate’s did not.
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No back seater shouldn't necessarily prevent a safe landing! Remember the F4 at Bournemouth Airshow in the 80's whose Navigator ejected when they left the runway, the surprised Pilot diverted to Lyneham and landed safely as a single seat F4!! I remember it landing as I was at the in-laws overlooking the airfield.
Blue water operations to the boat are a bit different, but by sticking to the required processes and taking a bit more time the F-18 may have made it back safely, which is entirely the point of the USN report and findings.
Aviate, navigate, communicate!
Blue water operations to the boat are a bit different, but by sticking to the required processes and taking a bit more time the F-18 may have made it back safely, which is entirely the point of the USN report and findings.
Aviate, navigate, communicate!
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uncontrollable deviation to the left
pilot’s parachute fully opened just before he hit the water. His crewmate’s did not.
moot point but were they ever going to get to the deck and/or survive if they had stayed with the cab?
pilot’s parachute fully opened just before he hit the water. His crewmate’s did not.
moot point but were they ever going to get to the deck and/or survive if they had stayed with the cab?
It would be worth it to look up the single engine failure procedures for the F-18, and single engine approach procedures to the CV, if one is going to comment on this aircraft loss, and the decisions the crew did or did not make. As I don't have a NATOPS(F-18) handy ... no comment.
As to FOD: the first hole in the cheese.
As to FOD: the first hole in the cheese.
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Splash....How does the Ejection Seats work on the F-18....is it individually or the first seat trigger pulled sets them both off in sequence?
Single Seat/Single Engine makes it easier yet!
Single Seat/Single Engine makes it easier yet!
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All FW Naval aviation have procedures for engine failure the takeoff evolution. All multi engine platforms calculate the TOLD numbers for worse case engine failure (and in the case of the KC-130 two engine failure) and ability to land safely. The exceptions are the Harrier and F-35.
These procedures are practiced in the simulator at the RAG before ever getting into an actual aircraft. Engine failure during the critical phases of the takeoff were mandatory items on annual NATOPS checks up to a few years ago and I suspect are still required.
From the available information it looks eminently recoverable to the CVN, just execute the procedures as done in the simulator previously through at least one cycle.
I know lots of guys that would give themselves simulated EPs (pull power back, etc.) whenever the situation allowed; engine failure on takeoff when leading a flight until formation joined, flying simulated single engine approaches, etc.
Single engine jet? Lost engine on takeoff = lost acft.
S/F, FOG
These procedures are practiced in the simulator at the RAG before ever getting into an actual aircraft. Engine failure during the critical phases of the takeoff were mandatory items on annual NATOPS checks up to a few years ago and I suspect are still required.
From the available information it looks eminently recoverable to the CVN, just execute the procedures as done in the simulator previously through at least one cycle.
I know lots of guys that would give themselves simulated EPs (pull power back, etc.) whenever the situation allowed; engine failure on takeoff when leading a flight until formation joined, flying simulated single engine approaches, etc.
Single engine jet? Lost engine on takeoff = lost acft.
S/F, FOG
If, a big IF, this was a case of rushing the proceedures and being blamed for the loss of the jet, I have alot of sympathy with the crew. Certainly, fast-jet Ops are/were run on pumped-up adrenaline and, despite the best efforts of Flight Safety, the pressure is always on to take action, FAST! 
OAP
OAP
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Super Hornet FnA-18E/F NATOPS PDF here at 17.5Mb: https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-000.pdf
"CHAPTER 14 Takeoff Emergencies
14.1 EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY
After catapult launch, several emergencies may cause the aircraft to settle, e.g., slow catapult, AB blowout, degraded engine performance, single engine total loss of thrust, improper trim setting, etc. If settling cannot be stopped immediately, it is necessary to eject without delay. Priorities during emergency catapult flyaway are to establish control of the aircraft, arrest aircraft settle, and accelerate for climbout.
If a settle is detected, the throttles should be advanced to MAX as soon as possible. If the thrust output of one engine is degraded, some yaw and roll should be expected. If one engine is failed completely, significant amounts of yaw and roll result with both throttles at MAX. In this worst case, full rudder pedal and partial lateral stick may be required to oppose yaw/roll and maintain lateral-directional control of the aircraft. Too much rudder pedal is not harmful, but too little rudder pedal may cause controllability problems. Therefore, FULL rudder pedal to oppose yaw/roll is prudent.
