Aerospace Project Management Woes - Why?
Not totally correct, the avionics presented no problems, however the US military having a "we do not have air conditioning in our military helicopters" stance had airbus remove it for the Lakota, the air conditioning was not just there for the crew, but for avionics cooling as well, hence they had problems early on until the system was restored.
It was called "Environmental Control System" which is a fancy way of saying "air conditioning" though you could get heat through the ducts as well. The MH-60R has it as well.
From a years old description of the system ... yes, it does indeed have scuppers, it's a Navy aircraft!
Cabin, cockpit, nose avionics compartment, and transition section temperature is controlled by the Environmental Control System (ECS). The system provides both heating and air conditioning within a range of 2 to 71 °C. Supplementary air circulation is provided in the cockpit by manually controlled air inlets (scuppers).
where engineers are overlooked by the management development process; a tendency by CFOs (esp. in publicly traded firms) to adopt the best-case program schedule as the most likely schedule; and the usual proclivity towards firefighting -- i.e. day-to-day milestones being missed, leading to heroic efforts to recover schedule down the road -- in the absence of strong
management.
management.
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: Hanging off the end of a thread
Posts: 32,915
Received 2,838 Likes
on
1,212 Posts
Unfortunately, the LUH has just encountered its first spot of trouble. The Associated Press reports that during flight tests in Southern California in 80-degree weather, cockpit temperatures in the UH-72A Lakota rose above 104 degrees, the designated critical point for communication, navigation and flight control systems…
A July 2007 report to the Army said that no cockpit equipment failed during testing, but the aircraft is considered “not effective for use” in hot environments until the military adds air conditioners to the helicopters. Civilian helicopters like the EC145 from which the Lakota is derived use air conditioning, and experience no problems with hot environments as a result. In contrast, military helicopters generally do not include air conditioning because adding them reduces available power, and increases their maintenance overhead.
The issue is the first example of the Army mis-estimating the factors involved in taking a commercial off the shelf helicopter and adapting it for military use – an issue that has plagued the Bell 407-derived ARH-70A helicopter almost from its inception. While the LUH program was designed to buy helicopters solely for use at home and far away from combat zones, there had been talk of changing that and creating a more flexible fleet of UH-72 helicopters that could fill various roles as needed. The latest issue, and the proposed resolution, makes that flexible fleet future less likely.
A July 2007 report to the Army said that no cockpit equipment failed during testing, but the aircraft is considered “not effective for use” in hot environments until the military adds air conditioners to the helicopters. Civilian helicopters like the EC145 from which the Lakota is derived use air conditioning, and experience no problems with hot environments as a result. In contrast, military helicopters generally do not include air conditioning because adding them reduces available power, and increases their maintenance overhead.
The issue is the first example of the Army mis-estimating the factors involved in taking a commercial off the shelf helicopter and adapting it for military use – an issue that has plagued the Bell 407-derived ARH-70A helicopter almost from its inception. While the LUH program was designed to buy helicopters solely for use at home and far away from combat zones, there had been talk of changing that and creating a more flexible fleet of UH-72 helicopters that could fill various roles as needed. The latest issue, and the proposed resolution, makes that flexible fleet future less likely.
LUH-72 Issues
The issue is not that EC sold the Army a bad bird. The issue is that bean counters at higher levels within DA considered the A/C a luxury item and deleted it. The A/C does not keep up out there, because there is not one. There is a ventilation system, but not an A/C like the rest of us are used to. Not to mention 2 other key issues. The avionics are not certified to work above 95F OAT and the doors cannot be open in flight except when performing hoist ops. The TH-67 initially came with A/C. The Army then paid to have them removed before acceptance. Due to airframe issues caused by the doors being removed multiple times per day, they then paid to have A/C reinstalled on the initial fleet and all future deliveries.
The AH-1 and the AH-64 systems were sold as an Environmental Control Unit (ECU). These 2 aircraft have no window that can be opened in flight. The OH-58D started out with an ECU, but some nitwit changed the wording to reflect an A/C. Yet, it is loaded with avionics that constantly overheated during Desert Storm.
Early OH-58Ds still have a mount for the A/C on the power accessory gearbox. It was direct drive, and not piggybacked off of the TR driveshaft like the TH-67.
