Ownership of risk

[alfred_the_great]

Not just commercial pressure, pilot ego seems to be coming into play as well.

[BEagle]

There can also be 'senior officer pressure' which some aircrew are unwilling to challenge....

We were on detachment once; due to the size of the det, we were accommodated off-base in an hotel. On the day we were due to fly back, the weather at base was dire - strong crosswinds out of our limits. So the DetCo decided that we'd stay another night, then RTB the following day when the weather was forecast to be significantly better.

Then we received an order from base (it was from 'Thrombo' the Flt Cdr) ordering us to fly home immediately. The reason being that the Dulles schedule had taken off, so if it was good enough for him, it'd be good enough for us. After a pause to pay the significant hotel cancellation fee ('Thrombo' hadn't thought of that), off we all went. It was someone else's turn to fly, so I was in the back listening on a long lead, but the wind and turbulence when we got back made for a very tricky landing indeed.

I gather that the Boss had A Word with Thrombo after that!

The nastiness of wind and turbulence at MPA shouldn't be underestimated. Also, crews need to check the maximum gust recorded in the previous few minutes rather than the METAR. I once landed in a serious crosswind which was just in limits, but it was hard work. Afterwards I queried the W/V with the MetO, only to be told that the peak gusts had been well outside the limit! Thank for telling us, chaps... If in doubt, get the tower to pass constant W/V values on final approach.

I'd have had no qualms at all about using the short cross RW; we used to practise low approaches and go-arounds on it and it wasn't really all that difficult. Best time to practise was on Saturday mornings, when the bone idle pongo officers were still in their pits instead of being at work as they should have been - the 6-day week had something to do with not having to pay to live/eat in the OM, or something. But you were expected to honour the commitment! A 4 Conway go-around over the DeathStar reminded them that at least some of us were at work!

[Could be the last?]

My understanding is that it becomes MP international Airport.......for about 3 hours on a Saturday afternoon - the terminal is handed over to a civ company to process the Latam and that is it. Services to operate the airfield are still military. I would like to see the FIG, regardless of juristication, get the requisite number of air traffickers, fire personnel, vass, security And other associated staff to run the airfield iaw with CAA regs and therefore potentially own the risk themselves! Ultimately, if they were to contribute to the running costs at a more appropriate level then I would expect that they may get more of a vote, but they don’t!

[langleybaston]

Afterwards I queried the W/V with the MetO, only to be told that the peak gusts had been well outside the limit! Thank for telling us, chaps... If in doubt, get the tower to pass constant W/V values on final approach.

Yes, absolutely. Unless things have changed radically, ATC and the Duty Pilot [if any] act as a cutout/liaison between Met and aircrew, and the Met folk provide ATC with routine obs and pre-agreed "specials". ATC will have/should have its own identical wind readout, but not the time trace {anemograph] that Met have. I think the current METAR coding allows recent peak gusts to be reported.

The thought occurs "does Met know the cross wind limits for each incoming aircraft ?" It certainly should, and the better SMetOs and SATCOs used to make sure that happened.

[BruntVaisala]

And a new twist on this ridiculous situation, it appears that fixed wing aircraft are banned from even flying over Mount Pleasant below 3000ft when there is a Prob 30 of severe turbulence. This is the NOTAM:
19 Nov 2018 0700Z - 19 Nov 2018 1700Z
AD CLOSED TO VISITING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT DUE TO SEVERE TURBULENCE.
NO ZONE TRANSITS BELOW 3000FT AGL.

Interestingly the forecast period for rotors is 0900Z to 1600Z, it appears the airspace as well as the airfield are now being closed for a greater period than the forecast weather itself, what is that all about?

[glad rag]

Lots of "free" time and the internet I would imagine.....

[Could be the last?]

BV,

And this is a ridiculous situation why?

