Air Cadets grounded?
I think the instructor flew right seat and talked the student through the operation of the 'flap cum airbrake' lever. One of the aircraft (we had 4) was found to have the 'B' wing with flaps which went down rather than up when it was delivered but this was soon changed to a 'C' wing. As for the central column, the technique so I was told was for the cadet to hold it by the handgrip and the instructor would then place his hand loosely round the base of the control column so he could take over by moving his hand upwards thereby displacing the cadet's hand.
Last edited by chevvron; 15th May 2017 at 21:20.
To join a BGA or RAGFGSA club would mean paying out and many cadets being still at school they either had to rely on their parents doing this or forgo it entirely, which as most parents couldn't afford it is what most cadets did, but don't forget, they had flown solo in an RAF aircraft.
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Longer ron
The problem with buying new gliders is the production rate, the industry is simply not able to generate the airframes.
If you ordered a fleet of 50 gliders I would expect it would take two years to get ten airframes delivered so the only realistic option to get cadets back in the air is to recover the best Viking airframes while looking at a phased fleet replacement.
I think a lot of people fail to understand how small the gliding industry is and that it is not posable to increase production rate ( be it recovery or new aircraft ) because of the lack of skilled staff.
If you ordered a fleet of 50 gliders I would expect it would take two years to get ten airframes delivered so the only realistic option to get cadets back in the air is to recover the best Viking airframes while looking at a phased fleet replacement.
I think a lot of people fail to understand how small the gliding industry is and that it is not posable to increase production rate ( be it recovery or new aircraft ) because of the lack of skilled staff.
The ACO has been waiting for more than 3 years for fewer aircraft.
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I still feel that the wrong decision has been made with regard to equipment.
The Winch Launch gliders which are better for teamwork and so on (fully recognized benefits) are harder to place in terms of real estate than the motorgliders. Regular units are happier to take Motorglider VGS as lodger units as they fit better with the working patterns of these units. And the FOD risks are much reduced.
The right decision would have been to re-engine the Motorglider airframes through an OEM programme run by Grob. Shuffle the airframes to keep a capability (reduced) in the UK until all Vigilants are re-engined. Then possibly have a reduced number of larger regional Motorglider VGS's afterwards. This also consolidates the approach which has been taken in the past where Vigilants have been temporarily detached to be 'nearer the customers' (such as 618 to Manston where there is no local permanent VGS). You just cant achieve that flexibility with a winch launch VGS.
Sell the Vikings 'as is', get rid of the new winches. Put the money in the pot.
Cost savings from consolidation of sites, standardization of equipment and standardization of training make the business case an absolute 'no-brainer' - but it doesn't fit with the model which appears to be that they don't like the VGS being powered operations.............
But what is done is done and sadly we are where we are................
Arc
The Winch Launch gliders which are better for teamwork and so on (fully recognized benefits) are harder to place in terms of real estate than the motorgliders. Regular units are happier to take Motorglider VGS as lodger units as they fit better with the working patterns of these units. And the FOD risks are much reduced.
The right decision would have been to re-engine the Motorglider airframes through an OEM programme run by Grob. Shuffle the airframes to keep a capability (reduced) in the UK until all Vigilants are re-engined. Then possibly have a reduced number of larger regional Motorglider VGS's afterwards. This also consolidates the approach which has been taken in the past where Vigilants have been temporarily detached to be 'nearer the customers' (such as 618 to Manston where there is no local permanent VGS). You just cant achieve that flexibility with a winch launch VGS.
Sell the Vikings 'as is', get rid of the new winches. Put the money in the pot.
Cost savings from consolidation of sites, standardization of equipment and standardization of training make the business case an absolute 'no-brainer' - but it doesn't fit with the model which appears to be that they don't like the VGS being powered operations.............
But what is done is done and sadly we are where we are................
Arc
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The problem is the paperwork, which might or might not hide problems with none / some / all of the gliders. It doesn't matter what gliders they do or don't have, if the paperwork is in a guddle the glider is unairworthy.
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If I might...
The problem is not 'the paperwork'. The problems are the failures of organisation, culture and competence that led to the paperwork being in an unholy mess.
Looking after the paperwork for a fleet of utterly basic GRP aircraft should have been a walk in the park. The RAF and the MoD should have been able to meet all the applicable regulations. The people involved should have been able to carry out the repairs properly. The FTRS should have been able to pass their first CAMO assessments back in 2013 with ease.
But as one of my old chiefs used to say ''should' don't mean sod all, Sir'.
The basic question remains unanswered - how on earth did the RAF, of all services, end up putting schoolchildren into the air in non-airworthy aircraft?
