More KC-46A woes....
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They did. For example, here's a cut and paste from the article cited above:
The KC-46A tankers will be built using a low-risk approach to manufacturing by a trained and experienced U.S. work force at existing Boeing facilities.
Do you understand what "low risk approach to manufacturing means?" What "existing Boeing facilities" means? It does not mean "risk free development." Read the paragraph in post #569 regarding civil certification and using the existing production certificate to manufacture the aircraft. BTW, this sentence was addressing the Airbus proposal, which proposed an entirely new production facility using new people totally unfamiliar with the aircraft to build Airbus' KC-30. And oh yes, it would have required certifying that production facility and its processes. Not an easy or quick thing to do. Or cheap.
The KC-46A tankers will be built using a low-risk approach to manufacturing by a trained and experienced U.S. work force at existing Boeing facilities.
Do you understand what "low risk approach to manufacturing means?" What "existing Boeing facilities" means? It does not mean "risk free development." Read the paragraph in post #569 regarding civil certification and using the existing production certificate to manufacture the aircraft. BTW, this sentence was addressing the Airbus proposal, which proposed an entirely new production facility using new people totally unfamiliar with the aircraft to build Airbus' KC-30. And oh yes, it would have required certifying that production facility and its processes. Not an easy or quick thing to do. Or cheap.
Last edited by KenV; 23rd May 2017 at 17:53.
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From what I have read here previously, and I think KenV will agree, Boeing put their best management and engineers on other programmes which had problems and larger orders such as the 787 and P-8, and those assigned to the KC-46 were very much the B team. The problems which then occurred, such as not designing the wiring looms to DoD specifications etc, were down to engineering screw-ups and lack of management oversight - not a struggle to implement new technology.
So what caused the delay? First the aggressive schedule did not have a lot of margin for error. It was very success oriented. The first big foul up related to civil certification of a military aircraft. Wire harnesses were designed using civil requirements, but USAF insisted (properly) they should have been done to military requirements. That cost about one third of the delay. Then a real blunder was uncovered related to the design of new fuel manifolds. That cost another three months. Then during testing a vendor mis-labelled a container of test fluid contaminating and damaging the entire fuel system of the test aircraft. That added a few more months. The boom flight control system went digital (the original was analog) and included a software feature designed to replace a mechanical over pressure relief valve. It worked great during a bunch of flight tests. But it turned out the software was not quite "robust enough" under some conditions, necessitating a change back to include the mechanical relief valve. That added more months. Not to add the relief valve, that was easy. But a lot of flight testing had been done using the new configuration and going back to the old one meant redoing a bunch of that flight testing. And so it went until the program is now about a year behind schedule.
Such glitches are pretty much par for the course (A380 had huge wiring problems early in the program also.) and are usually accommodated by the dollar and schedule margin built into the program. But this program was exceptionally tight and the margin proved to be insufficient.
ORAC, I am not sure I understand. If USAF insisted on the military way, why Boeing did not include its cost on the revised calculations before finalizing the contract and delivery times?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
It's like the T&Cs on something like Amazon, di you actually read them before clicking yes?
Those used to working on military contracts know through long experience the relevant manuals and specifications for military work. You throw in a team used to working on civil projects who equally just know the civil specifications, are they going to spend months trying to read every book/standard in the contract?
Assumption? Someone in a hurry just assumed the specs were the same, nobody had the military contract background to query the design - and it came back to bite them.
Those used to working on military contracts know through long experience the relevant manuals and specifications for military work. You throw in a team used to working on civil projects who equally just know the civil specifications, are they going to spend months trying to read every book/standard in the contract?
Assumption? Someone in a hurry just assumed the specs were the same, nobody had the military contract background to query the design - and it came back to bite them.
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Those used to working on military contracts know through long experience the relevant manuals and specifications for military work. You throw in a team used to working on civil projects who equally just know the civil specifications, are they going to spend months trying to read every book/standard in the contract?
