15th September 1940
rolling20, day bombing of the Luftwaffe's airfields in Northern France (and they were mainly just that, fields) would have resulted in far greater losses of our aircraft (both fighters and bombers) than theirs. That was the lesson so bitterly learnt in France and Norway previously (as Wensleydale posted already). The BoB was a battle of attrition, as Dowding had already made clear when he insisted that Fighter Command be retained in the UK to fight in its own skies for Air Supremacy. It would have lost that fight if it had fought in the Luftwaffe's skies.
As to the bombers that might have been used, those mentioned by Danny were those that had been sent with the BEF to strike tactical targets by day and suffered massive losses as a result. I suspect that was his rueful point. Those that you listed were already earmarked for the night strategic bombing offensive and were the forerunners of the later heavies that were to have such a devastating effect on the German war effort, but that is yet another controversy of course...
As to the bombers that might have been used, those mentioned by Danny were those that had been sent with the BEF to strike tactical targets by day and suffered massive losses as a result. I suspect that was his rueful point. Those that you listed were already earmarked for the night strategic bombing offensive and were the forerunners of the later heavies that were to have such a devastating effect on the German war effort, but that is yet another controversy of course...
AASF was mainly attacking troop columns at low level, where flak was murderous and had no fighter cover. When they attacked at medium/high level losses were in part no where near as bad. (aside of returning to the Meuse bridges after a early successful attack) Some airfields were concrete Chugalug2 , Amiens was twice attacked with no apparent success. As for the night offensive, we had to use whatever we had however we could , thus Wimpeys, Whitleys and Hampdens being used on the barges. The debate will go on, I have said my bit and bid you good day gentlemen!
I shall raise a glass to all who perished in the BoB this evening.
I shall raise a glass to all who perished in the BoB this evening.
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May I just add that the Hampdens of 5 Group had the task of shipping attack throughout the early war years and were being held for attacks on the German Fleet. Attacks on invasion barges was part of their primary role! They subsequently prioritised on mine laying and attacks on the German Capital ships in ports such as Brest. (It was not their fault that most bombs bounced off the armoured decks of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen when they were lucky enough to score hits).
Like Rolling20, I too will be raising a glass in memory tonight.
Other factors in this debate are missing, ACM Dowding as AOCinC of Fighter Command had numerous things to his advantage, by his foresight he developed an air defence system that exists to this day, was in receipt of ULTRA information, a privilege accorded to few very senior commanders and was able to have a subordinate commander in the shape of AVM Keith Park who was able to prosecute the battle. Radar allowed for aircraft to be ground based so standing patrols fatiguing aircrew were not required. The range of the ME 109 did not allow them to have enough time over the combat area to protect their bombers when north of London and their loss of pilots when over the UK.
Fighter sweeps over France during the Battle would have caused costly losses to both pilots and aircraft which at the time would not have allowed replacement and led to a draining of Fighter Command's strength, Dowding was right to refuse to deploy any more aircraft beyond the AASF to France before and during Dunkirk as they too would have been lost.
The Luftwaffe, had the problems of cross channel flights, as mentioned relatively short combat range of its fighters, loss of pilots as bombers usually at the start had two rated pilots in each crew and lastly political interference. After the Luftwaffe bombed London (Croydon) accidentally RAF bombed Berlin leading Hitler to order a change in bombing from tactical against radar stations and airfields and onto strategic, against the cities. Their advantage was numbers but not necessarily the correct aircraft ME 110 and JU 87 comes to mind, useful against an inadequate air defence system, many squadron commanders had had combat experience in the Spanish Civil War, Molders and Galland to name two.
Apart from the pilots I will raise a glass in memory of Sir Hugh Dowding, the man who fought and won the most significant battle this country has faced since the Battle of Hastings in terms of invasion threat. A man forgotten by most, who was cr***d on by political manoeuvrings and machinations of the people above him in the RAF.
AVM Park went to to command the air defence of Malta, and we know how that battle turned , same result as the Battle of Britain, showed the system worked.
From what I have read and seen of her, maybe also raise a glass as well to Air Commodore Joan Hopkins, a modern day AVM Park.
Other factors in this debate are missing, ACM Dowding as AOCinC of Fighter Command had numerous things to his advantage, by his foresight he developed an air defence system that exists to this day, was in receipt of ULTRA information, a privilege accorded to few very senior commanders and was able to have a subordinate commander in the shape of AVM Keith Park who was able to prosecute the battle. Radar allowed for aircraft to be ground based so standing patrols fatiguing aircrew were not required. The range of the ME 109 did not allow them to have enough time over the combat area to protect their bombers when north of London and their loss of pilots when over the UK.
