Air Cadets grounded?
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Achievement
We'll certainly 100% Flight Safety and 100% ground ops safety has been achieved, but keep this quiet in case they adopt the current ops level as being SOP consistent with zero risk ops.
I just wonder when the veil of secrecy is to be lifted ? Any ideas chaps ?
I just wonder when the veil of secrecy is to be lifted ? Any ideas chaps ?
Air Vice Marshal Mike Lloyd, the Air Officer Commanding 22 (Training) Group which will oversee 2FTS, said: "I am delighted to see the gliding community recognised in this way and I look forward to many more cadets earning their wings under the expert guidance of John and his team".
Saying that; while I usually try and ascribe events to incompetence rather than malice it is increasingly difficult to do so.
Paperwork Glitch destroys ATC Gliding system
Whilst JM did not cause the initial 'glitch in the system' he has certainly been responsible for the disaster that has befallen the organisation since easter 2014.
Not only was he totally unaware of the capable way the the Squadrons had performed for decades he also chose not to engage with them to find a way forward in a less painful manner.(This was a major failing)
He has no leadership quality that engineered a prompt resolution, and has only alienated those who have served the organisation for decades,and who now have no confidence in his capability to head up what was a fine training service.
If he stays in post the organisation may as well cease, as it will not be led by a person who has any idea what is required or how to engage with capable people.
If the 'higher authority' in the service do not see this then they are as guilty by association in allowing it, and it does the RAF great disservice to its reputation.
Not only was he totally unaware of the capable way the the Squadrons had performed for decades he also chose not to engage with them to find a way forward in a less painful manner.(This was a major failing)
He has no leadership quality that engineered a prompt resolution, and has only alienated those who have served the organisation for decades,and who now have no confidence in his capability to head up what was a fine training service.
If he stays in post the organisation may as well cease, as it will not be led by a person who has any idea what is required or how to engage with capable people.
If the 'higher authority' in the service do not see this then they are as guilty by association in allowing it, and it does the RAF great disservice to its reputation.
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POBJOY
Well said old boy, I just don't know how the heck this awful situation is being allowed to keep rolling on so long.
By the time the next few weeks have passed by we approach the 2 year marker, during which time information has been on D notice, absolutely no consideration for such amazing, dedicated and hard working staff, and precious little in tangible resources flowing back to kick start the training machine.
Without some Ex Lax and / or other purgatives, there is a real chance that no really serious aviation will take place before 2017. By then there will be few staff left, with the real risk that VGS ops may close for ever.
It's an absolute disgrace.
By the time the next few weeks have passed by we approach the 2 year marker, during which time information has been on D notice, absolutely no consideration for such amazing, dedicated and hard working staff, and precious little in tangible resources flowing back to kick start the training machine.
Without some Ex Lax and / or other purgatives, there is a real chance that no really serious aviation will take place before 2017. By then there will be few staff left, with the real risk that VGS ops may close for ever.
It's an absolute disgrace.
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A very poor show
While the VGS operational management seems to be lacklustre at best I am starting to think the real scandal is with the technical support. Or at least the technical support delivered up until recently.
Like Enigma I can't see gliding return in any quantity until the support contract gets awarded and then only if we get a new broom to sweep away the old maintenance and support practices.
Like Enigma I can't see gliding return in any quantity until the support contract gets awarded and then only if we get a new broom to sweep away the old maintenance and support practices.
Whilst JM did not cause the initial 'glitch in the system' he has certainly been responsible for the disaster that has befallen the organisation since easter 2014.
But it would be wise to remember that Haddon-Cave disgracefully named and shamed individuals who, demonstrably, had absolutely nothing to do with the policy decisions made at least 12 years before they took up post (June 1987 by the then AMSO) that led to the underlying failures. I have no idea how long the current Gp Capt has been in post, but we saw with Nimrod that a 3 year tour as IPTL (and given most have no prior experience) gives you no time at all to even understand systemic failings, never mind draw up a plan for the Gods to consider.
If the problems were confined to his own little part of MoD, then 3 years might be enough, but I doubt it. It takes 18 months just to bid and get funding and, because of the rundown in capability and expertise in both MoD and Industry, probably another year just to agree the necessary contract. Industry don't retain expertise if MoD decides to cancel contracts. It makes people redundant. The fact that the necessary procedural Standard has been cancelled without replacement, and the current MAA regs show no understanding of the subject, makes this doubly difficulty.
But, this is a systemic failing. The Gp Capt may be trying very hard indeed. Equally, he may have made an initial inquiry, only to have the last Minister for the Armed Forces' edict thrust under his nose and realised that doing something about it is a career killer. The Gp Capt is a VERY junior officer in this game. No real point in having a pop at him. My own feeling is that the likes of CAS is well aware of the problem and has had to earn his corn by making a decision. Front Line or ATC. He will have asked DG MAA, who will have told him he is years away from understanding the depth of the problem created nearly 30 years ago. Haddon-Cave wrongly baselined this at 1998. To fix all the problems, MoD is short of at least 11 years funding. This is one reason entire fleets have been retired. To acquire this funding, you have to at first acknowledge the problem. We haven't reached that stage yet as the MAA has only existed for 6 years.