There are a lot of missions in the hot months due to heat injuries of course. Too bad the bean counters valued a few dollars over people's lives.
Fortunately, many of these aircraft are going to VIP units. It will not take but a few VIP flights before we get an A/C. I just wonder how much more it will cost for it to be installed as an add-on.
On another note, as readers posted, this is not the 1st venture into FAA certified aircraft by the Army. There are currently about 200 N numbered (FAA registered) TH-67s at mother Rucker. And, they have not been maintained to FAA standards; but that is a whole other issue.
The issue is not that EC sold the Army a bad bird. The issue is that bean counters at higher levels within DA considered the A/C a luxury item and deleted it. The A/C does not keep up out there, because there is not one. There is a ventilation system, but not an A/C like the rest of us are used to. Not to mention 2 other key issues. The avionics are not certified to work above 95F OAT and the doors cannot be open in flight except when performing hoist ops. The TH-67 initially came with A/C. The Army then paid to have them removed before acceptance. Due to airframe issues caused by the doors being removed multiple times per day, they then paid to have A/C reinstalled on the initial fleet and all future deliveries.
The AH-1 and the AH-64 systems were sold as an Environmental Control Unit (ECU). These 2 aircraft have no window that can be opened in flight. The OH-58D started out with an ECU, but some nitwit changed the wording to reflect an A/C. Yet, it is loaded with avionics that constantly overheated during Desert Storm.
Early OH-58Ds still have a mount for the A/C on the power accessory gearbox. It was direct drive, and not piggybacked off of the TR driveshaft like the TH-67. There are a lot of missions in the hot months due to heat injuries of course. Too bad the bean counters valued a few dollars over people's lives.
Fortunately, many of these aircraft are going to VIP units. It will not take but a few VIP flights before we get an A/C. I just wonder how much more it will cost for it to be installed as an add-on.
On another note, as readers posted, this is not the 1st venture into FAA certified aircraft by the Army. There are currently about 200 N numbered (FAA registered) TH-67s at mother Rucker. And, they have not been maintained to FAA standards; but that is a whole other issue.
Air conditioning is standard in commercial versions of the aircraft, which have not had overheating problems. But the military usually avoids air conditioning in military aircraft to reduce weight and increase performance.
"We don't need air conditioning in the Blackhawks, so we didn't think it would be an issue" in the Lakota, McCuin said. "But when we got the helicopter into the desert, we realized it was a problem."
"We don't need air conditioning in the Blackhawks, so we didn't think it would be an issue" in the Lakota, McCuin said. "But when we got the helicopter into the desert, we realized it was a problem."
.
Last edited by NutLoose; 19th Aug 2015 at 15:05.
- Lack of clarity of project goal
- Over optimistic budget
- Insufficient early stages R&D in an effort to pare down costs
- Interference from Politicians/VSOs/Ex-VSOs/others
- Lack of engineering/scientific knowledge amongst project planners
- Insufficient input from hands-on end users
- Project participants who don't intend to be in-post at the into-service point, so they don't care if they are wrong
- Suppliers more interested in profit margin than a viable product
- Component designers without sufficient hands-on experience
- Over-reliance on computer outputs (Garbage In/Garbage Out)
- Striving for the cheapest rather than the best
- Too many 'yes-men'
- Something else?
"Budget" and "predicted cost" are seldom the same thing. I've had many projects where fair and reasonable cost was many times the budget sought by London. This almost always leads to delay.
Suppliers' profit margin. Not as big an issue as many think, especially on the main development and production contracts, due to post-costing. While many try to make their money on support, MoD policy actually hands them far more on a plate.
Most successful whole aircraft project I ever managed was down to 4 significant factors.
1. The Service (RN) Support Authority withdrew, refusing to support it. Great. Left me to do their work for them, which I was trained for. They weren't.
2. The Service users (front line operators and maintainers) were embedded in the team from day 1. The RN Appointer was brilliant. Double tours for continuity, aligned to the programme plan.
3. Early decision to completely ignore 1 and 2 Stars. If I'd followed their orders, the aircraft wouldn't be in service yet, 15 years after first flight. Others obeyed their orders, hence MRA4 and Chinook Mk3. (Which is why MoD told the PAC they couldn't be identified, despite their names and phone numbers being prominent in the MoD directory).
