More KC-46A woes....
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I'm still amazed at how Mr B. got this one so wrong - the F-35 (and the B787) I sort of understand - new tech, start from scratch etc etc
But here we have the world's premier airframe builder, modding a design that has been around for years and adding gear that is essentially also been in service for years ..... they were so confident they took a fix-priced contract so they obviously thought it would be money for old rope......
Amazing..................
But here we have the world's premier airframe builder, modding a design that has been around for years and adding gear that is essentially also been in service for years ..... they were so confident they took a fix-priced contract so they obviously thought it would be money for old rope......
Amazing..................
I suppose that if one looked at aircraft development programs from their infancy until entry into service, very few would be without some costly blemishes and late milestones. Like engineering, program management is real world, not science from an MBA text book. Add in project advocacy, changes in requirements, changes in finances, changes in personnel and things will naturally get complicated. It takes courage to undertake such a complex, multi-disciplinary endeavor with one's eyes open.
I suggest we start judging the success of the airplane/program a few years after entry into service and with some hindsight. I marvel at the large and enthusiastic football (AKA soccer) fans who cheer and jeer throughout the season and how few in the crowd would last five minutes on the field. Aviation is a bit like that, too.
I suggest we start judging the success of the airplane/program a few years after entry into service and with some hindsight. I marvel at the large and enthusiastic football (AKA soccer) fans who cheer and jeer throughout the season and how few in the crowd would last five minutes on the field. Aviation is a bit like that, too.
But here we have the world's premier airframe builder, modding a design that has been around for years and adding gear that is essentially also been in service for years ..... they were so confident they took a fix-priced contract so they obviously thought it would be money for old rope......
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Quote post #442: "The first time Boeing has really fumbled the ball in the post-war airline market".
Really? Perhaps I missed the sarcasm..
The Stratocruiser was larger than the Douglas DC-6 and Lockheed Constellation and cost more to buy and operate. Its reliability was poor, chiefly due to problems with the four 28-cylinder Pratt & Whitney Wasp Major radial engines and their four-blade propellers. Only 55 Model 377s were built for airlines, along with the single prototype.
Boeing skipped the development and marketing of an interim turboprop airliner, but it still took Boeing 10 years to recover and ultimately excel in the commercial airliner market. I recall a Boeing product development department slogan in the mid 1950's, "Life is too short for propellers"..
Really? Perhaps I missed the sarcasm..
The Stratocruiser was larger than the Douglas DC-6 and Lockheed Constellation and cost more to buy and operate. Its reliability was poor, chiefly due to problems with the four 28-cylinder Pratt & Whitney Wasp Major radial engines and their four-blade propellers. Only 55 Model 377s were built for airlines, along with the single prototype.
Boeing skipped the development and marketing of an interim turboprop airliner, but it still took Boeing 10 years to recover and ultimately excel in the commercial airliner market. I recall a Boeing product development department slogan in the mid 1950's, "Life is too short for propellers"..
Last edited by evansb; 28th May 2016 at 06:22.
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"I'm still amazed at how Mr B. got this one so wrong" ?
In order for me to better understand why this program is in such a parlous state I felt the need to refresh on the reasons by reading through the archived threads associated with this project. However, on my travels I came across this (for me), little gem of potted history up to 2015.
Ignoring the fact that it is written by an academic, the timeline of subterfuge is both long and amoebic.
Does the panel recognise that from reading this document, that the chances of a successful project outcome must be slim or none?
Apologies if the link was posted in a previous thread.
Imagegear
Ignoring the fact that it is written by an academic, the timeline of subterfuge is both long and amoebic.
Does the panel recognise that from reading this document, that the chances of a successful project outcome must be slim or none?
Apologies if the link was posted in a previous thread.
Imagegear
Last edited by ImageGear; 29th May 2016 at 15:20.
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Having read the referenced paper, I do wonder if as stated there is so much life left in the newly modernised 135s that there is a perceived need for a new tanker.
It would perhaps not be too surprising that many of the managers from the 787 transitioned to 767-2C/KC-46 early in the program 
I've posted before that in my nearly 40 years at the lazy B, the 767-2C/KC-46 is by far the worst managed program I've been involved with (no, I wasn't on the 787 program - the only other program in the same ballpark of screw-up). Quite a come down from the 777, that certified on the very day that had been scheduled 5 years before hand, while meeting or exceeding nearly every performance metric for the new aircraft.
