UK Maritime Patrol Aircraft - An Urgent Requirement
Having been part of a Purple Sqn, it was clear that the RAF and the RN usually have few difficulties getting on with the job and working together. It would seem logical for the Navy to provide expertise amongst the mission crew. However, the RN have limited numbers of multi engined pilots, and for any that moved to P1/8, it would be the only option in that career stream for them and therefore career limiting and unlikely to happen. So RAF to operate it for me, with RN helping if they can!
The Army though.....they always wanted to maintain their own chain of command, systems and structures - less working with, more working alongside!!! Any savings from them maintaining RAF/RN vehicles would soon evaporate as they posted in their own paymasters, RSMs, Adjutants etc!!!!
The Army though.....they always wanted to maintain their own chain of command, systems and structures - less working with, more working alongside!!! Any savings from them maintaining RAF/RN vehicles would soon evaporate as they posted in their own paymasters, RSMs, Adjutants etc!!!!
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The RAF owned the LRMP capability. They owned the CAS capability. They gained control of the air defence of the fleet capability from the RN.
Goodbye Nimrod, Jaguar, Harrier.
The RN are now without LRMP and air defence of the fleet cover. The Army is close to being without CAS cover, except what they can provide themselves with Apache.
The RAF have lots of their own fast, pointy air defence toys though.
Goodbye Nimrod, Jaguar, Harrier.
The RN are now without LRMP and air defence of the fleet cover. The Army is close to being without CAS cover, except what they can provide themselves with Apache.
The RAF have lots of their own fast, pointy air defence toys though.
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DCThumb
The Army are the ones who are in direct contact with the enemy on the ground. Perhaps they are understandably reluctant to expose themselves to the consequences of being weakened by the interference of less qualified outsiders.
I repeat, it is the ownership of the capability and control of its budget that is critical. I cannot see the Army being happy about the RAF owning and funding Apache. Ditto for the RN with LRMPA. The colour of the crew is not critical. Command and control is.
The Army are the ones who are in direct contact with the enemy on the ground. Perhaps they are understandably reluctant to expose themselves to the consequences of being weakened by the interference of less qualified outsiders.
I repeat, it is the ownership of the capability and control of its budget that is critical. I cannot see the Army being happy about the RAF owning and funding Apache. Ditto for the RN with LRMPA. The colour of the crew is not critical. Command and control is.
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UK MaritimePatrol Aircraft - An Urgent Requirement
When I was in Coastal Command - admittedly in the fifties and sixties, we operated quite happily jointly with the Royal Navy for their various tasks, shadowing our Soviet friends etc. I do not remember problems at the various joint Maritime Headquarters nor at JASS Londonderry so if it was OK then why should it not be OK now. I would still prefer four engines over the "oggin" however. If Danny is reading this, I am still here!,
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What do you guys not understand about "owning the capability and controlling the budget?" If Coastal Command had been owned and funded by the Navy instead of the RAF we'd probably still have a LRMP capability.
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@Genstabler
Did the previous MPA capability not get skipped because the contractor had supplied an unfinished PoS that was never going to work safely?
Please explain how the RN would have stopped this happening - whilst dealing with the same contractors 3/4bn overspend on the design of Astute.
Did the previous MPA capability not get skipped because the contractor had supplied an unfinished PoS that was never going to work safely?
Please explain how the RN would have stopped this happening - whilst dealing with the same contractors 3/4bn overspend on the design of Astute.
Last edited by camelspyyder; 14th Jul 2015 at 12:14.
camelspyyder asked:
Yes. The mission system worked OK, I gather, but the airframe was an utter PoS which was a pig to fly, even after substantial modifications. Ask the TPs.....
Did the previous MPA capability not get skipped because the contractor had supplied an unfinished PoS that was never going to work safely?
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Looking into the crystal ball then, which of the choices for the (possible) MMA buy would be likely to be ratified by the MAA ?
And should that be a factor in the choice?
And should that be a factor in the choice?
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Please pay attention children! My point was that if Coastal Command had been a RN command from the outset instead of RAF, there is no certainty that it would have ended up going down the ultimately disastrous Nimrod path anyway. More likely that they would have followed the example of other friendly navies, operated Orion or Atlantique and now be introducing P8 into service.
