BOI into the 2012 Tornado Collision over the Moray Firth

[Fox3WheresMyBanana]

Forgive my lack of clarity; that's what I meant - it would be given to SLOps to work out such procedures, not that it was SLOps fault.

Fox3 has visions of the SLOps' he has known making little Fox3 clay figures and
JABBING
BIG
PINS
IN!

[tucumseh]

I'm afraid family business diverts me, but my impression of some recent posts is that too many believe all this was a revelation to the MAA/MoD, so pre-2010 can just be ignored. This ongoing deceit taints everything the MAA does.

I also outlined in simple terms the process by which one can mitigate such risks, even in the face of rejection by higher committee. I imagine this did not go down well in MAA/MoD, because it goes against the notion, repeated above, that transference of risk to the SofS or a more senior rank/grade somehow absolves the junior of any obligation. One has an over-riding duty of care. Key staffs at a junior level (not a contradiction!) also have it written in to their Terms of Reference that they can over-rule such decisions using "engineering judgement" - especially if it mitigates Operational Constraints. Again, MAA/MoD don't like hearing this. Also, mandated regs require Industry appointees to initiate action, and they are given financial delegation to empower them. Not applicable in this case as the solution was already known, but the principle stands. MAA/MoD don't like this either. This attitude militates against the system working as intended.

Nor has the concept of "reasonable" time to mitigate before the clock runs on litigation been mentioned. That becomes a risk in itself, and potential mitigation includes getting off your ar*e and doing it yourself, if you know the solution - regardless of higher ups. In 1994 I was faced with precisely such a critical safety constraint/risk and took legal advice. The concept was well understood then, the advice was good, I progressed mitigation despite being told not to, and it was in-service in early 1996. My point is, this is not rocket science (it is a basic competence) and simply note this happened to me at the same time CWS was being progressed under a Technology Demonstrator Programme. The Submission to OR(RAF) in 1998 that Distant Voice speaks of was rejected; and at that point the time factor became "unreasonable". In the Risk Register, there should be at least one annual entry in each risk history, outlining who made the annual LTC bids and who rejected the programme, yet again.


By the way, having read the 1998 Submission, DDOR1(RAF) staff did a cracking job from 1991-96. But the Submission, and the completed work it describes (i.e. good to go for production in 1996), also make clear that the Tornado project office in MoD(PE) and support office at Wyton (?) would have been fully aware of events. It would be in their Risk Register, and a back up plan would (should) be in place that would be something along the lines I described above. Especially as further Development was minor, which is always a risk. CWS had been fully trialled and deemed acceptable by 1996. That mitigated most major procurement risks. Again, don't be taken in by the brief to Hammond (which must have involved the MAA), when in December 2013 he claimed CWS could not have been in Tornado in July 2012.

Fox3 - excellent posts.

[Easy Street]

DV,

Considering that a Cat C airprox is defined by the UK Airprox Board as one in which 'No risk of collision existed', I am certain that both MoD and MAA would consider the risk associated with that event both Tolerable and ALARP. Indeed, until 3 years ago, Cat C was also assigned to airproxes which the board considered to be 'non-events' (Cat E was only introduced in 2011). The Tornado mid-air collision risk is broken into three categories, Mil-Mil, Mil-GA and Mil-CAT, and Mil-CAT is considered the most unlikely. One very good reason for this is that CAT aircraft are all equipped with TCAS and at least one member of a Tornado formation will always be wearing a Mode 3/C squawk. If the analysis was being done purely on Mil-CAT collisions, there would be absolutely no case for fitment of CWS to Tornado. CWS is being fitted to address the Mil-Mil and Mil-GA risks, of which the former is (no surprise) the most likely.

To further illustrate how unreasonable it would be to ground the Tornado fleet for lack of a CWS, just consider what other mid-air collision mitigations must have already been discounted in reaching the current declaration of ALARP. For example, the ODH could insist that all Tornado flying be conducted under Instrument Flight Rules and ban autonomous low flying, while requiring the aircraft to be in continuous receipt of a Radar-based air traffic service. That would eliminate the mid-air collision risk almost at a stroke. But, it is not considered reasonably practicable, given the need for operational training to maintain readiness for the aircraft's declared roles (although training for low-intensity operations could probably take place under such constraints). Despite the impracticality, you can be totally assured that such a step would be taken in preference to grounding the fleet. Your suggestion that grounding is the only thing that would make the risk ALARP is totally unrealistic.

