UK Maritime Patrol Aircraft - An Urgent Requirement
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What have the facts got to do with anything?lol
You may well be right Gear down but, nobody saw this crash coming so I think it is way too simplistic to say it will rise again within a certain time frame. The problem is there is currently a glut of oil, it's the age old issue of supply and demand.
Is 2015 the year? yeah probably, the year might be right but the decision could be wrong!
You may well be right Gear down but, nobody saw this crash coming so I think it is way too simplistic to say it will rise again within a certain time frame. The problem is there is currently a glut of oil, it's the age old issue of supply and demand.
Is 2015 the year? yeah probably, the year might be right but the decision could be wrong!
TOFO,
IMHO, the next SDSR (15 or possibly 16?) is massively important but not critical. What do I mean by that? - well, lots of staffwork has gone on behind the scenes to support the need for an MMA (MPA), with some recent events that clearly justify the requirement. The SEEDCORN programme, which includes MPA SQEP/SME's in key positions in the UK, as well as the operating aircrew overseas remains perfectly positioned to re-generate the capability, if a positive decision is made in the next 12 months.
However, I think its pretty certain if whoever is in power makes a 'no' decision, then SEEDCORN will be wrapped up in short order. Personally, if this is the case, I think some government down the line will get back in the game - maybe SDSR 20 or 25 but obviously, we will be starting from scratch. Hence my view that it wouldn't be critical to delay another 5 or 10 years but we would miss a massive trick - and as you well know, it could take a decade or more after IOC for maritime aircrew generated from scratch to get anywhere close to the 'lost' experience.
Individuals like me who bang the table justifying the need for an MPA aren't stuck in a Nimrod time warp. All off us accept that is history and have moved on. We make a noise because we believe the UK badly needs an MPA full stop.
No getting away from the financial reality though, so despite many of us being optimistic, it really is a big unknown....
IMHO, the next SDSR (15 or possibly 16?) is massively important but not critical. What do I mean by that? - well, lots of staffwork has gone on behind the scenes to support the need for an MMA (MPA), with some recent events that clearly justify the requirement. The SEEDCORN programme, which includes MPA SQEP/SME's in key positions in the UK, as well as the operating aircrew overseas remains perfectly positioned to re-generate the capability, if a positive decision is made in the next 12 months.
However, I think its pretty certain if whoever is in power makes a 'no' decision, then SEEDCORN will be wrapped up in short order. Personally, if this is the case, I think some government down the line will get back in the game - maybe SDSR 20 or 25 but obviously, we will be starting from scratch. Hence my view that it wouldn't be critical to delay another 5 or 10 years but we would miss a massive trick - and as you well know, it could take a decade or more after IOC for maritime aircrew generated from scratch to get anywhere close to the 'lost' experience.
Individuals like me who bang the table justifying the need for an MPA aren't stuck in a Nimrod time warp. All off us accept that is history and have moved on. We make a noise because we believe the UK badly needs an MPA full stop.
No getting away from the financial reality though, so despite many of us being optimistic, it really is a big unknown....
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^^ Good post...
My view (which is not based current knowledge), I freely admit.
I don't know if we will get an MPA/MMA this year. On the one hand, I cannot see where the money is coming from (I hate it when people bang on about overseas aid, NHS waste etc...it is so distracting and irrelevant). On the other hand, people in high places do weird, unexpected and unpredictable things. The case for a the capability is rock solid; even more because we are intent on maintaining a broad range of maritime capabilities by building the carriers - maybe that will win the day.
So I just don't know.
But unlike PA, I think this year is the end game.
2015 we have an election, an SDSR and it is five years since we last few on ops.
Bringing the capability back is ever more logistically and financially difficult. If it is passed up this time, when do we look again...2020? how on earth do you counter the argument in 2020..."well we've done without for 10 years, why do we need it now", when restoring it in 10 years would take a massive chunk out of an ever diminishing defence budget.
Fingers crossed
My view (which is not based current knowledge), I freely admit.
I don't know if we will get an MPA/MMA this year. On the one hand, I cannot see where the money is coming from (I hate it when people bang on about overseas aid, NHS waste etc...it is so distracting and irrelevant). On the other hand, people in high places do weird, unexpected and unpredictable things. The case for a the capability is rock solid; even more because we are intent on maintaining a broad range of maritime capabilities by building the carriers - maybe that will win the day.
