Two Generals now looking for employment.
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West Coast
And under estimating the enemy.
I think I saw a quote where one person said the Taliban got a "Lucky Break".
Well if we train our troops to conduct raids behind enemy lines,
why can't the enemy ?
And under estimating the enemy.
I think I saw a quote where one person said the Taliban got a "Lucky Break".
Well if we train our troops to conduct raids behind enemy lines,
why can't the enemy ?
It is interesting to compare the handling of this incident to how the aftermath of the 1998 Cavalese disaster was handled (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavales...disaster_(1998))
I applaud the changes in USMC leadership that have evidently taken place over the past decade.
I applaud the changes in USMC leadership that have evidently taken place over the past decade.
"How MOD penny pinching led to disaster"
I know it has already been alluded to about the UK being responsible for FP etc, but it looks like the Independent has picked up on that very point and is conducting its own investigation:
Exclusive: Revealed - how Ministry of Defence penny-pinching led to disaster - Home News - UK - The Independent
If correct, it makes for some uncomfortable reading, and if correct, maybe this is the kick up the arse the UK needed for someone somewhere to realise that value and price are 2 different things and that in war, price should not necessarily be the over riding factor.
That said, I very much doubt that anybody on the UK side will be held to account, especially if the decision was taken by a bean counter or a VSO who has since been promoted:
Just what will it take for the military to be funded correctly and interference by beancounters and policy types with little knowledge and even less understanding to butt out of things they clearly don't understand?
Exclusive: Revealed - how Ministry of Defence penny-pinching led to disaster - Home News - UK - The Independent
If correct, it makes for some uncomfortable reading, and if correct, maybe this is the kick up the arse the UK needed for someone somewhere to realise that value and price are 2 different things and that in war, price should not necessarily be the over riding factor.
That said, I very much doubt that anybody on the UK side will be held to account, especially if the decision was taken by a bean counter or a VSO who has since been promoted:
In response to the report, an MoD spokesman said that it would be looking into the US report’s conclusions ... The US review was intended to examine US actions only and not those of coalition forces. However, the UK will consider the findings of this review to confirm our earlier assessment that no further UK action is required.
Tonight the MoD was urged to investigate the actions of British officers, with political and military figures insisting that the commanders of the base share the blame for the security lapses.
...security at the base was in fact the responsibility of British officers, some of whom have since been promoted.
Maj-Gen Gurganus’s former deputy, Stuart Skeates CBE – who was awarded a Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service in the operational honours announced yesterday – has been elevated from brigadier to major-general and is now the Commandant of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Jeff Portlock, the Bastion base commander on the night of the attack, has been promoted from group captain to Air Commodore.
Maj-Gen Gurganus’s former deputy, Stuart Skeates CBE – who was awarded a Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service in the operational honours announced yesterday – has been elevated from brigadier to major-general and is now the Commandant of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Jeff Portlock, the Bastion base commander on the night of the attack, has been promoted from group captain to Air Commodore.
"If British commanders were culpable then, like their American counterparts, I would expect disciplinary action to be taken. Questions do need to be answered."
It's good to know the purse-string-holding political figures insist that the commanders at the base get the blame. Perhaps they were expecting these officers to fund the FP from their own pocket?
Roland,
You tell us what you think about the causes for the Tower being unmanned then preach to us.
My money is it became a routine and the Taliban tweaked.....and thus used that point for entry as they knew it to be a weak point.
One does not have to attend the Base to understand the benefit of aggressive Patrolling in preventing attacks by the bad guys on fixed defenses. That is a concept taught at every level of Infantry training or physical security school.
Pinkerton rent-a-cops get that taught to them so why would the British/American/Tongan/Afghanistan forces assigned to defend the Base not adhere to that policy?
Large bases are hard to protect....but then does that come as a surprise to anyone....or should it be a surprise as it seemed to have been?
Excuses don't cut it in combat.....there is no "Try"....either you do or you do not.
Failing to do right gets people killed.