Proper AOA control is crucial to maintaining aircraft control and to arresting aircraft settle. AOA must be high enough to minimize altitude loss yet low enough to maintain lateral-directional control. During a nominal, two-engine catapult launch, the aircraft is trimmed to capture and maintain a reference AOA of 12° (hands off). The FCS does allow small overshoots during initial flyaway, but peak AOA should typically be below 13°. Catapult launch bulletins ensure an endspeed at least 15 knots above minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). Vmc numbers for the F/A-18E/F launch bulletins are defined at 14° AOA, which was selected as a compromise between arresting settle off the bow and controllability. (Increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional controllability resulting in higher minimum control speeds.) During single engine, MAX power catapult flyaway, controllability should be sufficient if airspeed is above Vmc.
Under normal circumstances, proper AOA control should be provided by the FCS. However, certain catapult failures (mis-trim, AOA probe splits or failures, FCS malfunctions) may require the pilot to actively control flyaway pitch attitude/AOA. With an AOA malfunction, HUD displayed AOA may be in error, so that pitch attitude becomes the only reliable source of AOA control. For this reason, the recommended flyaway procedure is to maintain 10 to 12° pitch attitude with the waterline symbol without exceeding 14° AOA (AOA tone). This should provide an AOA high enough to arrest the settle yet low enough to retain lateral-directional control.
Depending on aircraft gross weight, stores jettison may be required to ensure a positive single engine rate of climb (SEROC). Immediate jettison of excess weight minimizes altitude loss and, when launching with a lateral weight asymmetry, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration, potentially improving lateral-directional controllability.
It is also essential that the flaps remain in FULL until a positive rate of climb is established, as flap retraction increases aircraft settle.
The first four steps in the procedure are the most important to arrest settle and maintain control of the aircraft. Raising the LDG GEAR handle reduces drag and allows a greater rate of climb; however, attention should not be diverted from maintaining aircraft control to perform this action. The landing gear should only be raised when the first four immediate action steps have been accomplished, controllability is not in question, and raising the gear does not compound the emergency.
NOTE
When the LDG GEAR handle is raised, the on-speed AOA bracket is removed from the HUD.
If flyaway airspeed available -
*1. Throttles - MAX
*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL
*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH
*4. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with W symbol.
• Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).
If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -
*5. EJECT
• Exceeding 10° to 12° pitch attitude may result in rapid loss of lateral directional control.
• Raising flaps will increase aircraft settle...."
https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-000.pdf
"CHAPTER 14 Takeoff Emergencies
14.1 EMERGENCY CATAPULT FLYAWAY
After catapult launch, several emergencies may cause the aircraft to settle, e.g., slow catapult, AB blowout, degraded engine performance, single engine total loss of thrust, improper trim setting, etc. If settling cannot be stopped immediately, it is necessary to eject without delay. Priorities during emergency catapult flyaway are to establish control of the aircraft, arrest aircraft settle, and accelerate for climbout.
If a settle is detected, the throttles should be advanced to MAX as soon as possible. If the thrust output of one engine is degraded, some yaw and roll should be expected. If one engine is failed completely, significant amounts of yaw and roll result with both throttles at MAX. In this worst case, full rudder pedal and partial lateral stick may be required to oppose yaw/roll and maintain lateral-directional control of the aircraft. Too much rudder pedal is not harmful, but too little rudder pedal may cause controllability problems. Therefore, FULL rudder pedal to oppose yaw/roll is prudent.
Proper AOA control is crucial to maintaining aircraft control and to arresting aircraft settle. AOA must be high enough to minimize altitude loss yet low enough to maintain lateral-directional control. During a nominal, two-engine catapult launch, the aircraft is trimmed to capture and maintain a reference AOA of 12° (hands off). The FCS does allow small overshoots during initial flyaway, but peak AOA should typically be below 13°. Catapult launch bulletins ensure an endspeed at least 15 knots above minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc). Vmc numbers for the F/A-18E/F launch bulletins are defined at 14° AOA, which was selected as a compromise between arresting settle off the bow and controllability. (Increased AOA helps arrest sink but also reduces lateral-directional controllability resulting in higher minimum control speeds.) During single engine, MAX power catapult flyaway, controllability should be sufficient if airspeed is above Vmc.
Under normal circumstances, proper AOA control should be provided by the FCS. However, certain catapult failures (mis-trim, AOA probe splits or failures, FCS malfunctions) may require the pilot to actively control flyaway pitch attitude/AOA. With an AOA malfunction, HUD displayed AOA may be in error, so that pitch attitude becomes the only reliable source of AOA control. For this reason, the recommended flyaway procedure is to maintain 10 to 12° pitch attitude with the waterline symbol without exceeding 14° AOA (AOA tone). This should provide an AOA high enough to arrest the settle yet low enough to retain lateral-directional control.