So I just don't know.
But unlike PA, I think this year is the end game.
2015 we have an election, an SDSR and it is five years since we last few on ops.
Bringing the capability back is ever more logistically and financially difficult. If it is passed up this time, when do we look again...2020? how on earth do you counter the argument in 2020..."well we've done without for 10 years, why do we need it now", when restoring it in 10 years would take a massive chunk out of an ever diminishing defence budget.
Fingers crossed
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I still struggle to comprehend how the government of an island nation thinks that, whilst it is essential to investigate air incursions in our AOR, there is no immediate requirement to investigate surface/subsurface incursions - other than by FRE or allies. At least Seedcorn pers are retaining the skills required to start over; as long as it's done soon. Of course, the RN could also support MPA ops, but I think that they are likely to find manning to aircraft carriers difficult.
Duncs
Duncs
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What I struggle with is the Governments position off "MPA/ MMA regeneration will be a matter for SDSR 2015".
Yet over the last couple of years we are constantly drip fed news of new contracts, new orders for equipment and decisions to reverse certain SDSR 2010 findings.
For example, the decision to operate the second carrier, Order of 3 OPVs, New Radar and missile defence systems for the Falklands, Billion pound deals to supply the Army with new armoured vehicles, Extending Tornado etc. Huge strategic decisions.
Unfortunately emerging threats do not coincide with 5 year reviews. If there is a threat and there is, it should be acted upon and not allowed to develop into a crisis because of a "political calendar".
Yet over the last couple of years we are constantly drip fed news of new contracts, new orders for equipment and decisions to reverse certain SDSR 2010 findings.
For example, the decision to operate the second carrier, Order of 3 OPVs, New Radar and missile defence systems for the Falklands, Billion pound deals to supply the Army with new armoured vehicles, Extending Tornado etc. Huge strategic decisions.
Unfortunately emerging threats do not coincide with 5 year reviews. If there is a threat and there is, it should be acted upon and not allowed to develop into a crisis because of a "political calendar".
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Harry, What about some new kit from South Korea with a new coat of paint. They didn't give a hoot about British Industry when they ordered these bad boys in 2012.
Britain?s Tide Class: Supplies are From MARS
Worthy of reading is the section covering
Feb 27/12: Controversy.
BAE yet again admitting to be clueless.
Britain?s Tide Class: Supplies are From MARS
Worthy of reading is the section covering
Feb 27/12: Controversy.
BAE yet again admitting to be clueless.
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that was 2012.... and there is nowhere in the UK that could build a boat like that at any comparative cost - or at all
"BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK."
there is absolutely nothing they could use as a guideline - anyone know when the last one was built in the UK? Most closed in 1988-1993
"BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK."
there is absolutely nothing they could use as a guideline - anyone know when the last one was built in the UK? Most closed in 1988-1993
Apologies in advance for thread drift....
The reason they didn't "give a hoot" about British industry was partly that at the time, the Maritime Industrial Strategy (brainchild of Lord Drayson and his preferred RAND consultant, the wonderfully named Hans Pung) had forced the UK shipbuilding industry to merge/consolidate such that the capacity was sized to build QEC, followed by a steady drumbeat of warships (frigates - FSC/T26 and MHPC), with the occasional biggie thrown in at predictable times a long way downstream. This was the basis behind the TOBA between BAES and the MoD.
The implied assumption throughout the mid-noughties (endorsed by the pollies, MoD and industry), was that you sized the UK shipbuilding capacity to fit the predicted MoD demand for warships and complex auxiliaries. Simple auxiliaries (like tankers, which are primarily a steel box, with a heavily outfitted @rse-end) would go offshore. This was coloured by the experience with the two Waves bought off BAE at the turn of the century for about £150M each.
It took the MoD (specifically the EC(DSR) in town and the DE&S boys) about four years to work out that :
1. There wasn't a suitable OTS ship to meet the requirement (primarily capacity)
2. You couldn't convert a commercial tanker design to meet the requirement (speed, aviation facilities, mil comms and self defence and consequent accommodation demand)
3. You needed to get a competent consultant to design what you wanted and then get a shipyard that was ruthlessly efficient to build the basic ship design, get it to the UK and fit any sensitive bits to it there.
