VOYAGER AIRPROX
Thread Starter
VOYAGER AIRPROX
Widely reported in the local media, but this report makes interesting reading:
http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/docs/...8%20-%20v2.pdf
My gut feeling is that unfair comments have been levelled at the ATCO on this occasion.....
You'll have to open the link to know more as it would seem that excerpts may not be posted....
http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/docs/...8%20-%20v2.pdf
My gut feeling is that unfair comments have been levelled at the ATCO on this occasion.....
You'll have to open the link to know more as it would seem that excerpts may not be posted....
Join Date: Apr 1999
Location: Manchester, UK
Posts: 1,958
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Perhaps, but they got much closer than they should have. Try timing 18 seconds. It's a very very long time between an instruction to turn and it's commencement. I agree with beagle inasmuch as had the ATC turn instruction been complied with, the Voyager would have remained inside the control zone and passed well clear. But the ATCO took no action when his instruction was not complied with which surely warrants criticism. It would be interesting to see the full transcript. Was the 340hdg instruction acknowledged?
Last edited by ShotOne; 20th Nov 2014 at 22:14.
Would this have anything to do with the expected RAF Brize Airsoace Change Proposal or the Oxford/Kidlington RMZ (https://sites.google.com/site/oxfordairportrmz/)?
It would appear as a bit of "Safety Case Building" to me.
iRaven
It would appear as a bit of "Safety Case Building" to me.
iRaven
"The pilot... reported being in receipt of a Traffic Service.... The aircraft was level in the BZN CTR at 2300ft.." Ah, isn't that an impossible combination inside controlled airspace, the clue being in the name, ATC Service OUTSIDE Controlled Airspace?!
There are many issues here.
2 Gp crews tending to report every TCAS event (RA and TA) as an airprox, with a little ACP evidence building on the side.
The Voyager crew's understanding of the UK FIS and, thus possibly, the classification of airspace in which they were flying at the time.
The slow compliance by aircrews to instructions by ATCOs to turn and descend has been a contributory factor in a number of miltary airprox in recent years - formation turns and descents in IMC I understand but not single aircraft; however large.
At 1658L during the week there should have been an ATC Supervisor maintaining oversight, rather than distracting an ATCO from their primary duty. Especially when you consider that there were 4 radar positions open alongside the visual control room, with unit workload described as high to medium; too many times in recent years this has been a factor in military airprox. There is also something left unsaid here; the Director was setting up the PAR and thus, at a rough guess, was going to conduct the PAR having just directed the aircraft. Who then was going to fulfill the Director's roles and responsibilities iaw MAA RA towards the IFR traffic on PAR whilst they were conducting the GCA?
This distraction then led to them not monitoring the aircraft and not providing TI. The ATCOs prime role is to prevent collisions between aircraft and they can't do this if they're not watching what's going on. The way's in which an ATCO may prevent collisions is by issuing collision avoidance advice and/or by providing traffic information in order for the crew to determine a suitable course of action. In this situation they were unable to do either.
Root cause analysis would look at why that ATCO was placed in that position at that time of day, with that traffic loading, without a dedicated supervisor.
As for the UKAB's finding of cause, it is, as usual, utter guff. It is not a cause of the airprox (ie how the incident occurred) but a statement about what happened. The sooner the UKAB get their act together, as they have been told for a number if years now) the better.
2 Gp crews tending to report every TCAS event (RA and TA) as an airprox, with a little ACP evidence building on the side.
The Voyager crew's understanding of the UK FIS and, thus possibly, the classification of airspace in which they were flying at the time.
The slow compliance by aircrews to instructions by ATCOs to turn and descend has been a contributory factor in a number of miltary airprox in recent years - formation turns and descents in IMC I understand but not single aircraft; however large.
At 1658L during the week there should have been an ATC Supervisor maintaining oversight, rather than distracting an ATCO from their primary duty. Especially when you consider that there were 4 radar positions open alongside the visual control room, with unit workload described as high to medium; too many times in recent years this has been a factor in military airprox. There is also something left unsaid here; the Director was setting up the PAR and thus, at a rough guess, was going to conduct the PAR having just directed the aircraft. Who then was going to fulfill the Director's roles and responsibilities iaw MAA RA towards the IFR traffic on PAR whilst they were conducting the GCA?
This distraction then led to them not monitoring the aircraft and not providing TI. The ATCOs prime role is to prevent collisions between aircraft and they can't do this if they're not watching what's going on. The way's in which an ATCO may prevent collisions is by issuing collision avoidance advice and/or by providing traffic information in order for the crew to determine a suitable course of action. In this situation they were unable to do either.
