Staffing levels
It states
Air Cdre & Above TOTAL Surplus 115% (GD 114.9%)
Gp Capt TOTAL Surplus 52.6% (GD 51.2%)
Wg Cdr TOTAL Surplus 13.9% (GD 15.7%)
Sqn Ldr TOTAL Surplus 3.0%
JO TOTAL Deficit 10.5%
Air Cdre & Above TOTAL Surplus 115% (GD 114.9%)
Gp Capt TOTAL Surplus 52.6% (GD 51.2%)
Wg Cdr TOTAL Surplus 13.9% (GD 15.7%)
Sqn Ldr TOTAL Surplus 3.0%
JO TOTAL Deficit 10.5%
Biggus
More than happy with knowing who the fighting element of the RAF is and who actually fulfils that role (rank wise)! Not the point ....
The point I was loosely making was that throughout this thread there has been a constant reference that jobs/decisions that used to be made by a flt lt/sgn ldr are now being made by gp capt/1*. That, to me, is rank creep. It seems to me that the same could be said amongst our WO/SNCO/JNCO cadre as well - upping the 'responsibility' level to keep jobs for the boys?
PS - if we're going cpl pilots does that mean we will have SAC (non-FJ) WSOs?
More than happy with knowing who the fighting element of the RAF is and who actually fulfils that role (rank wise)! Not the point ....
The point I was loosely making was that throughout this thread there has been a constant reference that jobs/decisions that used to be made by a flt lt/sgn ldr are now being made by gp capt/1*. That, to me, is rank creep. It seems to me that the same could be said amongst our WO/SNCO/JNCO cadre as well - upping the 'responsibility' level to keep jobs for the boys?
PS - if we're going cpl pilots does that mean we will have SAC (non-FJ) WSOs?
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Wrath,
I thought it might help if I rejoined here.
Yes, there has undoubtedly been 'rank creep' - the phenomenon where decisions that were safe and efficiently taken at (for instance) SO2 level have now migrated up to Cdre or even two star. As well as justifying the larger number of senior posts with the resultant costs, this also leads to poorer and slower decision making, as orca has pointed out.
There's another aspect that i can personally testify to - and that has been the growth of officer numbers under the banner of 'jointery'. My own branch (RN Air Engineers) faced a huge challenge in the late 90s/early noughties to generate nearly 30 additional SO2 posts to feed the demands of JHC and JFH. To reiterate, not one more aircraft was in service, not one more sortie flown, but nearly 30 additional SO2s to 'manage' it. Oh, and a brace of SO1s as well. And Captains. And Commodores. And to my shame, I was complicit in it.
When JFH was set up, there was a deliberate decision to 'expand' the HQ staff numbers required to support the Sea Harrier fleet. Various reasons were given, including 'we're following best practice' to 'we want parity with the other Groups' to 'it helps build the officer corps'. The costs involved were never once considered. The only defence I can offer, and it's a poor one, is that I joined the team after the staffing levels were decided. My job was to invent new things for the additional bodies to do.
And thats what all bureaucracies that don't have to worry about cost do - they invent work to justify numbers. That's why all those senior officers are so busy. I could cite some simply awful examples of 'rank creep' from High Wycombe, but won't - I'm sure that all three Services and the CS could offer up similar idiocies.
However, try this one. I worked in DGA(N) in the 90s, when over 300 technical desks were supported by a highly efficient and well organised thing called a 'registry'. Younger readers won't know what that is - it was a team of admin clerks, overseen by one admin officer, who made sure that every piece of paper coming in and out was filed, every file (or 'pack') was kept up to date, and that all the information was readily available to the desk officers. Airworthiness files were subjected to special additional controls, befitting their importance. DGA(N)'s registry was eight strong.
In my last spell in DE&S, a PT of around 90 desk officers was now supported by a 'Business Management' team of around 12, almost all of who were 'admin officer' grades. The head of BM was now a very senior CS (SO1 equivalent). They did no filing (desk officers now had to do that), kept no records, and as a result the PT's filing systems, including airworthiness files, was a thoroughgoing mess.
You join up the dots.
