SDSR 15
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SDSR 15
So, as 2015 approaches and the associated SDSR draws near, I thought it might be worth starting a dedicated thread, to support discussion and debate.
To get things rolling, and to allow for comparison, here is a summary of the main changes arising from SDSR 10.
Personally, I'd like to see SDSR15 be a properly strategic review, that looks at the threat before the cost - and then adjusts to ensure affordability (rather than the other way around) and I'd like to see it finish the business it started in 2010, so far as cross-departmental capabilities and responsibilities are concerned.
Sun.
To get things rolling, and to allow for comparison, here is a summary of the main changes arising from SDSR 10.
Personally, I'd like to see SDSR15 be a properly strategic review, that looks at the threat before the cost - and then adjusts to ensure affordability (rather than the other way around) and I'd like to see it finish the business it started in 2010, so far as cross-departmental capabilities and responsibilities are concerned.
Sun.
SDSR 2010, the currently active document, has already been archived off the gov.uk website. It can be found here.
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.g.../dg_191634.pdf
From the foreword, signed by the PM/DPM.
Does the document then list the threats to the UK's interests?
No
On what basis can a clear strategy therefore be formed?
It can't.
And how could Ministers do this when, by their own admission..
Ministers 'didn't know Tornado from torpedo' over Afghan strategy - Telegraph
..and how well have the objectives been met anyway?
They haven't.
It's a cost-cutting exercise, and not a good one at that.
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.g.../dg_191634.pdf
Our Armed Forces – admired across the world – have been overstretched, deployed too often without
appropriate planning, with the wrong equipment, in the wrong numbers and without a clear strategy.
appropriate planning, with the wrong equipment, in the wrong numbers and without a clear strategy.
Does the document then list the threats to the UK's interests?
No
On what basis can a clear strategy therefore be formed?
It can't.
And how could Ministers do this when, by their own admission..
Ministers 'didn't know Tornado from torpedo' over Afghan strategy - Telegraph
..and how well have the objectives been met anyway?
They haven't.
It's a cost-cutting exercise, and not a good one at that.
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Sorry SW,
I beg to differ.
We all know that the next 5 years is going to see the HM Treasury squeeze the MoD budgets beyond anything we have experienced thus far since the recession. Afghan has managed to be an artificial funding ring fence where we have managed to keep our military (less so the Fisheads) on a trained and operational footing.
The MoD has been able to provide HM Govt and the nation with flexibility/contingency by using those very same highly trained, well equipped and experienced personnel to deliver small bespoke 'shows of force' and support to the FCO/NGO (everything from small exercises in Poland/Estonia, assisting Air Campaign against IS to Ebola and Sierra Leone and helping with flood defences in support of the Environment Agency).
But Afghan is now a distant memory for both politicians and many of the public. There is no requirement to spend money on training many personnel to a high standard (as per the Afghan tour cycles). Those that did benefit from this training and the corporate memory of both technical, kinetic and yet simple war fighting operations are leaving in large numbers across all 3 Services of all branches and trades.
It appears that when talking about 'hard choices ahead' then many of the political elite/'leaders' either are taking the world's developing strategic geopolitical situation on risk, or recognise that they can only do small token operations on the world stage (therefore reducing any political leverage that may come with such a token force) or are ignoring the advice from CDS/PUS and independent think tanks like RUSI.
Therefore in answer to your question I personally believe that ahead of the next SDSR the next Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMT should provide the MoD with its 5 year budget, with SDSR providing and prioritising the Defence Roles it requires and then the MoD review and then tell the Government of the day what they will get for the budget that they have allocated.
If that means 'capability holidays' (rubbish term) or moth balling/suspended animation/long term storage of ships, aircraft, and infantry battalions then so be it.
Having a fantasy SDSR 15 that talks the talk about what the real threats are to our nation etc, that does not have the resourcing (notably finance, but also the right quality and experience of people) will only result in either increased overall financial cost, political risk in not being able to deliver and possibly worse of costing more lives.
I personally get the feeling that the politicians strategic vision is should the requirement arise for a strong, well equipped Armed Forces (Cold War really does return, or IS really does need sorting out or AQAP require military action or a different posture than our current token efforts, then the HMT will throw money at the problem (as per HERRICK after the first few tours didn't go to plan).
If any future SDSR is not funded or resourced it quickly becomes irrelevant and everyone is forced to make it up as they go along, fire fighting and reverting to the use of the term of 'best effort' which has seen us through the last 13 years.
I beg to differ.