4. Follow the regulations. They're written by people who've got the t-shirt. (But cancelled in 2008, without replacement. A wise man has kept his own copy, as have sensible contractors).
The initial Post Project Evaluation report of 11th January 2001 is a gem of a read (if I say so myself). MoD deny its existence.
@ Nut Loose, I suggest you understand the distinction between the word "army" and "military." I also flew in Blackhawks, which were not air-conditioned.
That is all.
That is all.
I don't know if you find this to be true but in the software world its often the unglamorous projects which do best and my theory is that it is because they attract less idiots and people who want to stick their oar in.
Plus you can get away with doing what's right more often.
Plus you can get away with doing what's right more often.
Join Date: Oct 2002
Location: ɐıןɐɹʇsn∀
Posts: 1,994
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
imo, it's all about 'performance based salaries' and 'risk reduction'.
No 'manager' is prepared to take a 'risk' by accepting that someone lower on the payscale ladder might know something more than they do. It might make them look bad!
The issue is that said 'manager' isn't put in place solely by competence anymore. The capitalist system has self destructed thanks to greed (which is the basis of it's outlook anyway)
As much as we hope for altruism, it just doesn't exist anymore
No 'manager' is prepared to take a 'risk' by accepting that someone lower on the payscale ladder might know something more than they do. It might make them look bad!
The issue is that said 'manager' isn't put in place solely by competence anymore. The capitalist system has self destructed thanks to greed (which is the basis of it's outlook anyway)
As much as we hope for altruism, it just doesn't exist anymore
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: london
Posts: 379
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OP's Q was to flush out a (complex) aerospace product on time/price/Spec. We have responded with some diatribes about Waste-of-Space (we could have added Wastelands). Missing the point.
For-profit businesses do not relish R&D - high resource, low return. They want pea-in-pod volume at high margin - any colour you like as long as it's black. They don't need necessarily to make it, just to Prime it and take the mark-up - what does Daimler actually make in their Mercedes products? Early 787s had next-to-zero Boeing fabrication. So, Aerospace Prime Contractors now see themselves as integrators, not whittlers, of boxes and tin. If...a firm has the resilience to define its product, find the money, do it, and stand or fall on its market attractiveness, then, so. General Aviation offers many As, to OP's Q. But this is the Military Aviation thread.
Military Buyers think they know what they want and how to cause that to happen. In the 30 (>40!) years put forward by OP, only once has "success" accrued to a UK military Aero product: HSAL Hawk. The Spec. was clear, was put out to industry on a proposition of I pay, you do, was all-up contracted at a fixed package price; Customer left industry to get on with it. So that's the A to what is the secret.
But that cannot be read across to front line combat kit. If... Hawk had floundered in R&D, options (now COTS) were readily available. DoD and all the other hopeful Users for F-35s have no choice but to persevere and pay. While time goes by, they have no choice but to fund Customer-Initiated Change Proposals, scuttling the time/price basis of the original bid, because iPhone Old is of no use to our boys facing bad guys with iPhone Next. So, drift, bloat, until a Buyer says something NOW! please, not better, tomorrow, maybe.
RN made much of its management success in commissioning its Polaris/SSBNs on time (ordered 5/63, first patrol 15/6/68), on-Spec., on-budget. Well...but...this was as close to COTS as a weapon system could be (thank you, USN/DoD); it went to sea with a partial weapon load, and, as for on-budget, well what did that actually mean? “I hadn’t the
faintest idea (of hull build cost) so I took projected cost of Valiant (SSN) and doubled it.” (UK Polaris Executive Programme Manager...but I've lost the source!)
For-profit businesses do not relish R&D - high resource, low return. They want pea-in-pod volume at high margin - any colour you like as long as it's black. They don't need necessarily to make it, just to Prime it and take the mark-up - what does Daimler actually make in their Mercedes products? Early 787s had next-to-zero Boeing fabrication. So, Aerospace Prime Contractors now see themselves as integrators, not whittlers, of boxes and tin. If...a firm has the resilience to define its product, find the money, do it, and stand or fall on its market attractiveness, then, so. General Aviation offers many As, to OP's Q. But this is the Military Aviation thread.