Boeing did a major shakeup of the 767-2C/KC-46 about 18 months ago (not entirely coincidental, about the time of first flight), and the program has progressed much better since then. This latest round of problems is more along the line of "
happens" rather than the piss poor design decisions made early on that resulted in tanker fuel systems that leaked like a sieve and wire design that failed to meet basic wiring requirements. 
As to why the 787 and tanker programs got so fouled up - ask yourself what major change occurred at Boeing between when the 777 certified (1995) and when the 787 launched
I've posted before that in my nearly 40 years at the lazy B, the 767-2C/KC-46 is by far the worst managed program I've been involved with (no, I wasn't on the 787 program - the only other program in the same ballpark of screw-up). Quite a come down from the 777, that certified on the very day that had been scheduled 5 years before hand, while meeting or exceeding nearly every performance metric for the new aircraft.
Boeing did a major shakeup of the 767-2C/KC-46 about 18 months ago (not entirely coincidental, about the time of first flight), and the program has progressed much better since then. This latest round of problems is more along the line of "
happens" rather than the piss poor design decisions made early on that resulted in tanker fuel systems that leaked like a sieve and wire design that failed to meet basic wiring requirements. As to why the 787 and tanker programs got so fouled up - ask yourself what major change occurred at Boeing between when the 777 certified (1995) and when the 787 launched
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" KC-46 Pegasus aircraft are now expected to arrive at their first basing locations by late summer or early fall 2017.
The KC-46 was most recently scheduled for a spring 2017 arrival at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, the first formal training unit location; and McConnell AFB, Kansas, the first active duty-led Pegasus main operating base. But after a schedule risk assessment, Air Force officials determined the fielding timeline needed to be extended."
Further here :
Boeing and U.S. Air Force Adjust KC-46 Tanker Schedule | at DefenceTalk
The KC-46 was most recently scheduled for a spring 2017 arrival at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, the first formal training unit location; and McConnell AFB, Kansas, the first active duty-led Pegasus main operating base. But after a schedule risk assessment, Air Force officials determined the fielding timeline needed to be extended."
Further here :
Boeing and U.S. Air Force Adjust KC-46 Tanker Schedule | at DefenceTalk
Quote post #442: "The first time Boeing has really fumbled the ball in the post-war airline market".
Really? Perhaps I missed the sarcasm..
The Stratocruiser was larger than the Douglas DC-6 and Lockheed Constellation and cost more to buy and operate. Its reliability was poor, chiefly due to problems with the four 28-cylinder Pratt & Whitney Wasp Major radial engines and their four-blade propellers. Only 55 Model 377s were built for airlines, along with the single prototype.
Boeing skipped the development and marketing of an interim turboprop airliner, but it still took Boeing 10 years to recover and ultimately excel in the commercial airliner market. I recall a Boeing product development department slogan in the mid 1950's, "Life is too short for propellers"..
Really? Perhaps I missed the sarcasm..
The Stratocruiser was larger than the Douglas DC-6 and Lockheed Constellation and cost more to buy and operate. Its reliability was poor, chiefly due to problems with the four 28-cylinder Pratt & Whitney Wasp Major radial engines and their four-blade propellers. Only 55 Model 377s were built for airlines, along with the single prototype.
Boeing skipped the development and marketing of an interim turboprop airliner, but it still took Boeing 10 years to recover and ultimately excel in the commercial airliner market. I recall a Boeing product development department slogan in the mid 1950's, "Life is too short for propellers"..
Not sure how relevant a cut and past of the Stratocruiser wiki page is to the KC-46 unless you just want to cite a Boeing "failure", but not sure I would call the Stratorcruiser "fumbling the ball" badly in the commercial field which with other programs we see gross cost escalations, major time delays, high operating costs and teething problems. Boeing was producing bombers as fast as they could at the time, and saw an opportunity to make a commercial derivative of the C-97/KC-97. It did not sell to well as it was not economical, there was a limited market, a glut of cheaper airframes, and as you say had troublesome engines. I see the Stratocruiser as a niche jumbo (for its era), that did not make economic sense. Perhaps a Concorde or A-380 type niche. Did what it was designed to do, but not a huge seller when there were cheaper alternatives.