You tell us what you think about the causes for the Tower being unmanned then preach to us.
My money is it became a routine and the Taliban tweaked.....and thus used that point for entry as they knew it to be a weak point.
One does not have to attend the Base to understand the benefit of aggressive Patrolling in preventing attacks by the bad guys on fixed defenses. That is a concept taught at every level of Infantry training or physical security school.
Pinkerton rent-a-cops get that taught to them so why would the British/American/Tongan/Afghanistan forces assigned to defend the Base not adhere to that policy?
Large bases are hard to protect....but then does that come as a surprise to anyone....or should it be a surprise as it seemed to have been?
Excuses don't cut it in combat.....there is no "Try"....either you do or you do not.
Failing to do right gets people killed.
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SASless,
Sorry mate - the 'policy' of aggressive patrolling and fully layered defences was in place - but it is a big base with a huge perimeter. When you look at the 1,000s of square kms around the base that need to be dominated, we could pour wing after wing of FP troops into theatre and still have had the same result. I am reminded of the phrase that we have to get lucky every time, the enemy only once.
I'm confident that appropriate requests for increases in force concentration were made, but these were not upheld - the guys on the ground have to live with the risk factors which are present, the grown ups higher in the food chain have to live with their conscience if things go wrong on their shift. Sadly, the guys in the field are easily identified, the grey men in the out of theater command chain (including the civil servants and NATO civilian accounting officers) can slope off into the shadows when the chips are down. Life was ever such.
As for the smoke and mirrors diversion about a flight line fence, a fence is just a delineating feature. Unless it is covered by observation and fire, an obstacle isn't an obstacle - surely something taught at 'every Infantry training or physical security school'?
HD
Sorry mate - the 'policy' of aggressive patrolling and fully layered defences was in place - but it is a big base with a huge perimeter. When you look at the 1,000s of square kms around the base that need to be dominated, we could pour wing after wing of FP troops into theatre and still have had the same result. I am reminded of the phrase that we have to get lucky every time, the enemy only once.
I'm confident that appropriate requests for increases in force concentration were made, but these were not upheld - the guys on the ground have to live with the risk factors which are present, the grown ups higher in the food chain have to live with their conscience if things go wrong on their shift. Sadly, the guys in the field are easily identified, the grey men in the out of theater command chain (including the civil servants and NATO civilian accounting officers) can slope off into the shadows when the chips are down. Life was ever such.
As for the smoke and mirrors diversion about a flight line fence, a fence is just a delineating feature. Unless it is covered by observation and fire, an obstacle isn't an obstacle - surely something taught at 'every Infantry training or physical security school'?
HD
dervish:-
Indeed, and in every instance portrayed as a one-off! It is high time that the MOD's "stove-piping" of repeated instances of financial savings causing loss of life be seen for what it is, Gross Negligence at the highest levels of command.
Whether it be Bowman, Trabant, Flak Jackets, Chinooks, Nimrods, Hercules, Tornado, or whatever, many have died because of the Gross Incompetence of a few. The MOD is Unfit for Purpose, and nothing short of its total reform will change that. In the meantime Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation should be moved outwith the MOD and independent of it, and of each other. That at least could start to stem such avoidable losses suffered by the Armed Forces, whether they be at peace or war.
Savings at the expense of safety. I've heard that one before somewhere.........
Whether it be Bowman, Trabant, Flak Jackets, Chinooks, Nimrods, Hercules, Tornado, or whatever, many have died because of the Gross Incompetence of a few. The MOD is Unfit for Purpose, and nothing short of its total reform will change that. In the meantime Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation should be moved outwith the MOD and independent of it, and of each other. That at least could start to stem such avoidable losses suffered by the Armed Forces, whether they be at peace or war.