[BruntVaisala]

Could Be the Last - turbulence usually occurs with a northerly at MPA, that is a given as is turbulence downwind of almost all the high ground in the Falklands when it is windy, especially with an inversion thrown in.
What we are seeing at the moment is incredible. It has always been in the MPA orders book that there can be severe turbulence with a northerly, recent times have seen it defined a little more with the vague 56003 code. I say vague because all that means is severe turbulence, and only a small chance at that, it is the rotors that are getting individuals excitable.
Very few people (myself included) have any issue with long haul traffic being affected due to the cost of possible diversions. What makes no sense whatsoever is closing the airfield to commercial traffic, especially to an airline (LATAM) who operate daily into South American airfields, many of which I am sure suffer much more turbulence than MPA. Unfortunately (Glad Rag gets it in one) there is too much free time going around and some individuals are trying as hard as possible to ban aviation, or at least fixed wing aviation at MPA.
I know for a fact that none of the local FIGAS pilots have ever been approached regarding their thoughts about flying in and out of MPA and the turbulence that exists, and how it might compare to anywhere else in the Islands. Due to the ability of the Islander, and experience/skill of the pilots, there are very few days when they would decline an approach into MPA. Interesting given that they collectively have thousands of landings between them with the most experienced pilot there now having in excess of 20 years experience in the Falklands.
I guess maybe my last post was ridiculous, but only because it has been superseded. The ridiculous NOTAM published for tonight's wind bans overflight of fixed wing up to 4000 ft despite the code clearly being 5600THREE. Clearly the author of the NOTAM does not believe the met man???? Better to be safe though!!!!
Are you a pilot yourself Could Be, if so I would be curious to know what your aviation experience at MPA is.
Curiously though all of this BS only applies to fixed wing, I would be curious to know from someone in the know why helicopters appear to be unaffected. Oddly the airspace ban also only applies to the MPA overhead, are military aircraft banned from flying downwind of all high ground in the Falklands when turbulence is forecast?

[Aurora Australis]

On the 13th, an aeromedical evacuation aircraft was inbound to MPA from Chile, eta about 2245Z (presumably based on the TAF issued 1924Z - this was before the recent change where MPA extended the closures to include 1 hr before and one hour after any forecast 56//// conditions).

At 2226Z, an amended TAF was issued, with the forecast 560003 now from 2200Z. The aeromed was denied permission to land, despite the actual conditions remaining OK, and had to divert to Argentina.

Throughout the period, there were no gusts reported in the Actuals, and no SPECIs issued. Despite a peak reported wind of 19kts, and a large part of the period reporting less than 5kts, the airfield was closed to landings and departures. I have operated aircraft into Mount Pleasant for over thirty years. The dangerous rotor streaming conditions do NOT suddenly appear when the basic wind is 5 knots.
This is "safety" gone mad!

METAR EGYP 140950Z 33011KT 9999 FEW002 BKN170 10/07 Q0993 BLU NOSIG=
METAR EGYP 140850Z 36012KT 9999 FEW003 BKN150 08/07 Q0994 BLU NOSIG=
METAR EGYP 140750Z 36004KT 9999 VCFG MIFG FEW003 08/06 Q0995 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140650Z 34004KT 9999 FEW007 08/06 Q0995 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140550Z 35004KT CAVOK 08/06 Q0996 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140450Z 02003KT CAVOK 08/06 Q0996 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140350Z 10004KT CAVOK 07/06 Q0997 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140250Z 04008KT 9999 FEW010 SCT250 10/07 Q0998 BLU=
METAR COR EGYP 140150Z 34019KT CAVOK 11/08 Q0999 BLU=
METAR EGYP 140050Z 36016KT CAVOK 10/05 Q1000 BLU BECMG BKN010 GRN=
METAR EGYP 132350Z 35015KT CAVOK 12/04 Q1001 BLU BECMG BKN010 GRN=
METAR EGYP 132250Z 36014KT CAVOK 13/04 Q1002 BLU NOSIG=
METAR COR EGYP 132150Z 33014KT CAVOK 16/02 Q1002 BLU NOSIG=
METAR EGYP 132050Z 33014KT CAVOK 17/03 Q1002 BLU=
METAR EGYP 131950Z 30014KT CAVOK 18/03 Q1003 BLU NOSIG=