Military Buyers think they know what they want and how to cause that to happen. In the 30 (>40!) years put forward by OP, only once has "success" accrued to a UK military Aero product: HSAL Hawk. The Spec. was clear, was put out to industry on a proposition of I pay, you do, was all-up contracted at a fixed package price; Customer left industry to get on with it. So that's the A to what is the secret.
But that cannot be read across to front line combat kit. If... Hawk had floundered in R&D, options (now COTS) were readily available. DoD and all the other hopeful Users for F-35s have no choice but to persevere and pay. While time goes by, they have no choice but to fund Customer-Initiated Change Proposals, scuttling the time/price basis of the original bid, because iPhone Old is of no use to our boys facing bad guys with iPhone Next. So, drift, bloat, until a Buyer says something NOW! please, not better, tomorrow, maybe.
RN made much of its management success in commissioning its Polaris/SSBNs on time (ordered 5/63, first patrol 15/6/68), on-Spec., on-budget. Well...but...this was as close to COTS as a weapon system could be (thank you, USN/DoD); it went to sea with a partial weapon load, and, as for on-budget, well what did that actually mean? “I hadn’t the
faintest idea (of hull build cost) so I took projected cost of Valiant (SSN) and doubled it.” (UK Polaris Executive Programme Manager...but I've lost the source!)
Thread Starter
From reading the replies there is evidently a wealth of project management experience here. One wonders how many billions could be saved in defence procurement if this knowledge was distilled and taught to would-be programme managers.
Thank you Camlobe for expanding on the E-3D differences. Lonewolf_50's 'Perish the Thought' video linkis far too painfully close to the truth of the average project meeting that I've attended.
Tucumseh's point that if one group are left to get on with it with the minimum of outside interference, then a better product usually results. This is backed up by what Tornadoken said about the Hawk.
Perhaps the problem is the sales people want to offer the earth, and the customers are only to happy to buy what they are offered. When it comes to actually producing a new aircraft with all the new engines, sensors, weapons and other hardware there are just too many unknowns. Maybe we should be more willing to accept mid-life or even quarter-life updates from the word go, rather than insisting on every part of the system being ready at the intended entry into service?
Is part of the problem that too many programmes are put in the hands of, or at least influenced by, 'high-flying whizz kids' who have only had superficial contact with earlier programmes, and don't have the depth of understanding to appreciate the implications of their decisions?
Taped to a desk I saw the following:
The Cowboy Proverb:
Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.
As Tornadoken says:
This seemed to work for General Atomics with the Predator A. Make a product that works and you know the customer will need, put it out there, and when they have a burning need they will come banging on your door. It just takes the financial resilience to be able to wait until they need it.
Thank you Camlobe for expanding on the E-3D differences. Lonewolf_50's 'Perish the Thought' video link
is far too painfully close to the truth of the average project meeting that I've attended.Tucumseh's point that if one group are left to get on with it with the minimum of outside interference, then a better product usually results. This is backed up by what Tornadoken said about the Hawk.
Perhaps the problem is the sales people want to offer the earth, and the customers are only to happy to buy what they are offered. When it comes to actually producing a new aircraft with all the new engines, sensors, weapons and other hardware there are just too many unknowns. Maybe we should be more willing to accept mid-life or even quarter-life updates from the word go, rather than insisting on every part of the system being ready at the intended entry into service?
Is part of the problem that too many programmes are put in the hands of, or at least influenced by, 'high-flying whizz kids' who have only had superficial contact with earlier programmes, and don't have the depth of understanding to appreciate the implications of their decisions?
Taped to a desk I saw the following:
The Cowboy Proverb:
Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.
Customer left industry to get on with it. So that's the A to what is the secret.
Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.
Last edited by t43562; 21st Aug 2015 at 07:58. Reason: correct quote
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,573
Received 422 Likes
on
222 Posts
I also flew in Blackhawks, which were not air-conditioned.
Could have been prevented if the aircraft were kept inside longer, but apparently it was more important to wash the hangar floor every day than to consider crew comfort.
WW, Yes East Mids Airport is a very near neighbour!
I'm not surprised about the electrification.
NR usually fail to issue a scope of requirement and tells industry that they are the experts so tell us what you are going to do, stating all your assumptions.
