V-Force Deterrent Targets
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
Tartare, yes, known as warnings and indicators against which appropriate responses could be made. The only snag was Red didn't have the same book.
One of the better, but by no means absolute, was streams of missiles spotted by BMEWS. Slightly better was an observed nuclear detonation. In the SAC Command Post was a NUDETS lamp which would light if there was a nuclear detonation in the continental USA.
There were instances where there were no indicators or there were but they were no recognised or not reacted to.
One of the better, but by no means absolute, was streams of missiles spotted by BMEWS. Slightly better was an observed nuclear detonation. In the SAC Command Post was a NUDETS lamp which would light if there was a nuclear detonation in the continental USA.
There were instances where there were no indicators or there were but they were no recognised or not reacted to.
Tartare, PN will be able to comment much better on this, but I think dispersal of the V Force was seen politically as pretty much as a clear indicator that we were 'on our way'?
In the Cuban crisis, MacMillan deliberately did not order dispersal as he felt that it would be seen as such by the Soviets, and actually encourage them to strike first.
There is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that AVM Cross and other military commanders wanted to disperse the force (for obvious reasons) but MacMillan would not sanction this order.
I believe that The C in C Bomber Command could generate his aircraft and load them with live weapons on his own authority, but had to have political authority to disperse (unless the chain of command had been knocked out)?
Remember, in those days, there were two 'Nuclear deputies' authorised to order retaliation in times of national crisis if the PM was taken out by a Soviet attack (one with the PM, the other at a 'safe location' (probably Turnstile or its equivalent).
It was only if all lines of communication to the political leadership (PM and deputies) had been lost, then the C in C Bomber command would have been authorised to order retaliation on his own authority.
A bit like 'Wing Attack plan R' from Strangelove-without the dodgy 'human factors'.
PS Ian 16th, there were drawing board plans for a Vulcan B3, with extra crew (all with ejection seats) and longer fuselage/upgraded engines with reheat. It was to be an airborne alert skybolt carrier (up to 6 per aircraft)...one can only presume with Skybolt biting the dust, and the extreme cost of mounting airborne alert were reasons it never got off the drawing board?
In the Cuban crisis, MacMillan deliberately did not order dispersal as he felt that it would be seen as such by the Soviets, and actually encourage them to strike first.
There is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that AVM Cross and other military commanders wanted to disperse the force (for obvious reasons) but MacMillan would not sanction this order.
I believe that The C in C Bomber Command could generate his aircraft and load them with live weapons on his own authority, but had to have political authority to disperse (unless the chain of command had been knocked out)?
Remember, in those days, there were two 'Nuclear deputies' authorised to order retaliation in times of national crisis if the PM was taken out by a Soviet attack (one with the PM, the other at a 'safe location' (probably Turnstile or its equivalent).
It was only if all lines of communication to the political leadership (PM and deputies) had been lost, then the C in C Bomber command would have been authorised to order retaliation on his own authority.
A bit like 'Wing Attack plan R' from Strangelove-without the dodgy 'human factors'.
PS Ian 16th, there were drawing board plans for a Vulcan B3, with extra crew (all with ejection seats) and longer fuselage/upgraded engines with reheat. It was to be an airborne alert skybolt carrier (up to 6 per aircraft)...one can only presume with Skybolt biting the dust, and the extreme cost of mounting airborne alert were reasons it never got off the drawing board?
Last edited by Treble one; 31st Oct 2016 at 14:49.
Thank you gentlemen.
A privilege as always to hear from those who were at the sharp end.
I have stood underneath the Vulcan at Hendon and watched the stream take off film playing on the TV screens in the bomb bay - it is utterly chilling to see.
It's very interesting - I had always assumed dispersal was a prior-step of heightened readiness - a sort of UK Defcon 2 - rather than part of the sequence of actual launch itself.
But I can understand that given the heightened tensions - even the act of dispersing might be seen as strong evidence a pre-emptive strike was almost certain.
PN - do I understand your comment r/e streams of missiles or a detonation as meaning dispersal might only start if missiles were observed in flight incoming, or a warhead landed in the UK?
