Russia sends four SU27s to Syria
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
CBinPIT, after the '73 war No 1 Sqn with Harrier was committed to a 3-Day exercise to fly 100 sorties per day; they did.
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Here in the Russian media it has been confirmed that a soldier died, indeed. He was doing a simple technical work on the ground at the airbase. It was written about a suiside (because of a conflict with his girlfriend) but this sounds like a b-****, IMHO. Anyway, no connection to the war, such things happen every now and then.
Arrival of MANPADs was anticipated. This should make the AF group change the tactics. While -24s and -34s can operate at night and are more difficult targets, -25s are day birds and have to take special care.
Arrival of MANPADs was anticipated. This should make the AF group change the tactics. While -24s and -34s can operate at night and are more difficult targets, -25s are day birds and have to take special care.
MSNBC reporting US will be sending troops to fight ISIS on the ground in Syria and Iraq. What could possibly go wrong 
https://twitter.com/MSNBC/status/659044425893548033
https://twitter.com/MSNBC/status/659044425893548033
MSNBC reporting US will be sending troops to fight ISIS on the ground in Syria and Iraq. What could possibly go wrong
https://twitter.com/MSNBC/status/659044425893548033
https://twitter.com/MSNBC/status/659044425893548033
Caveat:
Give it 24 hours to see if that news organ got a bad lead. They aren't quite top tier, but if they are directly quoting Ash Carter in testimony to the Congress ... well, uh, I suppose the more the merrier?
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MI-17s are tough:
Only one source for this so far so take with a shovel of salt:
Photo of the Syrian Mi-17 which was hit with a MANPAD ? landed safely | ? Mil Mi-24 Hind ?
Only one source for this so far so take with a shovel of salt:
Photo of the Syrian Mi-17 which was hit with a MANPAD ? landed safely | ? Mil Mi-24 Hind ?
Looks like a MANPAD strike to me and the aspect is pretty easy to determine too. A bit surprising that the warhead did not go off, even with the grazing angle. Still, lucky day for the crew as the impact alone did a fair amount of damage.
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Russian Pilots in Syria Rejected US Request to Speak English Russian Pilots in Syria Rejected US Request to Speak English
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No surprise - Su-30SM can carry up to 7 tonns of bombs. See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-30 :
Aerial bombs: 6× KAB 500KR, 3× KAB-1500KR, 8× FAB-500T, 28× OFAB-250-270, Nuclear bombs
IMHO, Su-24 and -34 crews need some rest, and since Su-30 can also do this job, why not?
Aerial bombs: 6× KAB 500KR, 3× KAB-1500KR, 8× FAB-500T, 28× OFAB-250-270, Nuclear bombs
IMHO, Su-24 and -34 crews need some rest, and since Su-30 can also do this job, why not?
No surprise - Su-30SM can carry up to 7 tonns of bombs. See e.g. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-30 :
Aerial bombs: 6× KAB 500KR, 3× KAB-1500KR, 8× FAB-500T, 28× OFAB-250-270, Nuclear bombs
Aerial bombs: 6× KAB 500KR, 3× KAB-1500KR, 8× FAB-500T, 28× OFAB-250-270, Nuclear bombs
I talk **** about the wing but damn it, those Russians are flying close air just like Marine Corps Cobra pilots. They aren't scared to get in the **** and neither are those Russians
Also, there seems to be lots of stuff flying around in the footage. Hard to make out what it is - birds, debris? Editted to add: Also at around 32 sec there are ground impacts as the two Hinds fly away - poss collateral impacts from AA/small arms etc aimed at Russian helos?
Last edited by dead_pan; 30th Oct 2015 at 17:49.
Not sure who got this guy -- Russians, Americans, someone else -- but well done to whomever did.
Good riddance to bad rubbish.
A German rapper labeled an international terrorist for joining ISIS has been killed in an airstrike, according to the Pentagon. The rapper — born Denis Cuspert — had performed under the name "Deso Dogg" and since joining ISIS gone by the name Abu Talha al-Almani. Department of Defense spokeswoman Elissa Smith said that an Oct. 16 airstrike near Raqqa, Syria, had killed Cuspert.