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The Independent article contains the phrase (much discussed in other media) that:
"The attack in September saw 15 Taliban fighters dressed in American uniforms walk past an unmanned watch tower"
This reads as if there was a decision not to man the tower in question which left sections of the wire unobserved. If this was true then one might conclude that this was an unacceptable risk taken by commanders against the insurgent threat faced. However, if the towers chosen by those commanders to be manned were sufficient to provide uninterrupted continuous observation of the perimeter fence one would need to consider whether the sentries did not observe the incursion due to a human factor - whether blameworthy or otherwise. In any case perhaps there are degrees of complexity that might reasonably be left to those with all the facts – this is a rumour site but people’s names are in public here and we are normally rightly sensitive about speculation in such cases.
"The attack in September saw 15 Taliban fighters dressed in American uniforms walk past an unmanned watch tower"
This reads as if there was a decision not to man the tower in question which left sections of the wire unobserved. If this was true then one might conclude that this was an unacceptable risk taken by commanders against the insurgent threat faced. However, if the towers chosen by those commanders to be manned were sufficient to provide uninterrupted continuous observation of the perimeter fence one would need to consider whether the sentries did not observe the incursion due to a human factor - whether blameworthy or otherwise. In any case perhaps there are degrees of complexity that might reasonably be left to those with all the facts – this is a rumour site but people’s names are in public here and we are normally rightly sensitive about speculation in such cases.
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The report is comprehensive but still leaves some questions unanswered, one amongst all others for me. The report is written with the certain knolwedge that an attack took place that could be judged succesful (by Taliban standards, not by coalition standards, I am sure that we would't have accepted the odds offered).
If the total force size is set and commanders are left with the task of balancing risks against resources then what would have happened if the generals had rebalanced towards FP of Bastion and an attack had not occured, but there was an increased loss of life in Task Force Helmand/ Task Force Leatherneck AORs because the force density was reduced there? Hindsight is a wonderful tool but I would contend that the issues here are far from black and white.
If the total force size is set and commanders are left with the task of balancing risks against resources then what would have happened if the generals had rebalanced towards FP of Bastion and an attack had not occured, but there was an increased loss of life in Task Force Helmand/ Task Force Leatherneck AORs because the force density was reduced there? Hindsight is a wonderful tool but I would contend that the issues here are far from black and white.
When you look at the 1,000s of square kms around the base that need to be dominated,
Unsuccessful Raid.....six Harriers destroyed and several other aircraft damaged.....a PR Victory to boot? I would suggest that was a very successful raid. The Taliban are not bothered greatly about losses so that doesn't figure much into the equation.
By all accounts Maj Gen Studevent was a good all-round egg And thought highly of the RAF and the RAF Regiment in particular. He was also a guest speaker at Last years'CAS/RUSI Air Power Conference in London.
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SASless et al,
I can't get the CentCom link to work, so appologies if this is not relevant. Just to add some context, I would like to make the following observations:
1. The Towers date from the early days of Bastion and did not reflect the expanded fence line. So much so that several were demolished during the building of the new runway and others were a considerable distance inside the fence line.
2. Having helped host the Tongans when they arrived they were highly disciplined, extremely competent and a significant number had served in Iraq. They were, in one Army colleges words "as hard as a Wood Peckers' lips..". Unfortunately there was only 55 of them.
3. Due to the Theatre cap, the rest of the UK guarding was an unestablished commitment spread across the permenant garrison (with a few exceptions such as medics).
4. Having made numerous visits to Leatherneck it was clear that the Marines had fortified the place ready for another Khe Sahn and then manned the various watch towers according to the perceived threat.
5. Although Bastion was built in the middle of the desert, it is neither flat nor uninhabited. The terrain to the north and east is low hills and deep gullies, so much so the amount of earth work required just to construct the new facilities was simply staggering. Also a civilian population has sprung up in the relatively secure shadow if the base; this includes "the King of Sh*t Creek" who, having monopolised the sewage output of the base had a thriving melon plantation (and no doubt lots of tommatoes).
6. The resident RAF Regiment Sqn's primary task was to sanitise the approach and departure footprints, which they did a bloody good job at. They were neither scaled or tasked with securing the entire AOR.
