Wg Cdr Arthur Gill, OBE, DFC
The following programme at 8 pm this evening BBC Two - Burma's Secret Jungle War with Joe Simpson, Episode 1 may be of interest relative to recent posts, given that my geography is not as good as Danny's....
......and a belated reminder for those currently online that Episode 2 starts in half an hour.
Jack
......and a belated reminder for those currently online that Episode 2 starts in half an hour.
Jack
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Danny
Re the method of attack that was agreed with Brig. Wingate, Arthur had some difficulty in persuading him to be cooperative. Arthur argued for triangulating a target with smoke mortar bombs in order to identify it from the air. But Wingate didn't want his Chindits (10,000 of them, not 900 as I previously wrote) to have to carry smoke mortar bombs in addition to High Explosive, and he was concerned that the Japs would just put down a triangle on the Chindit's position once they realised they were being identified by smoke for aerial attack. Arthur pointed out that it was worth carrying the extra load of mortar bombs if it was going to result in close air support being available. The solution to the Japs putting down smoke themselves, was to have agreed colours for the day... maybe 1 red smoke and 2 white. This was practiced in the field with the Chindits in their training area at Gwalior. The 84 guys got to know the soldiers in the process, which gave added poignancy when they were later in battle... the soldiers seeing their Airforce colleagues fly in to attack, and the 84 aircrew, knowing their Chindit colleagues were down in the jungle below, relying on them to do a good job. Close air support at its best, maybe, given the technology of the time.
Re the method of attack that was agreed with Brig. Wingate, Arthur had some difficulty in persuading him to be cooperative. Arthur argued for triangulating a target with smoke mortar bombs in order to identify it from the air. But Wingate didn't want his Chindits (10,000 of them, not 900 as I previously wrote) to have to carry smoke mortar bombs in addition to High Explosive, and he was concerned that the Japs would just put down a triangle on the Chindit's position once they realised they were being identified by smoke for aerial attack. Arthur pointed out that it was worth carrying the extra load of mortar bombs if it was going to result in close air support being available. The solution to the Japs putting down smoke themselves, was to have agreed colours for the day... maybe 1 red smoke and 2 white. This was practiced in the field with the Chindits in their training area at Gwalior. The 84 guys got to know the soldiers in the process, which gave added poignancy when they were later in battle... the soldiers seeing their Airforce colleagues fly in to attack, and the 84 aircrew, knowing their Chindit colleagues were down in the jungle below, relying on them to do a good job. Close air support at its best, maybe, given the technology of the time.
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Danny
Thanks for the heads-up on the footage of the Vengeance on Youtube. I didn't know it existed. Quite emotional for me to see it... as if I was witnessing my father in his aircraft, seventy years ago. I notice that there's several clips available on Youtube, by searching 'Vultee Vengeance'.
Thanks for the heads-up on the footage of the Vengeance on Youtube. I didn't know it existed. Quite emotional for me to see it... as if I was witnessing my father in his aircraft, seventy years ago. I notice that there's several clips available on Youtube, by searching 'Vultee Vengeance'.
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Thanks! Just caught the second half of the Chindits programme.. will view it fully on iplayer... no doubt it will be in the 'history' section. Simpson mentioned aerial attack by Mustangs and showed an old bomb crater. He lamented the effect of the Commonwealth/Jap fighting on the Burmese civilians... there must have been casualties when Jap-held villages were bombed. Such was part of the sorry price for the Japanese invading Burma. Civilians died, but at least Burma eventually gained its freedom.
Thanks! Just caught the second half of the Chindits programme.. will view it fully on iplayer... no doubt it will be in the 'history' section. Simpson mentioned aerial attack by Mustangs and showed an old bomb crater. He lamented the effect of the Commonwealth/Jap fighting on the Burmese civilians... there must have been casualties when Jap-held villages were bombed. Such was part of the sorry price for the Japanese invading Burma. Civilians died, but at least Burma eventually gained its freedom.
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NigG,
Further working through "Vengeance", there is little relevant to 84 Squadron in particular, as Peter C. Smith intermingles official reports with many personal anecdotes from all the Squadrons in order to weave a coherent story.
But there are some repeated statements that I find it difficult to reconcile with my own remembered experience. For example, there many reports of (say) "xx Squadron and yy Squadron attacked enemy positions at zzzzzz with 12 aircraft from each Squadron". I flew 52 sorties with 110 RAF and 8 Squadrons and on only one (the very first), we put up 12 aircraft. But that was only done by combining a 'box-of-six' from 110 Squadron (a Flight) with another Flight from 82 (who were with us at Chittagong in May '43). All the rest of my 'ops' were flown in a single box-of-six.
I suppose you could say that the leader of 82 'led' 12 aircraft, in the sense that he navigated to the target, but the 110 'box' flew a mile behind, and its No.1 would plan his own approach to it, and signal (we kept R/T silence) separately the moves into echelon starboard and open bomb doors.
The reason is that the box-of-six is the largest unit which would have any chance of defending itself against fighter attack (and that would be a slim chance indeed). A box-of-four would be better. A "Balbo" of 12 would have no hope at all.
IMHO (and in the opinion of many others), the best tactic if we came under fighter attack would be to break, scatter, dive for the deck and bolt for home, Not very gallant - but then a live survivor is more use than a dead hero ! (He who fights and runs away.....). It was a good thing that we were never intercepted (and to this day nobody really knows why not).
More later, Danny.
PS: The above was still in draft last night, and I'm very interested in what you tell me in your #64. I'm a bit doubtful about the "triangulation" idea. On our 'ASC' sorties ("Army Support, Close", in the back-to-front nomenclature of the Services), we found that one mortar smoke bomb on target was enough, and of course we countered the "tit-for-tat" Jap tactic with coloured smoke, as you say. And it would be a third of the extra load that the Chindits had to carry. And it would give the formation leader a fixed point to aim at, rather than having to "guesstimate" the centre of a triangle.
On every strike, the accuracy of the leader is vital - for after the first bombs the target marker has vanished in a growing cloud of dust and smoke, all the following pilots can do is to line up on the centre of the cloud. I was last man down on the 12-ship sortie I mentioned, and the cloud I had to aim at was huge.
D.
Further working through "Vengeance", there is little relevant to 84 Squadron in particular, as Peter C. Smith intermingles official reports with many personal anecdotes from all the Squadrons in order to weave a coherent story.
But there are some repeated statements that I find it difficult to reconcile with my own remembered experience. For example, there many reports of (say) "xx Squadron and yy Squadron attacked enemy positions at zzzzzz with 12 aircraft from each Squadron". I flew 52 sorties with 110 RAF and 8 Squadrons and on only one (the very first), we put up 12 aircraft. But that was only done by combining a 'box-of-six' from 110 Squadron (a Flight) with another Flight from 82 (who were with us at Chittagong in May '43). All the rest of my 'ops' were flown in a single box-of-six.