Depending on aircraft gross weight, stores jettison may be required to ensure a positive single engine rate of climb (SEROC). Immediate jettison of excess weight minimizes altitude loss and, when launching with a lateral weight asymmetry, returns the aircraft to a symmetric configuration, potentially improving lateral-directional controllability.
It is also essential that the flaps remain in FULL until a positive rate of climb is established, as flap retraction increases aircraft settle.
The first four steps in the procedure are the most important to arrest settle and maintain control of the aircraft. Raising the LDG GEAR handle reduces drag and allows a greater rate of climb; however, attention should not be diverted from maintaining aircraft control to perform this action. The landing gear should only be raised when the first four immediate action steps have been accomplished, controllability is not in question, and raising the gear does not compound the emergency.
NOTE
When the LDG GEAR handle is raised, the on-speed AOA bracket is removed from the HUD.
If flyaway airspeed available -
*1. Throttles - MAX
*2. Rudder pedal - FULL AGAINST YAW/ROLL
*3. EMERG JETT button - PUSH
*4. Maintain 10° to 12° pitch attitude with W symbol.
• Do not exceed 14° AOA (AOA tone).
If unable to arrest yaw/roll or stop settle -
*5. EJECT
• Exceeding 10° to 12° pitch attitude may result in rapid loss of lateral directional control.
• Raising flaps will increase aircraft settle...."
https://info.publicintelligence.net/F18-EF-000.pdf
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 28th Oct 2016 at 18:32. Reason: add txt format
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From above Super Hornet NATOPS:
"...2.16.4 Ejection Seat System (F/A-18F).
The ejection seats in the F/A-18F are ejected at opposite divergent angles to one another. The rear seat diverges to the left while the forward seat diverges to the right. The amount of divergence is influenced by the weight of the aircrew and the speed of the ejection. The heavier the aircrew and the faster the speed the less the resulting divergent angle. In addition, a sequencing system is installed to allow dual ejection initiated from either cockpit or single (aft) seat ejection initiated from the rear cockpit. A command selector valve is installed in the rear cockpit to control whether ejection from the rear cockpit is dual or single...."
&
"...Single rear seat ejection when initiated from the rear cockpit. Dual ejection (rear seat first) when initiated from the front cockpit.
Dual ejection (rear seat first) when initiated from either cockpit...."
"...2.16.4 Ejection Seat System (F/A-18F).
The ejection seats in the F/A-18F are ejected at opposite divergent angles to one another. The rear seat diverges to the left while the forward seat diverges to the right. The amount of divergence is influenced by the weight of the aircrew and the speed of the ejection. The heavier the aircrew and the faster the speed the less the resulting divergent angle. In addition, a sequencing system is installed to allow dual ejection initiated from either cockpit or single (aft) seat ejection initiated from the rear cockpit. A command selector valve is installed in the rear cockpit to control whether ejection from the rear cockpit is dual or single...."
&
"...Single rear seat ejection when initiated from the rear cockpit. Dual ejection (rear seat first) when initiated from the front cockpit.
Dual ejection (rear seat first) when initiated from either cockpit...."
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 28th Oct 2016 at 18:47. Reason: add txt
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Scribd has a few examples of Super NATOPS plus a PCL Pocket Check List:
https://www.scribd.com/doc/34302299/...F-Super-Hornet
https://www.scribd.com/doc/34302299/...F-Super-Hornet
Thread Starter
Single engine jet? Lost engine on takeoff = lost acft.
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Certainly, fast-jet Ops are/were run on pumped-up adrenaline and, despite the best efforts of Flight Safety, the pressure is always on to take action, FAST!
I guess "thinking" is not one of the requirements then?
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There are many examples of the "OYSTER" F-18C Hornet Night Barricade 'MightyGem' story above on the internet - without a date. A USN LSO Newsletter April 2012 possibly has the correct year 1999 - with alternate date 1998 perhaps - sadly PDF no longer available - more text on request. http://www.hrana.org/documents/Paddl...yApril2012.pdf
1998/1999 (F/A-18C night event) on CONSTELLATION (CV 64) “Oyster” Osterle[/Carl Oesteri. Paddles]
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Although it went In about 2 miles from the ship, how far would it have travelled before he had input?, I seem the remember the launch on the F-18 is initially flown by the computer.