They require a budgetary price to get authorisation for the spend.
Because there is no proper scope, the budgetary priced offered up by different contractors will differ markedly as each has a different understanding of what is required.
NR picks the cheapest budgetary price and issues an ITT. Again, there will be a lot of documents but no defined scope. Industry tries to navigate its way through and prices against an assumed scope but invariably this scope is wrong and requires lots of re-work causing delays and increased cost. Sometimes new documents are issued that change the interpretation of the scope late in the day, or even after a bid has been submitted.
If a contract is awarded there will then be a period where the scope is defined again in order to complete outline designs; and industry has to re-price. During project delivery there will be numerous variation orders as the scope is refined. and on it goes.
NR is supposed to have a planned maintenance and upgrade programme but does not have the people who appear to know what the detail of that requires. And their planned programme always seems to come as a surprise to them with stupid deadlines and unrealistic expectations.
They have framework contractors who are supposed to deliver against the scopes but the scopes are poor. When the contractors issue designs for authorisation, NR hands them over the a design consultancy like Atkins or Jacobs to do the review and this all takes time and money and results in different understanding of the scope, so the Scope changes and the design has to change etc etc etc.
And then the contractors probably dont have enough of the trained resources and project managers to deliver etc etc
You could not make it up. It would be cheaper to rip up the railways and concrete over the Permanent Way for the exclusive use of Coaches and HGV.
I'm not surprised about the electrification.
NR usually fail to issue a scope of requirement and tells industry that they are the experts so tell us what you are going to do, stating all your assumptions.
They require a budgetary price to get authorisation for the spend.
Because there is no proper scope, the budgetary priced offered up by different contractors will differ markedly as each has a different understanding of what is required.
NR picks the cheapest budgetary price and issues an ITT. Again, there will be a lot of documents but no defined scope. Industry tries to navigate its way through and prices against an assumed scope but invariably this scope is wrong and requires lots of re-work causing delays and increased cost. Sometimes new documents are issued that change the interpretation of the scope late in the day, or even after a bid has been submitted.
If a contract is awarded there will then be a period where the scope is defined again in order to complete outline designs; and industry has to re-price. During project delivery there will be numerous variation orders as the scope is refined. and on it goes.
NR is supposed to have a planned maintenance and upgrade programme but does not have the people who appear to know what the detail of that requires. And their planned programme always seems to come as a surprise to them with stupid deadlines and unrealistic expectations.
They have framework contractors who are supposed to deliver against the scopes but the scopes are poor. When the contractors issue designs for authorisation, NR hands them over the a design consultancy like Atkins or Jacobs to do the review and this all takes time and money and results in different understanding of the scope, so the Scope changes and the design has to change etc etc etc.
And then the contractors probably dont have enough of the trained resources and project managers to deliver etc etc
You could not make it up. It would be cheaper to rip up the railways and concrete over the Permanent Way for the exclusive use of Coaches and HGV.
Skunk Works
May I suggest OP you find a copy of "The Skunk Works" by Ben Rich - Kelly Johnson's successor.
A great read but when you stop to think about how they got the Blackbird flying from first sketches to wheels up in under 5 years (in the '50's and '60's) it's was effectively down to experienced designers working literally next to the machinists with important decisions taken quickly and decisively with no interference from outside.
A great read but when you stop to think about how they got the Blackbird flying from first sketches to wheels up in under 5 years (in the '50's and '60's) it's was effectively down to experienced designers working literally next to the machinists with important decisions taken quickly and decisively with no interference from outside.
Thread Starter
Thanks Shaft109 for the tip. I'll get myself a copy.
It does beg the question, if this is the way to get a complex project completed in a short space of time, which must be cheaper in the long run, then why don't we do this all the time? I appreciate that there is a huge difference between building a prototype and tooling up for a production run, but the basic principle is there either way.
it's was effectively down to experienced designers working literally next to the machinists with important decisions taken quickly and decisively with no interference from outside.
If you think that Aerospace PM is bad, you try the rail industry
Occasionally, just occasionally, you get a project manager who gets it and then you think "ah, that's why you get 'x' times more than me".
The rest of the times it's micro management by timewasters who don't know what they are talking about.