Chug and Tuc would point to the actions of RAF VSOs in the 80s, when the dismantling of the MoD's airworthiness management systems started. They have a good point - but that doesn't fully explain why people in the MoD and the RAF apparently failed to carry out the basics for another 20 years from the 90s.
Honestly, I think it's time for an enquiry. Any thoughts?
Best Regards as ever to all those caught up in this and trying to do the right thing,
Engines
The problem is not 'the paperwork'. The problems are the failures of organisation, culture and competence that led to the paperwork being in an unholy mess.
Looking after the paperwork for a fleet of utterly basic GRP aircraft should have been a walk in the park. The RAF and the MoD should have been able to meet all the applicable regulations. The people involved should have been able to carry out the repairs properly. The FTRS should have been able to pass their first CAMO assessments back in 2013 with ease.
But as one of my old chiefs used to say ''should' don't mean sod all, Sir'.
The basic question remains unanswered - how on earth did the RAF, of all services, end up putting schoolchildren into the air in non-airworthy aircraft?
Chug and Tuc would point to the actions of RAF VSOs in the 80s, when the dismantling of the MoD's airworthiness management systems started. They have a good point - but that doesn't fully explain why people in the MoD and the RAF apparently failed to carry out the basics for another 20 years from the 90s.
Honestly, I think it's time for an enquiry. Any thoughts?
Best Regards as ever to all those caught up in this and trying to do the right thing,
Engines
Honestly, I think it's time for an enquiry. Any thoughts?
The question why this continued for (at the time) nearly 20 years was also addressed, but of course that can only be from the perspective of individual witnesses; although some had considerable experience and had witnessed first hand the RAF's reaction to the failings in December 1992 - threats of dismissal for refusing to obey orders to perpetuate the rundown. Under such a regime, many hitherto diligent and exceptional engineers will succumb to a culture of bullying, and ignore their training and regulations. In fact, MoD actually admits this, stating in a 2003 briefing to PUS that only one member of staff had complained, and that he was therefore wrong. (A notification provided under FoI, and submitted to Haddon-Cave). A lie in my opinion, but it is difficult to find anyone who will admit to voicing concerns; which is now both an offence and a legal obligation. But, also, many engineering decisions have been taken by non-engineers, who have self-delegated authority. This has never been resolved, although to be fair I think the MAA have snipped away at the outer edges. But 7 years of snipping should have exposed all!
Engines, you rightly point to the actions of RAF VSOs in the 80s, but I would point in turn to further RAF VSO actions in the 90s and beyond. Most of those actions were directed at covering up the initial subversion of the UK Military Airworthiness system and of diverting blame to others of 1* downwards to JOs for its fatal consequences. In order to do that control of airworthiness was removed from qualified and experienced engineers to unqualified non-engineers who would do the bidding of their RAF VSO seniors. Gradually the corporate knowledge of the regulations vanished, together with the regulations themselves which were systematically scrapped. When this was all brought to light by those outside the MOD and a review ordered into the loss of Nimrod XV230, once again the MOD went into damage limitation mode. Aided by the extraordinary labelling in the Review of the period of subversion as a "Golden Period" of airworthiness practice, it gave us the "Independent" MAA manned mainly by those who had been complicit (knowingly or otherwise) in the lingering death of UK Military Airworthiness.
The MAA cannot change its spots. It is not independent, it is part of the MOD, the very institution that has perpetrated this scandal. It is not capable of reform, because it does not understand what it is that has been destroyed before and after its formation. Even if it did it cannot go about that reform, because it would first of all have to admit why the system was destroyed and who destroyed it. The cover up is still in place because RAF VSO reputations are deemed a higher priority than the airworthiness of UK Military Aviation. This reform can only happen outwith the MOD. Similarly, UK Military Air Accident Investigation must just as importantly be removed from the MOD and be made independent of the MOD and a reborn MAA.
That is my response to your :-
The MAA cannot change its spots. It is not independent, it is part of the MOD, the very institution that has perpetrated this scandal. It is not capable of reform, because it does not understand what it is that has been destroyed before and after its formation. Even if it did it cannot go about that reform, because it would first of all have to admit why the system was destroyed and who destroyed it. The cover up is still in place because RAF VSO reputations are deemed a higher priority than the airworthiness of UK Military Aviation. This reform can only happen outwith the MOD. Similarly, UK Military Air Accident Investigation must just as importantly be removed from the MOD and be made independent of the MOD and a reborn MAA.
That is my response to your :-
doesn't fully explain why people in the MoD and the RAF apparently failed to carry out the basics for another 20 years from the 90s.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 17th May 2017 at 09:38. Reason: Words, dear boy, words.
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The problem is not 'the paperwork'. The problems are the failures of organisation, culture and competence that led to the paperwork being in an unholy mess.
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Until those in positions of responsibility with regard to this mess are publicly named and shamed for exposing children to risk, nothing will be done about it.