I don't subscribe to the 'it's all rubbish nowadays' view - the staffs are full of exceptionally good officers all doing their best to keep up. But the system needs a thorough 'reset' and 'realign' to get decisions down to the lowest practicable level, and to remove the accumulation of garbage that staff officers are being exposed to. It's making our armed services unaffordable.
How to get there - that's one for the staff.
Best Regards as ever to those shovelling the paperwork
Engines
I thought it might help if I rejoined here.
Yes, there has undoubtedly been 'rank creep' - the phenomenon where decisions that were safe and efficiently taken at (for instance) SO2 level have now migrated up to Cdre or even two star. As well as justifying the larger number of senior posts with the resultant costs, this also leads to poorer and slower decision making, as orca has pointed out.
There's another aspect that i can personally testify to - and that has been the growth of officer numbers under the banner of 'jointery'. My own branch (RN Air Engineers) faced a huge challenge in the late 90s/early noughties to generate nearly 30 additional SO2 posts to feed the demands of JHC and JFH. To reiterate, not one more aircraft was in service, not one more sortie flown, but nearly 30 additional SO2s to 'manage' it. Oh, and a brace of SO1s as well. And Captains. And Commodores. And to my shame, I was complicit in it.
When JFH was set up, there was a deliberate decision to 'expand' the HQ staff numbers required to support the Sea Harrier fleet. Various reasons were given, including 'we're following best practice' to 'we want parity with the other Groups' to 'it helps build the officer corps'. The costs involved were never once considered. The only defence I can offer, and it's a poor one, is that I joined the team after the staffing levels were decided. My job was to invent new things for the additional bodies to do.
And thats what all bureaucracies that don't have to worry about cost do - they invent work to justify numbers. That's why all those senior officers are so busy. I could cite some simply awful examples of 'rank creep' from High Wycombe, but won't - I'm sure that all three Services and the CS could offer up similar idiocies.
However, try this one. I worked in DGA(N) in the 90s, when over 300 technical desks were supported by a highly efficient and well organised thing called a 'registry'. Younger readers won't know what that is - it was a team of admin clerks, overseen by one admin officer, who made sure that every piece of paper coming in and out was filed, every file (or 'pack') was kept up to date, and that all the information was readily available to the desk officers. Airworthiness files were subjected to special additional controls, befitting their importance. DGA(N)'s registry was eight strong.
In my last spell in DE&S, a PT of around 90 desk officers was now supported by a 'Business Management' team of around 12, almost all of who were 'admin officer' grades. The head of BM was now a very senior CS (SO1 equivalent). They did no filing (desk officers now had to do that), kept no records, and as a result the PT's filing systems, including airworthiness files, was a thoroughgoing mess.
You join up the dots.
I don't subscribe to the 'it's all rubbish nowadays' view - the staffs are full of exceptionally good officers all doing their best to keep up. But the system needs a thorough 'reset' and 'realign' to get decisions down to the lowest practicable level, and to remove the accumulation of garbage that staff officers are being exposed to. It's making our armed services unaffordable.
How to get there - that's one for the staff.
Best Regards as ever to those shovelling the paperwork
Engines
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Historically officers who are good in peace time are not what you need when the balloon goes up - the longer it is between major wars the more this is so
looking back most armies/navies/airforces spend the first year of a new conflict retiring/firing (or in the case of the USSR shooting) a very large number of senior officers as they proven to be effectively useless
always amazes me how YOUNG SO's become in a major war.................
looking back most armies/navies/airforces spend the first year of a new conflict retiring/firing (or in the case of the USSR shooting) a very large number of senior officers as they proven to be effectively useless
always amazes me how YOUNG SO's become in a major war.................
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Given that the RAF are just shy of 20 years of continuos bomb dropping ops and the army have also been kept pretty busy 2003 to 2014 one presumes the rapid replacement of senior staffs applies to wars of national survival only?!
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Engines, I can enter the fray.
When the Army joined the Defence Training Estate they 'captured' the RAF bombing ranges. When AOC 1 Gp found out with less than 2 months to go he was incandescent.
