Air Cadets grounded?
1.3VStall:-
In which case I would advise him not to assume that the state-of-the-art platforms that you list, or indeed any aircraft or systems currently in use, are airworthy. One of the default MOD procedures following any airworthiness related accident is to stove-pipe discussion to that particular fleet rather than promote the obvious thought that such deficiencies might affect other fleets, other systems. As has been stated here time and time again, these issues are generic, there is a systemic problem in UK Military Airworthiness Provision to all UK Military Airfleets, it doesn't work and hasn't worked for decades.
Haddon-Cave is quoted and revered as if it were holy script. It is instead part of the disgraceful cover-up of VSO incompetence, malevolence, and gross negligence. Faced with evidence that clearly laid down the time-line of cause and effect as starting back in 1987, it could have created the foundations of a reformed authority that would enable the return of airworthiness to the UK military airfleet. It chose instead to distort that time line to the extent of labelling the time of the suborning of the regulations as a "golden period" of airworthiness, and recommended instead the establishment of the toothless and clueless MAA.
Why would it do such a perverse thing? Simply to protect those VSOs who were responsible. It chose instead to name SOs who were staked out as scapegoats to protect those guilty VSOs. But all that is par for the course in British Establishment self protection. The difference here is that an opportunity to return the UK Military Airfleet to airworthiness was missed, and our airforces remain thus compromised until real reform happens. More treasure and blood must be lost until then, and the fighting capacity of those airforces will continue to be compromised likewise. All this to protect those guilty old men...
Lack of airworthiness is like a canker. You can be blissfully unaware of it and carry on as normal. All appears from outside to be well, but little by little it is gnawing away at the innards and eventually, and too late to avoid, will have its way. Thus 63 deaths have been ascribed as such on this very forum. Whatever hit the ACO has taken it has been mercifully spared that. Others must fly to defend us, not knowing for sure about the innards, and having those who only do blood letting with leeches as a palliative to reassure them. Ask your MP how he feels about that!
I would be moved to ask my MP to investigate why the RAF - which operates state-of-the-art platforms like Typhoon, Voyager, and soon Lightning II, - is incapable of assuring the airworthiness of a fleet of simple aircraft with fixed undercarriages (thousands of which operate safely worldwide).
Haddon-Cave is quoted and revered as if it were holy script. It is instead part of the disgraceful cover-up of VSO incompetence, malevolence, and gross negligence. Faced with evidence that clearly laid down the time-line of cause and effect as starting back in 1987, it could have created the foundations of a reformed authority that would enable the return of airworthiness to the UK military airfleet. It chose instead to distort that time line to the extent of labelling the time of the suborning of the regulations as a "golden period" of airworthiness, and recommended instead the establishment of the toothless and clueless MAA.
Why would it do such a perverse thing? Simply to protect those VSOs who were responsible. It chose instead to name SOs who were staked out as scapegoats to protect those guilty VSOs. But all that is par for the course in British Establishment self protection. The difference here is that an opportunity to return the UK Military Airfleet to airworthiness was missed, and our airforces remain thus compromised until real reform happens. More treasure and blood must be lost until then, and the fighting capacity of those airforces will continue to be compromised likewise. All this to protect those guilty old men...
Lack of airworthiness is like a canker. You can be blissfully unaware of it and carry on as normal. All appears from outside to be well, but little by little it is gnawing away at the innards and eventually, and too late to avoid, will have its way. Thus 63 deaths have been ascribed as such on this very forum. Whatever hit the ACO has taken it has been mercifully spared that. Others must fly to defend us, not knowing for sure about the innards, and having those who only do blood letting with leeches as a palliative to reassure them. Ask your MP how he feels about that!
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I might be able to help explain the potential link between the MAA issues as set out by Chug and the scandal of the ATC gliders.
The fact here is that a fleet of military aircraft (and that's what these are - aircraft on the UK Military Aircraft Register) have now been grounded for around two and a half years, with little or no explanation from the RAF as to why. There could be many reasons why so little information has been made public, a probable one (alert - just my opinion here) being the potential for Joe Public (or Joe Newspaper) to ask why schoolchildren were being flown around the sky in aircraft that weren't being maintained in an acceptably safe manner. (One RAF officer has already said that they didn't have a safety case).
One question that needs a good answer is how the MAA has allowed this to happen. It's spent years and millions writing new regulations, setting up new occurrence reporting systems, conducting assurance activities, publishing reports (some of which read like Stalinist tractor production reports). Yet all the while the RAF was flying kids around in what appear to have been wholly inadequately maintained aircraft. What assurance activity had the MAA conducted on the FTS or 22 Gp?
This isn't an isolated case.The XX179 ejection seat accident report revealed that the seat had no safety case - but the MoD PT responsible must have been audited (and approved) by the MAA.
What I'm (badly) trying to point out is that the MoD's response to Haddon-Cave -set up a new organisation, write a load of new regulations and set up loads of 'top down' safety management systems - might just not be working as intended. Certainly not in the RAF's gliding organisation.
And that's a worry. Or it should be.
Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right things,
Engines
The fact here is that a fleet of military aircraft (and that's what these are - aircraft on the UK Military Aircraft Register) have now been grounded for around two and a half years, with little or no explanation from the RAF as to why. There could be many reasons why so little information has been made public, a probable one (alert - just my opinion here) being the potential for Joe Public (or Joe Newspaper) to ask why schoolchildren were being flown around the sky in aircraft that weren't being maintained in an acceptably safe manner. (One RAF officer has already said that they didn't have a safety case).
One question that needs a good answer is how the MAA has allowed this to happen. It's spent years and millions writing new regulations, setting up new occurrence reporting systems, conducting assurance activities, publishing reports (some of which read like Stalinist tractor production reports). Yet all the while the RAF was flying kids around in what appear to have been wholly inadequately maintained aircraft. What assurance activity had the MAA conducted on the FTS or 22 Gp?
This isn't an isolated case.The XX179 ejection seat accident report revealed that the seat had no safety case - but the MoD PT responsible must have been audited (and approved) by the MAA.
What I'm (badly) trying to point out is that the MoD's response to Haddon-Cave -set up a new organisation, write a load of new regulations and set up loads of 'top down' safety management systems - might just not be working as intended. Certainly not in the RAF's gliding organisation.