Given missile flight time from Eastern Europe/USSR to the UK - wouldn't that only have given crews a maximum three to four minutes to get to the aircraft (even if in caravans beside the runway), power up, taxi out (no air traffic control clearance needed) and stream take off - then try and get clear of the blast zone of the warheads that would surely hit their airfield?
Wouldn't it be virtually certain that the tail end of the stream would end up being taken out in an air-burst (or several airbursts if multiple warheads were assigned to targets?
Did pilots use full military power to get as far away from the airfield as possible to mitigate this possibility?
A privilege as always to hear from those who were at the sharp end.
I have stood underneath the Vulcan at Hendon and watched the stream take off film playing on the TV screens in the bomb bay - it is utterly chilling to see.
It's very interesting - I had always assumed dispersal was a prior-step of heightened readiness - a sort of UK Defcon 2 - rather than part of the sequence of actual launch itself.
But I can understand that given the heightened tensions - even the act of dispersing might be seen as strong evidence a pre-emptive strike was almost certain.
PN - do I understand your comment r/e streams of missiles or a detonation as meaning dispersal might only start if missiles were observed in flight incoming, or a warhead landed in the UK?
Given missile flight time from Eastern Europe/USSR to the UK - wouldn't that only have given crews a maximum three to four minutes to get to the aircraft (even if in caravans beside the runway), power up, taxi out (no air traffic control clearance needed) and stream take off - then try and get clear of the blast zone of the warheads that would surely hit their airfield?
Wouldn't it be virtually certain that the tail end of the stream would end up being taken out in an air-burst (or several airbursts if multiple warheads were assigned to targets?
Did pilots use full military power to get as far away from the airfield as possible to mitigate this possibility?
Last edited by tartare; 31st Oct 2016 at 22:12.
Tartare-I was never at the sharp end-its just that period of operations is something I am extremely interested in from a historical perspective.
PN on the other hand-he did it for real.
PN on the other hand-he did it for real.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
PN - do I understand your comment r/e streams of missiles or a detonation as meaning dispersal might only start if missiles were observed in flight incoming, or a warhead landed in the UK?
The two examples I cited were at the extreme end on the spectrum but were in no way absolute indicators of the outbreak of hostilities. A nuclear detonation may well have resulted from an accident and as for the stream of missiles, I know that has happened at least once.
Ah - I see - humour. 
In all seriousness though, I've read about Mickey Finns etc.
I assume dispersal was an intermediate step?
"We're ready - make another move and we take off" ??
Sort of like cocking the weapon...
In all seriousness though, I've read about Mickey Finns etc.
I assume dispersal was an intermediate step?
"We're ready - make another move and we take off" ??
Sort of like cocking the weapon...
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
Given missile flight time from Eastern Europe/USSR to the UK - wouldn't that only have given crews a maximum three to four minutes to get to the aircraft (even if in caravans beside the runway), power up, taxi out (no air traffic control clearance needed) and stream take off - then try and get clear of the blast zone of the warheads that would surely hit their airfield? Wouldn't it be virtually certain that the tail end of the stream would end up being taken out in an air-burst (or several airbursts if multiple warheads were assigned to targets?
Any generation and scramble from main base, before dispersal, would be the least desirable from a survival point of view but least escalatory before that.
Did pilots use full military power to get as far away from the airfield as possible to mitigate this possibility?
I learnt recently that it was likely that a missile launch would be in sequence from all sites so that they would not arrive simultaneously. This would give distant dispersals such as St Mawgan, Brawdy, Ballykelly, a significant advantage in survivability.
From Readiness 02 the first aircraft would probably be airborne in around 40 seconds, the second 55 and the 4th in 90 seconds. Assuming the validity of a 4 minute warning (more a media sound bite) the last aircraft could be 12 miles or more away from the airfield. However missile accuracy was such then that distance from the burst might vary between 7 and 17 miles.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
Dispersal had several functions. As you surmised, easier to launch 100 bombers from 25 bases than 4. It also increased the targeting problem requiring far more missiles or bombers. With the increase in targets it increased the chances that all weapons (1 or 2) on a target might fail or miss. It gave a visible display of readiness.