We all know that the next 5 years is going to see the HM Treasury squeeze the MoD budgets beyond anything we have experienced thus far since the recession. Afghan has managed to be an artificial funding ring fence where we have managed to keep our military (less so the Fisheads) on a trained and operational footing.
The MoD has been able to provide HM Govt and the nation with flexibility/contingency by using those very same highly trained, well equipped and experienced personnel to deliver small bespoke 'shows of force' and support to the FCO/NGO (everything from small exercises in Poland/Estonia, assisting Air Campaign against IS to Ebola and Sierra Leone and helping with flood defences in support of the Environment Agency).
But Afghan is now a distant memory for both politicians and many of the public. There is no requirement to spend money on training many personnel to a high standard (as per the Afghan tour cycles). Those that did benefit from this training and the corporate memory of both technical, kinetic and yet simple war fighting operations are leaving in large numbers across all 3 Services of all branches and trades.
It appears that when talking about 'hard choices ahead' then many of the political elite/'leaders' either are taking the world's developing strategic geopolitical situation on risk, or recognise that they can only do small token operations on the world stage (therefore reducing any political leverage that may come with such a token force) or are ignoring the advice from CDS/PUS and independent think tanks like RUSI.
Therefore in answer to your question I personally believe that ahead of the next SDSR the next Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMT should provide the MoD with its 5 year budget, with SDSR providing and prioritising the Defence Roles it requires and then the MoD review and then tell the Government of the day what they will get for the budget that they have allocated.
If that means 'capability holidays' (rubbish term) or moth balling/suspended animation/long term storage of ships, aircraft, and infantry battalions then so be it.
Having a fantasy SDSR 15 that talks the talk about what the real threats are to our nation etc, that does not have the resourcing (notably finance, but also the right quality and experience of people) will only result in either increased overall financial cost, political risk in not being able to deliver and possibly worse of costing more lives.
I personally get the feeling that the politicians strategic vision is should the requirement arise for a strong, well equipped Armed Forces (Cold War really does return, or IS really does need sorting out or AQAP require military action or a different posture than our current token efforts, then the HMT will throw money at the problem (as per HERRICK after the first few tours didn't go to plan).
If any future SDSR is not funded or resourced it quickly becomes irrelevant and everyone is forced to make it up as they go along, fire fighting and reverting to the use of the term of 'best effort' which has seen us through the last 13 years.
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MM4,
I find nothing to disagree with in what you say and I might not have articulated myself very well, as I think we're essentially saying the same thing.
My aspiration for SDSR goes like this:
1. Decide upon and define the threat.
2. Decide upon and define the necessary stance to mitigate that threat.
3. Cost it.
4. Adjust according to budget.
Unaffordable capability is not capability.
Point 4 involves describing and then understanding and accepting, any 'capability gaps' (we both agree that's a crap term) that result.
Sun.
I find nothing to disagree with in what you say and I might not have articulated myself very well, as I think we're essentially saying the same thing.
My aspiration for SDSR goes like this:
1. Decide upon and define the threat.
2. Decide upon and define the necessary stance to mitigate that threat.
3. Cost it.
4. Adjust according to budget.
Unaffordable capability is not capability.
Point 4 involves describing and then understanding and accepting, any 'capability gaps' (we both agree that's a crap term) that result.
Sun.
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I can see a moratorium on all equipment that has not yet been ordered, an (even) earlier end to the C-130J, further delays to the Astute, and early retirement of the 4 remaining Trafalgar, class SSNs, probable dithering over a Trident replacement - or cancellation if there's a lib-lab-snp coalition, earlier retirement of T1 Typhoons and GR4 Tornados. Wouldn't put too much cash on Sentinel seeing out the decade either. Do we need ~400 tanks? Probably, but that won't mean we keep them. Oh, also: niggardly pay rises, further pension 'restructuring'.
That's just off the top of my head anyway.
Lots of capability holidays to come. No redundancies though, people are too busy PVRing. The Argies, amongst others, will be laughing their collective cocks off.
That's just off the top of my head anyway.
Lots of capability holidays to come. No redundancies though, people are too busy PVRing. The Argies, amongst others, will be laughing their collective cocks off.
Last edited by Willard Whyte; 29th Dec 2014 at 16:07.
The process will look like this:
1 - Identify threats to national interests (which include threats to international order)
2 - Define and cost responses to these threats that will preferably deter them and if necessary defeat them
3 - Prioritize threats
4 - From bottom to top, either eliminate or scale the responses until the budget target is met
Two overarching problems, not exclusive to UK:
1 - Limits on what can be done to some costs, such as personnel and overhead, which drive the cutting burden disproportionately to modernization (R&D/procurement)
2 - A very small number of very expensive programs (nukes, carriers) that are hard to cancel, limit or stretch (because the unit costs get even worse) but that mean that as the overall procurement budget goes down by X per cent, what is left for other needs goes down by XY per cent, because all the bills have to be paid by smaller programs.