An organization with 5 RAFR Sqn Ldr, and a CoC at 1Gp of a flt lt and sqn ldr suddenly had 3 Lt Col and a train of CS added on, the 1Gp element continued but with no control.
The annual conference became biannual. Attendees rose from 8 to a dozen or more. While the people already existed, the T&S more than tripled.
When the Army joined the Defence Training Estate they 'captured' the RAF bombing ranges. When AOC 1 Gp found out with less than 2 months to go he was incandescent.
An organization with 5 RAFR Sqn Ldr, and a CoC at 1Gp of a flt lt and sqn ldr suddenly had 3 Lt Col and a train of CS added on, the 1Gp element continued but with no control.
The annual conference became biannual. Attendees rose from 8 to a dozen or more. While the people already existed, the T&S more than tripled.
Not that long ago one of the in vogue management speak w*#kwords in regular use in the RAF was empowerment, pushing decision making as far down the chain of command as possible - quite ironic when given this discussion about rank creep and that the very opposite of empowerment is occurring.
Requiring a Gp Capts permission to authorise travel costs for internal UK air fares was a good example of the exact opposite of empowerment. Often several forms had to be filled in, I believe Lossie even created its own unique system, and be signed off by various people before finally landing on the main mans desk. All of which took time, and mean that the Easyjet flight that would have cost £40 last week now costs £80 because the flight is tomorrow. Indeed a colleage of mine was once due to leave the base at 1200, and only finally got approval to go at 1000 the same morning!! Madness.
Last example from me, at least in this post. I joined a certain ME fleet in the late 80s. The hierachy consisted of the boss and 4 Flt Cdrs, so 1 x Wg Cdr and 4 x Sqn Ldrs. I returned to the same fleet 10 years later, only to find that the hierachy now consisited of 1 x Wg Cdr and 6 x Sqn Ldrs. The number of personnel was the same (actually slightly less), no more hours were being flown, no new tasks. Everything was pretty much the same as before, and, at least to my eyes, there was no noticeable improvement in the way the Sqn was run.
Requiring a Gp Capts permission to authorise travel costs for internal UK air fares was a good example of the exact opposite of empowerment. Often several forms had to be filled in, I believe Lossie even created its own unique system, and be signed off by various people before finally landing on the main mans desk. All of which took time, and mean that the Easyjet flight that would have cost £40 last week now costs £80 because the flight is tomorrow. Indeed a colleage of mine was once due to leave the base at 1200, and only finally got approval to go at 1000 the same morning!! Madness.
Last example from me, at least in this post. I joined a certain ME fleet in the late 80s. The hierachy consisted of the boss and 4 Flt Cdrs, so 1 x Wg Cdr and 4 x Sqn Ldrs. I returned to the same fleet 10 years later, only to find that the hierachy now consisited of 1 x Wg Cdr and 6 x Sqn Ldrs. The number of personnel was the same (actually slightly less), no more hours were being flown, no new tasks. Everything was pretty much the same as before, and, at least to my eyes, there was no noticeable improvement in the way the Sqn was run.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Biggus, no change there then. ISL decades ago.
On the morning MT refused to provide a vehicle for a run to Buchan. They offered a run to the station but Buchan declined to pick us up from Aberdeen (go figure).
No sqn ldr or wg cdr on sqn, OC AW and Staish both away. Could not get 658 signed. I declined to travel but was ordered by flt lt acting OC. I threatened redress and went- got my golden miles.
On the morning MT refused to provide a vehicle for a run to Buchan. They offered a run to the station but Buchan declined to pick us up from Aberdeen (go figure).
No sqn ldr or wg cdr on sqn, OC AW and Staish both away. Could not get 658 signed. I declined to travel but was ordered by flt lt acting OC. I threatened redress and went- got my golden miles.
Well said Engines. You know I agree with you about DGA(N). Especially under Ron Holley.