Equally it had the disadvantage of longer lines of logistics though RAF resources were planned to maintain near and far dispersals. Initially we had our own Anson which could carry a full V-bomber crew. Also organic Hastings and Varsities with any available Transport Command aircraft pressed in as well.
It also moved most of the bombers outside the ring of steel, the Bloodhound sites surrounding the bases from Finningley to Honington. The Thor bases at the time were also inside that ring.
Equally it had the disadvantage of longer lines of logistics though RAF resources were planned to maintain near and far dispersals. Initially we had our own Anson which could carry a full V-bomber crew. Also organic Hastings and Varsities with any available Transport Command aircraft pressed in as well.
It also moved most of the bombers outside the ring of steel, the Bloodhound sites surrounding the bases from Finningley to Honington. The Thor bases at the time were also inside that ring.
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Sussex
Age: 66
Posts: 371
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As I understand it, I think I was told here on PRUNE, no British V Bomber ever took off or landed in the UK with a live weapon aboard.
If that is not the case, forget the rest of this post.
There is an inherent danger of accident every time an aircraft takes off and lands, this is increased when taking off and landing at unfamiliar locations I think we can all agree.
So where I am going to is that besides giving a message to the Warsaw Pact that the UK was getting ready to go to war, there was a danger when dispersing the V Force that there could be an accident involving a weapon either at the dispersal airfield or on return to the main base. Not an outcome that would be desired...
Of course if Dispersal had been ordered and actioned, for the Diplomats to then defuse the situation, what was the SOP?
Just interested if anyone knew.
If that is not the case, forget the rest of this post.
There is an inherent danger of accident every time an aircraft takes off and lands, this is increased when taking off and landing at unfamiliar locations I think we can all agree.
So where I am going to is that besides giving a message to the Warsaw Pact that the UK was getting ready to go to war, there was a danger when dispersing the V Force that there could be an accident involving a weapon either at the dispersal airfield or on return to the main base. Not an outcome that would be desired...
Of course if Dispersal had been ordered and actioned, for the Diplomats to then defuse the situation, what was the SOP?
Just interested if anyone knew.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
In your latter case, unloading at dispersal for overland recovery would have been a logistical nightmare. It would have been militarily stupid like a Blackadder farce sending troops home for leave during the Christmas truce.
Reverting from a dispersed state was not, AFAIK, written in BCARs. However BCARs and the accompanying operational documents were brief in the extreme. The operation order for a bomber wing ran to about 34 pages of which 24 were individual target briefs. The SOP was 110 pages including none essentials like preamble, distribution and page check sheets.
Our orders for RTB from a nearby Bolthole was simply come home, bring with you all that you took. It was left to sqns, fits and sections to do the necessary. It was all well practised routine and tempting as may be I am sure we mounted QRA at home and then unloaded at the bolthole.
Reverting from a dispersed state was not, AFAIK, written in BCARs. However BCARs and the accompanying operational documents were brief in the extreme. The operation order for a bomber wing ran to about 34 pages of which 24 were individual target briefs. The SOP was 110 pages including none essentials like preamble, distribution and page check sheets.
Our orders for RTB from a nearby Bolthole was simply come home, bring with you all that you took. It was left to sqns, fits and sections to do the necessary. It was all well practised routine and tempting as may be I am sure we mounted QRA at home and then unloaded at the bolthole.
PhilipG
There is an inherent danger of an accident every time an aircraft flies and steps are taken to mitigate the risk. If the risk was too high, you wouldn't go flying. Equally if the urgency of the task is such then you may deem it acceptable to reduce the normal safety margins and operate to different criteria.
The dispersal airfields were not unfamiliar to the crews. We operated into and out of them on a regular basis and I would not accept that this represented any higher than the normal level of risk.
As PN says, there was no plan or SOP visible to us at the coalface. One can only surmise that anything that did exist started with:
"Breathe a huge sigh of relief and come up with a plan to revert to some lower state of readiness."
If you anticipated recovering the weapons by air, the first thing you had to consider was how to defuel the aircraft with the weapon on board? Sorry, no can do. So, you have to unload the weapon and having done that you might as well convoy it back by road, at least from the closer dispersals.
