RAF CAS says 'Politicians make it up as they go.'
it is good to see a VSO speak out whilst still in the job, and not sit quietly, accept the pension and then snipe from the sidelines.
But will the politicians take heed? Of course not. Now that sandpit ops. have virtually ceased, we'll be back to the world of part-time Dismal Des
I was fortunate to have an hour with CAS, as part of a course, a couple of weeks ago. He is a straight shooter and says it exactly how it is. He wasn't being controversial at RUSI, merely confirming what most of us already know. He is savvy enough, imho, to ensure we get the best possible outcome from SDSR15.
MGD - d'accord! 
Pheasant
Realy? So what about strategic Air Power delivery? Ranging from 'No Fly Zone', 'QRA' (including anti-terrorism stuff), Storm Shadow shots to bring another country to the negotiating table by taking down their air defences, positioning high end assets to deter agression (which we failed to do for Ukraine), etc..? No brown-jobs or fish-heads in sight for this type of mission.
We need to stop reliving the ground war that we are just winding up; a future conflict may not have any sea or land requirements at all. If we had not let our high-end warfighting capabilities whither so badly then we might have been able to save more lives in Ukraine but showing that strategic presence and intent that I have just spoken about.
I think the biggest problem is that we have allowed parochialism enter the debate too many times before. It shoukd be simple: if it floats then let the Navy have it (I never did understand why the RAF had its own Marine Branch - why couldn't the Navy have run this?); if it stays on the ground (ie. it doesn't float or fly) then let the Army have it (yes, I would include the RAF Regt in this); if it flies then let the Air Force have it (that would mean the FAA and AAC becoming light blue). That way it is simple, we can manage our highly skilled types like aircraft engineers and aircrew in a bigger pool and ensure that each Service Arm is supported and tasked by a Joint Force HQ (where we support each other depending on the military task). At present the numbers of these highly-skilled personnel is too small and we have seen manpower issues creep in with Sea Harrier, Apache and other small fleets of aircraft in the past.
Maybe I'm too simple for my own good!
LJ
Pheasant
He understands the proper position of the RAF as a supporting arm to the Army and RN (the RAF will never be the "supported" arm, that is not its role).
We need to stop reliving the ground war that we are just winding up; a future conflict may not have any sea or land requirements at all. If we had not let our high-end warfighting capabilities whither so badly then we might have been able to save more lives in Ukraine but showing that strategic presence and intent that I have just spoken about.
I think the biggest problem is that we have allowed parochialism enter the debate too many times before. It shoukd be simple: if it floats then let the Navy have it (I never did understand why the RAF had its own Marine Branch - why couldn't the Navy have run this?); if it stays on the ground (ie. it doesn't float or fly) then let the Army have it (yes, I would include the RAF Regt in this); if it flies then let the Air Force have it (that would mean the FAA and AAC becoming light blue). That way it is simple, we can manage our highly skilled types like aircraft engineers and aircrew in a bigger pool and ensure that each Service Arm is supported and tasked by a Joint Force HQ (where we support each other depending on the military task). At present the numbers of these highly-skilled personnel is too small and we have seen manpower issues creep in with Sea Harrier, Apache and other small fleets of aircraft in the past.
Maybe I'm too simple for my own good!
LJ
LJ - Strategic air power is all that's needed? Harris would have loved you. With you as his deputy, the RAF could have sewn up the Second World War all on its own. I'll bet you regard aircraft carriers as floating airfields instead of integrated weapons systems platforms fighting the sub-surface, surface and air battle, too. 
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Leon,
Either you are right or CAS is and my vote is with CAS. The only thing that air forces really do in an independent way is control of the air. But control of the air doesn't win the war it is an enabling function for land or maritime forces to complete the "winning" of the battle - controlling the land or sea space. Firing a storm shadow is an enabling function to further action. Re the FAA and AAC, ownership of tactical air power is probably best left to the arm that "owns and understands" the domain. If you enter this argument too deeply you will lose assets to the FAA and AAC not gain them for the RAF.
Listen to CAS he really does know best.
As for wearing flying ovies when not flying/in the flying environment, you chaps really need to realise how silly you look and how much people are laughing behind your backs. It might make RAF aircrew feel superior to their non-flying colleagues but they think you look like pr*ts!
Either you are right or CAS is and my vote is with CAS. The only thing that air forces really do in an independent way is control of the air. But control of the air doesn't win the war it is an enabling function for land or maritime forces to complete the "winning" of the battle - controlling the land or sea space. Firing a storm shadow is an enabling function to further action. Re the FAA and AAC, ownership of tactical air power is probably best left to the arm that "owns and understands" the domain. If you enter this argument too deeply you will lose assets to the FAA and AAC not gain them for the RAF.
Listen to CAS he really does know best.
As for wearing flying ovies when not flying/in the flying environment, you chaps really need to realise how silly you look and how much people are laughing behind your backs. It might make RAF aircrew feel superior to their non-flying colleagues but they think you look like pr*ts!