Your comparison with the Nimrod fuel system risk is also inappropriate; that risk arose from a physical characteristic of the airframe, and modification was the only possible fix. However, CWS is not the only mitigation to the mid-air collision risk. If the programme failed tomorrow, alternative steps could be taken to keep the risk below the tolerability threshold. Nimrod didn't have that luxury.

I also outlined in simple terms the process by which one can mitigate such risks, even in the face of rejection by higher committee. I imagine this did not go down well in MAA/MoD, because it goes against the notion, repeated above, that transference of risk to the SofS or a more senior rank/grade somehow absolves the junior of any obligation. One has an over-riding duty of care.

tuc, that's all very well when it comes to implementing safety-enhancing modifications. It doesn't read across to the sphere of operations, though. Otherwise, what is the point of a system of risk escalation? When a DDH has applied all reasonably practicable mitigations to an operating risk, but it is still too much for him to bear, he escalates it to the ODH. If the ODH is allowed to tolerate the risk, he can sign as saying so and operations can continue. That process is entirely pointless if the DDH then says "well it's still above my risk threshold, so I'm stopping anyway". Instead, the DDH carries on operating under the ODH's 'top cover', while applying whatever mitigations he can to keep the risk to a reasonably practicable minimum. Which, effectively, is what your junior engineer was doing when unilaterally applying safety enhancements.

[Growbag]

Not quite true Easy. The CWS is being fitted as mitigation for all MAC risks. Cat A airproxes have occurred with CAT, whether they had TCAS or not, and whether the Mil ac has been squawking or not. The likelihood of the occurrence is of course a factor, but a large part of the impetus of the programme being re-instated came from the societal risk of a Mil-Cat collision and the asymmetric response that it could create. Mil-Mil (and the sub-sections within that category) are more likely due to more flights taking place in uncontrolled airspace, but with air congestion and fast/pointy aircraft operating close to busy controlled airspace, airproxes and the possibility of MAC exist and happen with increasing regularity. The Cost Benefit Analysis of CWS vs CAT would probably concur with your view that "there would be absolutely no case for the fitment of CWS", but the reality of the situation was that this spectre was the reason it was reinstated after the SDSR.

[Cows getting bigger]

Are we losing the plot, just a little bit? If the GR4 warrants a CWS, why doesn't every other aircraft out there warrant the same?

I'm sat reading a report whereby four USAF personnel were wiped out in their MH60 having whacked into a flock of geese (http://www.usafe.af.mil/shared/media...140709-005.pdf). It seems to me that a fair bit of pragmatism has been applied in the report; they're not hunting down the MoD for the lack of accurate goose information. Alternatively, the Tornado mid-air almost goes as far as questioning the colour of ink used on the auth sheets.

Surely we need to strike a balance here? I'm all for safety management and hazard analyses but don't we need to question things when we get into Tippex sniffing, HSE mode?

[Easy Street]

Growbag,

All true. The 'societal risk' captures the need to be seen to do something, which is the unfortunate position we've got ourselves into.

CGB,

I'm not aware of any front-line combat aircraft having a CWS, and there are plenty out there with poorer cockpit visibility than the Tornado. However, 'no-one else has one' does't mean that it's impracticable to have one. I think the focus has fallen upon Tornado because it does a lot of flying at low level, without any kind of surveillance service, mixing with autonomous traffic, often at the lower end of VMC criteria, with the crew spending at least some of their lookout time ensuring they don't hit the ground. DG MAA seems to be trying his best in the Convening Authority comments to build a societal case for installation of CWS in Typhoon and F-35, but the different operating environments of those aircraft (much greater use of segregated airspace, under some kind of surveillance or control) mean that the risks do not read directly across from Tornado. Besides, if anyone thinks that it would be remotely practicable to install a CWS in Typhoon or F-35 at anything other than prohibitive cost, then please do tell how; perhaps you could apply the same techniques to installing the operational capabilities that we are paying through the nose for! I'm not aware of any stealthy TCAS antennae being available COTS, before anyone asks.

[salad-dodger]

All true. The 'societal risk' captures the need to be seen to do something, which is the unfortunate position we've got ourselves into.

You are wrong, however tongue in cheek you may be trying to be. Addressing a societal risk is not just about being seen to be doing something.

There are societal risks associated with nuclear power generation, bulk fuel storage, chemical plants etc. they don't just have to be seen to be doing something, they have to actually reduce the risk, often disproportionately so, because of the potential for wider damage to the industry.