What all this meant was that when MARS tanker was planned and profiled, there was no (recognised) UK capacity to build them (BAES being toppers with carriers). Arguably, A&P Tyne could have had a go as their carrier work wound down, as could Cammell Laird, but neither organisation had built a ship in the last thirty years, so risk through the roof. Mr Harland & Wolff had divested much of his build capacity (vice ship repair) so would have been similarly risky.
Oh and there was no money.
As it turned out, T26 is delayed, which means there's a gap in the steel fabrication demand (see the three OPV for £350M to see how it was filled), which could (only with hindsight) have been used to build a tanker or two. But by then the decision had been made and frankly it would have been painfully expensive.
Thankfully, that competent consultant (BMT DSL) stuck at the task, despite (in fairness to MoD) the funding being continuously deferred to meet the defence main effort and eventually the right result was achieved.
One hopes the same is achieved for MPA....
Thread drift off.
The reason they didn't "give a hoot" about British industry was partly that at the time, the Maritime Industrial Strategy (brainchild of Lord Drayson and his preferred RAND consultant, the wonderfully named Hans Pung) had forced the UK shipbuilding industry to merge/consolidate such that the capacity was sized to build QEC, followed by a steady drumbeat of warships (frigates - FSC/T26 and MHPC), with the occasional biggie thrown in at predictable times a long way downstream. This was the basis behind the TOBA between BAES and the MoD.
The implied assumption throughout the mid-noughties (endorsed by the pollies, MoD and industry), was that you sized the UK shipbuilding capacity to fit the predicted MoD demand for warships and complex auxiliaries. Simple auxiliaries (like tankers, which are primarily a steel box, with a heavily outfitted @rse-end) would go offshore. This was coloured by the experience with the two Waves bought off BAE at the turn of the century for about £150M each.
It took the MoD (specifically the EC(DSR) in town and the DE&S boys) about four years to work out that :
1. There wasn't a suitable OTS ship to meet the requirement (primarily capacity)
2. You couldn't convert a commercial tanker design to meet the requirement (speed, aviation facilities, mil comms and self defence and consequent accommodation demand)
3. You needed to get a competent consultant to design what you wanted and then get a shipyard that was ruthlessly efficient to build the basic ship design, get it to the UK and fit any sensitive bits to it there.
What all this meant was that when MARS tanker was planned and profiled, there was no (recognised) UK capacity to build them (BAES being toppers with carriers). Arguably, A&P Tyne could have had a go as their carrier work wound down, as could Cammell Laird, but neither organisation had built a ship in the last thirty years, so risk through the roof. Mr Harland & Wolff had divested much of his build capacity (vice ship repair) so would have been similarly risky.
Oh and there was no money.
As it turned out, T26 is delayed, which means there's a gap in the steel fabrication demand (see the three OPV for £350M to see how it was filled), which could (only with hindsight) have been used to build a tanker or two. But by then the decision had been made and frankly it would have been painfully expensive.
Thankfully, that competent consultant (BMT DSL) stuck at the task, despite (in fairness to MoD) the funding being continuously deferred to meet the defence main effort and eventually the right result was achieved.
One hopes the same is achieved for MPA....
Thread drift off.
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Thanks Not a Boffin.
"BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK." there is absolutely nothing they could use as a guideline"
But they are building carriers with nothing to use as a guidline !
Back to my main point. Between SDSR 2010 and SDSR 2015/6 there has been, despite a percieved lack of cash, some big ticket items bought from UK and from foreign nations. I scratch my head wondering why is MMA/MPA such a sacred cow for 2015 when its universally agreed that we need one now.
Easy answer is, that its because it is not going to happen.
"BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK." there is absolutely nothing they could use as a guideline"
But they are building carriers with nothing to use as a guidline !
Back to my main point. Between SDSR 2010 and SDSR 2015/6 there has been, despite a percieved lack of cash, some big ticket items bought from UK and from foreign nations. I scratch my head wondering why is MMA/MPA such a sacred cow for 2015 when its universally agreed that we need one now.
Easy answer is, that its because it is not going to happen.
"BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK." there is absolutely nothing they could use as a guideline"
But they are building carriers with nothing to use as a guidline !
But they are building carriers with nothing to use as a guidline !
The second isn't exactly true. The carriers are "just" complex warships (hoofing big ones to be sure) for which they've got plenty of estimating rates. There's nothing inherently different about them (other than size) compared to T45 for example.
"BAE has said that they don’t know the exact cost of building such a ship in the UK."
