Martin Baker to be prosecuted over death of Flt Lt. Sean Cunningham
What I can say is that after Sean’s untimely death it is far less likely to happen to anyone else.
I think we need to be confident that there isn't other latent issues hiding in the MB design and safety management.
Years ago a friend was logging his first proper seat time; after contemplating the rather violent change of scenery he started wondering when the parachute would make its appearance. He even had the presence of mind to remember he had a high level barostat fitted to the seat so the chute should have made a relatively quick appearance. When he tried to move his hand to the manual separation release he found the the sleeves of his LSJ were bound so tightly between his legs and so much material had been stretched by the force of the restraints (with the restraint fabric pulled through to the metal clips) there was no way he could move his hand over his thigh, let alone across his kneepad to operate the handle. He then spent time trying to work his way free of the Houdini straight jacket.
The chute did deployed before he got to the manual handle. MB's response to this issue was initially dismissive of an issue before deciding that the seat eventually worked so why should he moan.
Quite a few of us revisited the seat rig to contemplate what would happen when the restraint cords were pulled beyond the stitching (not possible on the training rig) and contemplated how much LSJ material would be pulled tight around the shoulders by the power of the arm restraints. Those of us with knowledge of the accident opted for a shorter LSJ sleeve length but outside of this circle the issue was treated with derision.
In the years since the arm restraint design has spread across multiple types and judging by the number of long LSJ sleeves I see one hopes that the issue has been resolved rather than forgotten.
Before this accident my sleeve length looked like this; I do not know if Typhoon mitigates the issue in a different way or if the issue has carried over:
Years ago a friend was logging his first proper seat time; after contemplating the rather violent change of scenery he started wondering when the parachute would make its appearance. He even had the presence of mind to remember he had a high level barostat fitted to the seat so the chute should have made a relatively quick appearance. When he tried to move his hand to the manual separation release he found the the sleeves of his LSJ were bound so tightly between his legs and so much material had been stretched by the force of the restraints (with the restraint fabric pulled through to the metal clips) there was no way he could move his hand over his thigh, let alone across his kneepad to operate the handle. He then spent time trying to work his way free of the Houdini straight jacket.
The chute did deployed before he got to the manual handle. MB's response to this issue was initially dismissive of an issue before deciding that the seat eventually worked so why should he moan.
Quite a few of us revisited the seat rig to contemplate what would happen when the restraint cords were pulled beyond the stitching (not possible on the training rig) and contemplated how much LSJ material would be pulled tight around the shoulders by the power of the arm restraints. Those of us with knowledge of the accident opted for a shorter LSJ sleeve length but outside of this circle the issue was treated with derision.
In the years since the arm restraint design has spread across multiple types and judging by the number of long LSJ sleeves I see one hopes that the issue has been resolved rather than forgotten.
Before this accident my sleeve length looked like this; I do not know if Typhoon mitigates the issue in a different way or if the issue has carried over:
Can we put it to bed now?!
Bob Viking, can you please tell us WHY zero-zero seat pins (MDC too?) are replaced on the move these days?
Surely it would be better to do so only when stationary and before unstrapping?
Surely it would be better to do so only when stationary and before unstrapping?
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MB are quoted in today's Times "This was an isolated failure relating to the tightening of a nut during maintenance procedures conducted by RAF Aerobatic Team mechanics."
Is that a 'Yeah but it's still the RAF's fault' kind of comment?
Going back to page 1 of this thread, did 'some liney', 6 years ago, find their career come to an abrupt halt or have the RAF had to wait, without prejudice, for the HSE case to conclude before initiating any internal action?
Is that a 'Yeah but it's still the RAF's fault' kind of comment?
Going back to page 1 of this thread, did 'some liney', 6 years ago, find their career come to an abrupt halt or have the RAF had to wait, without prejudice, for the HSE case to conclude before initiating any internal action?
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Integration of AEA
Hi JTO,
I do know that the RAFCAM integration team at Henlow did used to put a great deal of effort into the things you describe. Use of various crash test instrumented dummies and test rigs to simulate g etc. They also carry out detailed forensic examination of AEA that has been subject to actual use in events. Their top man has given a number of lectures to the RAeS on the subject. I understand that most recently their efforts have been focused on fire retardant gear and also body armour.