TAF EGYP 140448Z 1406/1424 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 TEMPO 1406/1421 34025G35KT 530003
PROB40 TEMPO 1406/1413 BKN010 PROB40 TEMPO 1406/1421 VRB07KT 560003
PROB30 TEMPO 1406/1410 BKN004 BECMG 1421/1424 24013KT 50////=

TAF COR EGYP 140206Z 1403/1421 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 BECMG 1403/1405 BKN010
TEMPO 1403/1421 34025G35KT 530003 PROB40 TEMPO 1403/1410 BKN004
PROB30 TEMPO 1403/1421 VRB07KT 560003 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010=

TAF EGYP 140142Z 1403/1421 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 BECMG 1403/1405 BKN010
TEMPO 1403/1420 34025G35KT 530003 PROB40 TEMPO 1403/1410 BKN004
PROB30 TEMPO 1403/1420 VRB07KT 560003 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010
BECMG 1420/1421 31017G27KT 50////=

TAF EGYP 132250Z 1400/1418 35015G25KT 9999 FEW010 520003 BECMG 1400/1403 BKN010
PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1410 BKN004 PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1413 34025G35KT 530003
PROB30 TEMPO 1400/1418 VRB07KT 560003 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010
BECMG 1413/1416 35020G35KT 520003 PROB40 TEMPO 1413/1418 34030G40KT 530003=

TAF AMD EGYP 132226Z 1322/1415 32015KT 9999 FEW040 BECMG 1322/1401 35015G25KT 520003
TEMPO 1322/1415 34025G35KT 530003 PROB30 TEMPO 1322/1415 VRB07KT 560003
BECMG 1400/1403 BKN010 PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1409 BKN004 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010=

TAF EGYP 131924Z 1321/1415 32015KT 9999 FEW040 BECMG 1322/1401 35015G25KT 520003
TEMPO 1323/1415 34025G35KT 530003 PROB30 TEMPO 1323/1415 VRB07KT 560003
BECMG 1400/1403 BKN010 PROB40 TEMPO 1400/1409 BKN004 BECMG 1411/1414 FEW010=

[L1011effoh]

AA, you are quite correct that the rotor will not occur when the forecast wind is for 5 knots. However, I interpret these TAFs in a different way to you, and suspect that the forecaster is trying to show the detachment of the rotor from the hills that moves across the threshold, causing the severe turbulence. Note that the Prob 30 Tempo VRB07 runs exactly during the time period of the 340/25G35 wind forecast so you should read this in conjunction with the basic forecast wind during this period. I have seen the wind trace from the Met Office there showing 35-45kts across followed by a spell of 5 knots wind as the detached rotor moves across the airfield.

Despite this, I agree with you that the movement ban seems to be excessive at the moment. Having also subsequently flown into FNC, I would say that FNC was regularly worse than the conditions at MPA for turbulence, although it is an easy approach at MPA.

[Aurora Australis]

Hi L1011effoh. Thanks for your input. I guess from your username that you are an ex-Tristar crew member, so its good to hear from someone who may have experienced the conditions in question in a large jet (my experience of operating at MPA is in small and medium fixed wing, and rotary).
I agree with your comments about the interpretation of the TAF, as I said in my earlier post (#13) in the thread -

".....turbulence due to rotor activity indicated by 56/// group". In my view that is not strictly correct - those codes say nothing about the cause of the turbulence. There will be turbulence to some degree any time the wind at MPA is from the North, but the clue to the fact that it is rotor streaming is not in the 560003 alone, but the fact that it is accompanied by (e.g.)VRB05 - for someone not familiar with the phenomenon, they could be fooled into thinking that the TEMPO VRB05 meant the occasional relief from the bad turbulence of northerly 45kts, whereas it is exactly the opposite - it is when the rotors break off the hill and stream down over the airfield that the wind comes from all directions and is at its most turbulent."