Leadership Capability
TUC We are talking about a Glider fleet here which is as basic as you can get in aviation terms.
This is not a fleet that had 'issues' with control or airframe failures but a fleet that was operated by competent staff that knew their equipment and how it worked with no history of problems.
Buy not engaging with the actual operators before grounding the entire fleet (with a subsequent ongoing ending of operations) this shows how little JM knew about his operation or the level of capability of the Volunteer staff.
The operation of gliding is SIMPLE in tech terms which is why it has been such a useful part of the ATC organisation and why Cadets of all abilities are/were able to undertake it.
This has now been destroyed for no cogent reason other than the lack of of knowing how to deal with the matter with a REASONABLE RESPONSE.
The first part should have been to liaise and confer with the operators in order to assess the risk factor.This would have had the benefit of concentrating ALL THE EXPERTISE together to arrive at a ( REASONABLE solution).
Of course if you do not really want volunteers running the operation then you have a major flaw in the entire set up,but do not hide behind safety and paperwork to attend to that issue.
The ATC Schools were an unique operation in the RAF/MOD system and have demonstrated for decades their ability to operate in a safe competent manner and deliver high quality training and an excellent Cadet experience.
In some respects they are a model of how well things can be done by having capable people running an aviation facility and using their own trained staff who offer continuity of operations and standards. This has not changed over the years and has adapted well to the addition of the SLMG without undue complications.
What the organisation did not need was someone who did not bother to find out what a fine system he had and seems to hold the whole volunteer element with distain. No Leadership, No Confidence = No Gliding and the Cadet organisation now has a credibility factor of a lead balloon.No amount of paperwork shuffling can now hide this disaster for the organisation and i have now 'mailed' the new CDS to tell it as it is.
This is not a fleet that had 'issues' with control or airframe failures but a fleet that was operated by competent staff that knew their equipment and how it worked with no history of problems.
Buy not engaging with the actual operators before grounding the entire fleet (with a subsequent ongoing ending of operations) this shows how little JM knew about his operation or the level of capability of the Volunteer staff.
The operation of gliding is SIMPLE in tech terms which is why it has been such a useful part of the ATC organisation and why Cadets of all abilities are/were able to undertake it.
This has now been destroyed for no cogent reason other than the lack of of knowing how to deal with the matter with a REASONABLE RESPONSE.
The first part should have been to liaise and confer with the operators in order to assess the risk factor.This would have had the benefit of concentrating ALL THE EXPERTISE together to arrive at a ( REASONABLE solution).
Of course if you do not really want volunteers running the operation then you have a major flaw in the entire set up,but do not hide behind safety and paperwork to attend to that issue.
The ATC Schools were an unique operation in the RAF/MOD system and have demonstrated for decades their ability to operate in a safe competent manner and deliver high quality training and an excellent Cadet experience.
In some respects they are a model of how well things can be done by having capable people running an aviation facility and using their own trained staff who offer continuity of operations and standards. This has not changed over the years and has adapted well to the addition of the SLMG without undue complications.
What the organisation did not need was someone who did not bother to find out what a fine system he had and seems to hold the whole volunteer element with distain. No Leadership, No Confidence = No Gliding and the Cadet organisation now has a credibility factor of a lead balloon.No amount of paperwork shuffling can now hide this disaster for the organisation and i have now 'mailed' the new CDS to tell it as it is.
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What's wrong.
Pobjoy, there was not much wrong with the VGS at the operational sharp end and in my opinion if it not broke there is no need to fix it !
The glider maintenance is another matter and without saying too much that might prejudice the upcoming support contract there is no doubt that the maintenance of the fleet was very substandard.
The glider maintenance is another matter and without saying too much that might prejudice the upcoming support contract there is no doubt that the maintenance of the fleet was very substandard.
With all that is going on with MOD real estate at the moment I still think that the whole affair was not simply an airworthiness issue.
The choice of JM to take over ACO gliding may or may not have been an honest mistake by 'somebody' but it would probably have been very difficult to find anybody more unsuited to the task.
I know some people think that it is unlikely that any other agendas were at play - but as I posted previously - the ACO gliding system has in effect been dismantled - thereby possibly making it easier to close certain sites (or at least move certain units from them - since these 'units' no longer exist in practice) - and not a whimper from anybody on an official level !
The choice of JM to take over ACO gliding may or may not have been an honest mistake by 'somebody' but it would probably have been very difficult to find anybody more unsuited to the task.