And that's a worry. Or it should be.
Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right things,
Engines
Engines, thank you for yet another excellent post. It confirms yet again that the ACO Gliders, and the Hawk Mk 10 ejection seat, together with airworthiness related fatal air accidents involving the Chinook Mk2, the Nimrod Mk2, the Sea King ASaC Mk7, the Hercules "K model", and the Tornado GR4, all share with the MAA itself the dubious distinction of being victims of the aftermath of an AMSO 1987 policy decision that led directly to "savings at the expense of safety".
That policy has cost this country dear, in blood, treasure, and capability. The least of that cost is the grounding of the ACO fleet. That is not to understate that particular cost in any way. It will manifest itself for decades to come I have no doubt. What is scarcely mentioned though is that list of aircraft and systems above is merely what is in the public domain, due mainly to airworthiness related accidents and subsequent inquiries and reports. They are but the tip of an iceberg upon which UK Military Aviation has foundered. In most other regimes something effective would have been done by now, no doubt surreptitiously, in order to assure national security. This regime though is different, whereby national security must take second place to a higher consideration, that of the reputations of RAF VSOs!
That is the real scandal, a cover-up involving succeeding generations of RAF VSOs that has prevented proper reform of what is now a terminally dysfunctional system. The only way that reform can happen is to free both Regulator and Investigator from the MOD and from each other. Then at last the MAA can begin to get its own house in order, reject the lies of Haddon-Cave, relearn the arcane art of airworthiness provision and maintenance, and then implement that into the UK military airfleet. In the course of which it would be monitored by a renewed and independent MilAAIB so that it can be found wanting as a regulator when airworthiness accidents occur (as they inevitably will of course).
The obstacle to all this is the MOD. It has to be overcome, or the outlook for the UK Air Forces is nothing short of bleak.
That policy has cost this country dear, in blood, treasure, and capability. The least of that cost is the grounding of the ACO fleet. That is not to understate that particular cost in any way. It will manifest itself for decades to come I have no doubt. What is scarcely mentioned though is that list of aircraft and systems above is merely what is in the public domain, due mainly to airworthiness related accidents and subsequent inquiries and reports. They are but the tip of an iceberg upon which UK Military Aviation has foundered. In most other regimes something effective would have been done by now, no doubt surreptitiously, in order to assure national security. This regime though is different, whereby national security must take second place to a higher consideration, that of the reputations of RAF VSOs!
That is the real scandal, a cover-up involving succeeding generations of RAF VSOs that has prevented proper reform of what is now a terminally dysfunctional system. The only way that reform can happen is to free both Regulator and Investigator from the MOD and from each other. Then at last the MAA can begin to get its own house in order, reject the lies of Haddon-Cave, relearn the arcane art of airworthiness provision and maintenance, and then implement that into the UK military airfleet. In the course of which it would be monitored by a renewed and independent MilAAIB so that it can be found wanting as a regulator when airworthiness accidents occur (as they inevitably will of course).
The obstacle to all this is the MOD. It has to be overcome, or the outlook for the UK Air Forces is nothing short of bleak.
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I feel that this thread has now passed me by in that it has reached a level of discussion well beyond my ken, and that is as how it should be, gathering more and more evidence and piling on the pressure. That pressure should be renewed now that M. Lancaster, TD, MP is now the relevant minister. It is of interest that part of his portfolio is as the minister responsible for the Armed Forces Covenant. As the majority of posters on this thread appear to be both serving and retired members of Her Majesties Armed Forces I would suggest that we are entitled to a much greater level of information with regard to everything in this thread than we are currently receiving.
Might I suggest that ALL of you are who are flying or flew, or flew in, in what can now be described as Non-Airworthy military aircraft, ask the minister as to why your life is being or has been put at risk above and beyond the normally accepted risks of flight in a military aircraft.
Now that we have a new minister I have copied a couple of eMails to the previous minister via my quietly effective MP lady sylvia Hermon and the replies fro J Brazier, TD MP. I'll start with parts of my email asking questions in relation to the written ministerial statement to the house of commons and the reply to my MP. I might add that I also wrote a separate email to the Office of The First Minister/ Deputy First Minister at Stormont, cc'd to the First Ministers for Scotland and Wales. I also wrote an email to the chair of the Public Accounts Committee at Westminster. To date I have received NO replies from these four.
"As stated, and to re-iterate:
• Has the Minister been asked as to why this fiasco has come about?
• Is he aware that up to 146 aircraft document sets (ADS) are missing, most likely illegally destroyed.
• What were the RAF officers who held the SO1 and SO2 posts doing whilst their apparent incompetence allowed a private company to charge for work that was not done, work that was done without being asked for and in a manner that left aircraft in an un-airworthy state, signed entires in official documents (the aircraft Form 700 series, comprising part of the ADS) as having overseen work that was neither done nor overseen?
• Has he been asked as to why it has taken so long to get such a limited number of aircraft back to an airworthy state?
• Why were the Vigilant aircraft engines not replaced/refurbished at 2000 hrs which is their designed life between overhauls.
• Why, indeed, were the aircraft allowed to fly with engines past their “Life-ex” number of hours
• The reason for there only being 15 Vigilant aircraft available to 2019 is that someone found 15 replacement engines in boxes in the 2 FTS engineering facility.
• Whilst travel, accommodation and messing on residential courses is free, cadets will, of course, require “pocket money” for the week. The parents of some cadets may find it difficult to fund their offspring with such.
There are many more questions that need asking and many many anomalies to the plans drawn up by 2FTS and as presented to the minister who has, I believe, been treated to a smoke and mirrors job that in no way reflects the reality of the current situation.
Lastly, does Lady Sylvia not think that charging the MoD for work that was not done, work that left aircraft in a dangerous state and the illegal destruction of official (and possibly incriminating) documents are crime in themselves, and furthermore, the apparent lack of any form of official investigation into this possibly criminal fiasco?
My reply to the above.
ear Lady Sylvia,
Very many thanks for sending me copies of the letters to you from the minister for reserves, J Brazier TD MP. I have already part written a reply to his first letter dated 03/05/16. Personal circumstances have precluded me from finishing it until now. I will add my comments in relation to todays reply (26/05/16).