So I am aware that it is the supposedly light winds that can have the worst turbulence. However, what I had meant to highlight in the sequence of METARs was that on that day, during the 560003 forecast, for a period of 15 hours of reports, not one showed a wind speed above 19kts, and the majority below 5kts, with no gusts reported. I was not there on that day, but have been on many other similar ones, and even on the worst days when there definitely are rotors, the majority of the time the basic wind will be, e.g.350/35-45, with only the occasional light and variable. Every report being light northerly suggests to me that, as on many other occasions, the conditions were nowhere near as bad as forecast.

If you were indeed Tristar crew on the airbridge, do you think that closing the airfield to all fixed-wing purely on the basis of forecast, with no flexibility for aircraft already enroute and close to landing (i.e. the LATAM flight from Punta Arenas) or even for departures, when the conditions are clearly not as forecast, is reasonable?

Edit - apologies, I see above that you already answered that in some way, by saying that you agreed the policy was excessive!

[langleybaston]

Originally Posted by L1011effoh

AA, ...................................................

If the forecasts are now produced by non-local Meteorologists, then they will be free from the temptation to make local TAF manipulations designed to lure unsuspecting TriStar crews down from ASI following the decision tree LPD/PNR/continue 'flowchart'. This seemed to be especially prevalent when mail/veg/replacements were inbound on the TriStar.

Not sure what "non-local" means in this context. Unless there has been a poor policy change, my belief is that the forecasts are produced by UK Met staff of Senior Scientific Officer [old-speak!] grade, and with substantial experience, and sitting in the office on the airfield.

If this is not so, that would be a great deterioration in coverage.

[L1011effoh]

Originally Posted by langleybaston

Not sure what "non-local" means in this context. Unless there has been a poor policy change, my belief is that the forecasts are produced by UK Met staff of Senior Scientific Officer [old-speak!] grade, and with substantial experience, and sitting in the office on the airfield.

If this is not so, that would be a great deterioration in coverage.

Sorry, I think I misinterpreted post #32 on a quick read. I'll edit my post.

[langleybaston]

Originally Posted by L1011effoh

Sorry, I think I misinterpreted post #32 on a quick read. I'll edit my post.

Don't make the mistake of thinking that I know what I am talking about ........ I know what USED to happen, and what SHOULD happen, but only someone on the spot, or a current Met person, will know the facts.

Remote forecasting for the Falklands sounds virtually impossible ............ by all accounts from my colleagues, forecasting on the spot was very difficult, and we only sent very able people.

[BruntVaisala]

- Undertake a more robust investigation into the phenomenon at MPC and generate the facts that will placate key elements of the FIG who are financially disadvantaged by delayed civ air into the military airfield. This research should include physical trials of ac flying in the 56//// conditions with key protagonists on board.

- Complement the met office with better technology to forecast with more accuracy etc, LIDAR??

Better Tech - absolutely, I believe this may be being looked at.

Physical trials - Now there is an idea! Could even ask the locals, they might have some experience and opinions worth listening to. I fully appreciate that none of them have the wealth of training that the RAF have however I would be willing to bet that the longest serving pilot at FIGAS at the moment has about 2000 landings at MPA alone over the last 20+ years with the previous two longest servers exceeding that. In fact as a collective the FIGAS pilots (current and retired) have well in excess of 120 years collective experience and 120000 landings in the Falklands, probably in excess of 10,000 landings at MPA in every weather condition year around. I am not aware of a single landing incident regarding a FIGAS aircraft at MPA although I am standing by to be corrected on this.

If this experience was to be tapped into along with a common sense approach along the lines of Madeira for inexperienced crews this should be easily resolved.
A simple way of data gathering in the short term if aircraft are prohibited from landing might be for MPA to request transiting aircraft to fly the approach lanes and provide PIREP's.

I would be interested to know how many weather related landing occurrences that have been at MPA. I know of one years ago regarding the hero. On the third, and final, approach they banged it in and required a heavy landing check. The alternative had been to divert to SA. Bizarre thing was they had experienced a similar event the day before but committed aviation again with an almost identical forecast.