Assumption? Someone in a hurry just assumed the specs were the same, nobody had the military contract background to query the design - and it came back to bite them.
Assumption? Someone in a hurry just assumed the specs were the same, nobody had the military contract background to query the design - and it came back to bite them.
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"What is the "truth" and "half-truth" concerning the number of people who have died flying an A-400M vs a KC-46?"
Being as the KC-46 is a development of an existing design...Over 700 people have died during the 'development' of the KC-46.
The problem with comparing apples (KC-46) with oranges (A400M) is that the stats can be manipulated as required to suit an agenda.
Being as the KC-46 is a development of an existing design...Over 700 people have died during the 'development' of the KC-46.
The problem with comparing apples (KC-46) with oranges (A400M) is that the stats can be manipulated as required to suit an agenda.
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That's part of it. Another part is that a lot of the wire harnesses are designed, installed, and certified to civil certification standards and other wire harnesses to Mil Standard. It was assumed that if a wire harness was going to be certified by the FAA, it would be designed and installed per the civil standards. Bad assumption. Many (though not all) civilly certified wire harnesses had to be designed and installed per Mil Standard. That's rather odd to certify to one standard and design and install to another, but that's how the contract read. And that was missed.
I've posted previously that the 767-2C/KC-46 was, by far, the worst managed program I was involved in during my 39+ career at Boeing (with the disclaimer that I wasn't on the 787 program 
).
When Airbus was awarded the tanker contract in 2008, I was simultaneously disappointed and relieved - both the 787 and the 747-8 were in development (I was heading my group for the 747-8 and we were already shorthanded) and I knew we didn't have the bandwidth to do another program.
A couple years later, when were asked for work statements for the revised proposal, we were told to "assume success", and not to pad our estimates. I put in what I thought was a bare bones estimate yet still got grilled as to why we needed so many hours (a later, independent audit concluded my estimate was less than half of what was needed). Plus, while I don't know if this happened on the tanker, I know for a fact, that my work statement estimate for the 747-8 was unilaterally reduced by 30% by upper management after I submitted it (needless to say, we over-ran that estimate...).
While it was certainly true that the tanker program didn't get the 'A' team, the level of miss-management was really mind boggling. The wiring and EMI protection requirements were fully known up front, and some groups took them into account early on. Perhaps it's because wire isolation and EMI protection have long been a major design concern for propulsion (engine to engine isolating being a FAR requirement), we were designing for them even during the proposal stage. It simply boggles the mind that some groups apparently remained completely ignorant of the USAF requirements until after the first tanker aircraft was basically built - to quote a great movie, "What we have here is failure to communicate". EVERY manager who's group didn't properly incorporate the required wire isolation and EMI protection should have been demoted or fired for incompetence - but to the best of my knowledge nothing of the kind happened. In fact, quite the opposite occurred - I personally know several people who were very competent managers on the 767-2C/KC-46 program who got so fed up/beat up that they voluntarily left the management ranks and returned to engineering or simply retired.
FAA cert was another can of worms - and contrary to popular belief the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (SACO) doesn't do Boeing many favors (BTW FAA Part 25 cert was a USAF requirement, although it drove massive cost into the program with little tangible benefit). The FAA has something called "Changed Product Rule" (CPR) - which is used on a derivate aircraft to determine what systems can retain their original cert basis and what has to step up to the latest regulations. Many systems were blindsided when the FAA ruled them to be 'Changed Systems per CPR' due to small changes, resulting in tens of thousands of hours of non-value added work to show full compliance to regulations that were only slightly changed from the original cert basis (I personally got caught out by that one). My question as to why we had to certify a military derivative aircraft to a greater level of safety than it's civilian counterpart (that, BTW, has an enviable safety record) went strangely unanswered
I also grossly underestimated the additional effort required for USAF coordination (by roughly a factor of 10
) as this was my first exposure to a military program.