"Cuspert was a foreign terrorist fighter and operative for ISIL who used
social media to take advantage of disaffected youth and potential Western
recruits," she said in a brief statement, using another name for ISIS. "He
publicly threatened the president of the United States and German citizens; he also encouraged Western Muslims to conduct attacks."
"Cuspert was a foreign terrorist fighter and operative for ISIL who used
social media to take advantage of disaffected youth and potential Western
recruits," she said in a brief statement, using another name for ISIS. "He
publicly threatened the president of the United States and German citizens; he also encouraged Western Muslims to conduct attacks."
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Now Israel has been conducting air strikes in Syria:
Report: Israel Air Force Strikes Hezbollah, Regime Facilities in Syria - Israel News - Israel News - Haaretz Israeli News Source
The list of current combatants is very impressive.
All with different interests.
More details: http://www.timesofisrael.com/report-...for-hezbollah/
Report: Israel Air Force Strikes Hezbollah, Regime Facilities in Syria - Israel News - Israel News - Haaretz Israeli News Source
The list of current combatants is very impressive.
All with different interests.
More details: http://www.timesofisrael.com/report-...for-hezbollah/
Last edited by Eclectic; 31st Oct 2015 at 19:02.
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Today the capital of Islamic State, Raqqa, took a huge and unprecedented pasting.
Two dozen air strikes and a huge number reported dead.
Much collateral damage.
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_lfZ7uEgj8
Is this connected to A321 7K9268 in Sinai?
Two dozen air strikes and a huge number reported dead.
Much collateral damage.
Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_lfZ7uEgj8
Is this connected to A321 7K9268 in Sinai?
Last edited by Eclectic; 3rd Nov 2015 at 18:17.
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Some news opposite to those Daily Beast "hopes for escalation" of tension between the US and Russia:
1. US and Russian planes tested in flight comms (voice over radio) to prevent accidents and establish procedures to coordinate maneuvers:
US and Russian fighter jets test safety protocols in skies over Syria - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
2. A permanent link was established between military commands at the US base in Qatar and the Russian base in Syria to prevent conflicts in the area (as it was officially announced yesterday on TV by a Russian 3-star general). A similar link was earlier established with the Israeli air command.
3. Russian military established contacts with some groups of a so-called Syrian opposition (at least two groups were mentioned) which claimed they were fighting ISIS. 12 sorties were performed yesterday by the Russian planes to attack the (ISIS) targets that the above opposition groups pointed to the Russian military.
If all the above is true, then it is indeed a clear step towards coordinated efforts to vanish ISIS. How to change the regime in Syria will come after that. But one step at a time.
1. US and Russian planes tested in flight comms (voice over radio) to prevent accidents and establish procedures to coordinate maneuvers:
US and Russian fighter jets test safety protocols in skies over Syria - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
2. A permanent link was established between military commands at the US base in Qatar and the Russian base in Syria to prevent conflicts in the area (as it was officially announced yesterday on TV by a Russian 3-star general). A similar link was earlier established with the Israeli air command.
3. Russian military established contacts with some groups of a so-called Syrian opposition (at least two groups were mentioned) which claimed they were fighting ISIS. 12 sorties were performed yesterday by the Russian planes to attack the (ISIS) targets that the above opposition groups pointed to the Russian military.
If all the above is true, then it is indeed a clear step towards coordinated efforts to vanish ISIS. How to change the regime in Syria will come after that. But one step at a time.
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Video.
Allegedly of jet attacking Tall Othman in Hama and then being shot down.
The commander gets very excited:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6upNfCquhYc
PS. More is coming in about this.
Supposedly it is a Syrian Mig 21
PPS.
The MSM have the story now: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...ticle27096117/
Allegedly of jet attacking Tall Othman in Hama and then being shot down.
The commander gets very excited:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6upNfCquhYc
PS. More is coming in about this.
Supposedly it is a Syrian Mig 21
PPS.
The MSM have the story now: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...ticle27096117/
Last edited by Eclectic; 4th Nov 2015 at 15:10.
Some news opposite to those Daily Beast "hopes for escalation" of tension between the US and Russia:
1. US and Russian planes tested in flight comms (voice over radio) to prevent accidents and establish procedures to coordinate maneuvers:
US and Russian fighter jets test safety protocols in skies over Syria - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
2. A permanent link was established between military commands at the US base in Qatar and the Russian base in Syria to prevent conflicts in the area (as it was officially announced yesterday on TV by a Russian 3-star general). A similar link was earlier established with the Israeli air command.