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More likely that they would have followed the example of other friendly navies, operated Orion or Atlantique and now be introducing P8 into service.
If the purchase of the Orion or Atlantique had little UK workshare then the military's political masters would lean toward an alternative that did. To think otherwise is to display an astounding level of naivety.
Last edited by The Helpful Stacker; 14th Jul 2015 at 20:58.
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Beagle bollocks
Beagle - I've called bull**** on your comments ref the MRA4 before so please stop spouting the crap about the poor flying qualities.
I know every single pilot who ever flew the MRA4, including all the TPs, myself included, and it was not a pig. Initial configuration, yes, production standard, no.
I know every single pilot who ever flew the MRA4, including all the TPs, myself included, and it was not a pig. Initial configuration, yes, production standard, no.
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MRA4 - the truth?
My word - it would seem that we had a mission system that worked, a (production version) airframe that worked, and:
MRA4 is a platform with 15 hours unrefueled flight duration, a 2,000 plus mile radius of action, 13 weapon hard points, radar range of 250 miles, is search and rescue capable, has advanced communications, superior electro optics for surface intelligence gathering and has very capable underwater detection systems. All integrated, working and demonstrated – AND ALREADY PAID FOR
So do I gather that the only things lacking were serviceable balls on VSOs who were not able to guide the project through the changing certification process?
What an expensive shame....
MRA4 is a platform with 15 hours unrefueled flight duration, a 2,000 plus mile radius of action, 13 weapon hard points, radar range of 250 miles, is search and rescue capable, has advanced communications, superior electro optics for surface intelligence gathering and has very capable underwater detection systems. All integrated, working and demonstrated – AND ALREADY PAID FOR
So do I gather that the only things lacking were serviceable balls on VSOs who were not able to guide the project through the changing certification process?
What an expensive shame....
My word - it would seem that we had a mission system that worked, a (production version) airframe that worked, and:
MRA4 is a platform with 15 hours unrefueled flight duration, a 2,000 plus mile radius of action, 13 weapon hard points, radar range of 250 miles, is search and rescue capable, has advanced communications, superior electro optics for surface intelligence gathering and has very capable underwater detection systems. All integrated, working and demonstrated – AND ALREADY PAID FOR
So do I gather that the only things lacking were serviceable balls on VSOs who were not able to guide the project through the changing certification process?
What an expensive shame....
MRA4 is a platform with 15 hours unrefueled flight duration, a 2,000 plus mile radius of action, 13 weapon hard points, radar range of 250 miles, is search and rescue capable, has advanced communications, superior electro optics for surface intelligence gathering and has very capable underwater detection systems. All integrated, working and demonstrated – AND ALREADY PAID FOR
So do I gather that the only things lacking were serviceable balls on VSOs who were not able to guide the project through the changing certification process?
What an expensive shame....
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Don't care who owns it/flys it - MPA works fine in both air forces and navies all over the world - just like to see it back in our military inventory.
And MRA4 is history - let it go.
And MRA4 is history - let it go.
Please pay attention children! My point was that if Coastal Command had been a RN command from the outset instead of RAF, there is no certainty that it would have ended up going down the ultimately disastrous Nimrod path anyway. More likely that they would have followed the example of other friendly navies, operated Orion or Atlantique and now be introducing P8 into service.
The RAF wanted either the Orion or the Atlantic to replace the Shackleton; as there was some British content in the Atlantic already, the Air Staff felt that the Atlantic was probably going to be the better option politically.
The RAF/MoD attempted from the outset to get a quid pro quo from the French to ease the political aspect, with attempts to get a French buy of P1154s (which would've saved that project) Canberra PR9s, or even Hunter T7s to offset the Atlantic purchase; the French didn't bite, and...
...the government, via Roy Jenkins at the Ministry of Aviation demurred, and blocked procurement of the Atlantic, insisting that a British made aircraft be procured; this programme then gained traction because it offered other benefits, namely that it could be sold as partially offsetting the cancellation of P1154, HS681 and - in due course - TSR 2 in favour of US products with the procurement of P1127 plus something else; that 'something else' was Comet MR, aka Nimrod.
Nimrod was saved from the 1965 defence cuts, because - as Healey put it:
Though my initial savings depended on the substitution of three American aircraft for three British, I was able to provide valuable work for the British aircraft industry by ordering the Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft and... the Harrier.
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