I shall stick my neck out here and say that I doubt if there is a single technical grade at AbbeyWood today who satisfies the "Grade Description" for his/her grade. Do the Services have a similar "Rank Description"? For example, the direct entrant grade in DE&S (C2, aka HPTO/HSO) is required to have demonstrated the ability to manage 200 staff. For a C1 that is 600. Similarly, a C2 avionic engineer is also required to have managed projects across all disciplines (software, radar, ELINT, nav etc), in every stage of the procurement cycle, before promotion to C1. Step forward anyone in DE&S who satisfies that criteria.
In 1989, IPTLs were HPTO/C2. For many, this would be their 3rd grade as a team leader. In the "new" 1999 model they were typically UG6, 3 grades higher, with smaller teams and less responsibility. As you say, grades have been inflated in certain areas, while ignoring the Grade Descriptions. How many even know they exist!? I know from first hand experience this is one reason why the Treasury have a downer on MoD, as the Descriptions are issued by HMT and all tied to the expected wage bill. Grade inflation means a bigger wage bill, and less for kit. I read recently that this is going to get even worse with new "pay flexibility". That will really p*ss off those in post who find themselves earning >25% less and expected to do their new colleague's job as he hasn't a clue. I don't mind paying more for proven excellence and competence. But at the moment we're talking about paying more for the unproven.
I recall one 39-strong IPT with 15 of them comprising the "Management Board". I imagine someone will beat that ratio!
I shall stick my neck out here and say that I doubt if there is a single technical grade at AbbeyWood today who satisfies the "Grade Description" for his/her grade. Do the Services have a similar "Rank Description"? For example, the direct entrant grade in DE&S (C2, aka HPTO/HSO) is required to have demonstrated the ability to manage 200 staff. For a C1 that is 600. Similarly, a C2 avionic engineer is also required to have managed projects across all disciplines (software, radar, ELINT, nav etc), in every stage of the procurement cycle, before promotion to C1. Step forward anyone in DE&S who satisfies that criteria.
In 1989, IPTLs were HPTO/C2. For many, this would be their 3rd grade as a team leader. In the "new" 1999 model they were typically UG6, 3 grades higher, with smaller teams and less responsibility. As you say, grades have been inflated in certain areas, while ignoring the Grade Descriptions. How many even know they exist!? I know from first hand experience this is one reason why the Treasury have a downer on MoD, as the Descriptions are issued by HMT and all tied to the expected wage bill. Grade inflation means a bigger wage bill, and less for kit. I read recently that this is going to get even worse with new "pay flexibility". That will really p*ss off those in post who find themselves earning >25% less and expected to do their new colleague's job as he hasn't a clue. I don't mind paying more for proven excellence and competence. But at the moment we're talking about paying more for the unproven.
I recall one 39-strong IPT with 15 of them comprising the "Management Board". I imagine someone will beat that ratio!
shall stick my neck out here and say that I doubt if there is a single technical grade at AbbeyWood today who satisfies the "Grade Description" for his/her grade. Do the Services have a similar "Rank Description"? For example, the direct entrant grade in DE&S (C2, aka HPTO/HSO) is required to have demonstrated the ability to manage 200 staff. For a C1 that is 600. Similarly, a C2 avionic engineer is also required to have managed projects across all disciplines (software, radar, ELINT, nav etc), in every stage of the procurement cycle, before promotion to C1. Step forward anyone in DE&S who satisfies that criteria.
No disrespect intended to Tcumsesh, but I think he is utterly wrong on this front. There may well, in the past, have been a requirement to demonstrate you could manage numbers of people, but if it was, it is dead, buried and no longer remotely relevant.
If it helps, I have never, ever, seen any hint of a personnel description of this sort in the last 15 years when it comes to discussing requirements for direct entry. I say this as someone who has a reasonable amount of experience sniffing round HR manuals on promotion and staffing issues.
If it helps, I have never, ever, seen any hint of a personnel description of this sort in the last 15 years when it comes to discussing requirements for direct entry. I say this as someone who has a reasonable amount of experience sniffing round HR manuals on promotion and staffing issues.
Oh Biggus, the SARFARCE can do better than that!
that's nothing! Look what happened in SAR Wing, which had bumbled along admirably rescuing people for decades with 1 Wg Cdr in charge, 2 Sqn Ldr Sqn Commanders with nine flights (in total) each commanded by a Flight Lieutenant - plus a Sqn Ldr OC eng and a Jengo. That's what I joined in 1978.