So, should the worst occur, eg MAC with CAT then the RAF's (and other Mil aviation) freedom to operate and train within UK airspace would be massively reduced.

Not a difficult concept, just take off the blinkers and think about it.

S-D

[Easy Street]

S-D, yes, sorry for being tongue-in-cheek. ALARP still applies to societal risks, though, and I'm unconvinced that even the spectre of a Mil-CAT collision is enough to tip the scales of reasonability and practicality for installation of CWS to Typhoon and F-35. Even a podded solution would be likely to fall foul of the unbelievable timescales involved in systems integration on those platforms.

[Chugalug2]

Easy Street, please don't take offence, but I find that your ingenious arguments, for not doing this or questioning that, convince me of the need to remove such discussions from the deliberations of endless Whitehall meetings and place them in the hands of a body with the Authority to insist on the implementation of programmes, such as Military CWS, as and when deemed necessary. That would be the MAA, just as soon as they become an Authority that is.

It is all very well to say:-

if anyone thinks that it would be remotely practicable to install a CWS in Typhoon or F-35 at anything other than prohibitive cost, then please do tell how

Why not keep it simple? No bells or whistles, just an off the shelf TCAS would have prevented this accident, and would cover most other situations, with the exceptions of military formations and dynamic manoeuvres when the answer is probably to switch off all or some of the alerts.

CAT has managed the 100% fit required by the CAA, despite:-

much greater use of segregated airspace, under some kind of surveillance or control

So why can't UK Mil?

The real issue that I have with your position is that you proffer alternative scenarios of ever increasing unlikelihood in order to show that doing nothing is in comparison very reasonable and responsible. Thus was the Hercules refused ESF for decades until the inevitable (though no doubt 'highly unlikely') happened and ten people were killed.

Aircraft have been bumping into each other since the start of powered flight. We now have a very reliable system to stop it. Let's just be sensible and fit it to all our large and/or fast military aircraft.

[Distant Voice]

Why not keep it simple? No bells or whistles, just an off the shelf TCAS would have prevented this accident, and would cover most other situations, with the exceptions of military formations and dynamic manoeuvres when the answer is probably to switch off all or some of the alerts.

An off the shelf TCAS was available in 1991, but rejected as being unsuitable for FJ. Now, 23 years latter, we have decided to fit it (I think).

DV

[Easy Street]

Chug, I'm not arguing against installation of CWS in Tornado. I have been attempting to demonstrate why the risk is still considered tolerable and ALARP while the kit is under development, in response to DV's suggestions that it was not. I'm glad that CWS is being fitted and yes, there was a relatively easy (if sub-optimal) solution. If it's considered 'ingenious' to point out flaws of substance in DV's allegations of intolerability and non-ALARPness, would you instead prefer that we take decisions based purely on unsubstantiated statements of a somewhat headline-grabbing nature?

The point about F35 and Typhoon is that they operate in vastly different environments to Tornado. Not only that, they have better cockpit visibility and are both equipped with air-air radars and passive detection systems. They also fly proportionally fewer hours per crew due to advances in synthetic training (substantially so for F35). Now that doesn't mean that they shouldn't have CWS, but it does change the cost-benefit balance compared to the Tornado case. As for societal risk, how would MOD's reputation suffer if it became known that we, alone among F35 partner nations, had compromised the stealth characteristics of the aircraft by cutting holes for after-market TCAS? Besides, would that not make the aircraft unfit for its operational purpose, much like an ESF-less C130?

[tucumseh]

I have been attempting to demonstrate why the risk is still considered tolerable and ALARP while the kit is under development

Not applicable in this case, as that phase was completed in the 90s. Was it tolerable and ALARP during the 16 years the Requirement was, apparently, frozen through lack of action? You are compartmentalising the risks to the present day and current initiative to resurrect this old abandoned requirement. That is a typical MAA/MoD ploy and, yet again, seems to be related to the dogma that nothing went wrong pre-1998, and everything was wrong from 1998-2010. The very fact that many infinitely more complex risks were successfully mitigated with effortless competence in these periods is conveniently ignored, especially by the MAA. They never want to ask Why?