First of all let me start by saying that I mean no disrespect to Mr. Brazier whatsoever. I save that for the very senior officers in both the ACO and the RAF who have, to my mind, fed the minister a diet of bovine faeces.
I am afraid that he has been poorly and incorrectly briefed. His letter is full of inaccuracies, in places totally wrong and certain conclusions are not fact but, to my mind, terminological inexactitudes, uttered to support 2FTS’s discrimination towards Self Launching Motor Gliders and civilian volunteer instructors in that neither hold no place in glider training to solo for the Air Cadet Organisation. I will, if I may, address each paragraph in turn.
Paragraph 1.
“ Northern Ireland will be losing its gliding squadron but gaining (for the first time) powered air experience flying for cadets in the Province”
This is factually wrong. 13 Air Experience Flight (AEF) has been flying as part of Queens University Air Squadron (QUAS) since the 1950s until the closure of QUAS in 1996. Indeed my first ever powered aircraft flight was with 13 AEF in 1964, in a Chipmunk aircraft, flying out of RAF Aldergrove. That was my first ever time upside down and pulling “G”. I have been doing just that for most of my life ever since.
Paragraph 2.
“Our aim is that a new Air Experience Flight (AEF) will be created at Aldergrove with three Grob Tutor aircraft. There are currently 427 RAF cadets in the Northern Ireland Wing, meaning there should be approximately one aircraft per 140 cadets. This compares very favourably with the cadet to aircraft ratios found in similar sized Air Experience Flights in mainland United Kingdom.”
The above are admirable aims. However, the Grob 105 tutor is only being released for AEF duties as they are no longer required for Ab-Initio RAF flying training. These aircraft as explained in paragraph 7 are owned and maintained by the M.o.D. contractor Babcock. under this contract each flight is costed at circa £500/hour. The contract with Babcock finishes in 2019. Therefore, the aim to have all cadets having three flights per year from 2018 will only last for one year. Will the Babcock contract be extended or renewed and, either way, will the contract cost then come from the ACO budget?
Notwithstanding the above, in order to maintain the aircraft Babcock will either have to employ suitably licensed A & C aircraft engineers locally or have the AEF staff trained in pre & post flight servicing of the aircraft, (an aircraft which is somewhat more complex than the Vigilant) and have the aircraft flown to a maintenance facility across the Irish Sea. There is a third possibility in that a local company may be sub-contracted to perform the maintenance and ground handling. this though will put the ACO back to the same situation they were in with SERCO and Soaring Oxford.
Paragraph 3.
“The part task trainer (simulator) which is currently located at Newtownards will also be relocated to Aldergrove, with the aim that it will be fully operational there by the end of 2016. Cadets currently have access to the part task trainer at Newtownards as and when the Volunteer Gliding Squadron (VGS) staff are available. A new training syllabus for the part task trainer is being finalised and our instructors will be retrained throughout the summer to deliver this new training at Aldergrove.”
The so called “simulator” or part task trainer is a form of PC simulator game called X-Plane. I have this on my iMac at home and, like its competitor Microsoft Flight Simulator X, shows that I have safely landed a Boeing 747 at KaiTak International Airport in Hong Kong (Where my family and I lived for two years). Any one who believes that is probably living in Cloud Cuckoo Land. It bears no resemblance to real flight and can lead to the introduction of bad habits, which can lead to problems for cadets when being instructed for real. There is also a question hanging over the purchase of these so called “Part Task Trainers. Was there a proper tender process or was it, as has been suggested in some quarters based on a friend or family member of someone employed at 2FTS “knew someone in a computer company and could get a good deal”? As for the purchase of an end user licence for each computer, was this the standard Program Licence and EULA or was it the “X-Plane for Professional Use” with the appropriate hardware and software as mandated by the FAA?
With the closure of 664 VGS, who is going to be retrained to be a game instructor? I very much doubt that any of the instructors at Newtownards would wish to sit in a replica cockpit and never get off the ground. I know that of the 4 staff who could possibly convert to the Grob 115 Tutor, One is now too old and another is unlikely to be considered for reasons of past ill health. Of those instructors left three are hoping to gain places on the staff of Kirknewton VGS but I suspect that the attendance requirements will negate these desires. Who then, as asked, will give up their weekends to play computer games? If not these, will ATC squadron personnel be required to attend a course at 2FTS to 1. Be taught to fly and 2. Taught to instruct?
Paragraph 4.
The reformation of 502 Sqn. R.Aux. A.F. is a red herring. It has absolutely nothing to do 664 VGS (Which will soon be no more)
Paragraph 5.
Whoever wrote this letter for the ministers signature cannot even get their facts right. 664 VGS is based at Newtownards airfield, Co. Down. NOT at RAF Kirknewton.
Paragraph 6.
As Paragraph 5. Totally wrong in that cadets have NEVER had to pay the Cadet Contribution to Messing when attending flying training and gliding induction. There is no facility for providing messing in any shape or form at 664 VGS other than a ‘fridge and an electric kettle for staff tea and coffee. Cadets were advised to bring their own packed lunch or use a local fast food outlet.
Paragraph6.
The time scale to resurrect 12/13 AEF and bring the AEF flying program on stream is probably circa 2018. As stated earlier, the Babcock Tutor contract expires in 2019. So, at present this looks like only a years air experience flying in the province. As for the value of second hand Grob 109s, I suggest the minister should look again. A good condition G109 with a low hours engine is going for around £40K.
Paragraph 7.
The summary is, just as the rest of this letter is, plain wrong. As I said in my reply to Paragraph 1 the “new” AEF will not allow cadets powered flying opportunities for the first time. It was being done for many many years by 13 AEF before it was closed down as part of the closure of QUAS in 1996. The hope of getting gliders available in quantity by 2018 is not, on current releases back to service likely by 2018. I suspect that Kirknewton being the only non English squadron will be the last to be outfitted.
As for the letter forwarded to me today, I can only agree that the safety, not only of Air Cadets, but also of the volunteer gliding staff, who fly many hours per year to provide such training for the ACO, is paramount.