By the time I left it in 1999 the SAR Force was commanded by a Group Captain with a Wg Cdr 2i/c and of course a Wg Cdr OC ENg. The two squadrons, each reduced to three flights, were commanded by Wg Cdrs with a Sqn Ldr 2i/c, and each flight now commanded by a Sqn Ldr Flt Cdr.
And as you found
No wonder it's being privatised. Amazed it took so long! 
The hierachy consisted of the boss and 4 Flt Cdrs, so 1 x Wg Cdr and 4 x Sqn Ldrs. I returned to the same fleet 10 years later, only to find that the hierachy now consisited of 1 x Wg Cdr and 6 x Sqn Ldrs. The number of personnel was the same (actually slightly less), no more hours were being flown, no new tasks. Everything was pretty much the same as before, and, at least to my eyes, there was no noticeable improvement in the way the Sqn was run.
By the time I left it in 1999 the SAR Force was commanded by a Group Captain with a Wg Cdr 2i/c and of course a Wg Cdr OC ENg. The two squadrons, each reduced to three flights, were commanded by Wg Cdrs with a Sqn Ldr 2i/c, and each flight now commanded by a Sqn Ldr Flt Cdr.
And as you found
"there was no noticeable improvement in the way the Sqn was run"
Last edited by Al-bert; 27th Jan 2015 at 22:49. Reason: quote Biggus
Requiring a Gp Capts permission to authorise travel costs for internal UK air fares was a good example of the exact opposite of empowerment. Often several forms had to be filled in, I believe Lossie even created its own unique system, and be signed off by various people before finally landing on the main mans desk. All of which took time, and mean that the Easyjet flight that would have cost £40 last week now costs £80 because the flight is tomorrow. Indeed a colleage of mine was once due to leave the base at 1200, and only finally got approval to go at 1000 the same morning!! Madness.
...and completely at odds with the concept of Mission Command.
In a previous tour in overseas, I had to return every few months for a medical check-up at Frimley PArk (half-way between Heathrow and Gatwick). The appointments would be made 3 months beforehand and I would then commence the life-sapping process of getting approvals for flights. ESG would pass it to some Army chap at some random German barracks who would then go 'Oh - MEDEVAC' and book me on a C-17 to...Birmingham. I would then point out that Birmingham was no where near Frimley Park, to which he'd respond 'Get your QM to get a driver and car'. I'd then point out - again - that there were 6 of us here and we didn't have section vehicles nor drivers to get me to the overseas APOE and certainly didn't have the connectivity to dick some unit to drive me from B'ham to Frimley Park. And so it would go on, and as in the quote (above) my flight would be approved a day or two beforehand, BA, and a rental car at the other end - but no subsistence allowance payable! So I was expected to be there and back in a day - given that I had to fast 12 hours beforehand.
Gentleman Aviator
Ooh! Luxury. In Main Building I think that 2* approval is needed for flights.
So to go to London from Scotland, it's easier to take the - more expensive than SqueezyJet, even in "standard" class (oh no sir, no more 1st class!) - train option, cos that can be approved locally!
No disrespect intended to Tcumsesh, but I think he is utterly wrong on this front. There may well, in the past, have been a requirement to demonstrate you could manage numbers of people, but if it was, it is dead, buried and no longer remotely relevant.
If it helps, I have never, ever, seen any hint of a personnel description of this sort in the last 15 years when it comes to discussing requirements for direct entry. I say this as someone who has a reasonable amount of experience sniffing round HR manuals on promotion and staffing issues.
If it helps, I have never, ever, seen any hint of a personnel description of this sort in the last 15 years when it comes to discussing requirements for direct entry. I say this as someone who has a reasonable amount of experience sniffing round HR manuals on promotion and staffing issues.
Nor, I concede, could be the management of 600, because we don't have many establishments with sufficient numbers! But the principle holds good, that of seeking consistency in any given grade. Another factor is that, hitherto, staff had to demonstrate to the promotion board the ability to undertake any job at the next grade. That changed to persuading them that, in time, you'd be able to do the post you were applying for. That's a BIG difference.