You could say the RAF have taken an ambivalent disregard to safety in exposing children to undue risk and I'm thinking not just of the reason for this thread but certain lack of operational practices that lead to the deaths of innocents - not equipping aircraft with Mode C transponders and not making use of local radar services.
7700
You could say the RAF have taken an ambivalent disregard to safety in exposing children to undue risk and I'm thinking not just of the reason for this thread but certain lack of operational practices that lead to the deaths of innocents - not equipping aircraft with Mode C transponders and not making use of local radar services.
7700
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Job Application
B Bear - I had a look at the job application. When I read the bit at Para 2 Line 3 I'm afraid my blood boiled somewhat, leading me to send the following email to the address for requesting information for clarification on the claims made in said paragraph.
Dear Sir or Madam
I read the job description, as above, with interest. I note that in paragraph 2 it is stated that "The gliders comprising a mix of self-launching and conventional types are MoD owned and maintained in accordance with current Royal Air Force maintenance procedures.
I would be obliged if you would let me know as to when this practice came into being as, when I was flying teen-age members of the Air Training Corps and others, the aircraft were, so it has been revealed, un-airworthy and Not maintained in accordance with current Royal Air Force maintenance procedures, thus making them legally un-airworthy and, ipso facto, unsafe and, thereby putting my life and the lives of my young students at risk.
I see, also, that the applicants will have to go through various checks (immigration and fraud, to name but two) and abide by certain compliances and codes (i.e.The Civil Service Code). This being so, what reciprocal agreements can the successful candidate expect in return that, for instance, the aircraft in which he is going to fly in has not only been declared airworthy and, therefore, safe but that process and procedures will be in place to ensure that that remains so, unlike the procedures and processes that were not adhered to, both by the Royal Air Force and the contractors concerned, which put my life and, more importantly, the lives of those students and passengers (including my wife of 45 years) at risk at that time.
I look forward to your reply.
Dear Sir or Madam
I read the job description, as above, with interest. I note that in paragraph 2 it is stated that "The gliders comprising a mix of self-launching and conventional types are MoD owned and maintained in accordance with current Royal Air Force maintenance procedures.
I would be obliged if you would let me know as to when this practice came into being as, when I was flying teen-age members of the Air Training Corps and others, the aircraft were, so it has been revealed, un-airworthy and Not maintained in accordance with current Royal Air Force maintenance procedures, thus making them legally un-airworthy and, ipso facto, unsafe and, thereby putting my life and the lives of my young students at risk.
I see, also, that the applicants will have to go through various checks (immigration and fraud, to name but two) and abide by certain compliances and codes (i.e.The Civil Service Code). This being so, what reciprocal agreements can the successful candidate expect in return that, for instance, the aircraft in which he is going to fly in has not only been declared airworthy and, therefore, safe but that process and procedures will be in place to ensure that that remains so, unlike the procedures and processes that were not adhered to, both by the Royal Air Force and the contractors concerned, which put my life and, more importantly, the lives of those students and passengers (including my wife of 45 years) at risk at that time.
I look forward to your reply.
Trying to remember how many years ago I posted it would be easier cheaper and quicker to buy new gliders to solve the problem
Hey but what do I know ??
Hey but what do I know ??
How long would it take to:
a) Review a 20 year old requirement to confirm it is still valid (or probably go through a desirable change spec)
b) Agree a budget for the purchase
c) go out to tender
d) review the submissions (if any were received)
e) Have MAOS audit and approve the proposed supplier. (which could take more than 12 months on its own. EASA Part 145 doesn't read across.)
e) go through the commercial contract issue process
f) carry out acceptance trials
g) write the complete APS for the aircraft, and have it MAOS approved.
My guess is 7-10 years before a single new glider was seen under the current system, and the cost including MOD overheads doubling the equivalent ex-works price to the civilian world.
ACW342
I hope you get a reply! Well done.
Regarding the Civil Service Code, during the MoK Review the Civil Service Commissioners confirmed there was no way the public could make a complaint that it was breached. Only a serving civil servant can do this, and I can assure you that doing so would be career ending. This could be construed as a breach of the Armed Forces Covenant.
I hope you get a reply! Well done.
Regarding the Civil Service Code, during the MoK Review the Civil Service Commissioners confirmed there was no way the public could make a complaint that it was breached. Only a serving civil servant can do this, and I can assure you that doing so would be career ending. This could be construed as a breach of the Armed Forces Covenant.
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That might give them time to sort out the organisational issues that have lead to the current situation. it would then take many more years to replace the fleet, as I suspect the K21 would be the only serious contender (not the Perkoz or PW6) and Shleicher can already sell as many as they can build so the ATC might get 2 per year.