With regard to Mr. Braziers statement “I accept that, except for the Air Cadets themselves, every element of the Air Cadet gliding operations and support organisation over a long period of time shared some responsibility for the erosion of confidence in the airworthiness of MOD gliders which led to the pause” I take exception to the above in that I do not believe that those at the coal face of squadron level engineering part of Air Cadet gliding operations were part of the problem. I suspect that after the privatisation of ACO gliding engineering at the then CGS/3FTS, the only place where aircraft servicing requirements were meticulously carried out was in fact at squadron level. I can tell you that if I am going to fly in an aircraft I will ensure that at squadron level everything is done properly and by the book. No shortcuts. Never. Not if my cadets are going to fly in one of our aeroplanes. However the way in which the people who actually run the Volunteer Gliding Squadrons, and who have given given freely of their time and effort, have been treated by the ACO and 2 FTS in particular was, and is, totally abysmal.
Furthermore, that it is taking the might of the Royal Air Force, (in which I served for twenty two years) and MoDUK (AiR) up to FOUR YEARS to recover a small fleet of the simplest of aircraft to an airworthy state is totally shameful! To my mind an awful lot of posteriors are being covered.
In relation to the CAMO and MAA, I would suggest that the minister pay heed to the “Air Cadets Grounded” thread in the Military Aviation Forum on the Professional Pilots Rumour Network, PPrune.org. There has been a lot of discussion by both serving and retired persons, who hold, or have held very senior positions, on the efficacy, or lack thereof, of the MAA.
I would be obliged if you would forward this email to the minister in it’s entirety. I do not need a reply. Nothing that I, or any other, can say or do will change the direction that one man has decided is the future way. The damage has been done. and in the recovery, the ACO and 2FTS have destroyed something that not only worked but worked well. The Air Cadet Gliding organisation will never be as good as it was and in the destruction a lot of goodwill and effort has been destroyed.
As for those staff cadets who have had the good fortune to have had the fires of their aviation ambitions fanned by 664 VGS, I wish them well for they are the last in Northern Ireland. There will be no more now that 664 VGS is no more.
As for those responsible for this debacle, shame on them.
With thanks for your continued interest I remain,
Yours Sincerely
X X Xxxxxx
Cadet Sergeant, 2178 (Holywood) Squadron, Air Training Corps
Corporal, Assistant Air Traffic Controller, Royal Air Force
Adult Warrant Officer and Officer Commanding (pro tem) 2178 (Holywood) Squadron, Air Training Corps
Civilian Gliding Instructor, 664 Volunteer Gliding Squadron
Squadron Flight Safety Officer, 664 Volunteer Gliding Squadron
And the final reply,
I haven't bothered to reply to the above. Obviously the person who drafts these things, ready for the bosses signature, aren't aware that the majority of us know about composite repairs. As for "..that Northern Ireland cadets will in future have the same opportunities as cadets throughout the country to undertake wings course and experience flight up to solo standard" That I think is a load of bollows. Some cadets may get a course, but attend for six or eight week-ends on the trot?
Parents driving up to 2 hours to BFS or BHD on a Friday evening for the squeezy to EDI and the same again on a Sunday. And what about when the squeezy goes "tech" at EDI and is cancelled. Who's there to look after wee John or Janet. And, of course, what about the FSCs from NI, Wales and those in Scotland well above the central belt? they,ve had their lot. No going on to advanced, G2 and G1 etc. The same road that one of our FSCs took and is now on his first tour on Typhoons.
Apologies for the lengthy post but do compare Mr Braziers replies to me with the ones you have received - a carbon copy with only the names changed to protect the guilty mayhaps ? For those of you who haven't yet written to the minister now is a good time to do so in order to welcome him to his new job
A342
Might I suggest that ALL of you are who are flying or flew, or flew in, in what can now be described as Non-Airworthy military aircraft, ask the minister as to why your life is being or has been put at risk above and beyond the normally accepted risks of flight in a military aircraft.
Now that we have a new minister I have copied a couple of eMails to the previous minister via my quietly effective MP lady sylvia Hermon and the replies fro J Brazier, TD MP. I'll start with parts of my email asking questions in relation to the written ministerial statement to the house of commons and the reply to my MP. I might add that I also wrote a separate email to the Office of The First Minister/ Deputy First Minister at Stormont, cc'd to the First Ministers for Scotland and Wales. I also wrote an email to the chair of the Public Accounts Committee at Westminster. To date I have received NO replies from these four.
"As stated, and to re-iterate:
• Has the Minister been asked as to why this fiasco has come about?
• Is he aware that up to 146 aircraft document sets (ADS) are missing, most likely illegally destroyed.
• What were the RAF officers who held the SO1 and SO2 posts doing whilst their apparent incompetence allowed a private company to charge for work that was not done, work that was done without being asked for and in a manner that left aircraft in an un-airworthy state, signed entires in official documents (the aircraft Form 700 series, comprising part of the ADS) as having overseen work that was neither done nor overseen?
• Has he been asked as to why it has taken so long to get such a limited number of aircraft back to an airworthy state?
• Why were the Vigilant aircraft engines not replaced/refurbished at 2000 hrs which is their designed life between overhauls.
• Why, indeed, were the aircraft allowed to fly with engines past their “Life-ex” number of hours
• The reason for there only being 15 Vigilant aircraft available to 2019 is that someone found 15 replacement engines in boxes in the 2 FTS engineering facility.
• Whilst travel, accommodation and messing on residential courses is free, cadets will, of course, require “pocket money” for the week. The parents of some cadets may find it difficult to fund their offspring with such.
There are many more questions that need asking and many many anomalies to the plans drawn up by 2FTS and as presented to the minister who has, I believe, been treated to a smoke and mirrors job that in no way reflects the reality of the current situation.
Lastly, does Lady Sylvia not think that charging the MoD for work that was not done, work that left aircraft in a dangerous state and the illegal destruction of official (and possibly incriminating) documents are crime in themselves, and furthermore, the apparent lack of any form of official investigation into this possibly criminal fiasco?
My reply to the above.
ear Lady Sylvia,
Very many thanks for sending me copies of the letters to you from the minister for reserves, J Brazier TD MP. I have already part written a reply to his first letter dated 03/05/16. Personal circumstances have precluded me from finishing it until now. I will add my comments in relation to todays reply (26/05/16).
First of all let me start by saying that I mean no disrespect to Mr. Brazier whatsoever. I save that for the very senior officers in both the ACO and the RAF who have, to my mind, fed the minister a diet of bovine faeces.
