Air Cadets grounded?
Gentleman Aviator
AOC 22 has asked his fellow AOCs to provide where possible.
ODI is good tm (I would say that!); at a recent cadet event - a Wing Field Day I think it was - literally hunderds of cadets got airborne in the mighty Wokka.
BZ Odiham.
ODI is good tm (I would say that!); at a recent cadet event - a Wing Field Day I think it was - literally hunderds of cadets got airborne in the mighty Wokka.
BZ Odiham.
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I would be the first to agree that grounding an aircraft that has not been properly maintained is sensible. Grounding the whole fleet because a new organisation does not like the way the paperwork has been done is complete nonsense. How long would it take to visit each squadron, check each glider for serviceability and sign it up take? Days probably not, weeks certainly but months, I don't think so.
Believe me, everyone is working flat out to try and resolve the return to flight programme within the all encompassing Safety Regulation framework.
And finally, the grounding of all of the fleet aircraft has had nothing to do with how badges have been sewn onto flying kit or the discovery of fire extinguishers being out of date. As a point of order, that 'new organisation' (the MAA and 2FTS) has proven to be precisely what the VGS needed. Rerun to flight WILL happen and you'll all come out of this 'pause in flying' in much better shape than previous.
Last edited by TheChitterneFlyer; 18th Jul 2014 at 09:06. Reason: Addition of 'hopefully'
Chitterne
True, but it took me a quarter of century in aviation for my engineering mates to convince me that airworthiness is not just all about aircraft construction and engineering. So whilst flying suits and fire extinguishers did not lead to the pause in flight, it would seem to be further evidence that the VGS airworthiness system was poor and needed correcting. The quoted examples are but a small number of those found by the new CAMO. You are 'spot on' with your praise of 2FTS and their CAMO in my opinion. Their work has been tireless since they first stood up and without it then I fear that Air Cadet gliding would have been stopped for good. Which would be a real shame as VGS flying is funded until at least 2025.
The MAA definition of Airworthiness is:
iRaven
True, but it took me a quarter of century in aviation for my engineering mates to convince me that airworthiness is not just all about aircraft construction and engineering. So whilst flying suits and fire extinguishers did not lead to the pause in flight, it would seem to be further evidence that the VGS airworthiness system was poor and needed correcting. The quoted examples are but a small number of those found by the new CAMO. You are 'spot on' with your praise of 2FTS and their CAMO in my opinion. Their work has been tireless since they first stood up and without it then I fear that Air Cadet gliding would have been stopped for good. Which would be a real shame as VGS flying is funded until at least 2025.
The MAA definition of Airworthiness is:
Airworthiness is the ability of an aircraft or other airborne equipment or system to be operated in flight and on the ground without significant hazard to aircrew, ground crew, passengers or to third parties
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iRaven; well said.
You're most certainly correct in saying that were it not for the VGS being brought into line with other military platforms and how 'Airworthiness' is managed, the chances of Air Cadet Gliding continuing into the future were just about zero. I'm not in any way pointing fingers at anyone from within the previous regime; neither would it be appropriate to do so. During recent years, the business process of safely operating/managing aeroplanes has come along in great leaps and bounds and, painful as it might be for those who don't/didn't have a firm understanding of what the MAA are mandated to do, the VGS guys and gals will no doubt be sharing the pain that other military units have had to endure.
Some of the 'old school' may well be somewhat disgruntled by their outdated perceptions of 'Why change something which has proven to have worked well for the previous thirty years'... there's good reason for 'change' and not just for 'change sake'. As a direct result of the Afghanistan Nimrod incident, the Haddon Cave Report was instrumental in changing the way in which airworthiness was to be managed in the future. I wholly recommend that everyone within military aviation circles should take the time to read the report. It's a huge document and it's within the public domain, hence, I'll include the link here https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...29037/1025.pdf
Some pills are difficult to swallow, however, the prescribed medication should be taken in good faith.
You're most certainly correct in saying that were it not for the VGS being brought into line with other military platforms and how 'Airworthiness' is managed, the chances of Air Cadet Gliding continuing into the future were just about zero. I'm not in any way pointing fingers at anyone from within the previous regime; neither would it be appropriate to do so. During recent years, the business process of safely operating/managing aeroplanes has come along in great leaps and bounds and, painful as it might be for those who don't/didn't have a firm understanding of what the MAA are mandated to do, the VGS guys and gals will no doubt be sharing the pain that other military units have had to endure.