I know some people think that it is unlikely that any other agendas were at play - but as I posted previously - the ACO gliding system has in effect been dismantled - thereby possibly making it easier to close certain sites (or at least move certain units from them - since these 'units' no longer exist in practice) - and not a whimper from anybody on an official level !
''and that doing something about it is a career killer.''
This particular Group Captain was a retired wing cdr navigator and already over age for the 2FTS job so I doubt he had much of a future career ahead !
sorry cannot get quote facility to work
This particular Group Captain was a retired wing cdr navigator and already over age for the 2FTS job so I doubt he had much of a future career ahead !
sorry cannot get quote facility to work
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Has anyone thought that the delay could be down to the Delivery Duty Holder's responsibilities; and that would sit with OC2FTS. The legal responsibility lies with the DDH to the point they leave this mortal coil; and on a fleet of gliders when you (as an individual) are not 100% confident of the serviceability, paperwork trail, etc. I definenately wouldn't.
Pobjoy & l ron
As I said, I have no wish to denigrate the man. I don't know him and am in no position to challenge your own experiences. When there are systemic failings, I don't like to see an individual singled out for being unable to cope with decisions of yesteryear. Very few knew how to. I suspect anything he has done pales into insignificance when judged against those who were warned their illegal acts would kill aircrew, and carried on regardless in the knowledge they would be allowed to judge their own case - and then did. That is truly malevolent. My "career killer" comment refers to the rulings of, for example, Andrew Robathan MP Min(AF) on 8.1.13; and DE&S's confirmatory statement of 13.2.13. (One of many). Thou shalt not refuse to obey an order to make a false declaration about airworthiness (even though it carries a 2 year sentence). But if your man did make such a declaration, then I of course withdraw....and he deserves your opprobrium.
As I said, I have no wish to denigrate the man. I don't know him and am in no position to challenge your own experiences. When there are systemic failings, I don't like to see an individual singled out for being unable to cope with decisions of yesteryear. Very few knew how to. I suspect anything he has done pales into insignificance when judged against those who were warned their illegal acts would kill aircrew, and carried on regardless in the knowledge they would be allowed to judge their own case - and then did. That is truly malevolent. My "career killer" comment refers to the rulings of, for example, Andrew Robathan MP Min(AF) on 8.1.13; and DE&S's confirmatory statement of 13.2.13. (One of many). Thou shalt not refuse to obey an order to make a false declaration about airworthiness (even though it carries a 2 year sentence). But if your man did make such a declaration, then I of course withdraw....and he deserves your opprobrium.
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Dear Lord, the aircraft are single engine, unpressurized ,fixed gear,uncomplicated flying machines, what is so bloody difficult about keeping them safe and serviceable? My wife and I kept over twenty similar aircraft in service with a utilization of about 230 hours per month on each air-frame/engine combination, and didn't kill a single person, and now the whole might of the RAF takes two years to think about what to do? Its like a Monty Python show!
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AC Gliding.
Well said Clunkdriver. In my day (1960s) we had one Sqn Ldr to whom all 27 Gliding Schools and 2 Gliding Centres reported. He had 2 (very experienced) JEngos, who had roaming technical oversight, and one GD Flt Lt J class officer deputy. He also had one Flt Lt overseeing all the Air Experience Flights and another looking after Flying Scholaships, and the links to the flying clubs involved. We never had an accident nor even a serious incident in my two years of happy involvement, including a very great deal of aero-towing. When did it all become so complicated?! JP
The glider maintenance is another matter and without saying too much that might prejudice the upcoming support contract there is no doubt that the maintenance of the fleet was very substandard.
This is/was exactly the issue; the rest of the issues were minor and could have been sorted during normal operations (like the minor AEA issues that have attracted so much flak!). Some of the issues came out in that FOI request about incorrect elevator hinges being fitted, incomplete aircraft document sets and failures in the independent inspections. I know there were many more and that would definately prejudice commercial sensitivities.
As I have said all along JM made exactly the right decision to suspend flying, however, what happened after that as things developed may not have been as clear cut. To publically assassinate his personality without him knowing who you are is, in my opinion, bad form.
LJ
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...Attachment.pdf
Last edited by Lima Juliet; 2nd Feb 2016 at 19:08.
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Long Ron
This particular Group Captain was a retired wing cdr navigator and already over age for the 2FTS job so I doubt he had much of a future career ahead
Nav or Pilot? He wears pilot wings!
Nav or Pilot? He wears pilot wings!
JP:-
When it started becoming dangerous. That was when the UK Military Air Regulator (aka the MOD) began to renege on its duty of care to ensure the airworthiness of UK military aircraft. That began in 1987 when, to misquote Haddon-Cave, savings were made at the cost of safety. Not his date though as he considered that to be a Golden Period of Air Safety! Strange, when staff responsible for ensuring that airworthiness were ordered to disregard the regulations but to sign them off as complied with. I'm pretty certain that such an order is illegal, but the Air Officer concerned was supported by his superiors up to ministerial level, and it remains written MOD policy that such an order is permissible, and that to disobey it is an offence.