I am sure you achieve the same effect with or without flying overalls.
We've never met and I think your a d1ck.
We've never met and I think your a d1ck.
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I have known Pully for many years and have worked with and for him in both benign and operational environments. He is not immature or naive and is certainly streetwise and politically astute. Moreover, in my opinion he is the most credible joint CAS we have had. Personal views I know but based on 37 years in a polyester suit. I would hope that his RN and Army peers support his thrust as I would expect Hammond to also.
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Del
Is that not true though ?
Having someone in the Cockpit of an Apache who understands the Army tactics not better than someone who doesn't ?
Re the FAA and AAC, ownership of tactical air power is probably best left to the arm that "owns and understands" the domain.
Having someone in the Cockpit of an Apache who understands the Army tactics not better than someone who doesn't ?
Gentleman Aviator
We need to stop reliving the ground war that we are just winding up
We always procure to fight better the war we've just finished.
Which is where Pully's points about flexibility - that well known characteristic of Air Power - really count. Until we get serviceable crystal balls, we WON'T know what's coming next....
[And for the record, I too think he's the best CAS we've had for a while - and not just cos he's a rotary mate.]
Puts me in mind of a dit a mate in plans sent on a Christmas card once.
"We planners are a funny lot,
We wear no sword or pistol.
But please excuse the way we walk;
Our balls are made of crystal!"
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Two or Three?
LJ "It should be simple: if it floats then let the Navy have it (I never did understand why the RAF had its own Marine Branch - why couldn't the Navy have run this?); if it stays on the ground (ie. it doesn't float or fly) then let the Army have it (yes, I would include the RAF Regt in this); if it flies then let the Air Force have it (that would mean the FAA and AAC becoming light blue). That way it is simple, we can manage our highly skilled types like aircraft engineers and aircrew in a bigger pool and ensure that each Service Arm is supported and tasked by a Joint Force HQ (where we support each other depending on the military task). At present the numbers of these highly-skilled personnel is too small and we have seen manpower issues creep in with Sea Harrier, Apache and other small fleets of aircraft in the past."
The reduction in personnel, types and capability, in my view, means we have reached a point where it is no longer a sensible use of the declining resources to maintain 3 air arms (RAF, FAA, AAC).
The logical alternative is 2 services but, we trust, that would not be politically acceptable.
Mind you, achieving LJ's view will require a determined PM not just SoS. I'd throw RM in with RAF Regt and why Paras? When was the last time there was a unit (say company) drop - or will there ever be again?
The reduction in personnel, types and capability, in my view, means we have reached a point where it is no longer a sensible use of the declining resources to maintain 3 air arms (RAF, FAA, AAC).
The logical alternative is 2 services but, we trust, that would not be politically acceptable.
Mind you, achieving LJ's view will require a determined PM not just SoS. I'd throw RM in with RAF Regt and why Paras? When was the last time there was a unit (say company) drop - or will there ever be again?
The argument that 'air' is different from 'sea' and 'land' in being only a supporting environment doesn't hold water, if you'll pardon the turn of phrase. People are born, grow up, have families and generally live their lives on land. Ultimately, our interests are those which secure and facilitate our ability to do so in some measure of comfort. In that sense our individual lives are land-centric (unsurprisingly). There are plenty of resources in the sea, and of course it's a great medium for trade, but ultimately trade and resources are just things that make our life on land that much richer. So, taking the pedantic view of 'supporting' vs 'supported' environments, air and sea are both 'supporting' - mediums for trade and providers of resource. Take the 'supported should own the supporting' argument further and the Army should own the Navy, too, which is self-evident nonsense.
I won't contribute to the FJ vs RW vs AT debate other than to observe that the independent role of air power was exercised successfully over the 6 months of the Libya campaign. It was 'independent' in the sense that NATO air power operated independently of NATO sea and land forces. Yes, local forces were able to exploit the situation to conduct land operations. But, I'll observe again, since people are born, reproduce and grow old on land, the final intended effect of everything we do in the military (independently or not) is a change in the course of people's earthbound lives.
Deep breath.... and back to the original topic!
CAS is obviously bang-on with everything he says about the political-military interface, and I don't see it as controversial at all. I haven't seen the full transcript, but I hope that he made a point about the resource implications of making decisions at the last possible moment. This is where politicians' desire for a late decision is in total opposition to their desire to spend no money until the decision has been taken.
Our forces are funded in peacetime to maintain defined readiness states for various types of operations. If politicians want forces held at higher readiness than has been funded, or if they want to have their finger on the trigger of an operation beyond the scope of the planning assumptions, then there is cost involved - but 'operational' expenditure cannot be authorised until an operation is actually declared in progress. On several occasions over recent years, we've marched up the hill, picking up costs within core, only to be marched down again and left to get on with it. Our own senior leadership is complicit to the extent that the answer is more often 'yes' than 'yes, but...'. If there was more recognition that out-of-scope readiness has costs, I think the tensions caused by last-minute decision-making would be somewhat lessened.