The sad reality of this is that due to this over the top reaction to a risk analysis it is far more likely to cause a death to a medical patient awaiting extraction.

By closing the airfield to almost all (helicopters it seems are unaffected by turbulence) prevents the embarrassment of explaining to military personnel why they are not going home today despite the LATAM flight arriving / departing and FIGAS doing likewise.

[BruntVaisala]

Aurora Australis I have just been looking at your post (number 54) and also had a look back at a the other forecasts for your day in question. Interestingly the wind at MPA throughout the period matches the expected surface wind over the sea immediately north of the islands prior to orographic and temperature influence. What is particularly striking is that every METAR put together indicates a very steady met picture that is not at all reflected in the TAF. This suggests to me that the TAF is not worth the paper it is written on, or, that the infamous rotor is indeed sitting over MPA for almost all of that period, which would also prove the TAF to be incorrect.

Does anyone on here have any knowledge on how the met office evaluate themselves? It seems that unless someone is allowed to fly through the area then it is now impossible to evaluate it.

The last couple of years since the runway has been closed to F/W operations (don't see how that can be legal) during the periods of forecast rotors have continuously shown a matching of the TAF aligning with major sporting events on a Saturday and not to actual rotors existing.

I am ready to be corrected but I do not believe a single METAR has been issued during such a period that has displayed 340 25G35 with a TREND of VRB07. This would indicate rotors breaking from the hillside and crossing the airfield. The simple fact of the matter is that the forecasting model in these situations is not fit for purpose.

[Could be the last?]

BV - AA,

Like I have alluded to, whatever you think of the Met’s output or whether the Airfield Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions during forecasted rotors it is irrelevant. Ultimately, if you are not happy with the situation and want to own the risk yourselves, get your own airfield!

[langleybaston]

Originally Posted by BruntVaisala

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

Does anyone on here have any knowledge on how the met office evaluate themselves? It seems that unless someone is allowed to fly through the area then it is now impossible to evaluate it.

,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

I do not understand the reference to flying with regard to TAFs or indeed METARS. Unless things have changed out of all recognition, wind forecasts and observations are with respect to anemometer height. Flying at 30 feet through the area at 30 ft. sounds intrinsically dangerous.

[BruntVaisala]

Originally Posted by langleybaston

I do not understand the reference to flying with regard to TAFs or indeed METARS. Unless things have changed out of all recognition, wind forecasts and observations are with respect to anemometer height. Flying at 30 feet through the area at 30 ft. sounds intrinsically dangerous.

I am not suggesting flying through at anemometer height, however it is a funny thing but there are usually two occasions during every flight when flight does take place at this height. Funnily enough with the windsock being at 30ft it is in the non turbulent zone anyway

With regard to flying, the METARS should reflect (over the course of many hours) the TAF, otherwise the TAF would clearly not have been very accurate. Point being that when a TAF says 360/25G35 PROB 30 TEMPO VRB 07 I would find it not unreasonable to see a variety of winds over that period be reflected in the METAR. It never is! Hence querying how the Met Office evaluates, not necessarily their own performance, but more the strength of their forecasting model.

[BruntVaisala]

Originally Posted by Could be the last?

BV - AA,

Like I have alluded to, whatever you think of the Met’s output or whether the Airfield Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions during forecasted rotors it is irrelevant. Ultimately, if you are not happy with the situation and want to own the risk yourselves, get your own airfield!

You clearly have a problem with decisions being queried. I have no problem with the Met output but the reality is that the Operator is being overly zealous with the restrictions being put in place and zero credit is being given to aircraft being operated in and out of Mount Pleasant Airport by crews with a large amount of experience in operating into far more challenging runways. The recent spate of NOTAM's closing the airspace over MPA demonstrated the incoherent and knee-jerk reaction to the "risk", the fact that three different NOTAM's had three different restrictions in a week highlights this.