I suppose you could say that the leader of 82 'led' 12 aircraft, in the sense that he navigated to the target, but the 110 'box' flew a mile behind, and its No.1 would plan his own approach to it, and signal (we kept R/T silence) separately the moves into echelon starboard and open bomb doors.
The reason is that the box-of-six is the largest unit which would have any chance of defending itself against fighter attack (and that would be a slim chance indeed). A box-of-four would be better. A "Balbo" of 12 would have no hope at all.
IMHO (and in the opinion of many others), the best tactic if we came under fighter attack would be to break, scatter, dive for the deck and bolt for home, Not very gallant - but then a live survivor is more use than a dead hero ! (He who fights and runs away.....). It was a good thing that we were never intercepted (and to this day nobody really knows why not).
More later, Danny.
PS: The above was still in draft last night, and I'm very interested in what you tell me in your #64. I'm a bit doubtful about the "triangulation" idea. On our 'ASC' sorties ("Army Support, Close", in the back-to-front nomenclature of the Services), we found that one mortar smoke bomb on target was enough, and of course we countered the "tit-for-tat" Jap tactic with coloured smoke, as you say. And it would be a third of the extra load that the Chindits had to carry. And it would give the formation leader a fixed point to aim at, rather than having to "guesstimate" the centre of a triangle.
On every strike, the accuracy of the leader is vital - for after the first bombs the target marker has vanished in a growing cloud of dust and smoke, all the following pilots can do is to line up on the centre of the cloud. I was last man down on the 12-ship sortie I mentioned, and the cloud I had to aim at was huge.
D.
Last edited by Danny42C; 16th May 2016 at 08:52. Reason: ADDN.
He lamented the effect of the Commonwealth/Jap fighting on the Burmese civilians... there must have been casualties when Jap-held villages were bombed. Such was part of the sorry price for the Japanese invading Burma. Civilians died, but at least Burma eventually gained its freedom.
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NigG (your #66),
Sadly, yes. But our "bread-and-butter" 'op' was taking out Japanese army dug-in bunkers (somewhere in "Vengeance" it is stated that a few of these went 20 ft deep); that would be 80% of our work; the Vengeance might have been designed for the job; we went at it with gusto; the Army was very appreciative and said so - for they would have taken many casualties if these places had to be reduced by conventional means.
But they weren't very big (around the size of a doubles tennis court), and four tons of HE with delay fuses (for deep penetration) on target would be enough: anything more than six VV would be overkill.
Danny.
... there must have been casualties when Jap-held villages were bombed...
But they weren't very big (around the size of a doubles tennis court), and four tons of HE with delay fuses (for deep penetration) on target would be enough: anything more than six VV would be overkill.
Danny.
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Danny
Thanks for your information and points you raised. They sent me scurrying for 'Scorpion's Sting', the 84 Squadron history. Happily I can give you a more authoritative explanation than I previously did:
Target identification. In December '43 Arthur discussed the topic with Brig. Wingate, commander of the Chindits. The ground was often too featureless for Wingate's suggestion that troops would identify targets by sending a map reference. Arthur proposed the use of two smoke mortar bombs, one at each end of the target at the appointed Time Over Target (TOT). Wingate raised the risk of the Japs countering the technique by putting smoke down on friendly troops. Arthur proposed that they either used coloured smoke, of a specified colour, or if coloured smoke was not available, using either three mortar bombs to form a triangle, that defined the target area, or four to make a square. This technique was tested on the ground in Gwalior with the Chindits, and was subsequently adopted.
I recall my father explaining that there was an added complication when they were using their low level dive technique, during the monsoon, when cloud was too low to permit a vertical dive. There was a risk of bombs missing the target, usually over-shooting it. This was potentially hazardous for nearby friendly troops. So it was important for the pattern of mortar smoke bombs to define where the troops were. That way, the dive was made across the front of the troops, so that any over-shooting bombs or bombs falling short wouldn't imperil them.
Number of aircraft deployed on an op. 84 Squadron had sixteen Vengeances, 12 available for ops and 4 as reserves or being serviced. Normally 12 were flown for a mission. Sometimes the 12 would separate, 6 attacking one target, while the other 6 went for another one. 3 were enough to destroy a bridge. The formation used was invariably in stepped-down Vics of 3 aircraft, each flight of 3 being stepped below the one in front. This was easy to maintain and was less tiring on long flights (some taking 3 to 4 hours). It also gave optimal protection against attack by fighters, the rearward guns, combining their fire power. The sixth and twelfth aircraft carried cameras, which the pilot would switch on before he peeled-off into the attacking dive. In an attack by 6 aircraft, they would then record the accuracy of bomb-strikes of the first 4 aircraft. Film would be assessed by 221 Group Ops Room, who would decide if a second attack was necessary, depending on the type of target.
Bombs. Bombload was usually 2X 500 lb and 2X 250 lb HE. Nose rods might be fitted to detonate the bomb slightly above ground surface, to maximise blast. Delayed action were used on deep bunkers, to effect penetration. HE and incendaries were used for supply dumps and stores. Bridges received both instantaneous and delayed action bombs. The latter going-off up to seven days later, to spoil attempts to repair the bridge.
Opening the book at random, exactly the right page was before my eyes. I think my father might be taking an interest in this Thread!
Thanks for your information and points you raised. They sent me scurrying for 'Scorpion's Sting', the 84 Squadron history. Happily I can give you a more authoritative explanation than I previously did:
Target identification. In December '43 Arthur discussed the topic with Brig. Wingate, commander of the Chindits. The ground was often too featureless for Wingate's suggestion that troops would identify targets by sending a map reference. Arthur proposed the use of two smoke mortar bombs, one at each end of the target at the appointed Time Over Target (TOT). Wingate raised the risk of the Japs countering the technique by putting smoke down on friendly troops. Arthur proposed that they either used coloured smoke, of a specified colour, or if coloured smoke was not available, using either three mortar bombs to form a triangle, that defined the target area, or four to make a square. This technique was tested on the ground in Gwalior with the Chindits, and was subsequently adopted.
I recall my father explaining that there was an added complication when they were using their low level dive technique, during the monsoon, when cloud was too low to permit a vertical dive. There was a risk of bombs missing the target, usually over-shooting it. This was potentially hazardous for nearby friendly troops. So it was important for the pattern of mortar smoke bombs to define where the troops were. That way, the dive was made across the front of the troops, so that any over-shooting bombs or bombs falling short wouldn't imperil them.