Fighter sweeps over France during the Battle would have caused costly losses to both pilots and aircraft which at the time would not have allowed replacement and led to a draining of Fighter Command's strength, Dowding was right to refuse to deploy any more aircraft beyond the AASF to France before and during Dunkirk as they too would have been lost.
The Luftwaffe, had the problems of cross channel flights, as mentioned relatively short combat range of its fighters, loss of pilots as bombers usually at the start had two rated pilots in each crew and lastly political interference. After the Luftwaffe bombed London (Croydon) accidentally RAF bombed Berlin leading Hitler to order a change in bombing from tactical against radar stations and airfields and onto strategic, against the cities. Their advantage was numbers but not necessarily the correct aircraft ME 110 and JU 87 comes to mind, useful against an inadequate air defence system, many squadron commanders had had combat experience in the Spanish Civil War, Molders and Galland to name two.
Apart from the pilots I will raise a glass in memory of Sir Hugh Dowding, the man who fought and won the most significant battle this country has faced since the Battle of Hastings in terms of invasion threat. A man forgotten by most, who was cr***d on by political manoeuvrings and machinations of the people above him in the RAF.
AVM Park went to to command the air defence of Malta, and we know how that battle turned , same result as the Battle of Britain, showed the system worked.
From what I have read and seen of her, maybe also raise a glass as well to Air Commodore Joan Hopkins, a modern day AVM Park.
Last edited by air pig; 15th Sep 2014 at 11:14.
Many good posts. And I will raise a glass to AVM Keith Park, another forgotten man.
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"Operation Sea Lion was never going to happen..." It was never Hitler's preferred solution, which was neutrality on our part to allow them to deal with their real enemy, Communist Russia. Even a walkover of an invasion would have tied up large numbers of troops needed in the East.
ShotOne:
Your assertion is totally correct, Hitler had to go into the Balkans, North Africa and Greece in 1941 to dig Mussolini out of the deep c**p, he'd got himself into. This delayed Barbarossa until the late spring early summer of 1941. Barbarossa failed for many reasons: started too late, should have waited until 1942, too many units relying on horse drawn transport and very long supply chain with few railways for support, but that is a whole other discussion.
Apart from Hitler, Admiral Raeder of the Kriegsmarine was also uncomfortable as he could not be sure of naval superiority in the English Channel and its approaches, and I suspect did not believe Goring, that the Luftwaffe could control the skies, but politically he could not express his doubt. The OKW did not think they had enough invasion barges either.
Remember one part of the British Isles was invaded and occupied, namely the Channel Isles, who were not liberated until after the 8th of May 1945. A dark period of history, of what went on during that time. Read Tom Freeman Keel's book, Alderney to Auschwitz, very illuminating.
Your assertion is totally correct, Hitler had to go into the Balkans, North Africa and Greece in 1941 to dig Mussolini out of the deep c**p, he'd got himself into. This delayed Barbarossa until the late spring early summer of 1941. Barbarossa failed for many reasons: started too late, should have waited until 1942, too many units relying on horse drawn transport and very long supply chain with few railways for support, but that is a whole other discussion.
Apart from Hitler, Admiral Raeder of the Kriegsmarine was also uncomfortable as he could not be sure of naval superiority in the English Channel and its approaches, and I suspect did not believe Goring, that the Luftwaffe could control the skies, but politically he could not express his doubt. The OKW did not think they had enough invasion barges either.
Remember one part of the British Isles was invaded and occupied, namely the Channel Isles, who were not liberated until after the 8th of May 1945. A dark period of history, of what went on during that time. Read Tom Freeman Keel's book, Alderney to Auschwitz, very illuminating.
Clearly very subjective issue, but IMO, if we had lost to an invasion (or surrendered), then Hitler would still have been defeated by the Russia. However, the US would then have had no platform to establish a western front and all of Europe could have ended up under Stalin's thumb, rather than just half of it.
The Cold War would have been very different if the USA had remained the only free democracy!
(Edited to add: I know I'm ignoring Canada, Australia, NZ and others, but you get my point!)
The Cold War would have been very different if the USA had remained the only free democracy!
(Edited to add: I know I'm ignoring Canada, Australia, NZ and others, but you get my point!)