You are of course correct that this criteria is not, and never has been, deemed relevant to direct entrants. That is my point. The same year I failed was the year the direct entry scheme really took off. Immediately, there was a 2-tier system - and there still is. The difference today is the inexperienced are in the majority. What hasn't changed is they can never attain the competencies required of a non-direct entrant, typically gained at the 5 previous grades (or 6 if you count apprentice). The CS has dumbed down and long ago reached the stage, described by the likes of Engines, where very senior people now do tasks considered routine by older, less senior, colleagues.
In the Services, at any given rank, I always found a high degree of consistency in training, experience and competence. Not so in the CS, especially after about 1990. Servicemen, quite rightly, found it hard to understand why 2 CSs at the same grade could have such vastly different backgrounds. One deemed inexperienced and not quite competent enough because he'd only managed 100 or so projects, in the process having been leader of significant teams; the other deemed experienced and suitable for grade skipping after a couple of years as minutes secretary on a single, minor project.
Look where it led us. That poor sod of an MRA4 "Safety Manager", completely untrained for the job and nothing in his background that would suggest he could be. Named and shamed by H-C, yet the underlying policy, that of bums on seats regardless of suitability, ignored. He wasn't to blame. It was an organisational failure.
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Engines has hit the nail on the head re rank and number inflation. For the RN the problem really started in the '90s when Jointery reared its ugly head. If I take the Joint Helicopter Command first. When the shape of the HQ was designed the powers that be agreed that the division of posts to the RN, Army and RAF should be proportionate with the RN being allocated 18% of the slots. This equated to about 23 officer posts. This caused a panic in the manpower world of 2SL as e Commando Helo Force at HQ level was run by 3 staff officers, mainly SO2s. The more senior roles were filled by triple hatted officers who also coverered the likes of LYnx, Seaking, Harrier etc. The SAR Force was run, at HQ level, by an SO2. The culprit was the RAF who had something like 52 staff officers running the Support Helo Force.
The advent of JOint Force Harrier was even more amusing. Once again there were very few staff officers to transfer into the new joint organisation. However, it was agreed that the AOC of this Force would be RN (Adm. Henderson). When he arrived at High Wycombe he could not believe the size of the organisation he was taking over and quickly set about reducing the size and introduce some efficiency. It was most definitely an uphill battle. His successor Adm Lidbetter carried on the battle but eventually lost when the RAF "reorganised" their Group structure and disbanded the Admirals Group!
The advent of JOint Force Harrier was even more amusing. Once again there were very few staff officers to transfer into the new joint organisation. However, it was agreed that the AOC of this Force would be RN (Adm. Henderson). When he arrived at High Wycombe he could not believe the size of the organisation he was taking over and quickly set about reducing the size and introduce some efficiency. It was most definitely an uphill battle. His successor Adm Lidbetter carried on the battle but eventually lost when the RAF "reorganised" their Group structure and disbanded the Admirals Group!
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Gentlemen,
While not disagreeing with Pheasant, I'd stress that the issue of 'rank creep' is a truly tri-service one. There's also the issue that 'rank creep' leads to overmanning, as the rigidity of the military rank structures generates extra posts.
Take a job that's being done by an SO2 and (for example) make it an SO1 post, and you will almost always see two SO2 posts appear in the new organisation to justify the SO1 post - 'one on one' rank structures being deemed inefficient. Of course adding an extra SO2 post to shore up a new SO1 post isn't inefficient in the least - as long as you're not the one paying the manpower bills.
As far as JFH went, I can testify to the fact that compared with some of the other FJ staffs at High Wycombe, JFH was a model of 'lean' management. (but still, in my view, overmanned). I can also confirm that keeping it that way was an uphill battle. Every few months, I would be approached by the HQ staffs and asked whether the JFH engineering team required additional SO2s. I always refused, not to 'cut off my nose to spite my face' but because I honestly didn't need any more SO2s.
Good thread, this - come on, let's have some more examples of 'rank creep' from those who are actually doing the business out there.
