Air Cadets grounded?
Real Experience
JP I know what you mean;at Kenley out CO had us making loads of useful equipment from scratch,it was a spin off from his job at the Woolwich Arsenal.
At least 50% of the original instructors had started when the ATC only had single seaters and after briefing his cadet would then winch him on a ground slide! many of the others were former aircrew.
You were encouraged to attend courses for Glider inspections and simple repairs so consequently even staff cadets were 'qualified' to be hands on with all the equipment in use.
If someone had suggested we aerotowed a machine to Halesland the answer would probably have been 'why only one'.
I am sorry T-head but the schools were both capable and safe and did not need a hangar full of p-work to operate because they knew their business and passed on quality and capability to a high standard.I agree there was far less of a H&S culture but that was because it had not been invented then; however it did exist by the very capability,common sense, and standards the schools operated to without the 'tick box' mentality that has been the reason for the current debacle.
Remember all of the current problems stem from the full time paid 'system' that is supposed to back up the VGS operations;i would also remind you that the safety record (which is the only bench mark you can use) is not exceeded by any other flying organisation including the RAF.
At least 50% of the original instructors had started when the ATC only had single seaters and after briefing his cadet would then winch him on a ground slide! many of the others were former aircrew.
You were encouraged to attend courses for Glider inspections and simple repairs so consequently even staff cadets were 'qualified' to be hands on with all the equipment in use.
If someone had suggested we aerotowed a machine to Halesland the answer would probably have been 'why only one'.
I am sorry T-head but the schools were both capable and safe and did not need a hangar full of p-work to operate because they knew their business and passed on quality and capability to a high standard.I agree there was far less of a H&S culture but that was because it had not been invented then; however it did exist by the very capability,common sense, and standards the schools operated to without the 'tick box' mentality that has been the reason for the current debacle.
Remember all of the current problems stem from the full time paid 'system' that is supposed to back up the VGS operations;i would also remind you that the safety record (which is the only bench mark you can use) is not exceeded by any other flying organisation including the RAF.
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I guess it depends what you call safe? My records indicate that 8 of the 15 Prefects, 21 Barges and 50 Mk3s were written off in Air Cadet Service and no I have not included Hangar fires and buildings collapsing.
Write offs
I suspect the write offs were more to do with the reducing ability to repair aircraft, similar to the situation with the canvas hangars that became u/s due to eventual lack of maintenance.
Barges were also prone to 'blow-overs' when mini-sqalls 'nipped in' and it did limit their use when operating with limited manpower and the inability to 'quickly' return then to a hangar.
The Prefect skid was not that beefy, and i seem to recall the pylon behind the pilot could 'spring' if the nose dug in on a poor or undulating surface.
However when you look at the flying incidents record against the type of operation,length of service,huge no of launches, and ratio of injuries(virtually zero) the record is second to none.
Remember; the organisation was turning out 'HUNDREDS' of A&B certs every year with Cadets having far less dual before doing 3 solo's.
The CFI's would keep a very careful watch on operations and in the main were VERY experienced instructors that no one questioned.
I recall that at restricted sites the base leg and final turn was only 400/200 ft
which gives very little margin for error,and sites like Halesland would never have been chosen in later years.
I think the 'capability' factor carried on due to staff continuity and the pride the Schools had in their operation.
Looking back at the actual way standards were maintained i think the rising staff Cadet element were always aware that although they had great freedom;an abuse of that trust would mean a swift departure out of the system and the CFI needed only to 'hint' about something for it to be taken very seriously. In fact this had the effect of increasing 'capability' as one aspired to maintain standards but also became 'capable' of avoiding being caught on 'excursions' !!
Barges were also prone to 'blow-overs' when mini-sqalls 'nipped in' and it did limit their use when operating with limited manpower and the inability to 'quickly' return then to a hangar.
The Prefect skid was not that beefy, and i seem to recall the pylon behind the pilot could 'spring' if the nose dug in on a poor or undulating surface.