Please note that these observations date from the back end of 2010, so things will have no doubt changed.
I can't get the CentCom link to work, so appologies if this is not relevant. Just to add some context, I would like to make the following observations:
1. The Towers date from the early days of Bastion and did not reflect the expanded fence line. So much so that several were demolished during the building of the new runway and others were a considerable distance inside the fence line.
2. Having helped host the Tongans when they arrived they were highly disciplined, extremely competent and a significant number had served in Iraq. They were, in one Army colleges words "as hard as a Wood Peckers' lips..". Unfortunately there was only 55 of them.
3. Due to the Theatre cap, the rest of the UK guarding was an unestablished commitment spread across the permenant garrison (with a few exceptions such as medics).
4. Having made numerous visits to Leatherneck it was clear that the Marines had fortified the place ready for another Khe Sahn and then manned the various watch towers according to the perceived threat.
5. Although Bastion was built in the middle of the desert, it is neither flat nor uninhabited. The terrain to the north and east is low hills and deep gullies, so much so the amount of earth work required just to construct the new facilities was simply staggering. Also a civilian population has sprung up in the relatively secure shadow if the base; this includes "the King of Sh*t Creek" who, having monopolised the sewage output of the base had a thriving melon plantation (and no doubt lots of tommatoes).
6. The resident RAF Regiment Sqn's primary task was to sanitise the approach and departure footprints, which they did a bloody good job at. They were neither scaled or tasked with securing the entire AOR.
Please note that these observations date from the back end of 2010, so things will have no doubt changed.
Wallah,
Try the following USMC link. There is an Executive Summary.
CENTCOM 15-6 Executive Summary
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/...%20Summary.pdf
From
Read Camp Bastion Attack Investigation Documents > Headquarters Marine Corps > News Article Display
Try the following USMC link. There is an Executive Summary.
CENTCOM 15-6 Executive Summary
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/...%20Summary.pdf
From
Read Camp Bastion Attack Investigation Documents > Headquarters Marine Corps > News Article Display
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Thanks for that, the situation seems to have been pretty much unchanged from my time (though the Jordanians etc weren't present then). If I may, I would just offer the following:
1. There was a Major Incident Plan in place in 2010 (I wrote the Aircraft Accident Annex). Certainly my Annex was a joint document and we table topped various scenarios with the USMC. I even had a Marine Capt liaison officer working for me in Air Ops.
2. Contractor security and vetting was always a problem and one which nobody really wanted to grip. It reached farcical proportions when an attempt was made to get Air Traffic Control to vet them and issue an Air Side permit, on the principle they had to drive around the airfield to get to the construction site. ATC was promptly inundated by thousands of applications, most of whom could not speak English. We eventually got this turned off but it was not satisfactorily resolved during my stint.
3. The Jan 11 MOU essentially formalised the status quo. Leatherneck and Shorabak were essentially separate, self contained, autonomous camps. I suspect that the greatest level of cooperation was on the ATC / Airfield Ops side (which worked very well).
As always, my comments are caveated that I am a mere Ops Wallah and not a FP guru.
1. There was a Major Incident Plan in place in 2010 (I wrote the Aircraft Accident Annex). Certainly my Annex was a joint document and we table topped various scenarios with the USMC. I even had a Marine Capt liaison officer working for me in Air Ops.
2. Contractor security and vetting was always a problem and one which nobody really wanted to grip. It reached farcical proportions when an attempt was made to get Air Traffic Control to vet them and issue an Air Side permit, on the principle they had to drive around the airfield to get to the construction site. ATC was promptly inundated by thousands of applications, most of whom could not speak English. We eventually got this turned off but it was not satisfactorily resolved during my stint.
3. The Jan 11 MOU essentially formalised the status quo. Leatherneck and Shorabak were essentially separate, self contained, autonomous camps. I suspect that the greatest level of cooperation was on the ATC / Airfield Ops side (which worked very well).
As always, my comments are caveated that I am a mere Ops Wallah and not a FP guru.