To be absolutely fair to both parties (BAeS and MoD), this month is the 27th anniversary of the last time it was MoD Air Systems policy to know the "fair and reasonable" cost of anything, followed swiftly by the policy of the Services not quantifying a requirement. Some did it, others didn't; the point is it was no longer deemed necessary. If you don't quantify, you can't cost. I have a very good friend in DE&S who is a 1 Star and nearing retirement. He cannot remember these old policies. What chance do newer recruits have? They have my sympathy.
Bannock,
Maybe part of the reason why MPA/MMA is such a sacred cow for 2015 is the political aspect, which includes avoiding providing the opposition with ready ammunition.
The MRA4 will have been scrapped by the 2010-2015 government, which provided the arguments as to why this could happen. It will be a different government, the 2015-2020 one, that restores (maybe?) the capability. Thus potentially avoiding accusations of a U-turn?
Just a thought.
Maybe part of the reason why MPA/MMA is such a sacred cow for 2015 is the political aspect, which includes avoiding providing the opposition with ready ammunition.
The MRA4 will have been scrapped by the 2010-2015 government, which provided the arguments as to why this could happen. It will be a different government, the 2015-2020 one, that restores (maybe?) the capability. Thus potentially avoiding accusations of a U-turn?
Just a thought.
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Biggus, you have used two words which sum up the issue with MPA - "the capability". SDSR took a policy decision to remove the FW MPA capability. It stated that the capability could be provided by other mean, including using Allied assets.
To re-instate the FW (or quick reaction long endurance) capability a policy decision will need to be made via SDR 2015/16. There appears to be no other mechanism than this.
To re-instate the FW (or quick reaction long endurance) capability a policy decision will need to be made via SDR 2015/16. There appears to be no other mechanism than this.
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Exactly,
To often to mention the focus on here has been on the aircraft, and not the manpower (manpower measured & costed in establishment posts). The removal of the capability enabled a sizable force reduction (again, measured in established posts). Reversing that would be a pretty big deal and would only come at the cost of significant pain elsewhere in the RAF (or maybe RN).
Removing a capability is an SDSR level decision, and the same sort of mechanism is needed to restore it. Unless a real shooting match kicks off, of course.
To often to mention the focus on here has been on the aircraft, and not the manpower (manpower measured & costed in establishment posts). The removal of the capability enabled a sizable force reduction (again, measured in established posts). Reversing that would be a pretty big deal and would only come at the cost of significant pain elsewhere in the RAF (or maybe RN).
Removing a capability is an SDSR level decision, and the same sort of mechanism is needed to restore it. Unless a real shooting match kicks off, of course.
Bismarck
Not strictly true. It said that they had elected not bring the MRA4 into service. It then waffled on about how other assets would mitigate the gap in the required capability - anyone who really knew, knew that there wasn't any realistic way of mitigating the capability gap. Still never let the truth get in the way of the MoD spin machine. I see they are still trotting out the same hackneyed line every time some foreign MPA arrive at Lossiemouth outside of a major exercise!
SDSR took a policy decision to remove the FW MPA capability. It stated that the capability could be provided by other mean, including using Allied assets.
Not strictly true. It said that they had elected not bring the MRA4 into service.
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Like a lot of ex kipper fleet I followed this saga very closely at the time. I can tell you with absolute certainty that the "issues" with the MRA4 and the actual "redundancy", or lack of priority, of the capability (as perceived by some) were both factors in the decision. Or put another way, even if the MRA4 was perfect, the capability was in the firing line anyway. I have no idea which factor was the primary or what timeline was in play - does it in anyway matter????
This was reflected afterwards by Liam Fox in his frequently conflicting statements. He said on a number of occasions the capability was not needed (or could be covered by other assets). He called it a "cold war" capability in one article. But he also said the MRA4 was fatally flawed and blamed that too, when it suited him.
Anyway, this is pretty moot now. My view is it will take an SDSR to get it back - I could easily be wrong, but that's how I see it.
This was reflected afterwards by Liam Fox in his frequently conflicting statements. He said on a number of occasions the capability was not needed (or could be covered by other assets). He called it a "cold war" capability in one article. But he also said the MRA4 was fatally flawed and blamed that too, when it suited him.
Anyway, this is pretty moot now. My view is it will take an SDSR to get it back - I could easily be wrong, but that's how I see it.