GLWT...
1 - Identify threats to national interests (which include threats to international order)
2 - Define and cost responses to these threats that will preferably deter them and if necessary defeat them
3 - Prioritize threats
4 - From bottom to top, either eliminate or scale the responses until the budget target is met
Two overarching problems, not exclusive to UK:
1 - Limits on what can be done to some costs, such as personnel and overhead, which drive the cutting burden disproportionately to modernization (R&D/procurement)
2 - A very small number of very expensive programs (nukes, carriers) that are hard to cancel, limit or stretch (because the unit costs get even worse) but that mean that as the overall procurement budget goes down by X per cent, what is left for other needs goes down by XY per cent, because all the bills have to be paid by smaller programs.
GLWT...
SDSR10:
• two new carriers, with one equipped to allow full interoperability with key allies; Rollover to SDSR15
• introduction of the more capable carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter instead of the vertical take off variant; Denied by contractor building the ships who was making the ships and had a far bigger stake/interest in the less capable VSTOL version
• six state of the art Type 45 air defence destroyers; Done - and good they are but not enough of them
• seven of the most advanced Astute-class hunter-killer submarines in the world; Delayed but some in service within SDSR10 timeframe
• replacing Type 23 frigates with Type 26 frigates and reducing the total number of frigates and amphibious ships; Delayed
• restructuring amphibious shipping to enable the landing of a Commando Group (up to 1,800 personnel); Done
• five Multi-Role Brigades with a range of capabilities to operate across the variety of possible future conflicts; Done
• a significant increase in Special Forces enabling manpower (medical, signals, logisticians); Done
• reducing the Army’s non deployable regional administrative structures and rationalising deployable HQs; Done
• 12 new Chinook heavy lift helicopters; In delivery
• 14 A330 strategic tanker and transport aircraft to replace the ageing VC10 and TriStar fleets; In delivery
• the withdrawal of Nimrod MRA4 and the Harrier; Done
• introduction of 22 A400M transport aircraft; In delivery
• rationalising the defence estate through the sale of surplus land and running cost reductions; Massive screw ups by DIO mean that there is still large swathes of out of use estate not sold off
• accelerating the re-basing of our forces from Germany; Well in progress
• reducing the civilian workforce by around 25,000 and military personnel by around 17,000 by 2015. Pretty much complete
So for SDSR15, I predict:
More blah about the new flat-tops?
More blah about the A330s/A400Ms?
More blah about SCAVENGER - which is Reaper coming into core?
Loss of Sentinel?
Announcement on Future Combat Air System? (Taranis)
Shake up of DIO and actually getting some receipts in for some of the land? This will include the basing and airfields study?
More on the NEM and the use of Reserves? (Cost cutting in other words!)
Rationalisation of training? (single gateways for all 3 services?)
Some blah on MFTS?
Loss of some tanks?
Setting out a pathway for the new deterent? (Sea, land or airborne?)
More Army manpower reductions?
There you go, my two-penneth
LJ
• two new carriers, with one equipped to allow full interoperability with key allies; Rollover to SDSR15
• introduction of the more capable carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter instead of the vertical take off variant; Denied by contractor building the ships who was making the ships and had a far bigger stake/interest in the less capable VSTOL version
• six state of the art Type 45 air defence destroyers; Done - and good they are but not enough of them
• seven of the most advanced Astute-class hunter-killer submarines in the world; Delayed but some in service within SDSR10 timeframe
• replacing Type 23 frigates with Type 26 frigates and reducing the total number of frigates and amphibious ships; Delayed
• restructuring amphibious shipping to enable the landing of a Commando Group (up to 1,800 personnel); Done
• five Multi-Role Brigades with a range of capabilities to operate across the variety of possible future conflicts; Done
• a significant increase in Special Forces enabling manpower (medical, signals, logisticians); Done
• reducing the Army’s non deployable regional administrative structures and rationalising deployable HQs; Done
• 12 new Chinook heavy lift helicopters; In delivery
• 14 A330 strategic tanker and transport aircraft to replace the ageing VC10 and TriStar fleets; In delivery
• the withdrawal of Nimrod MRA4 and the Harrier; Done
• introduction of 22 A400M transport aircraft; In delivery
• rationalising the defence estate through the sale of surplus land and running cost reductions; Massive screw ups by DIO mean that there is still large swathes of out of use estate not sold off
• accelerating the re-basing of our forces from Germany; Well in progress
• reducing the civilian workforce by around 25,000 and military personnel by around 17,000 by 2015. Pretty much complete
So for SDSR15, I predict:
More blah about the new flat-tops?