Number of aircraft deployed on an op. 84 Squadron had sixteen Vengeances, 12 available for ops and 4 as reserves or being serviced. Normally 12 were flown for a mission. Sometimes the 12 would separate, 6 attacking one target, while the other 6 went for another one. 3 were enough to destroy a bridge. The formation used was invariably in stepped-down Vics of 3 aircraft, each flight of 3 being stepped below the one in front. This was easy to maintain and was less tiring on long flights (some taking 3 to 4 hours). It also gave optimal protection against attack by fighters, the rearward guns, combining their fire power. The sixth and twelfth aircraft carried cameras, which the pilot would switch on before he peeled-off into the attacking dive. In an attack by 6 aircraft, they would then record the accuracy of bomb-strikes of the first 4 aircraft. Film would be assessed by 221 Group Ops Room, who would decide if a second attack was necessary, depending on the type of target.
Bombs. Bombload was usually 2X 500 lb and 2X 250 lb HE. Nose rods might be fitted to detonate the bomb slightly above ground surface, to maximise blast. Delayed action were used on deep bunkers, to effect penetration. HE and incendaries were used for supply dumps and stores. Bridges received both instantaneous and delayed action bombs. The latter going-off up to seven days later, to spoil attempts to repair the bridge.
Opening the book at random, exactly the right page was before my eyes. I think my father might be taking an interest in this Thread!
Last edited by NigG; 16th Jun 2016 at 17:59.
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I hope he is !
NigG,
You've given me so much material here (and all "up my street") that I hardly know where to start !
It was (nearly always) too featureless ! Only in cases like the Akyab Jail strike ("Pilot's Brevet" p.133 #2658) was the target so big that you couldn't fail to find it or miss it when you did. A grid reference in a thousand square miles of jungle means very little to a poor pilot or nav in an aircraft, I'm afraid.
No, you can't rely on the timekeeping being as accurate as that. Best idea is for the Army chaps to "gather round" as close as they dare, wait till they can hear and then see us coming, pause till we are about 45 degrees elevation from them and whack down the smoke.
Even in vertical bombing, there was less "line error" (left-right) than over/undershooting (forward-back). As the dive angle decreases, the line error, if anything, should decrease, but the over/undershoot will increase, as the nose has to be pulled up more (a lot more in a VV, with its long nose and no AoI), and the release point becomes more of a guess. As you say:
Good idea (never did it myself, or heard of it being done). Can see the sense of it in a shallow dive, where you can choose your heading in the dive. But vertical, your aircraft chooses your heading for you, as you are "weathercocking" (twisting) all the time down to keep the yellow line on target, so it is pot-luck whichever heading you bomb and pull-out on.
(Still small voice: why not use the Hurricane and Beaufighter for LL bombing, as they can see so much better, and do it all the time [in all weathers], and so are much better at it ?)
And there was me, with my ("Pilot's Brevet", p.135, #2684):
Had to think hard about this. I assume the camera was fitted facing forward (not in the bomb-bay, as in my case). 6 (?) might see the leader's bomb flash and smoke. Ye..ss, but my guess would be that 4 or 5 would be better, 6 might see only the dust and smoke cloud kicked up by 2 and 3. But they were the ones who were doing it, they should know.
(You'll have seen "Vengeance" pp 150-151 - wonderful series of shots, but must have been taken from some other aircraft.
That's more like it !
True - but only provided you hit it ! A bridge is notoriously difficult to hit, you have to destroy a span or an abutment (the Narigan bridge in Akyab survived many attempts to hit it, before it was brought down, I believe).
Well, I don't know what air gunnery refresher training 84 Squadron had (and the IAF, possibly at OTU). The rest had none. In your back seat might be a Navigator who had never touched a Browning in his life, still less fired one, or an old Blenheim Wop/AG or AG who was last in its two-gun turret in early '42.
The Vengeance had a Heath Robinson affair in the back. Basically, it was a pillar on a joint on the cockpit floor. This could wobble about all over the place, but was restrained by a couple of links. On top was the twin-gun assembly which had limited free movement. It was all handwork, there was no power assistance.
And even 12 of these are going to fight off a determined attack by a couple of pairs of well-handled "Oscars" ? (100 mph faster than the formation, much more agile than even a single VV, and more heavily armed ?)
Forget it ! It would be the Fairey "Battle" v. Me109 story ('39-'40) in France all over again. Our back-seat men would blaze away valiantly, but would be unlikely to hit anything other than their own tails (or somebody else's), what with their pilots screwing the things round desperately to turn into the next attacker.
Good thing it never happened !
Much too much, I'm afraid.
Danny.
You've given me so much material here (and all "up my street") that I hardly know where to start !
...The ground was often too featureless for Wingate's suggestion that troops would identify targets by sending a map reference...
...one at each end of the target at the appointed Time Over Target (TOT)...
...I recall my father explaining that there was an added complication when they were using their low level dive technique, during the monsoon, when cloud was too low to permit a vertical dive. There was a risk of bombs missing the target, usually over-shooting it...
...This was potentially hazardous for nearby friendly troops. So it was important for the pattern of mortar smoke bombs to define where the troops were. That way, the dive was made across the front of the troops, so that any over-shooting bombs or bombs falling short wouldn't imperil them...
(Still small voice: why not use the Hurricane and Beaufighter for LL bombing, as they can see so much better, and do it all the time [in all weathers], and so are much better at it ?)
...The sixth and twelfth aircraft carried cameras, which the pilot would switch on before he peeled-off into the attacking dive. In an attack by 6 aircraft, they would then record the accuracy of bomb-strikes of the first 4 aircraft. Film would be assessed by 221 Group Ops Room, who would decide if a second attack was necessary, depending on the type of target...
...An air staff officer back at Group had a bright idea (make for the hills, chaps!) Why not kill two birds with one stone? Fit a camera in the bomb bay of the last Vengeance to go down, and let him take the photographs himself after he's bombed. They checked for free space in the bay: it could be done..
(You'll have seen "Vengeance" pp 150-151 - wonderful series of shots, but must have been taken from some other aircraft.
...Sometimes the 12 would separate, 6 attacking one target, while the other 6 went for another one...
..3 were enough to destroy a bridge...
... It also gave optimal protection against attack by fighters, the rearward guns, combining their fire power...
The Vengeance had a Heath Robinson affair in the back. Basically, it was a pillar on a joint on the cockpit floor. This could wobble about all over the place, but was restrained by a couple of links. On top was the twin-gun assembly which had limited free movement. It was all handwork, there was no power assistance.
And even 12 of these are going to fight off a determined attack by a couple of pairs of well-handled "Oscars" ? (100 mph faster than the formation, much more agile than even a single VV, and more heavily armed ?)