Root cause analysis would look at why that ATCO was placed in that position at that time of day, with that traffic loading, without a dedicated supervisor.
As for the UKAB's finding of cause, it is, as usual, utter guff. It is not a cause of the airprox (ie how the incident occurred) but a statement about what happened. The sooner the UKAB get their act together, as they have been told for a number if years now) the better.
For the movements at Brize they already have too much square footage of airspace, these and similar events will probably be used to try to grab more. Add the fact that Kidlington and Farnborough are trying for Class D - GA traffic in the uk is slowly being strangled by the constant push for more controlled airspace. Cases in point at Robin Hood International with their <10 movements a day and Norwich which is even less.
This airprox appears to be a non event.
This airprox appears to be a non event.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Englandshire
Posts: 145
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Class D doesn't stop GA flying in it.
As for the UKAB it's well worth going as an observer, it an eye opener. It's a shame you cannot say anything as an observer there.
As for the UKAB it's well worth going as an observer, it an eye opener. It's a shame you cannot say anything as an observer there.
Join Date: Apr 1999
Location: Manchester, UK
Posts: 1,958
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"non-event..?" OK, nothing got bent or burnt but the same chain of events anywhere moderately busy would take some sorting out. The aircraft ended up outside controlled airspace which certainly wasn't the controllers intention.
Last edited by ShotOne; 24th Nov 2014 at 06:53.
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: UK sometimes
Posts: 134
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can say something as an observer, and it is a disgrace. They are very explicit in saying it is not their job to apportion blame but this belies what is said. Also a cursory check of some random reports will reveal (in most) thinly veiled attacks on the professionalism (lack of) of pilots and controllers alike.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,573
Received 413 Likes
on
218 Posts
I'm surprised to read that some military pilots are reporting every TA. In the big bad world outside CAS, it's not unusual to have to deal with them, usually without the assistance of ATC. The attitude of the SK76 driver in his report reflects that.
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Hiq et Ubique
Posts: 171
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The slow compliance by aircrews to instructions by ATCOs to turn and descend has been a contributory factor in a number of miltary airprox in recent years - formation turns and descents in IMC I understand but not single aircraft; however large.
And that is my main point - how about we stop the armchair analysis, sat comfortably behind our anonymous profiles, and refrain from criticising the actions of those involved. We weren't there, we don't have the whole picture and so we don't know.
As for the our civilian counterparts under the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme:
Part 1: List of Aircraft Operations, Maintenance, Repair and Manufacture - Related Occurrences to be Reported
a) Avoidance manoeuvres:
• risk of collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object or an unsafe situation when avoidance action would have been appropriate;
• an avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object;
• an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid other unsafe situations.
k) Breakdown in communication between flight crew "CRM" (crew resource management) or between flight crew and other parties (cabin crew, ATC [air traffic control] engineering).
aa) ACAS RA (Air Collision Avoidance System, Resolution Advisory). Note: TCAS (Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System) is a form of ACAS. All ACAS RAs should be reported, regardless of the cause.
a) Avoidance manoeuvres:
• risk of collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object or an unsafe situation when avoidance action would have been appropriate;
• an avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object;
• an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid other unsafe situations.
k) Breakdown in communication between flight crew "CRM" (crew resource management) or between flight crew and other parties (cabin crew, ATC [air traffic control] engineering).
aa) ACAS RA (Air Collision Avoidance System, Resolution Advisory). Note: TCAS (Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System) is a form of ACAS. All ACAS RAs should be reported, regardless of the cause.
Avoid imitations
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Wandering the FIR and cyberspace often at highly unsociable times
Posts: 14,573
Received 413 Likes
on
218 Posts
There was no RA, though, was there? Only a TA, according to the report.
BTW, the TCAS 1, as fitted to the SK76, doesn't have the ability to give RA so there was no requirement for that crew to make a report, although they would no doubt have filed an AIRPROX based on other factors if they had felt the need.
To be perfectly blunt though, having had what I considered at the time very good cause to file a few AIRPROX reports, they don't actually seem to achieve much (apart from giving the board something to discuss over lunch of course).
BTW, the TCAS 1, as fitted to the SK76, doesn't have the ability to give RA so there was no requirement for that crew to make a report, although they would no doubt have filed an AIRPROX based on other factors if they had felt the need.
To be perfectly blunt though, having had what I considered at the time very good cause to file a few AIRPROX reports, they don't actually seem to achieve much (apart from giving the board something to discuss over lunch of course).