It would seem more likely that any scenario would involve a phased return to a "normal" alert state and remember that we could be held at RS15 for 30 days. By selectively standing down dispersals on a rotation basis this could probably be significantly extended, who knows?
One thing you can be sure of is that it wouldn't have all wrapped up with a tannoy message of "Endex" and everyone going to the bar. Things would not return to normal for a long time.
YS
There is an inherent danger of accident every time an aircraft takes off and lands, this is increased when taking off and landing at unfamiliar locations I think we can all agree.
The dispersal airfields were not unfamiliar to the crews. We operated into and out of them on a regular basis and I would not accept that this represented any higher than the normal level of risk.
As PN says, there was no plan or SOP visible to us at the coalface. One can only surmise that anything that did exist started with:
"Breathe a huge sigh of relief and come up with a plan to revert to some lower state of readiness."
If you anticipated recovering the weapons by air, the first thing you had to consider was how to defuel the aircraft with the weapon on board? Sorry, no can do. So, you have to unload the weapon and having done that you might as well convoy it back by road, at least from the closer dispersals.
It would seem more likely that any scenario would involve a phased return to a "normal" alert state and remember that we could be held at RS15 for 30 days. By selectively standing down dispersals on a rotation basis this could probably be significantly extended, who knows?
One thing you can be sure of is that it wouldn't have all wrapped up with a tannoy message of "Endex" and everyone going to the bar. Things would not return to normal for a long time.
YS
We used to do QRA on Hastings and Hercules and supported the V force when they dispersed. I have been to places as far apart as Macrihanish and St Mawgan and several in between. But never outside the UK on one of these tasks.
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: london
Posts: 379
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A National Retaliatory War Plan
PN: KS' dismissal of Lamb's "no serious {solo-UK} plans" will derive from Baylis/Stoddart, Experience, Appendix 3, P.221: 5/10/62 RAFBC targeting memo: National Retaliatory War Plan as 15 cities, (which could have been addressed (wef 12/62) by 80xYellow Sun 2). UK role in integrated SIOP (inc. SMF Thor) is in P.221 as 98 targets, comprising 16 cities, 44 “offensive” sites (airfields), 10 ADCCs, 28 IRBM sites; all for next review 7/63. Hennessy,PM,P114 has that as “down to 16 cities (due to) improvements (in) air defences”. Skybolt would address all, from 1966. But, on 21/12/62: no.
Lamb, P.319 has ex-CAS MRAF Slessor, on Nassau: “It is a really appalling thought that a couple of Ministers and a zoologist {S.Zuckerman} can skip off to the Bahamas {and} commit us to a military monstrosity {SSBN/FBM} on the purely political issue of nuclear independence - which anyway is a myth.” What might the MRAF have meant?
A UK-solo target-set applied between 7/57 (Blue Danube CA Release Moore/Illusion,P.112) and 1/7/58 (target integration, RAFBC: USAF/SAC). None of Wynn's 653 pages of Official History, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, addresses a NRWP: nearest is P.273, CoS Committee paper 28/5/57 Strategic Target Policy, 2 eventualities: co-ordinated w.USAF, and "Action on an emergency basis in a situation in which UK was forced into unilateral retaliation". That paper led by 5/58 to: “a fully integrated (target) plan wef 1/7/58 taking into account BC's ability to be on target several hours before (main SAC force ex-US; RAF/SAC) examination of separate BC and SAC plans had shown that every BC target was also on SAC's list and (both) had doubled-up strikes (to) ensure success”. (SAC then had 217 targets, ea. for 3 bombs; we had 24 BD by 3/58, so 12 targets). VCAS 20/1/56: SoS/Def “agreed 17/12/53 that one of (MBF's) primary tasks (would) be retardation operations (to assist Saceur)”.
1/10/58- 17/3/62 MBF carried more US Project E weapons than Made-in-Britain models (so launch was subject to USAF custodials-on-Base, so to US CinC). From 23/5/63 MBF was Tasked by Saceur...bar “where (supreme) national interests are at stake”. (Today: SEADS) was our job. Wynn,Pp.103/4/261/271.