Forget it ! It would be the Fairey "Battle" v. Me109 story ('39-'40) in France all over again. Our back-seat men would blaze away valiantly, but would be unlikely to hit anything other than their own tails (or somebody else's), what with their pilots screwing the things round desperately to turn into the next attacker.
Good thing it never happened !
Much too much, I'm afraid.
Danny.
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Danny
Thanks for that interesting set of observations. Remarkable days, for sure! Earlier you mentioned that you'd completed 52 sorties with 110 and 8 Sqns. No doubt the number of vertical dives you did greatly exceeded that number. Arthur, when he was your age, wrote the following in 84 Sqn Association's newsletter:
'Belated physical effects of dive bombing
A medical report appeared in an American aviation journal which stated that dive bomber crews could not safely undertake more than 70 vertical dives,without physical damage due to the adverse effects of high g-forces on the body during pull-out at the bottom of the dive. Yet most of our crews did hundreds of dives during training and operationally; pulling 7g-plus without any special clothing such as 'g-suits'. I sometimes wonder if that verdict has any bearing on the fact that very few of our crews are still living. Several of those still alive have suffered physically in recent years - with severe headaches and strokes.
It's a pity the doctors didn't tell us about this before we dived more than three times the maximum number of dives now recommended. A little late now! However, they were exhilarating days. We were young; we were lucky in many ways; and, most important, most of us survived - thank the Lord.'
Thanks for that interesting set of observations. Remarkable days, for sure! Earlier you mentioned that you'd completed 52 sorties with 110 and 8 Sqns. No doubt the number of vertical dives you did greatly exceeded that number. Arthur, when he was your age, wrote the following in 84 Sqn Association's newsletter:
'Belated physical effects of dive bombing
A medical report appeared in an American aviation journal which stated that dive bomber crews could not safely undertake more than 70 vertical dives,without physical damage due to the adverse effects of high g-forces on the body during pull-out at the bottom of the dive. Yet most of our crews did hundreds of dives during training and operationally; pulling 7g-plus without any special clothing such as 'g-suits'. I sometimes wonder if that verdict has any bearing on the fact that very few of our crews are still living. Several of those still alive have suffered physically in recent years - with severe headaches and strokes.
It's a pity the doctors didn't tell us about this before we dived more than three times the maximum number of dives now recommended. A little late now! However, they were exhilarating days. We were young; we were lucky in many ways; and, most important, most of us survived - thank the Lord.'
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How much Dive Bombing is Too Much ?
NigG,
This sent me scurrying back to my log. I started on my new toy straight after the New Year (5th Jan '43). Luckily, we (110 *) seem to have got ourselves a good bombing range right away (cf "Pilot's Brevet" p.130 #2592). On this we practised (or rather taught ourselves !) dive bombing from then @ to May 12th, then went off for a week's 'ops' together with 82 at Chittagong before the rains came and we had to come back.
Note *: At the end of April, my log is countersigned by Sqdn. Ldr. A.M. Gill. How come ? Don't think 84 was with us at Madhaiganj, but suppose they must have been.
Note @: March is a blank, seems I had malaria and jaundice.
Anyway, I must have done over 100 practice dives in that time (4 per sortie), plus 52 for real, plus just one more demo (which did not go at all well ! - cf "Pilot's Brevet" p.151 #3019).
I've never heard of lasting 'G' effects from prolonged dive bombing; would suppose that the proportion of surviving 90+ veteran dive bombers would be much the same as that of the the population as a whole. In any case, today's FJs regularly pull much more than the possible 5'G's which was all we could get before "grey-out".
Amen to that !...
Danny.
This sent me scurrying back to my log. I started on my new toy straight after the New Year (5th Jan '43). Luckily, we (110 *) seem to have got ourselves a good bombing range right away (cf "Pilot's Brevet" p.130 #2592). On this we practised (or rather taught ourselves !) dive bombing from then @ to May 12th, then went off for a week's 'ops' together with 82 at Chittagong before the rains came and we had to come back.
Note *: At the end of April, my log is countersigned by Sqdn. Ldr. A.M. Gill. How come ? Don't think 84 was with us at Madhaiganj, but suppose they must have been.
Note @: March is a blank, seems I had malaria and jaundice.
Anyway, I must have done over 100 practice dives in that time (4 per sortie), plus 52 for real, plus just one more demo (which did not go at all well ! - cf "Pilot's Brevet" p.151 #3019).
I've never heard of lasting 'G' effects from prolonged dive bombing; would suppose that the proportion of surviving 90+ veteran dive bombers would be much the same as that of the the population as a whole. In any case, today's FJs regularly pull much more than the possible 5'G's which was all we could get before "grey-out".
...It's a pity the doctors didn't tell us about this before we dived more than three times the maximum number of dives now recommended. A little late now! However, they were exhilarating days. We were young; we were lucky in many ways; and, most important, most of us survived - thank the Lord.'...
Danny.
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Danny
I was hoping to find an explanation for Arthur signing your log book. 84 Sqn had moved to Ratmalana, Ceylon on 19 April '43, in anticipation of a Jap naval attack. It didn't materialise, so they moved back north, to Ranchi, by August. I'll be able to lay my hands on Arthur's log book at the weekend, so hopefully this will shed more light.
Re. modern pilots pulling high G-forces, presumably they do it with the assistance of pressure suits. Maybe your lack of pressure suits had health implications, and it was this that the American medic was concerned about. Who knows? Anyway, you've made it to 94 and my father made it to 100 (albeit with a first stroke when he was 78). So one might legitimately wonder whether this chap was 'crying wolf'.
I wonder if you had any personal experience of the Vengeance's teething problems? On 24 Dec '42, Arthur took one of the squadron's first aircraft on a flight from Jodpur to Delhi, having collected it from the MU at Karachi, earlier in the day. 75 miles out from Jodpur, the engine cut out. He managed to keep it airborne, by madly operating a hand wobble-pump to keep the fuel flowing. They made it back to Jodpur with aching arms but without further incident. It turned out the electrical fuel pumps were faulty. There was however an upside to the story. The Marahajah of Jodpur had made an open invitation for officers to visit his brand new palace, 14 years in the building, the date being Christmas Eve. Arthur and his Nav. went along for the overnight stay. It was a remarkably opulent place, gold taps and door knobs. At dinner they sat around an enormous round table, where a toy train went about on a track to deliver food and condiments! Before departure, they were given gifts by the Marahajah. Arthur's was a very nice silver tankard, inscribed with his name, location and date. We still have it, in a display case. There were some generous-hearted, pro-British Indians, as well as the other lot, who of course, were pushing for Independence.
I was hoping to find an explanation for Arthur signing your log book. 84 Sqn had moved to Ratmalana, Ceylon on 19 April '43, in anticipation of a Jap naval attack. It didn't materialise, so they moved back north, to Ranchi, by August. I'll be able to lay my hands on Arthur's log book at the weekend, so hopefully this will shed more light.