Some of the 'old school' may well be somewhat disgruntled by their outdated perceptions of 'Why change something which has proven to have worked well for the previous thirty years'... there's good reason for 'change' and not just for 'change sake'. As a direct result of the Afghanistan Nimrod incident, the Haddon Cave Report was instrumental in changing the way in which airworthiness was to be managed in the future. I wholly recommend that everyone within military aviation circles should take the time to read the report. It's a huge document and it's within the public domain, hence, I'll include the link here https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...29037/1025.pdf
Some pills are difficult to swallow, however, the prescribed medication should be taken in good faith.
Last edited by TheChitterneFlyer; 18th Jul 2014 at 10:07.
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The trouble is with the lighter side of things there is often not a repair scheme or manual for it available, a lot of American built aircraft simply refer you to AC43-13 for structural repairs, ( indeed the likes of the Seneca, the Airframe structural repair section is about a page in size) you then work out your repair from that.
You can read and download those here if your interested, full of good stuff.
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...AC43.13-1b.pdf
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...2043.13-2B.pdf
I remember when the RAF first bought the gliders, If I remember correctly, they used one to look at the wings internally and as it had no access panels they cut several under the wings, there was no repair scheme so after their inspections they sold it as scrap, the person buying it ( CAA Licenced Engineer with years of carrying out structural repairs on gliders) carried out approved repairs to the wings and put it on the Civilian register, it was a long long time ago, so i may have the odd bit wrong but i'm pretty sure that is what happened to it.
Changes over have been traumatic, both in the Civil world and now it appears the Military, the trouble I forsee is the MAA are probably treating the whole issue as if it was a Voyager A330.
The CAA have of late set up a Light Aircraft section to address these issues, but with a Manning of 6 (though that number has reduced I believe to about 3 with people leaving) to cover the auditing for every aircraft and company operating in the UK below 5700KG.... have fun with that one.
Additionally there has been a move away from over legislating on the Civilian front to passing the buck on to operators and owners, so much so it frightens me, you are now in my eyes going to get maintenance driven by budget and not safety.
Aa an example, the Structural Inspection Programmes brought out by Cesssna to cover areas that need inspecting on the 100 series ageing fleets and now incorporated into the maintenance manuals, the CAA are taking the attitude that it is down to the owners/ operators whether or not they carry out these inspections....
You can read and download those here if your interested, full of good stuff.
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...AC43.13-1b.pdf
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/m...2043.13-2B.pdf
I remember when the RAF first bought the gliders, If I remember correctly, they used one to look at the wings internally and as it had no access panels they cut several under the wings, there was no repair scheme so after their inspections they sold it as scrap, the person buying it ( CAA Licenced Engineer with years of carrying out structural repairs on gliders) carried out approved repairs to the wings and put it on the Civilian register, it was a long long time ago, so i may have the odd bit wrong but i'm pretty sure that is what happened to it.
Changes over have been traumatic, both in the Civil world and now it appears the Military, the trouble I forsee is the MAA are probably treating the whole issue as if it was a Voyager A330.
The CAA have of late set up a Light Aircraft section to address these issues, but with a Manning of 6 (though that number has reduced I believe to about 3 with people leaving) to cover the auditing for every aircraft and company operating in the UK below 5700KG.... have fun with that one.
Additionally there has been a move away from over legislating on the Civilian front to passing the buck on to operators and owners, so much so it frightens me, you are now in my eyes going to get maintenance driven by budget and not safety.
Aa an example, the Structural Inspection Programmes brought out by Cesssna to cover areas that need inspecting on the 100 series ageing fleets and now incorporated into the maintenance manuals, the CAA are taking the attitude that it is down to the owners/ operators whether or not they carry out these inspections....
Last edited by NutLoose; 18th Jul 2014 at 11:50.
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NutLoose,
I don't doubt your frustration at there being, perhaps, the perception that Viking/Vigilant are being treated the same way as Voyager. The truth of the matter is that, from an airworthiness point of view, Viking/Vigilant are no different than that of Voyager. The same airworthiness principle's are applied to each and every platform.