More blah about the A330s/A400Ms?
More blah about SCAVENGER - which is Reaper coming into core?
Loss of Sentinel?
Announcement on Future Combat Air System? (Taranis)
Shake up of DIO and actually getting some receipts in for some of the land? This will include the basing and airfields study?
More on the NEM and the use of Reserves? (Cost cutting in other words!)
Rationalisation of training? (single gateways for all 3 services?)
Some blah on MFTS?
Loss of some tanks?
Setting out a pathway for the new deterent? (Sea, land or airborne?)
More Army manpower reductions?
There you go, my two-penneth
LJ
4. Adjust according to budget.
4 - From bottom to top, either eliminate or scale the responses until the budget target is met
Defence reform report recommendations (sep 13)
The Department should reduce the size of the senior cadre of Defence
and the management levels below it. To enable this, the Department
should review all non-front line military posts from OF5 (Captain / Colonel
/ Group Captain) and civilian posts from Band B (Grade 7), to determine
the need for the post, whether it needs to be civilian or military, and
optimum management structures.
Clearly not happened as Air Cdre and above is currently 115% over manned.
and the management levels below it. To enable this, the Department
should review all non-front line military posts from OF5 (Captain / Colonel
/ Group Captain) and civilian posts from Band B (Grade 7), to determine
the need for the post, whether it needs to be civilian or military, and
optimum management structures.
Clearly not happened as Air Cdre and above is currently 115% over manned.
Clearly not happened
In 2012 (First Review)
A Liability Review of all civilian and non-front line military posts from 0F5 up to 2* has been undertaken. The scope of this work has
increased and completion is now expected by end 2012.
increased and completion is now expected by end 2012.
The Liability Review is complete. Numbers of senior posts will continue to be monitored by DS Sec and HRD and implemented through
Command Plans.
Command Plans.
Complete: Military starred strength has reduced from 490 in 2010 to 448 by Oct 2014. Alongside this the equivalent SCS strength has reduced from to 309 in 2010 to 271 by Oct 2014.
Whilst it may be that one particular rank in one Service currently is 'over manned' this may be because 1* RAF officers are filling more than their "fair share" of joint appointments.
But don't let facts get in your way.....
The problem is, and will always be, that any 'strategic' analysis will be coloured by what we've got in the toy box and what on order from Toys r Us (BAES), and (of course) how much pocket money we can beg and take in advance.
Accordingly, responses to security risks (incipient problems) and threats (emergent problems) will be equipment-focussed, rather than effects-based.
One example I recall from a few years ago in MB, was when we entered in to long discussions with the Army over the introduction of loitering munitions. They were convinced that the only answer to attacking time-sensitive and dynamic targets was loitering munitions (kamikaze UAVs, for ease of explanation). They just didn't get the concept of joint fires, ie the kinetic effect is what is desired, not necessarily the means of delivery.
Of late I have been involved in guiding the drafting defence strategies for an emerging economy, and they follow the cascade method from Grand Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military (defence) strategy and so forth. It works; but they are also prepared to fund the resultant programmes.
Accordingly, responses to security risks (incipient problems) and threats (emergent problems) will be equipment-focussed, rather than effects-based.
One example I recall from a few years ago in MB, was when we entered in to long discussions with the Army over the introduction of loitering munitions. They were convinced that the only answer to attacking time-sensitive and dynamic targets was loitering munitions (kamikaze UAVs, for ease of explanation). They just didn't get the concept of joint fires, ie the kinetic effect is what is desired, not necessarily the means of delivery.
Of late I have been involved in guiding the drafting defence strategies for an emerging economy, and they follow the cascade method from Grand Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military (defence) strategy and so forth. It works; but they are also prepared to fund the resultant programmes.
Of course, the fact that Strategy exists
Alanbrooke, quoted in British Defence Doctrine
Means that all those who whine on about financial constraints and the current EP simply don't get it.
to derive from the [policy] aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.
Means that all those who whine on about financial constraints and the current EP simply don't get it.
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Stars
Interesting to note that while overall numbers have dropped by over 20% in the last 3 years, it seems starred posts have fallen by just over 8% if the 2014 figures above are right. Not saying that's wrong but it paints a picture.