However when you look at the flying incidents record against the type of operation,length of service,huge no of launches, and ratio of injuries(virtually zero) the record is second to none.
Remember; the organisation was turning out 'HUNDREDS' of A&B certs every year with Cadets having far less dual before doing 3 solo's.
The CFI's would keep a very careful watch on operations and in the main were VERY experienced instructors that no one questioned.
I recall that at restricted sites the base leg and final turn was only 400/200 ft
which gives very little margin for error,and sites like Halesland would never have been chosen in later years.
I think the 'capability' factor carried on due to staff continuity and the pride the Schools had in their operation.
Looking back at the actual way standards were maintained i think the rising staff Cadet element were always aware that although they had great freedom;an abuse of that trust would mean a swift departure out of the system and the CFI needed only to 'hint' about something for it to be taken very seriously. In fact this had the effect of increasing 'capability' as one aspired to maintain standards but also became 'capable' of avoiding being caught on 'excursions' !!
Last edited by POBJOY; 20th Feb 2016 at 16:25.
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Freda
Seems that we have to search social media (Twitter and Facebook) to see what is really happening out there.
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Wow
Some faltering progress then, extrapolating to maybe having ACCGS operational soon, followed by a search for any remaining VGS staff who may live somewhere near to the new non-disclosed locations post Basing review.
Try to fit them in to re-categorise at ACCGS, and hopefully having the odd aircraft to put into VGS location for local checks, and hey presto, there may be a shadow of something that we used to have years ago - by mid 2017. Only the New Years Honours list to submit names for "Queens Commendation for valuable service on the Ground" hereinafter named "The Fig leaf".
Good to see it's being treated as a rush job !
Try to fit them in to re-categorise at ACCGS, and hopefully having the odd aircraft to put into VGS location for local checks, and hey presto, there may be a shadow of something that we used to have years ago - by mid 2017. Only the New Years Honours list to submit names for "Queens Commendation for valuable service on the Ground" hereinafter named "The Fig leaf".
Good to see it's being treated as a rush job !
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IMHO this thread has seen far too many posts that have been dedicated to "bashing the head" and the belittling of the management structure of the ACO.
It matters not who or what is to blame for the "temporary" grounding of Air Cadet Gliding Operations. The whole point of the matter is that the Operational Duty Holder (ODH) made the "right call" in the bringing to a halt of gliding operations.
It matters NOT how "excellent" everyone, in the past, might have been within their old style management of the ACO. Moreover, "the system" has since moved on and, like it or lump it, everyone within the ACO is now held accountable for their actions within the structure of the MAA.
EVERY aircraft platform, within the RAF (Army or Navy), must have a risk register. It so happens that the Risk to Life (RtL) register of the glider platform was proven to be lacking with the engineering documentation. The fact of the matter is... there have been many repairs made to the glider fleet that didn't have an "authorised" repair schedule. The quantifying of those unauthorised repairs has become the subject of closer examination and, upon the necessary re-examination of those unauthorised repairs, new work schedules have been written, where appropriate, to approve the work that had been previously undertaken.
Hence, it matters not whether or not a flying suit didn't have the correct "stitching" to a name badge or that a fire extinguisher was found to be out of date (as previously reported), the whole "point" of the matter is that there were many shortfalls, within the engineering documentation, that warranted the "pause to flying".
Flying Regulation and the following of "correct engineering procedure" is the cornerstone of "airworthiness" for the whole of the ACO. The Viking and Vigilant, none complex platforms that they might be, remain under similar close scrutiny as any other aircraft platform that the RAF, Army or Navy might operate.
No one is doubting the ability of the VGS staff who have painstakingly made every effort to continue with their professional contribution to this worthwhile organisation. I would ask everyone who's involved with Air Cadet Gliding to reconsider some of the negative attitudes that have been so vociferously displayed here on PPrune to think again. Your "worth" to the young folk who wish to continue to fly within the ACO is within your hands.