The argument presented in this case simply does not stand the legal test, because the “reasonable time” to install the kit was exceeded. By MoD’s own admission it was good to go in 1996. (Withholding this information from inquiries was a separate, illegal act). The risk may have been ”tolerable and ALARP” for, say, the 2 years necessary to launch procurement and begin embodiment; but the failure (flat refusal) to meet this obligation created other, equally critical, risks. (Corporate, Management, Financial etc.) While I acknowledge nothing is more critical than loss of life, the existence of and refusal to mitigate these other risks demonstrably led to other accidents and deaths. THEY are definitely not tolerable and ALARP. Risk Management rules demand one assesses these risks in the round.

The status of the risks associated with CWS itself changed as soon as it became obvious the “reasonable time” would be exceeded. The probability of the risk (not fitting CWS on time) occurring became 100% (obviously, in about 2000). In practice one gets a red flag in your Risk Register because “100%” is not an acceptable entry. If the probability is 100%, it is not a risk (in the sense it MUST be mitigated to below 100%; for example, by approving funding). It MUST be escalated; for example, the SofS would need to issue a formal statement that he accepted the consequences. Did he? Was he even advised? How one deals with that is dependent on many factors, but an utterly crucial formal ruling exists whereby the Chief of Defence Procurement AT THIS TIME (Sir Robert Walmsley) upheld the creation of 2nd and 3rd Risk Registers, progressively removing such embarrassing MoD-owned risks, thus concealing the facts from auditors and investigators. Various Ministers have stated they are content with this, which may be of interest to the “Missing Files” inquiry!

tuc, that's all very well when it comes to implementing safety-enhancing modifications. It doesn't read across to the sphere of operations, though. Otherwise, what is the point of a system of risk escalation? When a DDH has applied all reasonably practicable mitigations to an operating risk, but it is still too much for him to bear, he escalates it to the ODH. If the ODH is allowed to tolerate the risk, he can sign as saying so and operations can continue. That process is entirely pointless if the DDH then says "well it's still above my risk threshold, so I'm stopping anyway". Instead, the DDH carries on operating under the ODH's 'top cover', while applying whatever mitigations he can to keep the risk to a reasonably practicable minimum. Which, effectively, is what your junior engineer was doing when unilaterally applying safety enhancements.

Like the MAA/MoD (I know, because I’ve listened in despair at them making this mistake) you seem to confuse Attaining and Maintaining airworthiness, and Fitness for Purpose. I’m talking about the first two; you’re correct if addressing the last. But they (MAA/MoD) don’t have the luxury of despair.



The “Junior Engineer” I mentioned was a civilian Staff Officer grade (in his post, by definition an experienced Engineer), one below the minima required to enter MoD(PE), and was addressing Attaining and Maintaining, which would avoid problems at Front Line and the need for Commanders to consider FFP, except in cases of equipment failure or logistic breakdown. This last sentence, in it’s entirely, is an alien concept in today’s MoD, so I accept very few understand it! But understanding it and perhaps re-introducing the concept, would make the MAA/MoD’s job a lot easier; and I, certainly, would look more kindly upon them for at least trying.

[Chugalug2]

Easy, tuc has dealt with your attempted denunciation of DV's points far better than I could. So I merely add, "wot he said!".

how would MOD's reputation suffer

believe me, that is not a problem.

we, alone among F35 partner nations, had compromised the stealth characteristics of the aircraft by cutting holes for after-market TCAS?

Then don't cut holes, find another solution. Let the ingenuity be expended there instead of in endless years of not doing anything.

[Distant Voice]

It's totally irrelevant what the CAA or H-C matrices show. The Duty Holders are working to MAA regs, like them or not. CATASTROPHIC/REMOTE in the RA1210 matrix is a 'HIGH' risk which can be held by an ODH. The MAA's tolerability table in RA1210 makes reference only to annual probability of death; it's got nothing to do with individual incident outcomes

I should point out that prior to RA1210 (Pre 2011?) BP 1201 was the standard. Based on this document, which was in use by IPTs, the collision risk classification is UNACCEPTABLE [Intolerable]. So what has happened in order to make this risk Tolerable? - RA1201 has lowered the standard. What does the table mean by 1 in 1000? What units apply, man-year, flights, flying hours. Besides this table refers to the "overall Risk of Death from operating aircraft" not individual risks.

Another issue is that concerning the meaning of "Remote", which is an important parameter when classifying a risk. Have you any idea how the MAA came up with "Likely to occur one or more times in 10 years", an interpretation which is completely out of step with the general definition. Who in their right mind can believe that 120 Class A's an 18 collisions since the aircraft entered service is Remote. Occasional, the next level up, is more fitting. OR getting back to BP 1201, "Probable".