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Air pig - 'Other factors in this debate are missing, ACM Dowding as AOCinC of Fighter Command had numerous things to his advantage, by his foresight he developed an air defence system that exists to this day, was in receipt of ULTRA information, a privilege accorded to few very senior commanders...'
Did the Enigma decodes have an input in the Battle of Britain?
Hinsley et al in 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' suggests that although British intelligence (all of it) was improving this was not a major factor in the Battle of Britain. It seems up to then mostly strategic intelligence was being derived. Hinsley credits 'the tenacity of British resistance' to the GAF's failure.
Also as Hinsley points out, this was the first major defeat Germany had suffered and as such represents a turning point in the war.
I agree it is difficult to know what would have happened had we lost the BoB but it surely would have affected the will to continue. Air superiority is not everything as the Normandy landings showed but it's a big help.
Did the Enigma decodes have an input in the Battle of Britain?
Hinsley et al in 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' suggests that although British intelligence (all of it) was improving this was not a major factor in the Battle of Britain. It seems up to then mostly strategic intelligence was being derived. Hinsley credits 'the tenacity of British resistance' to the GAF's failure.
Also as Hinsley points out, this was the first major defeat Germany had suffered and as such represents a turning point in the war.
I agree it is difficult to know what would have happened had we lost the BoB but it surely would have affected the will to continue. Air superiority is not everything as the Normandy landings showed but it's a big help.
Remembering, including the humble but important role of the barrage balloon boys of Fighter Command, my father among them.
Hipper: Totally appreciate your post but,
Just had a look at the river dealers, he wrote the book in 1979, and it was part of a 5 volume set, and whilst he may have had access to the files, some as well well know may have been 'weeded' or not declassified. therefore his history maybe incomplete. When you consider so much was lost in 1945 when Bletchley Park was disbanded.
The RAF may not have declassified many of its own records, we just do not know. We do know that R V Jones had a degree of access to Enigma product and intelligence, also PoW interrogation via Squadron Leader Felkin, in particular looking for Knickebein.
Did the Enigma decodes have an input in the Battle of Britain?
Hinsley et al in 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' suggests that although British intelligence (all of it) was improving this was not a major factor in the Battle of Britain. It seems up to then mostly strategic intelligence was being derived. Hinsley credits 'the tenacity of British resistance' to the GAF's failure.
Hinsley et al in 'British Intelligence in the Second World War' suggests that although British intelligence (all of it) was improving this was not a major factor in the Battle of Britain. It seems up to then mostly strategic intelligence was being derived. Hinsley credits 'the tenacity of British resistance' to the GAF's failure.
The RAF may not have declassified many of its own records, we just do not know. We do know that R V Jones had a degree of access to Enigma product and intelligence, also PoW interrogation via Squadron Leader Felkin, in particular looking for Knickebein.
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Truth is I don't know much about the RAF and Enigma but I did do some research on the naval war and as far as I could tell practically all, if not all, the decrypts are at The National Archives (in ADM223).
In the naval war Enigma started to become operationally useful around May 1941 at the time of the loss of the Bismarck and became more and more useful as the war progressed.
Hinsley says in the book (I have four volumes) that they were given unrestricted access to all British intelligence records in all archives.
It's interesting reading Roskill (Royal Navy in WW2) published before these revelations and he just refers to 'special intelligence'.
In the naval war Enigma started to become operationally useful around May 1941 at the time of the loss of the Bismarck and became more and more useful as the war progressed.
Hinsley says in the book (I have four volumes) that they were given unrestricted access to all British intelligence records in all archives.
It's interesting reading Roskill (Royal Navy in WW2) published before these revelations and he just refers to 'special intelligence'.
Hipper:
I suspect but cannot prove that in 1940 that the direction of ULTRA decrypts were more towards naval and air intelligence. R V Jones wrote extensively in his book about the results of the Oslo Report, which revealed information about blind bombing and the JU 88. As we both know intelligence is piecing together small items to produce a picture, it's how commanders look at and interpret that picture, that is the problem. Montgomery and Arnham comes to mind, but I digress.
In effect the RAF fought a brave and successful battle, against a resourceful well trained opponent, and as always in war, you win by making less errors than your enemy, making you own luck and by being a student of Sun Tzu.
Brickhistory: a glass of good red raised in salute this evening along with a viewing of the Battle of Britain. BEagle, watch you blood pressure.