TCF
It matters not who or what is to blame for the "temporary" grounding of Air Cadet Gliding Operations. The whole point of the matter is that the Operational Duty Holder (ODH) made the "right call" in the bringing to a halt of gliding operations.
It matters NOT how "excellent" everyone, in the past, might have been within their old style management of the ACO. Moreover, "the system" has since moved on and, like it or lump it, everyone within the ACO is now held accountable for their actions within the structure of the MAA.
EVERY aircraft platform, within the RAF (Army or Navy), must have a risk register. It so happens that the Risk to Life (RtL) register of the glider platform was proven to be lacking with the engineering documentation. The fact of the matter is... there have been many repairs made to the glider fleet that didn't have an "authorised" repair schedule. The quantifying of those unauthorised repairs has become the subject of closer examination and, upon the necessary re-examination of those unauthorised repairs, new work schedules have been written, where appropriate, to approve the work that had been previously undertaken.
Hence, it matters not whether or not a flying suit didn't have the correct "stitching" to a name badge or that a fire extinguisher was found to be out of date (as previously reported), the whole "point" of the matter is that there were many shortfalls, within the engineering documentation, that warranted the "pause to flying".
Flying Regulation and the following of "correct engineering procedure" is the cornerstone of "airworthiness" for the whole of the ACO. The Viking and Vigilant, none complex platforms that they might be, remain under similar close scrutiny as any other aircraft platform that the RAF, Army or Navy might operate.
No one is doubting the ability of the VGS staff who have painstakingly made every effort to continue with their professional contribution to this worthwhile organisation. I would ask everyone who's involved with Air Cadet Gliding to reconsider some of the negative attitudes that have been so vociferously displayed here on PPrune to think again. Your "worth" to the young folk who wish to continue to fly within the ACO is within your hands.
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Recovery Rate
So, up to 78 Vikings left to recover (if the fleet size of 81 that has been quoted is correct).
Does anyone know what the expected recovery rate is for the Viking? We cannot hide from the truth that the recovery rate has been shockingly low to date, by anyone's standards (8 aircraft in 22 months). This is now what needs to improve, lest the level of skill fade grows further and comes back to haunt us. It would be nice to think that every VGS could have at least 3 or 4 aircraft back by the middle of the summer.
Does anyone know what the expected recovery rate is for the Viking? We cannot hide from the truth that the recovery rate has been shockingly low to date, by anyone's standards (8 aircraft in 22 months). This is now what needs to improve, lest the level of skill fade grows further and comes back to haunt us. It would be nice to think that every VGS could have at least 3 or 4 aircraft back by the middle of the summer.
Last edited by ATFQ; 23rd Feb 2016 at 22:03.
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A Failure of Leadership, Culture and Priorities
I was just casting my eye back over the XV230 report by Charles Haddon-Cave QC.
It is titled 'A failure of Leadership, Culture and Priorities'. It cites 'a series of weaknesses in the area of personnel'. And one of the recommendations says:
'Recommendation 28.7: Officers’ terms on appointment should no longer include ‘change objectives’ but should, in future, include a statement requiring them to consider carefully the impact of any changes or initiatives and whether there might be any indirect or direct implications for Safety or Airworthiness.'
So, why has someone thought it sensible to replace a fleet of fully serviceable Van Gelder winches during the 'pause'. Not only will there be flying skill fade to contend with when gliding resumes there will now also be the challenge of operating a new type of winch, which is bound to bring teething problems - some no doubt airfield specific. A resumption of operations with the old winch followed by the gradual introduction of the new winch once instructors and staff had achieved a sensible level of flying currency would have been far preferable. As it is, another 'moving part' has been changed that did not need to be. The level of risk has been elevated unnecessarily, not to mention for no improvement in output.
It is titled 'A failure of Leadership, Culture and Priorities'. It cites 'a series of weaknesses in the area of personnel'. And one of the recommendations says:
'Recommendation 28.7: Officers’ terms on appointment should no longer include ‘change objectives’ but should, in future, include a statement requiring them to consider carefully the impact of any changes or initiatives and whether there might be any indirect or direct implications for Safety or Airworthiness.'