When there isn't a published repair scheme within the maintenance documentation then you'll, no doubt, now have to jump through many MAA hoops involving the unequivocal report from an Engineering Officer in outlining a suitable repair scheme.
I do recall, many years ago, witnessing many repairs to the primary structure of RAFGSA aeroplanes that were, in every respect, a work of art. The woodworking skills of some of those guys were second to none. I don't doubt that you have many similarly talented folk. However, that's not the issue. The issue is having a clear and concise directive of what can and what cannot be repaired, and, that it's within the accordance of the maintenance manual.
From the military perspective, it matters not what might be in place for the repair of civil light aeroplanes, because there are clear directives in place driven by the Military Regulatory Authority relating to Repair & Maintenance.
I tend to disagree with your view that maintenance will now be driven by budget and not safety. The VGS has now been funded to 2025 and, most certainly, any suggestion that a budget will override the safety case should ring alarm bells far and wide.
The downside of this particular mess has, of course, impacted upon all of those young folk who were expectant of doing some gliding this summer. Last summer was extremely wet and miserable, but this year has seen some fantastic gliding weather... which further exasperates those who want to get on with the business of flying.
All the best of luck in the return to flight programme.
I don't doubt your frustration at there being, perhaps, the perception that Viking/Vigilant are being treated the same way as Voyager. The truth of the matter is that, from an airworthiness point of view, Viking/Vigilant are no different than that of Voyager. The same airworthiness principle's are applied to each and every platform.
When there isn't a published repair scheme within the maintenance documentation then you'll, no doubt, now have to jump through many MAA hoops involving the unequivocal report from an Engineering Officer in outlining a suitable repair scheme.
I do recall, many years ago, witnessing many repairs to the primary structure of RAFGSA aeroplanes that were, in every respect, a work of art. The woodworking skills of some of those guys were second to none. I don't doubt that you have many similarly talented folk. However, that's not the issue. The issue is having a clear and concise directive of what can and what cannot be repaired, and, that it's within the accordance of the maintenance manual.
From the military perspective, it matters not what might be in place for the repair of civil light aeroplanes, because there are clear directives in place driven by the Military Regulatory Authority relating to Repair & Maintenance.
I tend to disagree with your view that maintenance will now be driven by budget and not safety. The VGS has now been funded to 2025 and, most certainly, any suggestion that a budget will override the safety case should ring alarm bells far and wide.
The downside of this particular mess has, of course, impacted upon all of those young folk who were expectant of doing some gliding this summer. Last summer was extremely wet and miserable, but this year has seen some fantastic gliding weather... which further exasperates those who want to get on with the business of flying.
All the best of luck in the return to flight programme.
Back in the mid-70s, I was a sprog civilian instructor at West Malling. The very first time I tried to get out of a Sedburgh, I stood up in the cockpit,and put my head forcibly into the bottom of the leading edge of the wing. There was a dent in the ply skin, and my head was similarly affected.
The aircraft was immediately quarantined for an inspection / repair by the regular repair delivery / visiting inspection from St Athan.
Get your act together in today's terms, and fly safe. So many of us owe so much to the ATC.
The aircraft was immediately quarantined for an inspection / repair by the regular repair delivery / visiting inspection from St Athan.
Get your act together in today's terms, and fly safe. So many of us owe so much to the ATC.
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When there isn't a published repair scheme within the maintenance documentation then you'll, no doubt, now have to jump through many MAA hoops involving the unequivocal report from an Engineering Officer in outlining a suitable repair scheme.
Some aircraft I can think of, the Cessna 152 as an example is actually very good in several aspects, Cessna recognised the fail points in wings when they impact the ground or have heavy landings, and they produce spar end section repairs and the drawings, so you can chop out sections of spar (Tip and Rear Inboard Spar) and let in replacement sections with the enclosed doublers.. otherwise I would simply re-spar the wings, not difficult if you know what you are doing and keep checking the washout to make sure you maintain it as you nail it all back together.
That is the probem the services will now come up against with off the shelf designs, as opposed to ordering bespoke one offs designed for the military as they used to in the past.