3. Russian military established contacts with some groups of a so-called Syrian opposition (at least two groups were mentioned) which claimed they were fighting ISIS. 12 sorties were performed yesterday by the Russian planes to attack the (ISIS) targets that the above opposition groups pointed to the Russian military.
If all the above is true, then it is indeed a clear step towards coordinated efforts to vanish ISIS. How to change the regime in Syria will come after that. But one step at a time.
1. US and Russian planes tested in flight comms (voice over radio) to prevent accidents and establish procedures to coordinate maneuvers:
US and Russian fighter jets test safety protocols in skies over Syria - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)
2. A permanent link was established between military commands at the US base in Qatar and the Russian base in Syria to prevent conflicts in the area (as it was officially announced yesterday on TV by a Russian 3-star general). A similar link was earlier established with the Israeli air command.
3. Russian military established contacts with some groups of a so-called Syrian opposition (at least two groups were mentioned) which claimed they were fighting ISIS. 12 sorties were performed yesterday by the Russian planes to attack the (ISIS) targets that the above opposition groups pointed to the Russian military.
If all the above is true, then it is indeed a clear step towards coordinated efforts to vanish ISIS. How to change the regime in Syria will come after that. But one step at a time.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
What is the Russian military good for?
The Russian military intervention in Syria—launched in a great rush just over a month ago—came as a surprise; perhaps not as shocking as the swift occupation and annexation of Crimea, but a surprise nevertheless. But does Russia’s ability to surprise and to project force in Syria prove, as Garret Campbell claims, that Western attempts “to discredit Russian military capabilities” were inaccurate?
In fact, the first month of the operation tells us little about Russian military capabilities. It does show that the Russian leadership is prepared to play with military instruments of policy way beyond the limit of, for Western politicians, acceptable risk. This readiness to face big risks constitutes a political advantage of sorts. But it remains unclear that the Russian military is up to the task. There are many looming disasters on the battlefield in Syria, and the Russian military will inevitably take the blame if they come to pass.
Reforms and rearmament
In hindsight, it is striking that at the start of this decade, when the key domestic political guideline in Russia was “modernization” (and foreign policy guideline was “reset”), the only real modernization that happened was that of the armed forces. The military reform launched by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov began just a couple of months after the inglorious “victory” in the August 2008 war with Georgia. His replacement in November 2012 by Sergei Shoigu helped in correcting some mistakes in the incoherent design for reforms and also shifted the focus to combat training. The improved combat readiness, particularly of Russian special forces, made it possible to execute the spectacular operation aimed at taking control over Crimea in March 2014. But many key parts of the military machine still remain under-reformed and untouched by modernization.
Reforms never come without pain, and it was the air force that suffered the most damage from the ill-conceived cuts and reorganizations. The decision to disband the traditional structure of air regiments and divisions, as well as organize enlarged air bases, created a situation where combat planes of dozens of different types and modifications are put together into awkward system of maintenance. The reforms also severely disrupted the process of higher education, so that presently very few new pilots and engineers graduate. The result has been an organizational and logistic nightmare that has produced a long series of crashes this summer, including the loss of two Tu-95MS strategic bombers. The latest entry in this sad track record was the loss of a MiG-31 fighter over Kamchatka last Saturday.
Massive rearmament was supposed to compensate for the disorganization caused by radical reforms. The air force was promised 350 new tactical aircraft and 1,000 helicopters by 2020. But as economic stagnation in Russia has taken hold, these plans are undergoing ad hoc revisions. The order for the long-advertised fifth generation T-50 (PAK-FA) fighter was cut from 50 to just 12 planes, with an uncertain delivery date. And the increase of the transport aviation fleet had to be cancelled because of the breakdown of cooperative ties with the Antonov design bureau in Ukraine.
Bold advance into the Syrian trap
Executing a limited intervention into the mutating Syrian civil war doesn’t challenge these assessments, even if it did produce an outsized political effect. It is important, as Garrett points out, not to see Russian capabilities through the lens of Western ways of warfare. But is also important to remember certain hard battlefield realities will impose themselves regardless of one’s way of war.