So, why has someone thought it sensible to replace a fleet of fully serviceable Van Gelder winches during the 'pause'. Not only will there be flying skill fade to contend with when gliding resumes there will now also be the challenge of operating a new type of winch, which is bound to bring teething problems - some no doubt airfield specific. A resumption of operations with the old winch followed by the gradual introduction of the new winch once instructors and staff had achieved a sensible level of flying currency would have been far preferable. As it is, another 'moving part' has been changed that did not need to be. The level of risk has been elevated unnecessarily, not to mention for no improvement in output.
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The wrong target !
The uniformed side of this debacle while not showing spectacular management skills should not be the target for most of the wrath from the forum.
The majority of the problems and the slow recovery rate of aircraft is largely a result of the legacy contractors lack of urgency, culture of indifference, lack of basic composite skills and a contract that lacks a performance criteria ( IE tech questions that go unanswered for months )
In the face of the lack of or wildly inaccurate data from the legacy maintenance & support contractors the uniformed side of this unfortunate mess have just stopped talking because anything they say is likely to be rendered untrue because they have been misinformed.
The MoD & VGS management are between a rock and a hard place, on one side is the very poor performance of the legacy contractor and the other to quickly return aircraft to service, the MoD may well have wished to have terminated the legacy contractors long ago but this action would have delayed the return to service further as it would take another contractor time to take over.
Part of the problem is that the culture inside the legacy contractors ranks is such that one would not want to employ anyone from that company for fear of poisoning the work ethic in your own company so the normal military contract practice of re-employing the workforce and a seamless change of management is not avalable.
There is no doubt that the underperformance of the contractors should have been picked up years back but with the budget of the RAF under pressure and other much more pressing business the line taken by the MoD was "it is only a simple glider contract, how can it go wrong ". An attitude that one can understand when you have much bigger fish to fry and not much money to do it.
The majority of the problems and the slow recovery rate of aircraft is largely a result of the legacy contractors lack of urgency, culture of indifference, lack of basic composite skills and a contract that lacks a performance criteria ( IE tech questions that go unanswered for months )
In the face of the lack of or wildly inaccurate data from the legacy maintenance & support contractors the uniformed side of this unfortunate mess have just stopped talking because anything they say is likely to be rendered untrue because they have been misinformed.
The MoD & VGS management are between a rock and a hard place, on one side is the very poor performance of the legacy contractor and the other to quickly return aircraft to service, the MoD may well have wished to have terminated the legacy contractors long ago but this action would have delayed the return to service further as it would take another contractor time to take over.
Part of the problem is that the culture inside the legacy contractors ranks is such that one would not want to employ anyone from that company for fear of poisoning the work ethic in your own company so the normal military contract practice of re-employing the workforce and a seamless change of management is not avalable.
There is no doubt that the underperformance of the contractors should have been picked up years back but with the budget of the RAF under pressure and other much more pressing business the line taken by the MoD was "it is only a simple glider contract, how can it go wrong ". An attitude that one can understand when you have much bigger fish to fry and not much money to do it.
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Chitterne Flyer
Few people on here have criticised the original "pause" decision. How the VGS aircraft got into such a poor state of "airworthiness" is quite another question. There are too many vested parties who have had too long to cover their tracks for any investigation to be worthwhile.
The criticism of the leadership of 2 FTS and ACO senior leadership is founded on the many hundreds of people left let down by unworthy and aloof Officers who have been promoted and appointed into these positions after an undistinguished RAF career to supplement or enhance their pension.
In normal times these characters would not be found out as the organisation would continue to function despite their efforts, however, these are not normal times. In true military fashion whilst the important issues are ignored or nudged in one direction and another the focus turns to the trivia such as flying badges and empire building. More effective leadership could well have found us on this very same path with the same outcome. The timescale may not have been that much different. What would have been different is the communication and leadership from the very top all the way down to Staff Cadet level in the various VGS and the newly joined youngster in the ATC squadrons.