How much of the problem is due to the fact that the gliders being of composite sandwich construction it is only possible to establish how well a repair has been done is by X-raying it? Even then you can't tell if the correct resin was used, and if it was in date at the time of use. A one off repair may be ok, but given the amount of use and perhaps abuse that these airframes have seen, a series of adjacent repairs may be an accident waiting to happen?
Rather than try and get to grips with 25+ years of inadequately recorded repairs, perhaps it is time to pension off the Grobs and go for new AS-K21s?
My understanding is the Air Cadets tried the K21 but they went for the Grob 103 as Schleicher were so busy building K21s for civil clubs that they could not accommodate the Air Cadet order and/or were unwilling to make requested modifications to their proven product.
Rather than try and get to grips with 25+ years of inadequately recorded repairs, perhaps it is time to pension off the Grobs and go for new AS-K21s?
My understanding is the Air Cadets tried the K21 but they went for the Grob 103 as Schleicher were so busy building K21s for civil clubs that they could not accommodate the Air Cadet order and/or were unwilling to make requested modifications to their proven product.
Last edited by Mechta; 27th Jul 2014 at 11:25. Reason: Grammar
1.3VStall, So should the MAA airworthiness book be thrown out the window?
From talking to someone who was in the MOD(PE) at the time and worked on the Vigilant purchase, they were faced with a rushed job to buy the aircraft on a 'use it or lose it' budget, whilst also faced with purchasing a new aircraft type which contravened the MOD's own airworthiness rulebook at the time. A prime example was the inability to inspect the elevator bellcrank at the bottom of the fin as part of a daily inspection. In this case, (the Grob 109/Vigilant) the aircraft is used in a manner quite different (circuits and bumps) to its civil counterpart which is a touring motor glider, so the forces seen could soon put it ahead of the civil fleet in terms of takeoff/landing cycles.
The rush to buy within the lifespan of the particular budget precluded taking the route used with the Venture (Motor Falke) and getting it licence built by a company familiar with MOD requirements, and capable of producing all the supporting documentation and repair schemes.
One could easily take out 'Viking' or 'Vigilant' and replace it with 'Rivet Joint' as the same story is being repeated three decades later.
From talking to someone who was in the MOD(PE) at the time and worked on the Vigilant purchase, they were faced with a rushed job to buy the aircraft on a 'use it or lose it' budget, whilst also faced with purchasing a new aircraft type which contravened the MOD's own airworthiness rulebook at the time. A prime example was the inability to inspect the elevator bellcrank at the bottom of the fin as part of a daily inspection. In this case, (the Grob 109/Vigilant) the aircraft is used in a manner quite different (circuits and bumps) to its civil counterpart which is a touring motor glider, so the forces seen could soon put it ahead of the civil fleet in terms of takeoff/landing cycles.
The rush to buy within the lifespan of the particular budget precluded taking the route used with the Venture (Motor Falke) and getting it licence built by a company familiar with MOD requirements, and capable of producing all the supporting documentation and repair schemes.
One could easily take out 'Viking' or 'Vigilant' and replace it with 'Rivet Joint' as the same story is being repeated three decades later.
Last edited by Mechta; 27th Jul 2014 at 11:26. Reason: Spelling
I always thought that because we scr3w3d around with the Grob 109 to make it a Vigilant (by raising the all-up-weight to carry parachutes and reconfiguring the fuel system plus other stuff) meant that we created our own set of problems - if we had bought totally 'off the shelf' (like we have with RIVET JOINT), then some of the issues experienced with the type would not have happened.
When buying an aircraft for 'circuits and bumps' then why did we insist on putting parachutes in, when the circuit height of 800ft QFE was below the likely successful abandonment height anyway?
Also, talking to some that fly the civvy Grob 109, they don't have as many problems with the Limbach engine running funny and the only difference that I'm aware of is the reconfigured fuel system?
It seems that as ever the military has itself to blame by not buying of the shelf and insisting that the manufacturer change their preferred specification - we did that with the Grob 115E by insisting on a new prop type for the Tutor and we know how well that went!
Anyway, this has nothing to do with the temporary pause [off thread alert!]
LJ
When buying an aircraft for 'circuits and bumps' then why did we insist on putting parachutes in, when the circuit height of 800ft QFE was below the likely successful abandonment height anyway?