I suspect but cannot prove that in 1940 that the direction of ULTRA decrypts were more towards naval and air intelligence. R V Jones wrote extensively in his book about the results of the Oslo Report, which revealed information about blind bombing and the JU 88. As we both know intelligence is piecing together small items to produce a picture, it's how commanders look at and interpret that picture, that is the problem. Montgomery and Arnham comes to mind, but I digress.
In effect the RAF fought a brave and successful battle, against a resourceful well trained opponent, and as always in war, you win by making less errors than your enemy, making you own luck and by being a student of Sun Tzu.
Brickhistory: a glass of good red raised in salute this evening along with a viewing of the Battle of Britain. BEagle, watch you blood pressure.
Don't forget that Harry Hinsley didn't have to rely on records entirely - his memory of what he got up to at Bletchley helped to inform his writing somewhat... (as did the input from former colleagues).
IIRC, there was a slight element of self-censorship in some parts of the work to avoid revealing matters which still had a degree of currency and which were deemed sensitive (Gordon Welchman lost his US security clearance [he moved there in the late 40s and became a US citizen] after writing his memoir of Hut Six in 1982).
The history may be incomplete, but not quite for the reasons one might assume...
IIRC, there was a slight element of self-censorship in some parts of the work to avoid revealing matters which still had a degree of currency and which were deemed sensitive (Gordon Welchman lost his US security clearance [he moved there in the late 40s and became a US citizen] after writing his memoir of Hut Six in 1982).
The history may be incomplete, but not quite for the reasons one might assume...
Bomber Command did attack German airfields located in Holland and Denmark during August 1940. Two attacks were of note, in one a RAF squadron managed to destroy 9 He-111s on the ground with no losses, on the other almost a complete Blenheim squadron was wiped out before they got to the target (the one aircraft to get back aborted en route and the pilot was courts marshaled). Attacking the German Airfields in the Pas de Calais was a non starter. There were a lot of them, defended by a large amount of light flak and a large number of Bf-109s, of which 20% were held back for base defence at any one time as a result of the Bomber Command efforts, which did in a small part reduce to 109 threat to Fighter Command.
Fighter Command did do Fighter Sweeps over France in 1941/2 while Leigh Mallory was in charge of 11 group with big wing tactics and the net result was a German victory. Park or Saul would not have made that mistake.
Fighter Command did do Fighter Sweeps over France in 1941/2 while Leigh Mallory was in charge of 11 group with big wing tactics and the net result was a German victory. Park or Saul would not have made that mistake.
Leigh Mallory, had the ear of Portal and was I believe involved in the higher machinations of the RAF, leading to Dowding being relieved of command after the BoB.
Ten years ago today, I was invited to participate in an event for 15 September by an RAF friend who was at one time a Tornado pilot.
I attended. We stood in formation, a bunch of us from a variety of nations, but of course this was a RAF show put on by folks who know how to do such things, and a very moving ceremony ensued. It included a fly past by Tornadoes, which went well.
Afterwards were a few casual drinks together as we all reaffirmed the brotherhood of military airmen.
It was in a deployed location. It was a good thing. It is one of my few fond memories of that deployed period. In honored brave men flying and defending the land that they love.
Salutes
I attended. We stood in formation, a bunch of us from a variety of nations, but of course this was a RAF show put on by folks who know how to do such things, and a very moving ceremony ensued. It included a fly past by Tornadoes, which went well.
Afterwards were a few casual drinks together as we all reaffirmed the brotherhood of military airmen.
It was in a deployed location. It was a good thing. It is one of my few fond memories of that deployed period. In honored brave men flying and defending the land that they love.
Salutes
Originally Posted by Danny42C
Equally, if he'd left us alone after Dunkirk, and turned his full force onto Russia in '40, his second blitzkreig might have been successful as the first and Moscow may have fallen (he got a long way in '41 as it was, before General Winter came to Stalin's aid.). Then he could have dealt with us at his leisure.
Not going as planned in May '41 was a mistake on their part, as was grossly underestimating the strength in depth of the Soviet forces, and then Hitler overruling his General's in ordering a large proportion of Army Group Centre's units north and south to assist Army Group's North and South at Lennigrad and Kiev stalling the drive to Moscow until late autumn and too close a proximity to the onset of winter.
and then came the night blitz.
I wonder if any thought was given to intruder operations over the Luftwaffe bomber bases. Probably wouldn't have stopped the attacks but might have disrupted them.
I wonder if any thought was given to intruder operations over the Luftwaffe bomber bases. Probably wouldn't have stopped the attacks but might have disrupted them.