The Russian intervention in Syria is only possible at all because the “hybrid war” in Eastern Ukraine, which has tied up the bulk of Russian combat-capable battalions, has seen virtually no use of the air force. Moscow sought to use this free capacity for staging demonstrations of air power over the Baltic theater but encountered effective containment—it has since scaled down its provocations. Syria appeared an easier option, and the deployment of an air regiment to the hastily prepared Hmeymym airbase outside Latakia went remarkably smoothly. As the air war has moved into the second month, however, issues with its trajectory have emerged.
The composition of the regiment (with a squadron of light Su-25SM fighter-bombers and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters) makes it most suitable for close air support. But that kind of difficult mission only makes sense if it’s in support of a ground offensive by Syrian government forces, which have proven incapable of conducting any successful campaign. Sustaining the air campaign at the present level may not be very expensive (conservative Russian estimate gives the figure of $2.5 million a day, compared to the roughly $9 million per day the United States spends on its anti-ISIS fight), but a technical setback is certain to hit sooner rather than later.
Escalation will be difficult because few other power projection options are available. The cruise missile salvo by the frigates of the Caspian flotilla on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s birthday was sensational, but it has seriously upset Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and so cannot be repeated. It had little resonance on the battlefield anyway. Expanding the scale of intervention would be logistically very difficult. The Russian navy had to lease and purchase eight commercial transports in order to deliver supplies for the operation at the level of up to 50 sorties a day (which means one sortie per aircraft). Its only aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is undergoing repairs (as it is most of the time), and the navy command could only dream of building an amphibious assault ship that would compare with Mistral-class ships, which France has refused to deliver.
What next for the over-stretched and abused military?
The Russian regime’s plan has clearly been to use initial battlefield success to negotiate an end to the civil war from a position of strength. But alas there has been little initial battlefield success. ISIS and other parts of the opposition have already begun to mount counter-offensives. And bringing the various sides together to negotiate appears as difficult as ever. If those negotiations fail, it will be hard for Russian leaders to find an opportunity to declare victory and go home.
But keeping the Russian military adventure going means waiting for a disaster to strike—and even with a high tolerance for risk, Putin has no stomach to take it. As the economy continues to sink, he needs new victories to keep the country mobilized around a patriotic agenda. And only military instruments work for his ambitious efforts to project strength from a position of weakness. The deadlock in Donbas was successfully camouflaged with the Syrian adventure, but in the near future this new quagmire might need another distraction. Georgia might be chosen again as a target of convenience, but the fact of the matter is that there are fewer and fewer uncommitted military capabilities to wield.
The bottom line is that, for the sake of regime survival, Putin has fallen back to the “safe” position of military confrontation. But the Russian military is not able to prevail in that confrontation and the Russian economy cannot possibly sustain it.
The Russian military intervention in Syria—launched in a great rush just over a month ago—came as a surprise; perhaps not as shocking as the swift occupation and annexation of Crimea, but a surprise nevertheless. But does Russia’s ability to surprise and to project force in Syria prove, as Garret Campbell claims, that Western attempts “to discredit Russian military capabilities” were inaccurate?
In fact, the first month of the operation tells us little about Russian military capabilities. It does show that the Russian leadership is prepared to play with military instruments of policy way beyond the limit of, for Western politicians, acceptable risk. This readiness to face big risks constitutes a political advantage of sorts. But it remains unclear that the Russian military is up to the task. There are many looming disasters on the battlefield in Syria, and the Russian military will inevitably take the blame if they come to pass.
Reforms and rearmament
In hindsight, it is striking that at the start of this decade, when the key domestic political guideline in Russia was “modernization” (and foreign policy guideline was “reset”), the only real modernization that happened was that of the armed forces. The military reform launched by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov began just a couple of months after the inglorious “victory” in the August 2008 war with Georgia. His replacement in November 2012 by Sergei Shoigu helped in correcting some mistakes in the incoherent design for reforms and also shifted the focus to combat training. The improved combat readiness, particularly of Russian special forces, made it possible to execute the spectacular operation aimed at taking control over Crimea in March 2014. But many key parts of the military machine still remain under-reformed and untouched by modernization.