Also, talking to some that fly the civvy Grob 109, they don't have as many problems with the Limbach engine running funny and the only difference that I'm aware of is the reconfigured fuel system?
It seems that as ever the military has itself to blame by not buying of the shelf and insisting that the manufacturer change their preferred specification - we did that with the Grob 115E by insisting on a new prop type for the Tutor and we know how well that went!
Anyway, this has nothing to do with the temporary pause [off thread alert!]
LJ
As someone who has flown the Vigilant from its introduction I can tell you that the reconfigured fuel system CURED the problems we had with the engine - if they'd ripped out the carburettors and fitted fuel injection whilst they were about it the vast number of DASORS for carb icing would have never happened as well.
I doubt any civvy 109 could divide its total flying hours by the total number of landings and get anywhere near the average of 12 minutes which was the result I got last time I did the maths on ZH118.
The Vigilant spends its life bashing the circuit and as its training 16 year olds the emphasis is on the word bash.
I doubt any civvy 109 could divide its total flying hours by the total number of landings and get anywhere near the average of 12 minutes which was the result I got last time I did the maths on ZH118.
The Vigilant spends its life bashing the circuit and as its training 16 year olds the emphasis is on the word bash.
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............and IMHO not the right aeroplane for the job. I actually think there was not a good option available at the time...............so the Grob 109 was what we went with - at least there was continuity of manufacturer so we could go back to them for spares and repair schemes in the future and that gave us safety - right ??
>Also, talking to some that fly the civvy Grob 109, they don't have as many problems with the Limbach engine running funny and the only difference that I'm aware of is the reconfigured fuel system?<
Just for the record, the G109A has the Limbach engine. The G109B on which the Vigilant is based has a Grob 2500E1 engine. I don't know whether the difference is material.
Just for the record, the G109A has the Limbach engine. The G109B on which the Vigilant is based has a Grob 2500E1 engine. I don't know whether the difference is material.
Grob 2500E1 engine
). Anyway, I've just checked the registrations of the gliding club that operates the ones I was talking about and they are 109Bs with Grob 2500E1 engines - they fly on average 40-50 hours a month on them and they don't have half the rough running incidences that the Vigilants seem to have. May be a coincidence, but they have had 3 109Bs with no problems. I also asked the engineer that looks after them and he said that he's never heard of issues with these civvy registered 109Bs.So guess what? i've drawn a conclusion that a similar number of Vigis that seem to have quite a few rough running engines that something appears wrong - either the different fuel system or maybe training in the use of carb heat, would be my best guess?!!! Or maybe they run more than 50hrs a month on the Vigis and their engines are kn@ckered?
Don't know, I'm not an engineer, but it does strike me as a bit odd...
LJ
Use of carb heat
LJ
At your local VGS the use of carb heat and risks associated with carb icing are covered on EVERY briefing. It's a standard slide and the ambient conditions are plotted to determine the risk. In Northern Europe that's always!
As VX275 said the fuel system was modified from the delivery spec and that largely cured the problem. That mod was, as I recall, due to the tireless efforts of the Sqn Ldr ENG at Syerston who fought to resolve the issue otherwise we would still be sending ghost solos as were in the early 90s.
BBK
At your local VGS the use of carb heat and risks associated with carb icing are covered on EVERY briefing. It's a standard slide and the ambient conditions are plotted to determine the risk. In Northern Europe that's always!
As VX275 said the fuel system was modified from the delivery spec and that largely cured the problem. That mod was, as I recall, due to the tireless efforts of the Sqn Ldr ENG at Syerston who fought to resolve the issue otherwise we would still be sending ghost solos as were in the early 90s.
BBK
Last edited by BBK; 28th Jul 2014 at 19:39. Reason: Typo
Mechta,
My post had absolutely no relevance to the MAA (which didn't exist when these systems were procured) - it was merely a reference to the fact that in the UK we seem incapable of buying a proven system off the shelf without "requesting modifications". 'Cos we know better, of course!
My post had absolutely no relevance to the MAA (which didn't exist when these systems were procured) - it was merely a reference to the fact that in the UK we seem incapable of buying a proven system off the shelf without "requesting modifications". 'Cos we know better, of course!