Re. modern pilots pulling high G-forces, presumably they do it with the assistance of pressure suits. Maybe your lack of pressure suits had health implications, and it was this that the American medic was concerned about. Who knows? Anyway, you've made it to 94 and my father made it to 100 (albeit with a first stroke when he was 78). So one might legitimately wonder whether this chap was 'crying wolf'.
I wonder if you had any personal experience of the Vengeance's teething problems? On 24 Dec '42, Arthur took one of the squadron's first aircraft on a flight from Jodpur to Delhi, having collected it from the MU at Karachi, earlier in the day. 75 miles out from Jodpur, the engine cut out. He managed to keep it airborne, by madly operating a hand wobble-pump to keep the fuel flowing. They made it back to Jodpur with aching arms but without further incident. It turned out the electrical fuel pumps were faulty. There was however an upside to the story. The Marahajah of Jodpur had made an open invitation for officers to visit his brand new palace, 14 years in the building, the date being Christmas Eve. Arthur and his Nav. went along for the overnight stay. It was a remarkably opulent place, gold taps and door knobs. At dinner they sat around an enormous round table, where a toy train went about on a track to deliver food and condiments! Before departure, they were given gifts by the Marahajah. Arthur's was a very nice silver tankard, inscribed with his name, location and date. We still have it, in a display case. There were some generous-hearted, pro-British Indians, as well as the other lot, who of course, were pushing for Independence.
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A truly fascinating exchange, Nigel and Danny. I read every word twice.
Nigel, in spite of Danny's protestations, I'm pretty sure he'll achieve at least the ton before he puts the red line under his last real-life log book entry.
Nigel, in spite of Danny's protestations, I'm pretty sure he'll achieve at least the ton before he puts the red line under his last real-life log book entry.
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NigG (your #74),
Thank you - can I put a proper reply on hold for a day or so ? (so that I can first finish and get on this Thread a very strange story indeed).
Meanwhile, cf "Pilot's Brevet" p.129 #2568, and have a browse round. Plenty of VV engine troubles there !
Danny.
Stanwell,
Wouldn't put money on it !
D.
Thank you - can I put a proper reply on hold for a day or so ? (so that I can first finish and get on this Thread a very strange story indeed).
Meanwhile, cf "Pilot's Brevet" p.129 #2568, and have a browse round. Plenty of VV engine troubles there !
Danny.
Stanwell,
Wouldn't put money on it !
D.
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NigG,
Finished early, as I've put a bit of "Pilot's Brevet" into it.
Some of the contributors to Peter C. Smith's excellent "Vengeance !" have seriously misled him (no doubt inadvertently, of course, because, as I've once said: "All memory is fallible, and an old man's memory is particularly fallible").
The most unfortunate example (to my mind) comes in p.117 of the text. I quote verbatim:
Never had anything to do with them. Think they were 200lb. Why incendiaries in place of HE ? - suppose something like a petroleum tank farm had come in range as they moved forward behind the Army.
This is supported by what he heard from:
.
Now cf ("Pilot's Brevet") p.134 #2680, and see if you can make sense of it all. Clearly they had got hold of the wrong name. But weirdly, Duncan was the name that had worked down to us at Digri with 8 Sqdn. How can such a hideous mistake have been made, even on the 'grapevine' ? (it had me at one time even thinking reluctantly of a possible Martin Guerre scenario).
Who actually died ? Don't know.
To start with, I knew "Bud" (but always as "Red") McInnes (RCAF) very well; he was on "B" Flight of 110 Sqdn, and had come out with me in December, '42. He was later the first CO of 1340 Flight from its formation in September '44 to April '45, when he went back to Canada and I took over from him for a year till the end in '46.
Reg Duncan (RCAF) was a good friend on "A" Flight of 110 and was one of the Blenheim veterans. He was my mentor for my first (and only!) training ride in the VV. Flew on 'ops' with him many a time. Must have gone home very early on, for I believe the RCAF counted their overseas tour (as was only right) from the time they left Canada, and Reg would have had several months training in UK (inc OTU), and then spent some time on Blenheim ops before they went out to India.
Nonsense ! Impossible ! In any case, Duncan's "Spunky" had had to be put down a year before - and it wasn't a "little" dog!
(The Index shows a Handsford, Glyn 117. But the Acknowledgements list only a HANDSFORTH, T.G. M.T. Driver, 84 Squadron RAF, but he is not indexed neither is Handford acknowledged. We may be talking about the same man - but this is is irrelevant).
Back to normal, now!
Danny.
Finished early, as I've put a bit of "Pilot's Brevet" into it.
Some of the contributors to Peter C. Smith's excellent "Vengeance !" have seriously misled him (no doubt inadvertently, of course, because, as I've once said: "All memory is fallible, and an old man's memory is particularly fallible").
The most unfortunate example (to my mind) comes in p.117 of the text. I quote verbatim:
..."Bud McInnes writes..............'After a month or so on ops we started carrying the large incendiary bombs under the wing,..
...and the Squadron [110] did have one accident in this regard - where one of these incediaries was a hang-up for some reason. Although the pilot knew he had a hang-up on return to base he landed anyway, and the bomb fell off and exploded right under his wing. Needless to say, the aircraft went up in a ball of smoke, and no one was saved"...
...'Glyn Hansford who was an armourer with 110 Squadron. His mount was a three-ton Chevrolet rather than a dive bomber, but he and his companions played a full part in this campaign. It was one long continuing round to keep the planes flying, but some incidents stood out as he related to me [McInnes], and the one just mentioned was one of them'..........'There were many acts of courage and devotion to duty. One of the most vivid was that of a Canadian pilot, Flying Officer Duncan , who returned from a sortie with a bomb hung up, which he could not shake off at all. He attempted to land with it on, a very risky thing to do, and it blew up as he touched down. He and his aircraft were totally destroyed..
Now cf ("Pilot's Brevet") p.134 #2680, and see if you can make sense of it all. Clearly they had got hold of the wrong name. But weirdly, Duncan was the name that had worked down to us at Digri with 8 Sqdn. How can such a hideous mistake have been made, even on the 'grapevine' ? (it had me at one time even thinking reluctantly of a possible Martin Guerre scenario).
Who actually died ? Don't know.
To start with, I knew "Bud" (but always as "Red") McInnes (RCAF) very well; he was on "B" Flight of 110 Sqdn, and had come out with me in December, '42. He was later the first CO of 1340 Flight from its formation in September '44 to April '45, when he went back to Canada and I took over from him for a year till the end in '46.