I am afraid that he has been poorly and incorrectly briefed. His letter is full of inaccuracies, in places totally wrong and certain conclusions are not fact but, to my mind, terminological inexactitudes, uttered to support 2FTS’s discrimination towards Self Launching Motor Gliders and civilian volunteer instructors in that neither hold no place in glider training to solo for the Air Cadet Organisation. I will, if I may, address each paragraph in turn.
Paragraph 1.
“ Northern Ireland will be losing its gliding squadron but gaining (for the first time) powered air experience flying for cadets in the Province”
This is factually wrong. 13 Air Experience Flight (AEF) has been flying as part of Queens University Air Squadron (QUAS) since the 1950s until the closure of QUAS in 1996. Indeed my first ever powered aircraft flight was with 13 AEF in 1964, in a Chipmunk aircraft, flying out of RAF Aldergrove. That was my first ever time upside down and pulling “G”. I have been doing just that for most of my life ever since.
Paragraph 2.
“Our aim is that a new Air Experience Flight (AEF) will be created at Aldergrove with three Grob Tutor aircraft. There are currently 427 RAF cadets in the Northern Ireland Wing, meaning there should be approximately one aircraft per 140 cadets. This compares very favourably with the cadet to aircraft ratios found in similar sized Air Experience Flights in mainland United Kingdom.”
The above are admirable aims. However, the Grob 105 tutor is only being released for AEF duties as they are no longer required for Ab-Initio RAF flying training. These aircraft as explained in paragraph 7 are owned and maintained by the M.o.D. contractor Babcock. under this contract each flight is costed at circa £500/hour. The contract with Babcock finishes in 2019. Therefore, the aim to have all cadets having three flights per year from 2018 will only last for one year. Will the Babcock contract be extended or renewed and, either way, will the contract cost then come from the ACO budget?
Notwithstanding the above, in order to maintain the aircraft Babcock will either have to employ suitably licensed A & C aircraft engineers locally or have the AEF staff trained in pre & post flight servicing of the aircraft, (an aircraft which is somewhat more complex than the Vigilant) and have the aircraft flown to a maintenance facility across the Irish Sea. There is a third possibility in that a local company may be sub-contracted to perform the maintenance and ground handling. this though will put the ACO back to the same situation they were in with SERCO and Soaring Oxford.
Paragraph 3.
“The part task trainer (simulator) which is currently located at Newtownards will also be relocated to Aldergrove, with the aim that it will be fully operational there by the end of 2016. Cadets currently have access to the part task trainer at Newtownards as and when the Volunteer Gliding Squadron (VGS) staff are available. A new training syllabus for the part task trainer is being finalised and our instructors will be retrained throughout the summer to deliver this new training at Aldergrove.”
The so called “simulator” or part task trainer is a form of PC simulator game called X-Plane. I have this on my iMac at home and, like its competitor Microsoft Flight Simulator X, shows that I have safely landed a Boeing 747 at KaiTak International Airport in Hong Kong (Where my family and I lived for two years). Any one who believes that is probably living in Cloud Cuckoo Land. It bears no resemblance to real flight and can lead to the introduction of bad habits, which can lead to problems for cadets when being instructed for real. There is also a question hanging over the purchase of these so called “Part Task Trainers. Was there a proper tender process or was it, as has been suggested in some quarters based on a friend or family member of someone employed at 2FTS “knew someone in a computer company and could get a good deal”? As for the purchase of an end user licence for each computer, was this the standard Program Licence and EULA or was it the “X-Plane for Professional Use” with the appropriate hardware and software as mandated by the FAA?
With the closure of 664 VGS, who is going to be retrained to be a game instructor? I very much doubt that any of the instructors at Newtownards would wish to sit in a replica cockpit and never get off the ground. I know that of the 4 staff who could possibly convert to the Grob 115 Tutor, One is now too old and another is unlikely to be considered for reasons of past ill health. Of those instructors left three are hoping to gain places on the staff of Kirknewton VGS but I suspect that the attendance requirements will negate these desires. Who then, as asked, will give up their weekends to play computer games? If not these, will ATC squadron personnel be required to attend a course at 2FTS to 1. Be taught to fly and 2. Taught to instruct?
Paragraph 4.
The reformation of 502 Sqn. R.Aux. A.F. is a red herring. It has absolutely nothing to do 664 VGS (Which will soon be no more)
Paragraph 5.
Whoever wrote this letter for the ministers signature cannot even get their facts right. 664 VGS is based at Newtownards airfield, Co. Down. NOT at RAF Kirknewton.
Paragraph 6.
As Paragraph 5. Totally wrong in that cadets have NEVER had to pay the Cadet Contribution to Messing when attending flying training and gliding induction. There is no facility for providing messing in any shape or form at 664 VGS other than a ‘fridge and an electric kettle for staff tea and coffee. Cadets were advised to bring their own packed lunch or use a local fast food outlet.
Paragraph6.
The time scale to resurrect 12/13 AEF and bring the AEF flying program on stream is probably circa 2018. As stated earlier, the Babcock Tutor contract expires in 2019. So, at present this looks like only a years air experience flying in the province. As for the value of second hand Grob 109s, I suggest the minister should look again. A good condition G109 with a low hours engine is going for around £40K.
Paragraph 7.
The summary is, just as the rest of this letter is, plain wrong. As I said in my reply to Paragraph 1 the “new” AEF will not allow cadets powered flying opportunities for the first time. It was being done for many many years by 13 AEF before it was closed down as part of the closure of QUAS in 1996. The hope of getting gliders available in quantity by 2018 is not, on current releases back to service likely by 2018. I suspect that Kirknewton being the only non English squadron will be the last to be outfitted.
As for the letter forwarded to me today, I can only agree that the safety, not only of Air Cadets, but also of the volunteer gliding staff, who fly many hours per year to provide such training for the ACO, is paramount.