Best regards as ever to those doing the essential work
Engijnes
While not disagreeing with Pheasant, I'd stress that the issue of 'rank creep' is a truly tri-service one. There's also the issue that 'rank creep' leads to overmanning, as the rigidity of the military rank structures generates extra posts.
Take a job that's being done by an SO2 and (for example) make it an SO1 post, and you will almost always see two SO2 posts appear in the new organisation to justify the SO1 post - 'one on one' rank structures being deemed inefficient. Of course adding an extra SO2 post to shore up a new SO1 post isn't inefficient in the least - as long as you're not the one paying the manpower bills.
As far as JFH went, I can testify to the fact that compared with some of the other FJ staffs at High Wycombe, JFH was a model of 'lean' management. (but still, in my view, overmanned). I can also confirm that keeping it that way was an uphill battle. Every few months, I would be approached by the HQ staffs and asked whether the JFH engineering team required additional SO2s. I always refused, not to 'cut off my nose to spite my face' but because I honestly didn't need any more SO2s.
Good thread, this - come on, let's have some more examples of 'rank creep' from those who are actually doing the business out there.
Best regards as ever to those doing the essential work
Engijnes
Jimlad (and Alfred)
I dug out the Grade Descriptions and I have two versions. The latest is after the concept of TG1 and TG2 was introduced, thus creating 2 grades between P/E and PTO (Grade D).
The SPTO description was updated to say "An SPTO (C1) technical manager may have a total staff charge of 200-700". (So my memory wasn't too bad). It differentiates between this type of SPTO post and a "Construction, Maintenance or Servicing" environment were "it would be unusual for numbers supervised to exceed 100-150".
Interestingly, an SEO (also a C1) is very different, merely saying "it is not unusual for a staff charge in excess of 100".
Remember, these are not MoD documents but, as I said, issued by the Treasury and supposed to be used by MoD when grading a new post. Think about it. When you last created a new post in your team, how was it graded? You, or your bosses, must have had some criteria to work to. At a more senior level, someone had to seek authority to increase the staff numbers, and hence the wage bill; and would have to justify both. Who makes that decision and polices correct grading on behalf of the Government? The Treasury. But, as we all know, this is widely ignored and has been for a long time. My point is that, in the Treasury's mind the MoD wage bill should be £X, based on these Grade Descriptions and staff numbers. If posts are inflated then the cost comes out of the overall budget. We aren't just given more money. In practice, what suffers is numbers. As you'll know, Bernard Gray seems to have renegotiated this for the first time in decades and has been granted greater flexibility regarding starting pay for new recruits. Presumably, the Treasury will update these Descriptions, in consultation with Trades Unions.
I dug out the Grade Descriptions and I have two versions. The latest is after the concept of TG1 and TG2 was introduced, thus creating 2 grades between P/E and PTO (Grade D).
The SPTO description was updated to say "An SPTO (C1) technical manager may have a total staff charge of 200-700". (So my memory wasn't too bad). It differentiates between this type of SPTO post and a "Construction, Maintenance or Servicing" environment were "it would be unusual for numbers supervised to exceed 100-150".
Interestingly, an SEO (also a C1) is very different, merely saying "it is not unusual for a staff charge in excess of 100".
Remember, these are not MoD documents but, as I said, issued by the Treasury and supposed to be used by MoD when grading a new post. Think about it. When you last created a new post in your team, how was it graded? You, or your bosses, must have had some criteria to work to. At a more senior level, someone had to seek authority to increase the staff numbers, and hence the wage bill; and would have to justify both. Who makes that decision and polices correct grading on behalf of the Government? The Treasury. But, as we all know, this is widely ignored and has been for a long time. My point is that, in the Treasury's mind the MoD wage bill should be £X, based on these Grade Descriptions and staff numbers. If posts are inflated then the cost comes out of the overall budget. We aren't just given more money. In practice, what suffers is numbers. As you'll know, Bernard Gray seems to have renegotiated this for the first time in decades and has been granted greater flexibility regarding starting pay for new recruits. Presumably, the Treasury will update these Descriptions, in consultation with Trades Unions.