Reg Duncan (RCAF) was a good friend on "A" Flight of 110 and was one of the Blenheim veterans. He was my mentor for my first (and only!) training ride in the VV. Flew on 'ops' with him many a time. Must have gone home very early on, for I believe the RCAF counted their overseas tour (as was only right) from the time they left Canada, and Reg would have had several months training in UK (inc OTU), and then spent some time on Blenheim ops before they went out to India.
...along with his little pet dog, which he had taken with him on every mission'...
(The Index shows a Handsford, Glyn 117. But the Acknowledgements list only a HANDSFORTH, T.G. M.T. Driver, 84 Squadron RAF, but he is not indexed neither is Handford acknowledged. We may be talking about the same man - but this is is irrelevant).
Back to normal, now!
Danny.
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Danny
Thanks for the Brevet reference and info regarding the wobble-pump. Yes 'Vengeance' is a good book, albeit with a slow start.
I remember reading about the hung-up bomb and the pilot failing to shake the thing off... with appalling consequences when he landed. It reminds me of an incident my father had... which wasn't as dangerous but probably wasn't very amusing at the time.
Before he joined 84 Squadron in the Western Desert, he was a staff pilot at 42 Air School in South Africa. They used the Fairey Battle for trainee bomb aimers among other training roles. On one occasion he returned from a training sortie to find a blanket of sea-fog rolling in over the airfield. It had covered the airfield buildings but the landing area was still clear. Out of youthful mischief, he circled the airfield a few times, knowing that the staff in the fog-bound buildings below would assume that the whole airfield was covered and that the ‘poor’ pilot was probably heading for a crash-landing.
On his final approach to land, he released the undercarriage to find that only one wheel had come down, the other one was still locked and retracted inside the wing. The little prank of a few moments ago was now transformed into serious situation. He rocked the aircraft, applied positive and negative G, and flew over the control tower to get them to make a visual check. It was well and truly stuck. He then made his approach to land. As he came in over the grass, he was joined by two fire engines racing alongside, one at each wing tip. From the cockpit he frantically waved for them to give him more clearance. After touch-down, he carefully kept up the wing that had the jammed wheel. At the last moment, the wing descended to the ground, rotating the airplane with a brisk swing to the left, before it came to rest. The damage was surprisingly light. The ground crew changed the wing-tip and a flap, and the aircraft was up in the air again in the afternoon! The fault was a defective undercarriage lock. Of course, aircraft technology was a lot less dependable than it is today.
Thanks for the Brevet reference and info regarding the wobble-pump. Yes 'Vengeance' is a good book, albeit with a slow start.
I remember reading about the hung-up bomb and the pilot failing to shake the thing off... with appalling consequences when he landed. It reminds me of an incident my father had... which wasn't as dangerous but probably wasn't very amusing at the time.
Before he joined 84 Squadron in the Western Desert, he was a staff pilot at 42 Air School in South Africa. They used the Fairey Battle for trainee bomb aimers among other training roles. On one occasion he returned from a training sortie to find a blanket of sea-fog rolling in over the airfield. It had covered the airfield buildings but the landing area was still clear. Out of youthful mischief, he circled the airfield a few times, knowing that the staff in the fog-bound buildings below would assume that the whole airfield was covered and that the ‘poor’ pilot was probably heading for a crash-landing.
On his final approach to land, he released the undercarriage to find that only one wheel had come down, the other one was still locked and retracted inside the wing. The little prank of a few moments ago was now transformed into serious situation. He rocked the aircraft, applied positive and negative G, and flew over the control tower to get them to make a visual check. It was well and truly stuck. He then made his approach to land. As he came in over the grass, he was joined by two fire engines racing alongside, one at each wing tip. From the cockpit he frantically waved for them to give him more clearance. After touch-down, he carefully kept up the wing that had the jammed wheel. At the last moment, the wing descended to the ground, rotating the airplane with a brisk swing to the left, before it came to rest. The damage was surprisingly light. The ground crew changed the wing-tip and a flap, and the aircraft was up in the air again in the afternoon! The fault was a defective undercarriage lock. Of course, aircraft technology was a lot less dependable than it is today.
Last edited by NigG; 5th Jun 2016 at 17:49.
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NigG (your #79),
Not at all ! (If you stick your head above the PPRuNe parapet, you must expect a few brickbats with the plaudits).
D.
NigG (your #74 again, filleted),
We're all looking forward to it - Log books (F.414) are worth their weight in gold. Even seventy years after, you have all the accurate flying dates and details of movements. and can (fairly) easily trace a man's flying career. At the very back there is a "Record of Service" and "Aircraft Flown", as well. All the flying monthly summaries are countersigned by your Flight and Squadron Commanders. It is one of any aircrew's prize possessions - he will never willingly part with it.
Don't think so. Never did me any harm I know of.
Where shall I start ? Better yet - cf "Pilot's Brevet" from about p.130 #2591 onwards.
Of course, the Maharajahs were all pro-British - they were safe in their Princely States (so long as they "played ball" with the Viceroy !) After Independence they got short shrift from the new Government, got their marching orders and were pensioned off. I believe the Palace of Jodpur is now a luxury hotel.
The question of the relationship between the Raj and its former (till 1947) subjects in the Indian subcontinent is an enormous subject with 300+ years of turbulent history behind it. Far too much for discussion on this (or any other) Forum - and I don't feel qualified to try !
I've got "a foot in both camps": "Wg Cdr Arthur Gill, DFC, OBE" and "Pilot.s Brevet" Threads now, and it's a bit awkward. Could I possibly suggest that anything which does not refer to your distinguished late Father in any way is Posted on "Brevet" Thread (and vice versa) ? Just a thought (refusal will not give offence !)
Cheers, Danny.
... (Hope you don't mind me discussing you, Danny!)...
D.
NigG (your #74 again, filleted),
...by August. I'll be able to lay my hands on Arthur's log book at the weekend, so hopefully this will shed more light...
...Maybe your lack of pressure suits had health implications,..
...I wonder if you had any personal experience of the Vengeance's teething problems?...
...There were some generous-hearted, pro-British Indians...
... as well as the other lot, who of course, were pushing for Independence...
I've got "a foot in both camps": "Wg Cdr Arthur Gill, DFC, OBE" and "Pilot.s Brevet" Threads now, and it's a bit awkward. Could I possibly suggest that anything which does not refer to your distinguished late Father in any way is Posted on "Brevet" Thread (and vice versa) ? Just a thought (refusal will not give offence !)
Cheers, Danny.
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Danny
I now have Arthur's log book in front of me. Unfortunately there's no indication of why it was he signed your log book in late April '43. The Squadron had recently moved down to Ceylon, in anticipation of a Jap naval attack. He was doing little flying in April, just an airshow near Madras. I guess he had his hands full.