The effect on the professional and experienced engineers whose whole existence was dedicated to ensuring airworthiness (including '60s Air Cadet gliders, JP!) can be imagined. One way and the other they left, to be replaced by compliant untrained inexperienced non-engineers. The regulations that were not now being applied were removed and forgotten. Very soon nobody was left who understood them or remembered them. Airworthiness related fatal air accidents, such as the Mull of Kintyre tragedy that killed 29, were investigated under the auspices of the MOD, but the cause was never found to be lack of airworthiness. 63 such airworthiness related fatalities have been identified in threads on this forum alone.
The MAA, "the independent" MOD subsidiary resulting from the Nimrod Review, is struggling to cope with the lack of airworthiness that now infects all MOD fleets (including Air Cadet gliders) Its modus operandi is to reinvent the wheel, but without having any trained wheelwrights. The result is the paper mountain complained of in this thread. You may think your aircraft are simple and therefore safe. They should be, but they are not. If it is the fault of anybody, then it is the fault of the Air Officers who subverted the regulations in the 80s/90s, and the Air Officers who have covered that up ever since. As Tuc says, they are fond of using JOs and SOs as scapegoats for their own actions, so don't fall for it.
Unless and until this is confronted by the Royal Air Force it will be compromised as a fighting force. Unless and until the MAA and the MilAAIB are made independent of the MOD and of each other it can all happen again anyway.
So, clunk driver, that is why it's so bloody difficult to keep them safe. It's all about airworthiness, not serviceability.
When did it all become so complicated?! JP
The effect on the professional and experienced engineers whose whole existence was dedicated to ensuring airworthiness (including '60s Air Cadet gliders, JP!) can be imagined. One way and the other they left, to be replaced by compliant untrained inexperienced non-engineers. The regulations that were not now being applied were removed and forgotten. Very soon nobody was left who understood them or remembered them. Airworthiness related fatal air accidents, such as the Mull of Kintyre tragedy that killed 29, were investigated under the auspices of the MOD, but the cause was never found to be lack of airworthiness. 63 such airworthiness related fatalities have been identified in threads on this forum alone.
The MAA, "the independent" MOD subsidiary resulting from the Nimrod Review, is struggling to cope with the lack of airworthiness that now infects all MOD fleets (including Air Cadet gliders) Its modus operandi is to reinvent the wheel, but without having any trained wheelwrights. The result is the paper mountain complained of in this thread. You may think your aircraft are simple and therefore safe. They should be, but they are not. If it is the fault of anybody, then it is the fault of the Air Officers who subverted the regulations in the 80s/90s, and the Air Officers who have covered that up ever since. As Tuc says, they are fond of using JOs and SOs as scapegoats for their own actions, so don't fall for it.
Unless and until this is confronted by the Royal Air Force it will be compromised as a fighting force. Unless and until the MAA and the MilAAIB are made independent of the MOD and of each other it can all happen again anyway.
So, clunk driver, that is why it's so bloody difficult to keep them safe. It's all about airworthiness, not serviceability.
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Chugalug, We operated in our God awful climate for 26 years with such aircraft, I can assure you our aircraft were not only airworthy but serviceable and safe, the fleet consisted of Grob 115, DA 40, DA20, C172, B19 along with various twins,and taildragers, flying from both high intensity large airfields, grass strips and ski runways with a bit of float flying thrown in for good measure, flown mostly by very low time pilots .If the RAF cant keep things both serviceable and safe with the benign flying conditions in the UK and all the support available then I suggest that you have the wrong folks running things.Time to clean house!
cd:-
Couldn't have said it better myself. With all due respect though, the only people that can authoritatively say that an aircraft is airworthy are the relevant competent air regulator. Therein lies the rub, the UK Military doesn't have one, hasn't had one for nigh on thirty years. Maintaining airworthiness is a continual auditing process. Break that continuity and you can no longer claim airworthiness. That continuity has been long broken. All it needed was a paper trail IAW the regulations. No regulations, no paper trail, no airworthiness.
It all sounds arcane and boring I know, but the lack of that paper trail can kill, and has killed.
Can I again make the point that this is not a reflection on those concerned with servicing, but on the MOD whose responsibility it is to procure and ensure airworthy military aircraft. It has reneged on that responsibility.
Time to clean house!
It all sounds arcane and boring I know, but the lack of that paper trail can kill, and has killed.
Can I again make the point that this is not a reflection on those concerned with servicing, but on the MOD whose responsibility it is to procure and ensure airworthy military aircraft. It has reneged on that responsibility.