As PN did train for a "National" Plan...are we at weasel words on "serious ...operational?" 16...ever decreasing.."cities"...Might the MRAF have meant: navigation exercises, fine (SAC B-47Es used The Gramophone Co., Hayes as a target); not to be confused with the real thing?
Lamb, P.319 has ex-CAS MRAF Slessor, on Nassau: “It is a really appalling thought that a couple of Ministers and a zoologist {S.Zuckerman} can skip off to the Bahamas {and} commit us to a military monstrosity {SSBN/FBM} on the purely political issue of nuclear independence - which anyway is a myth.” What might the MRAF have meant?
A UK-solo target-set applied between 7/57 (Blue Danube CA Release Moore/Illusion,P.112) and 1/7/58 (target integration, RAFBC: USAF/SAC). None of Wynn's 653 pages of Official History, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces, addresses a NRWP: nearest is P.273, CoS Committee paper 28/5/57 Strategic Target Policy, 2 eventualities: co-ordinated w.USAF, and "Action on an emergency basis in a situation in which UK was forced into unilateral retaliation". That paper led by 5/58 to: “a fully integrated (target) plan wef 1/7/58 taking into account BC's ability to be on target several hours before (main SAC force ex-US; RAF/SAC) examination of separate BC and SAC plans had shown that every BC target was also on SAC's list and (both) had doubled-up strikes (to) ensure success”. (SAC then had 217 targets, ea. for 3 bombs; we had 24 BD by 3/58, so 12 targets). VCAS 20/1/56: SoS/Def “agreed 17/12/53 that one of (MBF's) primary tasks (would) be retardation operations (to assist Saceur)”.
1/10/58- 17/3/62 MBF carried more US Project E weapons than Made-in-Britain models (so launch was subject to USAF custodials-on-Base, so to US CinC). From 23/5/63 MBF was Tasked by Saceur...bar “where (supreme) national interests are at stake”. (Today: SEADS) was our job. Wynn,Pp.103/4/261/271.
As PN did train for a "National" Plan...are we at weasel words on "serious ...operational?" 16...ever decreasing.."cities"...Might the MRAF have meant: navigation exercises, fine (SAC B-47Es used The Gramophone Co., Hayes as a target); not to be confused with the real thing?
Last edited by tornadoken; 7th Nov 2016 at 17:08.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
Tornadoes well assembled, I think that covers it well. I knew several SACEUR targets where an earlier missile strike was planned. I knew of only one SACEUR target where two attacks were planned. A nit of double bluff as both routes were identical with just 10 minutes between strikes.
That is not to say one of the other wings might have covered some of ours, indeed thinking about it, it would be entirely logical and sensible.
That is not to say one of the other wings might have covered some of ours, indeed thinking about it, it would be entirely logical and sensible.
Initially we had our own Anson which could carry a full V-bomber crew.
(Sorry, six racings snakes, I forgot the crew chief. As I recall most of our crew chiefs were "built for comfort" too.
Last edited by Tankertrashnav; 6th Nov 2016 at 22:56.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Thread Starter
TTN, apart from the provision of a toilet and a navigator the Bassett was indeed fine. For 5 man crew with kit, the nav bags alone were heavy enough, two Bassetts could do the job.
Cunning Artificer
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: The spiritual home of DeHavilland
Age: 76
Posts: 3,127
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In going off to dispersal (Micky Finn) I had some miserable times. Valley was probably the worst - the Bomber Command accommodation on the far side was badly run down with broken windows, a leaky roof and unserviceable heating / electrics. The cook managed to rustle up some beans on toast over a camp fire, but that was it. I spent a whole detachment down on the ORP where we at least had heating in the shack, but fell asleep standing up at the GPU and missed the scramble. The Crew Chief woke me up after they had gone. So much for the so-called "Vulcan Howl" 
On one Mickey Finn (Honington I think) we were given pep pills to help us stay awake.
On one Mickey Finn (Honington I think) we were given pep pills to help us stay awake.
On one occasion our squadron commander was walking around with a black cloud above him. All our aircraft on the station were u/s except one and he was supposed to provide an ACP aircraft plus a spare. I suggested that he nominate a u/s aircraft as the prime and the serviceable one as the backup. i.e. Jump in, it's u/s; go to the backup.