Reforms never come without pain, and it was the air force that suffered the most damage from the ill-conceived cuts and reorganizations. The decision to disband the traditional structure of air regiments and divisions, as well as organize enlarged air bases, created a situation where combat planes of dozens of different types and modifications are put together into awkward system of maintenance. The reforms also severely disrupted the process of higher education, so that presently very few new pilots and engineers graduate. The result has been an organizational and logistic nightmare that has produced a long series of crashes this summer, including the loss of two Tu-95MS strategic bombers. The latest entry in this sad track record was the loss of a MiG-31 fighter over Kamchatka last Saturday.
Massive rearmament was supposed to compensate for the disorganization caused by radical reforms. The air force was promised 350 new tactical aircraft and 1,000 helicopters by 2020. But as economic stagnation in Russia has taken hold, these plans are undergoing ad hoc revisions. The order for the long-advertised fifth generation T-50 (PAK-FA) fighter was cut from 50 to just 12 planes, with an uncertain delivery date. And the increase of the transport aviation fleet had to be cancelled because of the breakdown of cooperative ties with the Antonov design bureau in Ukraine.
Bold advance into the Syrian trap
Executing a limited intervention into the mutating Syrian civil war doesn’t challenge these assessments, even if it did produce an outsized political effect. It is important, as Garrett points out, not to see Russian capabilities through the lens of Western ways of warfare. But is also important to remember certain hard battlefield realities will impose themselves regardless of one’s way of war.
The Russian intervention in Syria is only possible at all because the “hybrid war” in Eastern Ukraine, which has tied up the bulk of Russian combat-capable battalions, has seen virtually no use of the air force. Moscow sought to use this free capacity for staging demonstrations of air power over the Baltic theater but encountered effective containment—it has since scaled down its provocations. Syria appeared an easier option, and the deployment of an air regiment to the hastily prepared Hmeymym airbase outside Latakia went remarkably smoothly. As the air war has moved into the second month, however, issues with its trajectory have emerged.
The composition of the regiment (with a squadron of light Su-25SM fighter-bombers and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters) makes it most suitable for close air support. But that kind of difficult mission only makes sense if it’s in support of a ground offensive by Syrian government forces, which have proven incapable of conducting any successful campaign. Sustaining the air campaign at the present level may not be very expensive (conservative Russian estimate gives the figure of $2.5 million a day, compared to the roughly $9 million per day the United States spends on its anti-ISIS fight), but a technical setback is certain to hit sooner rather than later.
Escalation will be difficult because few other power projection options are available. The cruise missile salvo by the frigates of the Caspian flotilla on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s birthday was sensational, but it has seriously upset Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and so cannot be repeated. It had little resonance on the battlefield anyway. Expanding the scale of intervention would be logistically very difficult. The Russian navy had to lease and purchase eight commercial transports in order to deliver supplies for the operation at the level of up to 50 sorties a day (which means one sortie per aircraft). Its only aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is undergoing repairs (as it is most of the time), and the navy command could only dream of building an amphibious assault ship that would compare with Mistral-class ships, which France has refused to deliver.
What next for the over-stretched and abused military?
The Russian regime’s plan has clearly been to use initial battlefield success to negotiate an end to the civil war from a position of strength. But alas there has been little initial battlefield success. ISIS and other parts of the opposition have already begun to mount counter-offensives. And bringing the various sides together to negotiate appears as difficult as ever. If those negotiations fail, it will be hard for Russian leaders to find an opportunity to declare victory and go home.
But keeping the Russian military adventure going means waiting for a disaster to strike—and even with a high tolerance for risk, Putin has no stomach to take it. As the economy continues to sink, he needs new victories to keep the country mobilized around a patriotic agenda. And only military instruments work for his ambitious efforts to project strength from a position of weakness. The deadlock in Donbas was successfully camouflaged with the Syrian adventure, but in the near future this new quagmire might need another distraction. Georgia might be chosen again as a target of convenience, but the fact of the matter is that there are fewer and fewer uncommitted military capabilities to wield.
The bottom line is that, for the sake of regime survival, Putin has fallen back to the “safe” position of military confrontation. But the Russian military is not able to prevail in that confrontation and the Russian economy cannot possibly sustain it.
