Harrier in Op CORPORATE
Well one huge difference would be the lack of a radar, which is a heck of a limitation for an A-A combat role...
That's why the sidewinder fit was just a "boresighted" thing - point the aeroplane at the target and hope the missile's seaker head can acquire what you're looking at rather than an integrated solution in which the aeroplane's radar hands over a specific target track to the missile's seeker system before launch.
PDR
That's why the sidewinder fit was just a "boresighted" thing - point the aeroplane at the target and hope the missile's seaker head can acquire what you're looking at rather than an integrated solution in which the aeroplane's radar hands over a specific target track to the missile's seeker system before launch.
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That's why the sidewinder fit was just a "boresighted" thing - point the aeroplane at the target and hope the missile's seaker head can acquire what you're looking at rather than an integrated solution in which the aeroplane's radar hands over a specific target track to the missile's seeker system before launch.
PDR
Don't forget we're talking about 30 plus years back and at the time there were plenty of radar equipped A-A machines tooling around in Europe and elsewhere with boresight only AIM capability.
This is probably one for the likes of the QWIs like Courtney Mil, because I may be slightly adrift on dates, but as I recall it at the time of the conflict even the UK's radar equipped F-4s, by definition operating in the A-A role, didn't have a off boresight capability for it's Sidewinders, either the AIM-9G's or the (just being introduced to the RAF inventory) Limas, .
Don't know about the SHARs fit.
Don't forget we're talking about 30 plus years back and at the time there were plenty of radar equipped A-A machines tooling around in Europe and elsewhere with boresight only AIM capability.
This is probably one for the likes of the QWIs like Courtney Mil, because I may be slightly adrift on dates, but as I recall it at the time of the conflict even the UK's radar equipped F-4s, by definition operating in the A-A role, didn't have a off boresight capability for it's Sidewinders, either the AIM-9G's or the (just being introduced to the RAF inventory) Limas, .
Don't know about the SHARs fit.
Last edited by wiggy; 26th Apr 2016 at 18:40.
You may be right, I will admit that I can't remember what was in the original NAVHARS of the FRS1, but the expanded acquisition modes were definitely in the FRS2/FA2.
But doing CAP without a radar (your own, a ground-based one or an AWACS) would mean relying on purely visual threat identification. The scene of action was over the horizon from the carriers' radars, so the only option would have been to have an FRS1 "stand off" and try to use its radar to direct the GR3s into visual acquisistion. Playing fighter-controller is a heck of a workload for a single-seat fast jet driver!
The whole SHAR A-A doctrine was based on using the radars of two aircraft travelling in opposite directions to minimise gaps in radar coverage (sharky's famous "coordinated pairs" tactic), and you can't use a GR3 in the same way. Obviously you can do SOMETHING, but how effective that would have been against radar-equipped missile-armed fighters is another story!
I could be wrong on this. I was a SHAR and then Harrier II man, but only ever as an engineer - never as a driver.
PDR
But doing CAP without a radar (your own, a ground-based one or an AWACS) would mean relying on purely visual threat identification. The scene of action was over the horizon from the carriers' radars, so the only option would have been to have an FRS1 "stand off" and try to use its radar to direct the GR3s into visual acquisistion. Playing fighter-controller is a heck of a workload for a single-seat fast jet driver!
The whole SHAR A-A doctrine was based on using the radars of two aircraft travelling in opposite directions to minimise gaps in radar coverage (sharky's famous "coordinated pairs" tactic), and you can't use a GR3 in the same way. Obviously you can do SOMETHING, but how effective that would have been against radar-equipped missile-armed fighters is another story!
I could be wrong on this. I was a SHAR and then Harrier II man, but only ever as an engineer - never as a driver.
PDR
We had Sidewinder Expanded Acquisition Mode (SEAM) around then in the F-4 - but IIRC, the SHAR was supposed to be able to slave the missile seeker heads towards the target using Blue Fox?
Weren't pretty well all South Atlantic air-to-air missile kills achieved visually though?
Incidentally, whatever people might think about him in later years, it's clear that Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...
Weren't pretty well all South Atlantic air-to-air missile kills achieved visually though?
Incidentally, whatever people might think about him in later years, it's clear that Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...
Without a radar and a significant speed advantage the GR3 would have been of marginal use on CAP. The Shar could cope with the relative lack of speed by having a reasonable radar to get a firing solution. Rolling out three miles behind Mirages in your GR3 wouldn't give you too many options so the initial intercept to visual pickup would have to be virtually flawless to give any chance of success.
Kitbag,
All marks of AIM9 were aided by radar. Most basically to allow the shooter to perform an intercept and roll out in range. From the early 80s onwards, to slave the mx seeker head to the target.
Regardless of that, boresite, tone, uncage, shoot works pretty well for that theatre.
But Flap62 is absolutely correct. The GR3 would have been, effectively, a point defence Hawk. It was not what it was designed to do.
All marks of AIM9 were aided by radar. Most basically to allow the shooter to perform an intercept and roll out in range. From the early 80s onwards, to slave the mx seeker head to the target.
Regardless of that, boresite, tone, uncage, shoot works pretty well for that theatre.
But Flap62 is absolutely correct. The GR3 would have been, effectively, a point defence Hawk. It was not what it was designed to do.
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Harrier Kills
My mate Alan Curtis was one of the pair that set off and were not seen again. Usual guesses as to the cause. He had an interesting CV started in the RAF 55 Sqn Victors in 1966 then went out to NZ on something fast and returned to dark blue. He splashed an Argie Canberra prior to the disapearing trick, prbably with a missile. I had E contact with his daughter last year for some photos because she knew little of his RAF career
PDR
Incidentally, whatever people might think about him in later years, it's clear that Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...