With regard to Mr. Braziers statement “I accept that, except for the Air Cadets themselves, every element of the Air Cadet gliding operations and support organisation over a long period of time shared some responsibility for the erosion of confidence in the airworthiness of MOD gliders which led to the pause” I take exception to the above in that I do not believe that those at the coal face of squadron level engineering part of Air Cadet gliding operations were part of the problem. I suspect that after the privatisation of ACO gliding engineering at the then CGS/3FTS, the only place where aircraft servicing requirements were meticulously carried out was in fact at squadron level. I can tell you that if I am going to fly in an aircraft I will ensure that at squadron level everything is done properly and by the book. No shortcuts. Never. Not if my cadets are going to fly in one of our aeroplanes. However the way in which the people who actually run the Volunteer Gliding Squadrons, and who have given given freely of their time and effort, have been treated by the ACO and 2 FTS in particular was, and is, totally abysmal.
Furthermore, that it is taking the might of the Royal Air Force, (in which I served for twenty two years) and MoDUK (AiR) up to FOUR YEARS to recover a small fleet of the simplest of aircraft to an airworthy state is totally shameful! To my mind an awful lot of posteriors are being covered.
In relation to the CAMO and MAA, I would suggest that the minister pay heed to the “Air Cadets Grounded” thread in the Military Aviation Forum on the Professional Pilots Rumour Network, PPrune.org. There has been a lot of discussion by both serving and retired persons, who hold, or have held very senior positions, on the efficacy, or lack thereof, of the MAA.
I would be obliged if you would forward this email to the minister in it’s entirety. I do not need a reply. Nothing that I, or any other, can say or do will change the direction that one man has decided is the future way. The damage has been done. and in the recovery, the ACO and 2FTS have destroyed something that not only worked but worked well. The Air Cadet Gliding organisation will never be as good as it was and in the destruction a lot of goodwill and effort has been destroyed.
As for those staff cadets who have had the good fortune to have had the fires of their aviation ambitions fanned by 664 VGS, I wish them well for they are the last in Northern Ireland. There will be no more now that 664 VGS is no more.
As for those responsible for this debacle, shame on them.
With thanks for your continued interest I remain,
Yours Sincerely
X X Xxxxxx
Cadet Sergeant, 2178 (Holywood) Squadron, Air Training Corps
Corporal, Assistant Air Traffic Controller, Royal Air Force
Adult Warrant Officer and Officer Commanding (pro tem) 2178 (Holywood) Squadron, Air Training Corps
Civilian Gliding Instructor, 664 Volunteer Gliding Squadron
Squadron Flight Safety Officer, 664 Volunteer Gliding Squadron
And the final reply,
I haven't bothered to reply to the above. Obviously the person who drafts these things, ready for the bosses signature, aren't aware that the majority of us know about composite repairs. As for "..that Northern Ireland cadets will in future have the same opportunities as cadets throughout the country to undertake wings course and experience flight up to solo standard" That I think is a load of bollows. Some cadets may get a course, but attend for six or eight week-ends on the trot?
Parents driving up to 2 hours to BFS or BHD on a Friday evening for the squeezy to EDI and the same again on a Sunday. And what about when the squeezy goes "tech" at EDI and is cancelled. Who's there to look after wee John or Janet. And, of course, what about the FSCs from NI, Wales and those in Scotland well above the central belt? they,ve had their lot. No going on to advanced, G2 and G1 etc. The same road that one of our FSCs took and is now on his first tour on Typhoons.
Apologies for the lengthy post but do compare Mr Braziers replies to me with the ones you have received - a carbon copy with only the names changed to protect the guilty mayhaps ? For those of you who haven't yet written to the minister now is a good time to do so in order to welcome him to his new job
A342
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I should have started with many many thanks to Coff for his educating me on how to post images on PP.
Thanks Coff!!
a342
Thanks Coff!!
a342
Well done that man!
The BS about repairs is all they could come up with, but even those could be 5 to 10 aircraft repairs at any one time with as little as three or four folk on the shop floor.
A poor excuse, not a valid reason.
The BS about repairs is all they could come up with, but even those could be 5 to 10 aircraft repairs at any one time with as little as three or four folk on the shop floor.
A poor excuse, not a valid reason.
ACW342, well done.
You have conveyed our thoughts completely. I am happy that I am not having to volunteer my services to the current bunch of losers.
This past week my gliding club has had two ATC cadets join (separate squadrons), very frustrated that 2FTS cannot get their act together and offer them the gliding that so many of us enjoyed some years ago.
You have conveyed our thoughts completely. I am happy that I am not having to volunteer my services to the current bunch of losers.
This past week my gliding club has had two ATC cadets join (separate squadrons), very frustrated that 2FTS cannot get their act together and offer them the gliding that so many of us enjoyed some years ago.
Mandator - that is something I did not know - that firm, for whom I worked on Concorde nose and visor, seems to have its tentacles pretty well spread, aviation wise, apart for being main dealer for more car marques than I can count
ACW342, the pages of this thread have never accommodated such an uplifting post as yours! Quality and length combined in one! It recalls the title of the 3 threads that started the PPRuNe airworthiness campaign, reversed the ROs' infamous finding, and focussed attention away from the supposed Gross Negligence of the pilots and towards that of the RAF VSOs that had knowingly put a grossly unairworthy aircraft into squadron service via an illegal RTS, and then ordered that it be used to transport over two dozen of the nation's top security specialists on a routine flight that inevitably ended tragically:-
http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...-3-merged.html
Time now for this thread to start hitting back with this excellent initiative!
http://www.pprune.org/military-aviat...-3-merged.html
Time now for this thread to start hitting back with this excellent initiative!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 31st Jul 2016 at 12:47.
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ACW342,
May I add my congratulations for an excellent post - hammer, nail and head are three words that come to mind. BZ.
The explanation given in the reply concerning GRP repairs is, frankly, risible. It smacks of exactly what happened in the Mull of Kintyre saga, where Ministers were being fed inaccurate or incomplete response to fair questions. In particular, GRP aircraft are not, by any stretch of any imagination 'one of the most complex aircraft to maintain and repair'. I think that aircraft with thick stretch formed metal skins, machined frames and complex fasteners get that prize.
But as Tuc would probably ask (so i will) 'what are the RAF trying to hide?' about the standard of repairs on the ATC fleet?. To repeat some of my previous guesses:
1. Repairs not being recorded on Airframe Log Cards
2. Lack of a proper Topic 6 leading to repairs that aren't approved.
Add in poor supervision, and you're lining up a lot of holes in a lot of safety related swiss cheeses.