The C-97 and KC-97 did just fine with over 800 built, but the airframe was really not what the airlines needed at the time.
Boeing was producing bombers and transports as fast as they could at the time: B-29, B-50, C/KC-97, B-47, B-52, and was a minor player in the commercial filed, so not sure I agree that it took them a decade "to recover" from the Stratocruiser. Recover from what? A few years later Boeing made the brilliant move with the Dash 80, which became the KC-135 and the 707.
If we want to press the American football analogy, I would chalk up the Stratocruiser as an "incomplete pass" with a play you never really expected to win the game with.
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Originally posted by tdracer
ask yourself what major change occurred at Boeing between when the 777 certified (1995) and when the 787 launched
ask yourself what major change occurred at Boeing between when the 777 certified (1995) and when the 787 launched
buying other companies
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I should have been clearer on that part of the statement. I could tell you lots of stories about the subsequent two CEOs relative to management styles, even before they came your way...
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This latest round of problems is more along the line of "
happens" rather than the piss poor design decisions made early on that resulted in tanker fuel systems that leaked like a sieve and wire design that failed to meet basic wiring requirements.
happens" rather than the piss poor design decisions made early on that resulted in tanker fuel systems that leaked like a sieve and wire design that failed to meet basic wiring requirements.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
I can Senator McCain and his committe have a few questions to ask about this after all the previous debacles over the tanker contract(s).
Boeing is going to about a year late delivering their first tranche of KC-46s and the penalty will be..... good question. The contact defines no penalties for schedule slippage or late delivery.....
Boeing?s Penalty For Latest KC-46 Delay Still Unclear
Boeing is going to about a year late delivering their first tranche of KC-46s and the penalty will be..... good question. The contact defines no penalties for schedule slippage or late delivery.....
Boeing?s Penalty For Latest KC-46 Delay Still Unclear
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Still plenty of real-estate at Mobile, Alabama should the USAF decide on some 'interim tankers'.
Kinda like they did when the Lockheed L-193 was the preferred tanker in 1954, and the Boeing KC-135 was brought in as an 'interim tanker'.
Kinda like they did when the Lockheed L-193 was the preferred tanker in 1954, and the Boeing KC-135 was brought in as an 'interim tanker'.
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Boeing is going to about a year late delivering their first tranche of KC-46s and the penalty will be..... good question. The contact defines no penalties for schedule slippage or late delivery.....
And FWIW, the late deliveries will result in a contract breach which will trigger a schedule rebaseline negotiation and its during those negotiations that Boeing will find out how much this will cost them. And although Boeing will (probably) deliver the physical aircraft on schedule, they will be non conforming in that the refueling system will not be certified. The software update that will make the aircraft conforming will be installed after the aircraft are delivered. So depending on what USAF had originally planned to do with the aircraft those first five months, there may be little or no impact to USAF. For example, if the first five months were planned for basic flight crew training with little or no aerial refueling, USAF's schedule is minimally impacted, which (theoretically) should result in a smallish penalty. Boeing have to wait and see.
Still plenty of real-estate at Mobile, Alabama should the USAF decide on some 'interim tankers'. Kinda like they did when the Lockheed L-193 was the preferred tanker in 1954, and the Boeing KC-135 was brought in as an 'interim tanker'.
Last edited by KenV; 3rd Jun 2016 at 14:02.
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KenV wrote:
Which reminds me of another tanker with non-conforming software, eh D-IFF_ident? How is the 330's Mystery Planning System these days - anywhere close to being fit for purpose yet?
Although the US will hide behind ITAR at the slightest excuse, aircrew-to-aircrew stories which came back from ARSAG tell me that the system for the KC-46A isn't much better either....
They only have to ask.....
The software update that will make the aircraft conforming will be installed after the aircraft are delivered.
Although the US will hide behind ITAR at the slightest excuse, aircrew-to-aircrew stories which came back from ARSAG tell me that the system for the KC-46A isn't much better either....
They only have to ask.....