I am sure that all these issues will be cleared up by the FAI

DV

[tucumseh]

"Another issue is that concerning the meaning of "Remote", which is an important parameter when classifying a risk. Have you any idea how the MAA came up with "Likely to occur one or more times in 10 years", an interpretation which is completely out of step with the general definition. Who in their right mind can believe that 120 Class A's an 18 collisions since the aircraft entered service is Remote."

Absolutely right.

Also, one needs to understand inter-relationships and dependencies. My concern here is the recurring nature of risks and failures, and "stove-piping". An example;

Tornado ZG710 (Patriot shootdown) and the Sea King mid-air (same day in 2003) had a common factor - the same individuals refused to direct that the known and notified risks be mitigated. Their ethos and behaviour were major risks to MoD's Air Systems, not just individual platforms. The 2 Star involved also had management oversight responsibility for ensuring Nimrod MR2 was airworthy. Also, the MRA4 programme. And Chinook Mk3. (That's some track record and he was duly made CB).

Similarly, the same risk that came to fruition on ZG710 (increasing likelihood of friendly fire, caused by refusal to properly integrate failure warnings) was only mitigated on AEW Mk2 by ignoring direct orders to leave it unsafe. The IFF project office refused to make their system safe, making false declarations that it was. The AEW programme manager fixed his aircraft during the Mk7 programme, but the recommendation for a fleet inspection of Tornado was rejected by two 2 Stars; in 1998 and 2002. ZG710 proved they did nothing. Even after the senior Reviewing Officer DIRECTED it be made safe, they took no action for over 6 years. Yet a more complex fix in AEW took days.

So, the same risk was mitigated on one platform, but not on others. Was it in all applicable Risk Registers? No, only one. At higher levels, no action was taken, so the risk associated with their refusal to meet legal obligations remained - and remains, because the MAA/MoD know about it and continue to maintain nothing untoward occurred. In turn, THIS risk has been at the root of numerous other fatalities. Associated with this risk is that the senior ranks are permitted to judge their own case. These risks are enduring, and the probability of occurrence increases daily because the ethos is taught to all new generations.


Clearly, at some level, commonality exists between ZG710 and the Moray Forth mid-air, because the risks associated with this Corporate abrogation of responsibility, both on Tornado and in the wider MoD, still exist.


Please don't interpret this as the entire MAA/MoD being bad. Drawing up a simple family tree of all the accidents we discuss here quickly illustrates just a few common names. (And, by MoD's own admission, the same person notifying the risk!). It only needs one, especially if it is the one charged with oversight. Worse, if he happens to be mentor and patron of the dolt who regards functional safety as optional. Oh God, I'm back on the Wg Cdr Spry thread. Never mind six degrees of separation. Here there are three at most, between every accident.


Not one of the above issues has ever been acknowledged or investigated by MAA/MoD.

[Easy Street]

Originally Posted by tucumseh

Was it tolerable and ALARP during the 16 years the Requirement was, apparently, frozen through lack of action? You are compartmentalising the risks to the present day and current initiative to resurrect this old abandoned requirement

I've deliberately compartmentalised my arguments to the present day because the subject of my posts has been limited to the continued operation of the aircraft while integration and installation of the current incarnation of CWS is completed. I have not addressed the question of whether the risk was tolerable and ALARP from 1996-2012; indeed your evidence strongly suggests that it wasn't. As I've made clear, though, I consider it to have been tolerable and ALARP since the decision to reinstate the CWS programme. Whether or not the risk was ALARP during the 2000s is not relevant to its status today, given that we can't turn back the clock and retro-fit the system. The current duty holders can only play the cards they've been dealt.

[Chugalug2]

ES:-

Whether or not the risk was ALARP during the 2000s is not relevant to its status today, given that we can't turn back the clock and retro-fit the system. The current Duty Holders can only play the cards they've been dealt.

"Not me Chief, I'm airframes!"; your quote exactly encapsulates the other worldliness with which the MOD does Air Safety. The current duty holders are part of the same system that said in effect "No" repeatedly to CWS, and future Duty Holders will no doubt disassociate themselves from this one in turn when they say "No" to, for instance, all FJs being fitted with CWS.

It is the 'Stove Piping' that tuc mentions that is the most insidious part of the MOD machine. The same man can undermine the safety of different fleets, and thus be a threat to them all, but a subsequent fatal accident to one of them is dealt with in isolation, or at most seen as involving that fleet alone. The rest have to wait patiently for their 'remote' accidents to happen in turn. Predictable and predicted, but not at the MOD!