I won't contribute to the FJ vs RW vs AT debate other than to observe that the independent role of air power was exercised successfully over the 6 months of the Libya campaign. It was 'independent' in the sense that NATO air power operated independently of NATO sea and land forces. Yes, local forces were able to exploit the situation to conduct land operations. But, I'll observe again, since people are born, reproduce and grow old on land, the final intended effect of everything we do in the military (independently or not) is a change in the course of people's earthbound lives.
Deep breath.... and back to the original topic!
CAS is obviously bang-on with everything he says about the political-military interface, and I don't see it as controversial at all. I haven't seen the full transcript, but I hope that he made a point about the resource implications of making decisions at the last possible moment. This is where politicians' desire for a late decision is in total opposition to their desire to spend no money until the decision has been taken.
Our forces are funded in peacetime to maintain defined readiness states for various types of operations. If politicians want forces held at higher readiness than has been funded, or if they want to have their finger on the trigger of an operation beyond the scope of the planning assumptions, then there is cost involved - but 'operational' expenditure cannot be authorised until an operation is actually declared in progress. On several occasions over recent years, we've marched up the hill, picking up costs within core, only to be marched down again and left to get on with it. Our own senior leadership is complicit to the extent that the answer is more often 'yes' than 'yes, but...'. If there was more recognition that out-of-scope readiness has costs, I think the tensions caused by last-minute decision-making would be somewhat lessened.
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When was the last time there was a unit (say company) drop - or will there ever be again?
Brits would have to be the Falklands ? SAS into the sea ?
US would be the airfield in Grenada.
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Para Drop
"British or any body ?
Brits would have to be the Falklands ? SAS into the sea ?
US would be the airfield in Grenada."
Without looking it up, about the only Para drop was probably H's replacement HALO? SAS would be SF, so not necessarily Para originally - surely we don't need to maintain 3 battalions of para qualified infantry because some might go SF, along with all sorts of non-para qualified SF recruits.
US - ISTR there was a large scale drop into Afghanistan in 2001. But they are in a different resource paradigm...
Brits would have to be the Falklands ? SAS into the sea ?
US would be the airfield in Grenada."
Without looking it up, about the only Para drop was probably H's replacement HALO? SAS would be SF, so not necessarily Para originally - surely we don't need to maintain 3 battalions of para qualified infantry because some might go SF, along with all sorts of non-para qualified SF recruits.
US - ISTR there was a large scale drop into Afghanistan in 2001. But they are in a different resource paradigm...
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Del,
I didn't respond to Leon's first two paras as I could see nothing worth responding to. If he thinks QRA is a strategic role then he clearly understands little.
No chip re FJ, and I am aircrew, but I have observed over the years the way the RAF has been poorly served by the "FJ pilots rule OK" attitude of the top of the RAF. At long last the best man for the job has been selected and you will reap the reward.
Re your comment on MPA. The MPA role was cut because Nimrod 4 was a disaster and the department needed to make savings. The role will return in some guise but don't fall into the trap that it will be an RAF ownership. The role is maritime and the appropriate duty holder may well be the RN.
PS The no fly zones in Iraq did not bring Saddam to the negotiating table, they just stopped him flying. Effect? Good for the Kurds and some others, but little else.
I didn't respond to Leon's first two paras as I could see nothing worth responding to. If he thinks QRA is a strategic role then he clearly understands little.
No chip re FJ, and I am aircrew, but I have observed over the years the way the RAF has been poorly served by the "FJ pilots rule OK" attitude of the top of the RAF. At long last the best man for the job has been selected and you will reap the reward.
Re your comment on MPA. The MPA role was cut because Nimrod 4 was a disaster and the department needed to make savings. The role will return in some guise but don't fall into the trap that it will be an RAF ownership. The role is maritime and the appropriate duty holder may well be the RN.
PS The no fly zones in Iraq did not bring Saddam to the negotiating table, they just stopped him flying. Effect? Good for the Kurds and some others, but little else.
Op Serval: French forces took the airports at both Timbuktu and Gao: once on the ground the troops met very little resistance from rebels and quickly gained control of the airport at Timbuktu. It was found that the runway at Timbuktu was littered with obstacles so much so the French had to para drop the 17th Airborne Engineer Regiment and its equipment to clear the obstacles and return the runway to active use and the ability to receive air traffic.
Served to gain the initiative and leapfrog hundreds of miles of desert.
Don't think we really have the nerve or mind-space to do this sort of thing; too cautious and would no doubt still be in the 'consideration'/planning stage CAS was talking about. Sometimes there are real penalties to not being able to make a timely decision
Served to gain the initiative and leapfrog hundreds of miles of desert.
Don't think we really have the nerve or mind-space to do this sort of thing; too cautious and would no doubt still be in the 'consideration'/planning stage CAS was talking about. Sometimes there are real penalties to not being able to make a timely decision