Yes, of course I'll be careful not to 'overwork' you! I appreciate you're busy in the 'Pilot's Brevet' Thread, and being asked questions that you've already covered in that Thread means that you have the somewhat unwelcome task of needing to trawl through and finding a page reference for me to view. Apologies... I'll be more careful!
Arthur's log book gives some insight into his operational flying over Burma. I've selected a representative sample of entries during the five months he was leading 84 Sqdn there, mid-February to mid-July 1944. The duration of ops were typically 1.5 to 2 hours, while the long range ones in support of the Chindits were 2.5 to 3.5 hours. A small selection, of 15 entries, out of the 108 operations he flew during this 150 day period, are as follows. (His record of the type of bombs dropped hasn’t been included):
29 February Bomb attack on Jap village of Metkalet. 12 Vengeances. Highly successful. Strafed target with front and rear guns.
4 March Another attack on the camp west of Kontha. Direct hits on target area. One aircraft lost. [An additional note adds:] WO Keech (USA) (pilot) and WO Watkins lost when their aircraft exploded during the dive over the target, possibly due to AA fire.
18 March Attack by 21 Vengeances on Jap road block in the Tiddim area. Target indicated by 25-pounder smoke shells. Light AA fire. 70 degree dive through hole in clouds, 12000’ to 7000’, height of target 6000’. One aircraft’s port tank holed.
4 April Raid on Jap occupied airfield of Tamu. Led 36 Vengeances (84, 110 and 7 Sqdns). Very successful. Top cover of 136 Sqdn Spitfires. [A note refers to an operation he didn’t fly on:] 6 April ‘B’ Flight flew into a very bad storm. P/O Gabrielson thrown out of aircraft ‘U’ and landed safely by parachute. He arrived back after 6 days of walking. Aircraft ‘Q’ crashed into mountains. Sgt Dyer received head injuries, and F/Sgt Russell had both arms broken.
8 April Long Range Penetration Group (LRPG) [Chindit] target. 450 mile flight to Mawlu, Irrawaddy. Bombed Jap bunker position overlooking a ‘Wingate’ landing strip [used for landing troops and stores behind enemy lines, by Dakota aircraft]. R/T communication with LRP column and smoke indication used. 12 Vengeances. Extremely successful. Heavy AA fire from Mawlu. [A note adds:] 3rd Indian Division states that bunker positions destroyed. 265 dead Japs counted.
12 April Set course for Agam to bomb Yenan. Recalled by radio because of Jap Army ‘01’ [‘Oscar’] fighters in the vicinity.
15 April AASC target. Led 24 Vengeances on attack on ridge, NE of Imphal. Large number of Japs dug-in. All bombs in target area. [Note adds:] Report from 4 Corps stated that Gurkha troops ‘went-in’ immediately after bombing and occupied the whole area with little opposition. Over 450 dead Japs counted.
22 April 24 Vengeances attack on Jap occupied village of Nigthoughhong, SW of Imphal. All bombs on target. Army trucks seen rushing South as last aircraft pulled out of dive. [Note adds:] British and Gurkha troops attacked immediately after our raid, but had only partial success due to Jap machine gun and anti-tank gun positions dug-in North of the village. Troops suffered over 50% casualties.
26 April Set course to bomb LRPG target at Indaw. Fighter Ops at Imphal diverted us and our fighter escort to the Northwest, and then back to base, because of 50-plus enemy fighters in the Imphal plain. I dived to height of mountain tops (6000’), amongst cumulus clouds, leading two boxes of six in tight formation. Our Hurricane escort was ‘jumped’ by Oscars. (Two Hurricanes damaged.)
8 May 36 Vengeances set course for Kalewa led by 110 Sqdn and escorted by 12 Long-range Hurricanes. I led ‘B’ Flight through bad weather to dumps near Kalewa. 110 and 7 Sqdns turned back, and ‘A ‘ Flight got lost! Heavy AA fire from Kalewa, but excellent bombing carried out. My own bombs hit a petrol or ammo dump and caused a huge explosion. (Fighter escort lost us.)
17 May Attempted to bomb Jap advanced 33 Division HQ located in 600’ mountains South of Bishenpur. Cloud base over whole target area 660’, making bombing impossible. [Note of 22 May says that the monsoon had arrived.]
23 May LRPG target, a boat-building yard, East of Indawgyi lake. 12 Vengeances. Very successful. Total distance 550 miles. Practically whole flight done above 10/10ths cloud.
1, 3, 4 June [Operations aborted due to cloud-cover over the target.]
5 June (LRPG) Attack on about 1000 Japs in the Pagoda at Onsansaing. My 1500 lbs bombs scored a direct hit on the centre of the Pagoda. Light AA fire encountered, probably 20mm, but it stopped when I strafed. I fired 900 rounds during my dive, into the Pagoda and the surrounding area.
26 June [Note made about an attack he didn’t fly on:] Vengeance FD 105 had a hydraulic pipe burst when approaching the target at Tamu. PO Finnie, the pilot, ordered F/O Ellis, gunner, to standby to bale-out. But as both cockpits were filled with ‘smoke’, Ellis evidently misunderstood and baled-out. He was seen to land South-east of Tamu. Finnie flew back to base! [A later note:] Subsequently learned that Jack Ellis had been capture by the Japs, imprisoned, tortured and then killed.
29 June New tactic tried out. Low-level, shallow dive attack on Ya-Nan bridge by 3 Vengeances. Direct hits scored. Bridge breached in two places and centre collapsed. [low-level attack was necessary due to low cloud preventing a normal vertical dive.]
5 July Low-level shallow dive attack on stores and troops at Le-u. 12 Vengeances attacked in flights of three. No.3 (Sgt Natrass) badly damaged by a great explosion – probably land-mine or ammo dump, but he flew back to base. 20mm and 37mm AA fire encountered.
10 July [Flying the squadron’s Spitfire] Weather recce Kalewa area. 10/10ths cloud South of Imphal Valley. Turned Northeast into Kabaw Valley and dived from 11000’ to 4000’. Sighted two ‘Oscar’ IIs, 1500’ above me. Turned into cloud and later sighted one ‘Oscar’. Attacked from behind and saw canon shells strike it. A large part broke-off and the enemy aircraft rolled onto its back and dived vertically into clouds covering the hills. (Claimed as ‘probably destroyed’). [Note adds:] Claim granted by 3rd TAF and Eastern Air Command 12 July ‘44. Oscar later confirmed as definitely destroyed.
Tough days! And even tougher on the Japanese. Arthur said he hated war, but I think these days of aerial warfare counted for the most remarkable of his life.
I now have Arthur's log book in front of me. Unfortunately there's no indication of why it was he signed your log book in late April '43. The Squadron had recently moved down to Ceylon, in anticipation of a Jap naval attack. He was doing little flying in April, just an airshow near Madras. I guess he had his hands full.