[tucumseh]

I've deliberately compartmentalised my arguments to the present day because the subject of my posts has been limited to the continued operation of the aircraft while integration and installation of the current incarnation of CWS is completed. I have not addressed the question of whether the risk was tolerable and ALARP from 1996-2012; indeed your evidence strongly suggests that it wasn't. As I've made clear, though, I consider it to have been tolerable and ALARP since the decision to reinstate the CWS programme. Whether or not the risk was ALARP during the 2000s is not relevant to its status today, given that we can't turn back the clock and retro-fit the system. The current duty holders can only play the cards they've been dealt.

Thank you Easy Street. But while I understand what you say, the danger is of being sucked in to the MAA/MoD dogma I mentioned, that Haddon-Cave handed them a huge “RESET” button which permits them to ignore everything that happened in the past. This would be an insult on so many levels, not least to those who perished.




I accept that, strictly speaking, the status of this specific risk has changed, and the Risk Register (if manipulated in a certain way) may cough out “Tolerable and ALARP”. But, as Distant Voice says, what criteria are used? Common sense (and mandated procedures in my day) says, given the history of repeated refusal to mitigate, one simply cannot reset to zero and say the same old risk mitigation plan WILL be effective. History shows the same plan was NOT effective (not least because of the MoD ethos that safety is optional and can be waived to save time and money). This ethos persists today, and MoD is quite happy to state this in writing (DE&S policy branch, to be precise). You cannot reset the probabilities of occurrence to the original figures. They MUST reflect history, trends and reality. Bluntly, they must reflect the fact that many senior staffs are hostile to what the project is trying to achieve. That alone would prevent Tolerable and ALARP. It is not As Low As Reasonably Practicable, because the same individuals are fighting against you, and they have a long and successful track record of winning and enjoying top level support. This may be in secondary or inter-related risks, but it MUST be there and linked to the main risk. All this would combine to push up the Risk Score. Also, the Project History Sheets (do they even exist?) must be referenced in the Risk Register. Not just the current "project", but the entire requirement. And not just referenced, but read and understood by all concerned. Perhaps more importantly, also understand how others have successfully fought your enemy off (e.g. the AEW example I quoted). And why they failed as well (e.g. Tornado/Patriot). The paper on that one case should be required reading for ALL in DE&S and MAA.




The elephant in the room is that MAA/MoD conveniently ignores that the causes and/or contributory factors in each of the many accidents we discuss here were predicted, predictable, notified and ignored. Ignored by the predecessors, mentors and tutors of those in charge today, who continue to protect them. This approach arises from the fact the MAA is built on two lies – that everything was fine until 1998 (Haddon-Cave) and the regulations are rubbish (MAA/MoD). To admit either is wrong would be a major step forward. At the moment, the MAA is seen to tread water at best, because much of its effort concentrates on the regulations, not implementation. Yet again, we have in CWS an example disproving the first lie; and MAA seen to gloss over it.

So, I do not believe this long standing risk that is neither Tolerable nor ALARP, and has come to fruition (causing deaths), can be reset to Tolerable and ALARP just because MoD has been (reluctantly) forced to think about it by these deaths.


This is the worst kind of management artifice.



Again, a history lesson, which few in MoD know about. Distant Voice and Angus Robertson MP were lied to by MoD when seeking papers on this crash; as they have lied to everyone I know who asks such questions. (ASaC, Patriot, Chinook, Nimrod, C130 and so on). It should not take the persistence of a few retired old lags to force MoD in to accepting legal obligations, yet demonstrably that is what has happened. MoD would quite happily have done absolutely nothing in each case if they could have got away with it.

[Minnie Burner]

This is all navel-gazing bonkers.
How the hell did we cope 40 years ago when the RAF had more squadrons than it now has FJs?
By the way, Typhoon & Lightning II shouldn't need CWS: if they don't know where ever other b@stard* is they should be sent back to the factory for a refund.

*That's co-op & non co-op b@stards, squawkin' or otherwise.

[Sandy Parts]

"By the way, Typhoon & Lightning II shouldn't need CWS: if they don't know where ever other b@stard is they should be sent back to the factory for a refund." - love it
I'm sure the info will be onboard the a/c somewhere in one of the many 'systems' and can be displayed at the press of a switch. However, will the 'operator' be able to assimilate it when it is needed?