Not sure what will become when they move from Henlow. I would have thought the sensible thing to do was to merge with the QinetiQ gang at Farnborough. However there was always a willy waving contest between the two organisations which at one time, Pre privatisation of Q2 were more joined up.
I do know that the RAFCAM integration team at Henlow did used to put a great deal of effort into the things you describe. Use of various crash test instrumented dummies and test rigs to simulate g etc. They also carry out detailed forensic examination of AEA that has been subject to actual use in events. Their top man has given a number of lectures to the RAeS on the subject. I understand that most recently their efforts have been focused on fire retardant gear and also body armour.
Not sure what will become when they move from Henlow. I would have thought the sensible thing to do was to merge with the QinetiQ gang at Farnborough. However there was always a willy waving contest between the two organisations which at one time, Pre privatisation of Q2 were more joined up.
dragartist/JTO
I fully agree. The 2002 QQ report, which informed MoD of the shackle problem (again), is a model example of a joint effort by M-B, BAeS, QQ and MoD. The vast majority in these organisations do a superb job.
But it is this report which renders the claim M-B didn't provide a bulletin a complete red herring. Had the SI seen it, they would have had to caveat their report 'the 1990 bulletin can't be found, but we got shed loads of subsequent notifications and did nothing'. The 'quality of design charge' was dropped by the HSE (who reported that?), which makes the Coroner look foolish (not reported either). But it looks like M-B took a hit on the administrative oversight charge just to get it out of the way, not realising MoD had withheld evidence that revealed MoD's greater offences.
Riskman - Yes, because it was!
I fully agree. The 2002 QQ report, which informed MoD of the shackle problem (again), is a model example of a joint effort by M-B, BAeS, QQ and MoD. The vast majority in these organisations do a superb job.
But it is this report which renders the claim M-B didn't provide a bulletin a complete red herring. Had the SI seen it, they would have had to caveat their report 'the 1990 bulletin can't be found, but we got shed loads of subsequent notifications and did nothing'. The 'quality of design charge' was dropped by the HSE (who reported that?), which makes the Coroner look foolish (not reported either). But it looks like M-B took a hit on the administrative oversight charge just to get it out of the way, not realising MoD had withheld evidence that revealed MoD's greater offences.
Riskman - Yes, because it was!
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Ergo although MOD may have commited sins, it has not committed any offences.
Crown Immunity from Criminal Liability
Action in the criminal courts is taken 'on behalf of the Crown'. Statute law is approved by the Crown (Royal Assent).
It would, it is said, be strange for the Crown to prosecute itself and this is the basis for the Crown being 'immune' from prosecution for criminal liability.
The Crown is not, however, 'immune' from the requirements of health and safety legislation generally. All of these duties are placed on the Crown just as on any other employer. The only difference is what action can be taken under criminal law if the Crown fails in its duties.
Action in the criminal courts is taken 'on behalf of the Crown'. Statute law is approved by the Crown (Royal Assent).
It would, it is said, be strange for the Crown to prosecute itself and this is the basis for the Crown being 'immune' from prosecution for criminal liability.
The Crown is not, however, 'immune' from the requirements of health and safety legislation generally. All of these duties are placed on the Crown just as on any other employer. The only difference is what action can be taken under criminal law if the Crown fails in its duties.
roving, we are all only too well aware of Crown Immunity. Even if that were not the case, the problem here is that Sean Cunningham's aircraft was unairworthy because the UK Military Air Regulator, the MAA aka the MOD, had failed in its duty to ensure otherwise. The apologists as ever want to ram a stovepipe onto this tragedy, just as they did with the Mull Chinook, the Iraq Hercules, the Afghanistan Nimrod, and every other airworthiness related fatal air accident that have accounted for some 75 lives in such accident threads in this forum alone. Rather than wanting to set heads on spikes, be they JO pilots, SOs and 1* VSOs, or Company CEOs, we need to wrest Regulation and Investigation from the maw of the MOD, and make them independent of it and of each other. Unless and until that happens the urgent reform of both processes will be stillborn. More people will then die needlessly in unairworthy UK Military aircraft. Let the Crown be immune, just stop the cover up, admit the actions that led to this scandal, and allow proper reform to start. Time is of the essence (as no doubt you would be prone to say), for the longer this mess continues the longer that UK Air Power is fatally compromised.