A bit like Nimrod, Chinook, Tornado.....I'll hazard a guess that some MoD rear ends are puckering just a bit right now.
Best Regards as ever to those who really walk the airworthiness walk,
Engines
May I add my congratulations for an excellent post - hammer, nail and head are three words that come to mind. BZ.
The explanation given in the reply concerning GRP repairs is, frankly, risible. It smacks of exactly what happened in the Mull of Kintyre saga, where Ministers were being fed inaccurate or incomplete response to fair questions. In particular, GRP aircraft are not, by any stretch of any imagination 'one of the most complex aircraft to maintain and repair'. I think that aircraft with thick stretch formed metal skins, machined frames and complex fasteners get that prize.
But as Tuc would probably ask (so i will) 'what are the RAF trying to hide?' about the standard of repairs on the ATC fleet?. To repeat some of my previous guesses:
1. Repairs not being recorded on Airframe Log Cards
2. Lack of a proper Topic 6 leading to repairs that aren't approved.
Add in poor supervision, and you're lining up a lot of holes in a lot of safety related swiss cheeses.
A bit like Nimrod, Chinook, Tornado.....I'll hazard a guess that some MoD rear ends are puckering just a bit right now.
Best Regards as ever to those who really walk the airworthiness walk,
Engines
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ACW342
Excellent post. Well said!
At first I thought this was just a paperwork cock up in that the gliders were probably "serviceable" but the audit trail was inadequate. It is obvious now, from reading PPRUNE, that it's far far worse. I'm familiar with Tuc's numerous posts about the systemic failings but naively assumed this was something else. It seems, to me at least, that it is all part of the same problem. A sad day and I sympathise with fellow ex VGS chaps and ladies who have been let down so badly. Not to mention the cadets who will never get the fantastic opportunities we had.
It is such a shame that just when the VGS staff needed some real leadership it was lacking.
MC
Excellent post. Well said!
At first I thought this was just a paperwork cock up in that the gliders were probably "serviceable" but the audit trail was inadequate. It is obvious now, from reading PPRUNE, that it's far far worse. I'm familiar with Tuc's numerous posts about the systemic failings but naively assumed this was something else. It seems, to me at least, that it is all part of the same problem. A sad day and I sympathise with fellow ex VGS chaps and ladies who have been let down so badly. Not to mention the cadets who will never get the fantastic opportunities we had.
It is such a shame that just when the VGS staff needed some real leadership it was lacking.
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A meeting with an ATC officer.
My wife and I have just returned from the DH Moth gathering held at the Shuttlewoth Trust in the UK, {ate too much, drank too much!} whilst there we met a young female Flight Leutenant who is involved with the ATC, a most impressive young lady indeed. The conversation between my wife, myself and her turned of course to the ATC gliding shambles, she explained to us the lengths she has gone to get cadets into the air, albeit being just a shadow of what the full gliding program was in the past. To meet someone with her grasp of the importance of the ATC organisation, and her efforts to fix things was in fact inspiring, with the likes of this officer there is light at the end of the tunnel, lets hope its not a train coming in the form of the bloody fools who have created this mess!
ACW342
If I may say again, your dissection of MoD's lies is admirable.
The phrase that grips me in the letter of 11 May is "poor practice went un-noticed". This is a damnable lie. One need only read the Airworthiness Reviews by Director of Flight Safety to the RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS to see that both knew of systemic failings in August 1992. CE claimed to the media (BBC, 2011) that he implemented the recommendations, but further reports by DFS between 1992 and 1998, and the Chief of Defence Procurement's admission to the Public Accounts Committee in March 1999, reveal the truth. The Nimrod Review confirmed these failings remained in 2009, and you are finding out what has been done to correct them since the formation of the MAA in 2010. The CE's claim is compounded by the fact that in December 1992 his subordinate, a 2 Star, threatened engineering staff who had been complaining about the failures since 1988 with dismissal if they persisted. The audit report designed to protect those staff was submitted direct to PUS in June 1996, confirming the failings. I have just outlined a long, unbroken audit trail proving very senior officers, officials and Minsters have known about this for the best part of 25 years.
Later this month a book will be published (Kindle version available now) which will help you in your efforts. I have no intention to discuss it further, except to say it was submitted to MoD, the Defence Select Committee and Cabinet Secretary for vetting, and passed.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Their-Great...atest+disgrace
If I may say again, your dissection of MoD's lies is admirable.
The phrase that grips me in the letter of 11 May is "poor practice went un-noticed". This is a damnable lie. One need only read the Airworthiness Reviews by Director of Flight Safety to the RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS to see that both knew of systemic failings in August 1992. CE claimed to the media (BBC, 2011) that he implemented the recommendations, but further reports by DFS between 1992 and 1998, and the Chief of Defence Procurement's admission to the Public Accounts Committee in March 1999, reveal the truth. The Nimrod Review confirmed these failings remained in 2009, and you are finding out what has been done to correct them since the formation of the MAA in 2010. The CE's claim is compounded by the fact that in December 1992 his subordinate, a 2 Star, threatened engineering staff who had been complaining about the failures since 1988 with dismissal if they persisted. The audit report designed to protect those staff was submitted direct to PUS in June 1996, confirming the failings. I have just outlined a long, unbroken audit trail proving very senior officers, officials and Minsters have known about this for the best part of 25 years.
Later this month a book will be published (Kindle version available now) which will help you in your efforts. I have no intention to discuss it further, except to say it was submitted to MoD, the Defence Select Committee and Cabinet Secretary for vetting, and passed.
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Their-Great...atest+disgrace
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To all PPruners reading this thread:
May I urge you all to take a look at the book that Tuc mentioned in his previous post - it's required reading for anyone who wants to understand just how far off track the MoD has been as far as airworthiness is concerned. Profits from sales also go to a damn fine charity (MSF).
Tuc's point about poor practice going unnoticed is, as he so correctly says, a damnable lie. The poor practice has happened and is still happening at many levels, from various MoD departments down to the front line, and this has been admitted following a series of reviews going back to the early 90s right through to 2011. Now we've got another 'occurrence' dated somewhere between 1995 and 2014.