).When Airbus was awarded the tanker contract in 2008, I was simultaneously disappointed and relieved - both the 787 and the 747-8 were in development (I was heading my group for the 747-8 and we were already shorthanded) and I knew we didn't have the bandwidth to do another program.
A couple years later, when were asked for work statements for the revised proposal, we were told to "assume success", and not to pad our estimates. I put in what I thought was a bare bones estimate yet still got grilled as to why we needed so many hours (a later, independent audit concluded my estimate was less than half of what was needed). Plus, while I don't know if this happened on the tanker, I know for a fact, that my work statement estimate for the 747-8 was unilaterally reduced by 30% by upper management after I submitted it (needless to say, we over-ran that estimate...).
While it was certainly true that the tanker program didn't get the 'A' team, the level of miss-management was really mind boggling. The wiring and EMI protection requirements were fully known up front, and some groups took them into account early on. Perhaps it's because wire isolation and EMI protection have long been a major design concern for propulsion (engine to engine isolating being a FAR requirement), we were designing for them even during the proposal stage. It simply boggles the mind that some groups apparently remained completely ignorant of the USAF requirements until after the first tanker aircraft was basically built - to quote a great movie, "What we have here is failure to communicate". EVERY manager who's group didn't properly incorporate the required wire isolation and EMI protection should have been demoted or fired for incompetence - but to the best of my knowledge nothing of the kind happened. In fact, quite the opposite occurred - I personally know several people who were very competent managers on the 767-2C/KC-46 program who got so fed up/beat up that they voluntarily left the management ranks and returned to engineering or simply retired.
FAA cert was another can of worms - and contrary to popular belief the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (SACO) doesn't do Boeing many favors (BTW FAA Part 25 cert was a USAF requirement, although it drove massive cost into the program with little tangible benefit). The FAA has something called "Changed Product Rule" (CPR) - which is used on a derivate aircraft to determine what systems can retain their original cert basis and what has to step up to the latest regulations. Many systems were blindsided when the FAA ruled them to be 'Changed Systems per CPR' due to small changes, resulting in tens of thousands of hours of non-value added work to show full compliance to regulations that were only slightly changed from the original cert basis (I personally got caught out by that one). My question as to why we had to certify a military derivative aircraft to a greater level of safety than it's civilian counterpart (that, BTW, has an enviable safety record) went strangely unanswered
I also grossly underestimated the additional effort required for USAF coordination (by roughly a factor of 10
) as this was my first exposure to a military program.
How about a meaningful, universally accepted safety parameter like "hull loss rate", or "fatalities per million operational hours". I think you'll find the A400 statistics would, well, suck...
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Please forgive my ignorance if I have missed a comment.
I have been following the development of the KC-46A on here since it's inception, but only from the standpoint of large project management.
Since I have no design or development experience of any aircraft on my CV, let alone a large military aircraft, I have a fairly simple question.
History suggests that although the 767 basic airframe was used, virtually everything else was "reworked" to meet the requirements of the USAF.
Would anyone be prepared to say, what the percentage of new components, (as in designed and manufactured specifically for..) had to be sourced to meet the specific USAF requirements?
Thanks
Imagegear
I have been following the development of the KC-46A on here since it's inception, but only from the standpoint of large project management.
Since I have no design or development experience of any aircraft on my CV, let alone a large military aircraft, I have a fairly simple question.
History suggests that although the 767 basic airframe was used, virtually everything else was "reworked" to meet the requirements of the USAF.
Would anyone be prepared to say, what the percentage of new components, (as in designed and manufactured specifically for..) had to be sourced to meet the specific USAF requirements?
Thanks
Imagegear
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Fuel system? Lots and lots of big changes to the tankage, plumbing, valving, pumping, displays, and processors/software.
Powerplant? Not too much. Slight change to engines (mostly to satisfy USAF servicing requirements). Nacelles are unique to KC-46 due to USAF not wanting thrust reversers, which also resulted in a change to the EEC software which controls the reversers that aren't there anymore. Off the shelf APU, but some changes to APU starting system to accommodate "alert status" APU starting.