Oh JayC change the record old stick, will you? We've already covered this before:
You obviously have a serious chip on both shoulders on this one, what do you propose? SACs/Cpls/Sgts/WOs in every defence attache or NATO post? I can tell you that without at least rank equivalency in these kinds of posts then the UK's voice will be lost. The same goes for joint appointments and then the singular Service loses out as well. 
LJ
PS When has "11" been "nearer 50"?
Jayc
Quote:
Air Cdre and above over manned by 115%. All ranks from Sqn Ldr are also overmanned.
Stats can be quite misleading. There are something like 75 Air Commodores in the RAF (for comparison it is the same in the RN and there are about 160 Brigadiers in the Army). Now your 115% is 11 extra Air Commodores over the 75, making a total of 86. When you take into account the size of our manpower that is 0.03% of our manpower that we are overborne by (an example of how stats can mislead!).
However, you need to consider 2 things:
1. Air Commodores are only as good as their next posting. If they do not get a posting on the Air Rank Appointments List (ARAL) then they get a 'blue letter' telling them they are to retire - directed retirement. So getting rid of 11 is quite easy when you no longer need them!
2. We probably need these extras for now with 1-star jobs in the Middle East (ISAF HQs, EAWs, etc...). Don't forget, for every out of area post you need 2x Air Commodores - 1 on work up and 1 doing the job.
So all in all, old fruit, I don't see the 'shock and horror' of 11 extra Air Commodores that can be switched off in an instant (well about 12 months when you bring in their resettlement).
LJ
Quote:
Air Cdre and above over manned by 115%. All ranks from Sqn Ldr are also overmanned.
Stats can be quite misleading. There are something like 75 Air Commodores in the RAF (for comparison it is the same in the RN and there are about 160 Brigadiers in the Army). Now your 115% is 11 extra Air Commodores over the 75, making a total of 86. When you take into account the size of our manpower that is 0.03% of our manpower that we are overborne by (an example of how stats can mislead!).
However, you need to consider 2 things:
1. Air Commodores are only as good as their next posting. If they do not get a posting on the Air Rank Appointments List (ARAL) then they get a 'blue letter' telling them they are to retire - directed retirement. So getting rid of 11 is quite easy when you no longer need them!
2. We probably need these extras for now with 1-star jobs in the Middle East (ISAF HQs, EAWs, etc...). Don't forget, for every out of area post you need 2x Air Commodores - 1 on work up and 1 doing the job.
So all in all, old fruit, I don't see the 'shock and horror' of 11 extra Air Commodores that can be switched off in an instant (well about 12 months when you bring in their resettlement).
LJ
LJ
PS When has "11" been "nearer 50"?
Is an SDSR in election year good or bad? To me, it makes for hasty decisions. None of the parties have published their defence policies to the level of detail required. Our planners in MoD main building will be spread very thin trying to cover all bases, which will suit the politicians. The answers to "what if?" questions may not be well thought out.
In addition to the above list, BOWMAN is being replaced. It is only 11 years since the contract was let, but it bought a lot of kit that had already been obsolescent for over 10 years, almost immediately scrapping hundreds of millions worth. It blew over £2Bn and didn't come close to delivering what was required, and never will. Volume programmes such as this, as opposed to ships or aircraft with a higher unit cost, tend to be ignored. BOWMAN is a double whammy because the requirement is largely driven by the US, and the need for interoperability. If that ever became policy, then we'd really be in the clag!
In addition to the above list, BOWMAN is being replaced. It is only 11 years since the contract was let, but it bought a lot of kit that had already been obsolescent for over 10 years, almost immediately scrapping hundreds of millions worth. It blew over £2Bn and didn't come close to delivering what was required, and never will. Volume programmes such as this, as opposed to ships or aircraft with a higher unit cost, tend to be ignored. BOWMAN is a double whammy because the requirement is largely driven by the US, and the need for interoperability. If that ever became policy, then we'd really be in the clag!
Ah, BOWMAN... I agree, what a POS. So much so that we had to procure these to be able to do the things we needed to do:
I wouldn't mind if our industry was incapable of producing a Harris 117 equivalent, but there is still something really screwed up with our procurment system, that we can't. I often think it is down to the way we muddle in the R&D phase and don't let industry get investors to produce what they think we might need.
LJ
I wouldn't mind if our industry was incapable of producing a Harris 117 equivalent, but there is still something really screwed up with our procurment system, that we can't. I often think it is down to the way we muddle in the R&D phase and don't let industry get investors to produce what they think we might need.
LJ