If I might, I'd like to try to briefly explain what Tuc is so bothered about (as well as Chug), and why they post about this stuff so repeatedly. It's this - the systems for producing airworthy (and hence safe) and operationally suitable aircraft, especially in the RAF, went badly off track in the late 1980s, mainly due to massive cuts in admin and support budgets. These have led directly (read the book and you'll see what I mean) to accidents. And loss of life. Avoidable loss of life.
Haddon-Cave identified the symptoms, but got the root causes wrong because he was fed a series of lies, including about when the cuts happened. These lies were designed to protect senior officers and civil servants. As a direct result, the solutions Haddon-Cave came up with were aimed at the wrong target - organisation and regulations. Yes, by 2008 the regs were in a mess, and yes, the lines of accountability had got badly tangled. But they weren't the core problem. Nor were the people he publicly fingered the real culprits.
The real problem was that existing, perfectly good mandated regulations weren't being followed. The real culprits were the people who had made conscious decisions not to do so.
Why bother with this stuff on the 'Air Cadets grounded' thread? Because what has happened to the ATC fleet is just another manifestation of the core problem - MoD and the RAF still aren't doing 'airworthiness' correctly. The Hawk XX179 fatality proved it (again) and the ATC glider scandal is just another ''data point' on a VERY ugly graph.
What to do? Here's my starters for ten (hat tip to Tuc for most of this).Restore the key features of the airworthiness management systems that used to work - such as Modification Committees staffed with technically qualified people, Configuration Control Boards that actually control configuration. Make Critical Design Reviews actually critically review the design. Restore proper 555 acceptance conferences. Reintroduce 'Requirements Scrutiny', using people who know how to do it. Introduce proper technical oversight of MoD projects to avoid some of the nonsenses happening right now in a PT near you.
But most of all, read the book - it's a cracker.
Best Regards as ever to all those who want to sort this lot out,
Engines
May I urge you all to take a look at the book that Tuc mentioned in his previous post - it's required reading for anyone who wants to understand just how far off track the MoD has been as far as airworthiness is concerned. Profits from sales also go to a damn fine charity (MSF).
Tuc's point about poor practice going unnoticed is, as he so correctly says, a damnable lie. The poor practice has happened and is still happening at many levels, from various MoD departments down to the front line, and this has been admitted following a series of reviews going back to the early 90s right through to 2011. Now we've got another 'occurrence' dated somewhere between 1995 and 2014.
If I might, I'd like to try to briefly explain what Tuc is so bothered about (as well as Chug), and why they post about this stuff so repeatedly. It's this - the systems for producing airworthy (and hence safe) and operationally suitable aircraft, especially in the RAF, went badly off track in the late 1980s, mainly due to massive cuts in admin and support budgets. These have led directly (read the book and you'll see what I mean) to accidents. And loss of life. Avoidable loss of life.
Haddon-Cave identified the symptoms, but got the root causes wrong because he was fed a series of lies, including about when the cuts happened. These lies were designed to protect senior officers and civil servants. As a direct result, the solutions Haddon-Cave came up with were aimed at the wrong target - organisation and regulations. Yes, by 2008 the regs were in a mess, and yes, the lines of accountability had got badly tangled. But they weren't the core problem. Nor were the people he publicly fingered the real culprits.
The real problem was that existing, perfectly good mandated regulations weren't being followed. The real culprits were the people who had made conscious decisions not to do so.
Why bother with this stuff on the 'Air Cadets grounded' thread? Because what has happened to the ATC fleet is just another manifestation of the core problem - MoD and the RAF still aren't doing 'airworthiness' correctly. The Hawk XX179 fatality proved it (again) and the ATC glider scandal is just another ''data point' on a VERY ugly graph.
What to do? Here's my starters for ten (hat tip to Tuc for most of this).Restore the key features of the airworthiness management systems that used to work - such as Modification Committees staffed with technically qualified people, Configuration Control Boards that actually control configuration. Make Critical Design Reviews actually critically review the design. Restore proper 555 acceptance conferences. Reintroduce 'Requirements Scrutiny', using people who know how to do it. Introduce proper technical oversight of MoD projects to avoid some of the nonsenses happening right now in a PT near you.
But most of all, read the book - it's a cracker.
Best Regards as ever to all those who want to sort this lot out,
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 2nd Aug 2016 at 19:46.
Engines, an excellent post as ever. Might I though take gentle issue when you say:-
He was given evidence that identified exactly when the cuts happened and how they were implemented, which included the issuing of illegal orders to subvert the regs and the threat to sack those who would not comply (as mentioned by tuc above). No doubt he received a different version of events from the ever helpful ministry special advisors, but it was his duty to sort the wheat from the chaff. Instead he decided to print the Establishment lies about a "Golden Period", and so the Report became part of the cover-up instead of exposing it.
That is the bitter truth about this scandal; the Establishment in the form of Coroners, VSOs, Ministers, MPs, HoC and HoL committees, the RAF Provost Marshal, the Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, to mention just a few, just didn't want to go there, though with some honourable exceptions. This is a scandal greater than the Dreyfus Affair in my view. Not only has it persecuted the innocent while protecting the guilty, but it has led to loss of life and wasted resources. Most damningly of all, it has seriously compromised our nation's Air Power. That is why I say the thoughtful measures that you propose must be under the auspices of an independent Regulator, ie independent of the MOD. Likewise with the Investigator, which must be independent of both, so that neither can be compromised by those who would again wish to do so.
Haddon-Cave identified the symptoms, but got the root causes wrong because he was fed a series of lies, including about when the cuts happened.
That is the bitter truth about this scandal; the Establishment in the form of Coroners, VSOs, Ministers, MPs, HoC and HoL committees, the RAF Provost Marshal, the Deputy Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, to mention just a few, just didn't want to go there, though with some honourable exceptions. This is a scandal greater than the Dreyfus Affair in my view. Not only has it persecuted the innocent while protecting the guilty, but it has led to loss of life and wasted resources. Most damningly of all, it has seriously compromised our nation's Air Power. That is why I say the thoughtful measures that you propose must be under the auspices of an independent Regulator, ie independent of the MOD. Likewise with the Investigator, which must be independent of both, so that neither can be compromised by those who would again wish to do so.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 2nd Aug 2016 at 21:17. Reason: Words dear boy, words.