Avionics, not too much. The biggest change was a switch to 787 flight deck displays and display processors/drivers. These parts have a KC-46 specific part number, but are essentially the same parts as on 787.
Wiring is a different thing. Over 25 miles of wire were added.
Obviously the refueling boom, WARP (Wing Aerial Refueling Pods), 3-D camera system, and RARO (Remote Aerial Refueling Operator) Station and associated installation provisions are KC-46 unique.
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Kenv
With apologies:
You mention six completely separate pieces of work which needed to be seamlessly integrated with all the associated functionality, redundancy, recovery, and hardening.
That's beginning to sound more like a 25-30% modification across the piece. If so then that represents quite a significant amount of effort in terms of project duration and the potential for delay.
Even if, as they should have been, all the bases had been covered during the design process, do you believe that the project still had the potential to be successful (Within the definition of success) for the USAF?
If not, is there a fallback position which will allow face saving on both sides?
Imagegear
With apologies:
You mention six completely separate pieces of work which needed to be seamlessly integrated with all the associated functionality, redundancy, recovery, and hardening.
That's beginning to sound more like a 25-30% modification across the piece. If so then that represents quite a significant amount of effort in terms of project duration and the potential for delay.
Even if, as they should have been, all the bases had been covered during the design process, do you believe that the project still had the potential to be successful (Within the definition of success) for the USAF?
If not, is there a fallback position which will allow face saving on both sides?
Imagegear
If not, is there a fallback position which will allow face saving on both sides?
Crunch Time: USAF Says Boeing?s Tanker ?Several Months Behind? | Defense content from Aviation Week
"Boeing’s time line for delivering 18 full-up KC-46A tankers to the U.S. Air Force is getting tighter and tighter.
The manufacturer is several months behind schedule on the tanker program, which means the first aircraft will not be delivered until after September, top Air Force officials told Congress in written testimony May 25.
“We are making steady but slower progress than we had anticipated,” Lt. Gen. Arnie Bunch, the service’s military deputy for acquisition, told the House Armed Services Committee. “We are running into areas where we are being delayed.”
Boeing has fixed the design problems with the tanker’s refueling system it saw last summer, and has had no new technical issues with the aircraft, the company says. But those design problems delayed completion of key flight tests; the challenge now is making up for lost time.
The test program is running behind the planned pace because several test aircraft are still undergoing upgrades to incorporate design changes, Bunch wrote in his testimony. Meanwhile, Boeing’s design of several subsystems and production of conformed hardware are still pending FAA approval, further slowing flight tests, he wrote. ..... "
LFH
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I thought the issue was that the criteria the FAA mandates for separation of critical wire bundles had been updated since the 767 was first certified in the early 80s but Boeing didn't comply with the updated rules for the 767-2C which has many more miles of wiring than a standard 767.
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I thought the issue was that the criteria the FAA mandates for separation of critical wire bundles had been updated since the 767 was first certified in the early 80s but Boeing didn't comply with the updated rules for the 767-2C which has many more miles of wiring than a standard 767.
Military EMP shielding issues are much more stringent than FAA requirements. Its MORE than FAA separation and FAA lightning protection requirements. As in a ' nearby ' ( say within 50 miles ) nuke EMP detonation pulse . The basic 767 has ( still ? ) minimum cable controls useable in the event of total loss of electrical power except for a RAT to power a few instruments. ( look up the GIMLI Glider ) tosee how that works ). .Now add FBW style controls for boom, special communication wiring, etc and the ' separation ' issue is the least of the problems.
And ' simply' moving certain wires futher apart is NOT simple- nor adequate to ' fix' - especially in a plane already stuffed and assmbled. re wiring your home AFTER completion would be relatively simple by compariso.
Extra grounding- alternate power paths, and special terminations are a small part of the corrections needed to comply to long standing MIL spec ..
Last edited by CONSO; 31st May 2017 at 02:22. Reason: fat fin ger spelling