Hear, hear, 
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Chugalug2, I am with you on all of that.
I was not simply being pedantic but underlining, once again, the fact that the Crown's immunity absolves it from penal consequences for its sins of commission and omission whilst others without immunity are hung out to dry.
I was not simply being pedantic but underlining, once again, the fact that the Crown's immunity absolves it from penal consequences for its sins of commission and omission whilst others without immunity are hung out to dry.
I would argue , to any forum, that replacing a seat pin without a visual checK of correct insertion, is dreadful practice, even more so if the aircraft is moving and in close proximity to other moving aircraft.
Let's hope the RAF has changed this basically unsafe procedure.
I would ask too, does RAF engineering not require an independent inspector to sign off critical work such as the was done on the shackle before releasing it to fly?
"...and just for the record, I flew ejection seats for 12 years, ejected once, hence my close interest in this accident, and was senior standards QFI in my last unit, so not exactly an uninformed amateur in this matter.
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Hear, hear to that. Sorry, Viking, it's not time to put it to bed until we have the reason for the change to long tried and tested procedures . Who, CFS, 4 FTS, HS, MB, Boscombe, or REDS, and why?
I would argue , to any forum, that replacing a seat pin without a visual checK of correct insertion, is dreadful practice, even more so if the aircraft is moving and in close proximity to other moving aircraft.
Let's hope the RAF has changed this basically unsafe procedure.
I would ask too, does RAF engineering not require an independent inspector to sign off critical work such as the was done on the shackle before releasing it to fly?
"...and just for the record, I flew ejection seats for 12 years, ejected once, hence my close interest in this accident, and was senior standards QFI in my last unit, so not exactly an uninformed amateur in this matter.
I would argue , to any forum, that replacing a seat pin without a visual checK of correct insertion, is dreadful practice, even more so if the aircraft is moving and in close proximity to other moving aircraft.
Let's hope the RAF has changed this basically unsafe procedure.
I would ask too, does RAF engineering not require an independent inspector to sign off critical work such as the was done on the shackle before releasing it to fly?
"...and just for the record, I flew ejection seats for 12 years, ejected once, hence my close interest in this accident, and was senior standards QFI in my last unit, so not exactly an uninformed amateur in this matter.
You're wasting your time expecting Bob Viking to stop asking you to move along as there's nothing to see here.
Just like the incident a few months ago where a Hawk went completely dark, and quiet above cloud, Bob thinks we should just play nice and not make waves.
Obviously our lords and masters know better than us, that's why they are our lords and masters. So... when the VSOs tell us to face the front and shut up, we ought to do just that.
No good is going to come of looking for the truth, we already know what it is, and it has to remain a secret to protect the guilty.
Lots to answer...
Tucumseh.
When I said “give it a rest” I was not referring to the broader discussion of airworthiness. I was referring to the “it wouldn’t have happened in my day” brigade. I have no problem with your discussion.
BEagle.
I have been flying on MB seats constantly since 2001. Since day one I have been taught to insert the seat pan and internal canopy handle pins during taxi back (stopping if necessary especially as an inexperienced pilot) and visually check them. The MDC unit pin is inserted after egress.
Newer aircraft also have a PINS caption on the CWP to indicate if the pin is inserted with the canopy closed.
Until recently (coincidence) we would also unstrap whilst taxiing. That practice has now ceased (which I disagree with).
Also remember that newer Hawks are able to taxi with the canopy open.
Retired BA/BY
I respect your experience but we did this to death a few pages ago.
I cannot tell you who made the change to procedures but somewhere between you retiring from the RAF and me joining, it happened.
It would not have been done on a whim and the same CFS that you and BEagle remember would have carefully reviewed the procedures.
Personally, I don’t want to be strapped into a live seat after landing. I can count several instances where crew (including myself) have had to perform an emergency egress where having the seat safe made for a quicker and safer exit.
FRCs will state during the emergency egress drills as item 1:
Seat pin...insert
I would argue that the chances of screwing that up are far higher when you are trying to exit in a hurry than they are during the taxi back.
Our opinions clearly differ but they are both based on what we were taught. A touch of confirmation bias for both of us perhaps?