Unlike the regular forces where poor leadership has to be tolerated due to military law and discipline, outside in the Civilian world poor leadership is quickly spotted and is generally dealt with quickly to remove obstacles to success. This is the reality of modern management for business to survive. The VGS is operating with British Leyland style leaders in a Google world.
Few people on here have criticised the original "pause" decision. How the VGS aircraft got into such a poor state of "airworthiness" is quite another question. There are too many vested parties who have had too long to cover their tracks for any investigation to be worthwhile.
The criticism of the leadership of 2 FTS and ACO senior leadership is founded on the many hundreds of people left let down by unworthy and aloof Officers who have been promoted and appointed into these positions after an undistinguished RAF career to supplement or enhance their pension.
In normal times these characters would not be found out as the organisation would continue to function despite their efforts, however, these are not normal times. In true military fashion whilst the important issues are ignored or nudged in one direction and another the focus turns to the trivia such as flying badges and empire building. More effective leadership could well have found us on this very same path with the same outcome. The timescale may not have been that much different. What would have been different is the communication and leadership from the very top all the way down to Staff Cadet level in the various VGS and the newly joined youngster in the ATC squadrons.
Unlike the regular forces where poor leadership has to be tolerated due to military law and discipline, outside in the Civilian world poor leadership is quickly spotted and is generally dealt with quickly to remove obstacles to success. This is the reality of modern management for business to survive. The VGS is operating with British Leyland style leaders in a Google world.
TCF,
I'm sorry but I will disagree with part of your post.
It does matter who is responsible for this mess. Whoever, they were getting paid to do a job. They failed to carry out that task. That is public money and the tax payers have every right to expect their money not to be wasted and those responsible held to account.
If it was the contractor, what were the CMT doing to ensure there was compliance with the contract?
It is now becoming more popular in today's environment that people of all professions think that they can absolve themselves of responsibility when it goes tits up.
I'm sorry but I will disagree with part of your post.
It does matter who is responsible for this mess. Whoever, they were getting paid to do a job. They failed to carry out that task. That is public money and the tax payers have every right to expect their money not to be wasted and those responsible held to account.
If it was the contractor, what were the CMT doing to ensure there was compliance with the contract?
It is now becoming more popular in today's environment that people of all professions think that they can absolve themselves of responsibility when it goes tits up.
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ATC in the news
Brave teenage cadets pull woman trapped in burning car to safety after crash in Stockport
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Two brave young men, and a perfect example of why we should be doing everything we can to grow the number of cadets. The number of air cadets has reduced by around 10 per cent over the past 18 months - arguably (and most likely) because of a lack of gliding (and flying) opportunities.
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Two brave young men, and a perfect example of why we should be doing everything we can to grow the number of cadets. The number of air cadets has reduced by around 10 per cent over the past 18 months - arguably (and most likely) because of a lack of gliding (and flying) opportunities.
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Cats five
It is a bit of both, the ATC will always attract the more adventurous but they tend to bring others along with them.
The ATC develops positive character in young people of all abilities, the flying is a recruiting hook but the confidence and self esteem that flying solo gives along with the sence of responsibility is a tool for building responsible adults.
The actions reported from Stockport show how the skills developed in the ATC have a positive impact in society at large, this was well understood Mrs Thatcher when she considerably boosted the cadet forces budget.
Finally I am sure that along with the rest of this forums contributors I would like to congratulate the two cadets from Stockport for their actions.
The ATC develops positive character in young people of all abilities, the flying is a recruiting hook but the confidence and self esteem that flying solo gives along with the sence of responsibility is a tool for building responsible adults.
The actions reported from Stockport show how the skills developed in the ATC have a positive impact in society at large, this was well understood Mrs Thatcher when she considerably boosted the cadet forces budget.
Finally I am sure that along with the rest of this forums contributors I would like to congratulate the two cadets from Stockport for their actions.
Last edited by A and C; 25th Feb 2016 at 07:51.