As an aside, B3-B8 had an astonishing reliability record, and the next time Ferranti saw most of the LRUs was when returned for the ILIC/Anderwave BF Mk2 upgrade in the late 80s/early 90s. The dog's bollo*ks of a radar, and the best radar company we ever had.
Quote:
BEagle......Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...
.........Tucumesh: Someone will know the full answer, but might this be due to a dearth of Blue Fox at the time?........
BEagle......Sharkey and 801 Sqn were far more knowledgeable about the use of Blue Fox and the associated tactics than were their 800 Sqn colleagues...
.........Tucumesh: Someone will know the full answer, but might this be due to a dearth of Blue Fox at the time?........
Also contributing, hadn't 801 just finished up a major exercise where they had worked on their air to air tactics and with the Blue Fox quite a bit?
Yep, they had just come off the Invincible after doing a North Atlantic cruise with an Alloy Express exercise off Norway at the end of it. Having a Wizard of a CPO Avionics Tech who could work wonders on any of the radars on the Squadron was more than a bit of a bonus as well.
Yes indeed, and that was the point at which John Fozzard made his remarkably prescient remark about "All the Sea Harrier needs now is a small war a long way from home to prove its capability" or similar. There were those who wondered whether John had actually *paid* Galtieri to invade...
:0)
PDR
:0)
PDR
The AIM9 in the FRS1 could be bore-sighted, slaved to the Blue Fox radar or used in "super scan". This last mode allowed the missile to search a box +/- a few degrees of the nose and + quite a lot of degrees (can't remember how many) above LFD, every few seconds. This effectively allowed it to lock a target that you couldn't get the nose onto. Only trouble was that the software was cobbled together v quickly and it was roll stabilised. This meant that in a hard starboard turn, the missile scanned out of your left ear!
Hey-Ho!
Hey-Ho!
Hi Mogwi,
....[INo 1 (F) Sqn GR3s did not carry sidewinders at all during the conflict[/I]...
We did actually,
There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.
We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.
We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.
Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.
Regards
....[INo 1 (F) Sqn GR3s did not carry sidewinders at all during the conflict[/I]...
We did actually,
There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.
We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.
We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.
Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.
Regards
Hi Mogwi,
....[INo 1 (F) Sqn GR3s did not carry sidewinders at all during the conflict[/I]...
We did actually,
There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.
We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.
We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.
Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.
Regards
....[INo 1 (F) Sqn GR3s did not carry sidewinders at all during the conflict[/I]...
We did actually,
There was just one day when we had the chance of an AA engagement with the ‘winders. That was 19 May, our one and only ‘training’ day, before we began mudmoving ops, having arrived in theatre on 18 May.
We flew all that day with Limas, practising ACM. All switches had to be made ‘live’ to get acquisitions, but we found no real problem locking on the Lima with boresight aiming. Most of us had already fired a ‘winder on Aberporth, using the same technique. We thought it was a magic weapon.
We were briefed that we could become part of the local Task Group CAP whilst airborne and indeed GOV and the Boss were directed to intercept a suspected enemy B707. Unfortunately it turned away and no intercept resulted, much to our disappointment.
Later on we hoped the Navy might let us join in the CAPs, flying in company with SeaJets if they ran short of airframes, but it was not to be.
Regards
Interesting exmudmover, thank you very much for chiming in.
When you said most had fired a 'winder, was that right before heading South, or in previous work?
Was also curious about the big (300 gallon?) ferry tanks. Did you make any of the long distance flights with them? I recall they affected handling a bit?
Was also curious about the big (300 gallon?) ferry tanks. Did you make any of the long distance flights with them? I recall they affected handling a bit?
4 GR3's were flown to the Hermes directly from Ascension during the last two weeks of the war and the 330 gallon tanks were used on those sorties as well, but were jettisoned before landing on the carrier. The four Harriers that did those sorties also carried a pair of the standard tanks on the outer wing plyons. Where the outer wing plyons 'Wet' and used on the ferry flights or were the standard tanks carried down there 'Dry' just to give the aircraft some tanks to use while being used operationally?
Hi sandiego89
Yes we used the big 330gal tanks often on ferry flights. They limited handling and could not be used for any hard manoeuvring or VTOL work. The big gotcha was landing. In the landing config, with nozzles deflected, the ac was quite pitchy and you were limited to a max of 85% power to prevent pitch-up. Not very nice when you were tired after a long ferry flight… I actually experienced a pitch-up once on a night landing at Key West Florida, after a hasty hurricane evacuation from Belize.
MAINJAFAD - IIRC the GR3 outer pylons were dry. Empty 100gall tanks were carried south on all the reinforcement ac because we were running short of them in theatre.
Most of us had fired a winder on Aberporth during our very hasty work-up for CORPORATE.
Yes we used the big 330gal tanks often on ferry flights. They limited handling and could not be used for any hard manoeuvring or VTOL work. The big gotcha was landing. In the landing config, with nozzles deflected, the ac was quite pitchy and you were limited to a max of 85% power to prevent pitch-up. Not very nice when you were tired after a long ferry flight… I actually experienced a pitch-up once on a night landing at Key West Florida, after a hasty hurricane evacuation from Belize.
MAINJAFAD - IIRC the GR3 outer pylons were dry. Empty 100gall tanks were carried south on all the reinforcement ac because we were running short of them in theatre.
Most of us had fired a winder on Aberporth during our very hasty work-up for CORPORATE.