I can assure you and BEagle that pins discipline has always been rigorously enforced and always will be.
Airpolice.
I have no beef with you but, please, grow up.
BGG.
Thankyou!
Did I miss anyone?!
BV
When I said “give it a rest” I was not referring to the broader discussion of airworthiness. I was referring to the “it wouldn’t have happened in my day” brigade. I have no problem with your discussion.
BEagle.
I have been flying on MB seats constantly since 2001. Since day one I have been taught to insert the seat pan and internal canopy handle pins during taxi back (stopping if necessary especially as an inexperienced pilot) and visually check them. The MDC unit pin is inserted after egress.
Newer aircraft also have a PINS caption on the CWP to indicate if the pin is inserted with the canopy closed.
Until recently (coincidence) we would also unstrap whilst taxiing. That practice has now ceased (which I disagree with).
Also remember that newer Hawks are able to taxi with the canopy open.
Retired BA/BY
I respect your experience but we did this to death a few pages ago.
I cannot tell you who made the change to procedures but somewhere between you retiring from the RAF and me joining, it happened.
It would not have been done on a whim and the same CFS that you and BEagle remember would have carefully reviewed the procedures.
Personally, I don’t want to be strapped into a live seat after landing. I can count several instances where crew (including myself) have had to perform an emergency egress where having the seat safe made for a quicker and safer exit.
FRCs will state during the emergency egress drills as item 1:
Seat pin...insert
I would argue that the chances of screwing that up are far higher when you are trying to exit in a hurry than they are during the taxi back.
Our opinions clearly differ but they are both based on what we were taught. A touch of confirmation bias for both of us perhaps?
I can assure you and BEagle that pins discipline has always been rigorously enforced and always will be.
Airpolice.
I have no beef with you but, please, grow up.
BGG.
Thankyou!
Did I miss anyone?!
BV
Bob Viking - Thank you.
Roving - I think you know that the persistent offences I mention are breaches of the Air Force Act (and its successors?). Making false record attracts a maximum 2-year sentence. I'm not just talking about the aircrew training records in this case, but the more serious and serial offences committed by those who knowingly signed to say they had personally ensured a valid safety case existed, when a succession of Service Inquiries have revealed they did not. That is a legally binding declaration, and the false declarations resulted in numerous deaths in aircraft that had no legal Release to Service. Chinook. Tornado. Nimrod. Sea King (albeit, it was very nearly right). C-130. Hawk. That is not an isolated instance. Those cases alone span 17 years. In my opinion, that indicates a very serious organisational failure, which MoD seems completely ambivalent towards. Not 'seems'. Confirmed, in writing.
Roving - I think you know that the persistent offences I mention are breaches of the Air Force Act (and its successors?). Making false record attracts a maximum 2-year sentence. I'm not just talking about the aircrew training records in this case, but the more serious and serial offences committed by those who knowingly signed to say they had personally ensured a valid safety case existed, when a succession of Service Inquiries have revealed they did not. That is a legally binding declaration, and the false declarations resulted in numerous deaths in aircraft that had no legal Release to Service. Chinook. Tornado. Nimrod. Sea King (albeit, it was very nearly right). C-130. Hawk. That is not an isolated instance. Those cases alone span 17 years. In my opinion, that indicates a very serious organisational failure, which MoD seems completely ambivalent towards. Not 'seems'. Confirmed, in writing.
Yes there was a problem, but what makes you think you have any righ to know about it?
good practice always evolves.
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Just a simple 'Feeler gauge' check for enough gap to ensure freedom of movement, if the bolts the wrong size then change it. Just don't clamp things together because the instructions tell you to.
How simple is it to have a properly engineered 'Gap' by feeler gauge, not all this 'Torque loading a bolt' so it's in 'Safety?' Just 'winding it up until the thread, or thread & a half shows through & clamping parts together as a result.
As I said much earlier, pilots used to 'Rackle the shackle in my day, to ensure that the shackle was really free.
How simple is it to have a properly engineered 'Gap' by feeler gauge, not all this 'Torque loading a bolt' so it's in 'Safety?' Just 'winding it up until the thread, or thread & a half shows through & clamping parts together as a result.
As I said much earlier, pilots used to 'Rackle the shackle in my day, to ensure that the shackle was really free.