Gentleman Aviator
To be fair to the ATC in terms of numbers, it should be considered against the demography of the ATC target cohort 13-ish to 20.
The size of that cohort has been falling; we can all remember a few years ago a number of primary schools closing or amalgamating because of falling rolls - that has now moved on to reduce the size of the pool in which the ATC can fish for cadets.
Not saying that lack of flying hasn't turned off some cadets, just saying it's not the only reason for falling numbers ......
The size of that cohort has been falling; we can all remember a few years ago a number of primary schools closing or amalgamating because of falling rolls - that has now moved on to reduce the size of the pool in which the ATC can fish for cadets.
Not saying that lack of flying hasn't turned off some cadets, just saying it's not the only reason for falling numbers ......
Not saying that lack of flying hasn't turned off some cadets, just saying it's not the only reason for falling numbers
Agree. It's wrong (if utterly predictable from some parties) to lay all the blame for falling cadet numbers at the door of the AEF/VGS issues.
Hate to break it to you but all the aircraft types you mention (and most others) have been somewhat busy in recent years. But if you feel that wars, upgrade programmes, manning crises and the like shouldn't stand in the way of providing AEF in operational types, please contact the Stn Cdr at the relevant base to make your point. And do share the reply.
Agree. It's wrong (if utterly predictable from some parties) to lay all the blame for falling cadet numbers at the door of the AEF/VGS issues.
Would it really have been that hard to arrange extra visits to willing civvie gliding clubs, or, laid [sic] on extra jollies in Chinook, Merlin, Puma, Herc etc?
Vigilants are being moved from Ternhill to Syerston this week, 90 day inspection/repair ? timescale has been quoted, believe some are leaving Cosford as well for Syerston soon.
Replacing Winches
As i heard it from am impeccable source the winches did not really need replacing but are going to be replaced by a 'smart winch' because on paper it leaves less to operator 'input',and provides some income for the winch company.
As many on here will know a winch is as complicated as a motorised fishing reel,if fact less complicated.The basic 'end product' has not changed and was yet another task readily undertaken for decades by young staff cadets many of whom had no driving licence.
On the MB twin drum there was still a choice of gears,and a 3rd gear launch on a windless day would not work.
Having said that the driver would know what aircraft he was launching and the approx wind strength.He would then consult a very complicated multi functional onboard computer and operate as required when given suitable signals.
As each computer was tailored to individual parameters the drivers took them home with them for safe keeping.The driver also had to remember to turn off the fuel when finished to avoid it draining into the oil sump which would then need draining and refilling with OMD11O. As the drain plug was enormous (about 36mm) it was not a size in most peoples car tool kit.It was of course down to the staff cadet who had an old VW Beetle and serviced it himself that could arrange this vital tool if ever required. The paperwork and documentation for all the aforementioned 'winch operation' was less than a A4 sheet and it worked.No operation has been improved by making it more complicated than required, but it is a good way of spending taxpayers money.
As many on here will know a winch is as complicated as a motorised fishing reel,if fact less complicated.The basic 'end product' has not changed and was yet another task readily undertaken for decades by young staff cadets many of whom had no driving licence.
On the MB twin drum there was still a choice of gears,and a 3rd gear launch on a windless day would not work.
Having said that the driver would know what aircraft he was launching and the approx wind strength.He would then consult a very complicated multi functional onboard computer and operate as required when given suitable signals.
As each computer was tailored to individual parameters the drivers took them home with them for safe keeping.The driver also had to remember to turn off the fuel when finished to avoid it draining into the oil sump which would then need draining and refilling with OMD11O. As the drain plug was enormous (about 36mm) it was not a size in most peoples car tool kit.It was of course down to the staff cadet who had an old VW Beetle and serviced it himself that could arrange this vital tool if ever required. The paperwork and documentation for all the aforementioned 'winch operation' was less than a A4 sheet and it worked.No operation has been improved by making it more complicated than required, but it is a good way of spending taxpayers money.