Yes, of course I'll be careful not to 'overwork' you! I appreciate you're busy in the 'Pilot's Brevet' Thread, and being asked questions that you've already covered in that Thread means that you have the somewhat unwelcome task of needing to trawl through and finding a page reference for me to view. Apologies... I'll be more careful!
Arthur's log book gives some insight into his operational flying over Burma. I've selected a representative sample of entries during the five months he was leading 84 Sqdn there, mid-February to mid-July 1944. The duration of ops were typically 1.5 to 2 hours, while the long range ones in support of the Chindits were 2.5 to 3.5 hours. A small selection, of 15 entries, out of the 108 operations he flew during this 150 day period, are as follows. (His record of the type of bombs dropped hasn’t been included):
29 February Bomb attack on Jap village of Metkalet. 12 Vengeances. Highly successful. Strafed target with front and rear guns.
4 March Another attack on the camp west of Kontha. Direct hits on target area. One aircraft lost. [An additional note adds:] WO Keech (USA) (pilot) and WO Watkins lost when their aircraft exploded during the dive over the target, possibly due to AA fire.
18 March Attack by 21 Vengeances on Jap road block in the Tiddim area. Target indicated by 25-pounder smoke shells. Light AA fire. 70 degree dive through hole in clouds, 12000’ to 7000’, height of target 6000’. One aircraft’s port tank holed.
4 April Raid on Jap occupied airfield of Tamu. Led 36 Vengeances (84, 110 and 7 Sqdns). Very successful. Top cover of 136 Sqdn Spitfires. [A note refers to an operation he didn’t fly on:] 6 April ‘B’ Flight flew into a very bad storm. P/O Gabrielson thrown out of aircraft ‘U’ and landed safely by parachute. He arrived back after 6 days of walking. Aircraft ‘Q’ crashed into mountains. Sgt Dyer received head injuries, and F/Sgt Russell had both arms broken.
8 April Long Range Penetration Group (LRPG) [Chindit] target. 450 mile flight to Mawlu, Irrawaddy. Bombed Jap bunker position overlooking a ‘Wingate’ landing strip [used for landing troops and stores behind enemy lines, by Dakota aircraft]. R/T communication with LRP column and smoke indication used. 12 Vengeances. Extremely successful. Heavy AA fire from Mawlu. [A note adds:] 3rd Indian Division states that bunker positions destroyed. 265 dead Japs counted.
12 April Set course for Agam to bomb Yenan. Recalled by radio because of Jap Army ‘01’ [‘Oscar’] fighters in the vicinity.
15 April AASC target. Led 24 Vengeances on attack on ridge, NE of Imphal. Large number of Japs dug-in. All bombs in target area. [Note adds:] Report from 4 Corps stated that Gurkha troops ‘went-in’ immediately after bombing and occupied the whole area with little opposition. Over 450 dead Japs counted.
22 April 24 Vengeances attack on Jap occupied village of Nigthoughhong, SW of Imphal. All bombs on target. Army trucks seen rushing South as last aircraft pulled out of dive. [Note adds:] British and Gurkha troops attacked immediately after our raid, but had only partial success due to Jap machine gun and anti-tank gun positions dug-in North of the village. Troops suffered over 50% casualties.
26 April Set course to bomb LRPG target at Indaw. Fighter Ops at Imphal diverted us and our fighter escort to the Northwest, and then back to base, because of 50-plus enemy fighters in the Imphal plain. I dived to height of mountain tops (6000’), amongst cumulus clouds, leading two boxes of six in tight formation. Our Hurricane escort was ‘jumped’ by Oscars. (Two Hurricanes damaged.)
8 May 36 Vengeances set course for Kalewa led by 110 Sqdn and escorted by 12 Long-range Hurricanes. I led ‘B’ Flight through bad weather to dumps near Kalewa. 110 and 7 Sqdns turned back, and ‘A ‘ Flight got lost! Heavy AA fire from Kalewa, but excellent bombing carried out. My own bombs hit a petrol or ammo dump and caused a huge explosion. (Fighter escort lost us.)
17 May Attempted to bomb Jap advanced 33 Division HQ located in 600’ mountains South of Bishenpur. Cloud base over whole target area 660’, making bombing impossible. [Note of 22 May says that the monsoon had arrived.]
23 May LRPG target, a boat-building yard, East of Indawgyi lake. 12 Vengeances. Very successful. Total distance 550 miles. Practically whole flight done above 10/10ths cloud.
1, 3, 4 June [Operations aborted due to cloud-cover over the target.]
5 June (LRPG) Attack on about 1000 Japs in the Pagoda at Onsansaing. My 1500 lbs bombs scored a direct hit on the centre of the Pagoda. Light AA fire encountered, probably 20mm, but it stopped when I strafed. I fired 900 rounds during my dive, into the Pagoda and the surrounding area.
26 June [Note made about an attack he didn’t fly on:] Vengeance FD 105 had a hydraulic pipe burst when approaching the target at Tamu. PO Finnie, the pilot, ordered F/O Ellis, gunner, to standby to bale-out. But as both cockpits were filled with ‘smoke’, Ellis evidently misunderstood and baled-out. He was seen to land South-east of Tamu. Finnie flew back to base! [A later note:] Subsequently learned that Jack Ellis had been capture by the Japs, imprisoned, tortured and then killed.
29 June New tactic tried out. Low-level, shallow dive attack on Ya-Nan bridge by 3 Vengeances. Direct hits scored. Bridge breached in two places and centre collapsed. [low-level attack was necessary due to low cloud preventing a normal vertical dive.]
5 July Low-level shallow dive attack on stores and troops at Le-u. 12 Vengeances attacked in flights of three. No.3 (Sgt Natrass) badly damaged by a great explosion – probably land-mine or ammo dump, but he flew back to base. 20mm and 37mm AA fire encountered.
10 July [Flying the squadron’s Spitfire] Weather recce Kalewa area. 10/10ths cloud South of Imphal Valley. Turned Northeast into Kabaw Valley and dived from 11000’ to 4000’. Sighted two ‘Oscar’ IIs, 1500’ above me. Turned into cloud and later sighted one ‘Oscar’. Attacked from behind and saw canon shells strike it. A large part broke-off and the enemy aircraft rolled onto its back and dived vertically into clouds covering the hills. (Claimed as ‘probably destroyed’). [Note adds:] Claim granted by 3rd TAF and Eastern Air Command 12 July ‘44. Oscar later confirmed as definitely destroyed.
Tough days! And even tougher on the Japanese. Arthur said he hated war, but I think these days of aerial warfare counted for the most remarkable of his life.
Last edited by NigG; 16th Jun 2016 at 19:06.
