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But you must admit it's a stonking line!
I am sure that you are aware of the problem of Groupthink.
Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:
1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.
Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:
1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.
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WEBF have you heard of Occams Razor?
"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."
"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."
Originally Posted by engineer (retard)
WEBF have you heard of Occams Razor?
"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."
"The razor states that one should proceed to simpler theories until simplicity can be traded for greater explanatory power. The simplest available theory need not be most accurate."
Occam's razor favours the explanations supported by the least assumptions, however this should not be taken as favouring explanations that are contradicted by evidence. Too often it us used as an excuse to ignore evidence - for example basing conclusions on circumstantial evidence. Imagine a young woman called Lucy who goes to the off licence every day. You see her one evening when less than sober. Is it fair to put these two things together and assume that she has a drinking problem? What if she works at the Off Licence, and had been out with friends? Has poor Lucy now been labelled as an alcoholic despite the lack of real evidence?
Several years later, Lucy is applying for a job where you work. You mention her going to the off licence every day, ad the time you saw her drunk, but manage not to mention her job there. The HR/management types decide that she will be unreliable due to her problem and she does not get the job. Fair?
If you think this sort of thing does not happen you must be living on a different planet.
Occam's razor has value as a rule of thumb, but is no substitute for the scientific method, systems thinking, or legal due processes. Life is complex.
Back to SDSR and the axing of Harrier:
1. Back in late 2009, the plan was to prepare for CVF by embarking Harriers at sea as often as possible, for longer periods. This was what the briefings in the service at that time said, and it was also backed by this discussion and the articles quoted at the time.
2. Following the 2010 General Election, the new Government wanted the SDSR to be completed as soon as possible, despite warning that it would need a year to complete.
3. For some reason, someone decided that there should be a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier. apart from putting both RN and RAF on the defensive, it meant that options like retaining a reduced Harrier force were not seriously studied. JFH had been cut from four to three squadrons in late 2009, so the feasibility of this option was not explored. A desire on the part of some in the RAF hierarchy to stitch up the RN perhaps? Post SDSR, there seem to be no RN pilots flying Tornado or Typhoon. Evidence of unhealthy attitudes?
4. Just before the SDSR announcement, the Prime Minister decided that we should procure the F-35C instead of F-35B, without investigating things such as the added training burden, the costs of installing extra equipment aboard Queen Elizabeth and Prince Of Wales, or the need for extra manpower.
5. Just before the SDSR, the Prime Minister panics as he fears cutting the Army's number when the Afghan commitment continues will lead to bad PR. So he demands the cuts hit the RN and RAF instead. The Army gets cut anyway, several years later.....
6. Because of the commitment of Tornado to Afghanistan, coupled with the reduction in Harrier numbers in late 2009, and the RAF's desire to keep Tornado, lead the Prime Minister to go along with their plan. The alternative of smaller numbers of both jets.
7. The First Sea Lord is told this the weekend before SDSR is announced. Presenting the option of additional naval cuts in exchange for funding the entire Harrier force is not a realistic option for the RN. If there had been say a month to investigate an option to retain say a single squadron, then my personal view is that things would have been different.
8. Post SDSR, Groupthink seems to have kicked in and some have forgotten that JFH was planning not only to act as seedcorn but to return to being a ready carrier force, which would have been useful during the Libyan conflict.
9. The switch to F-35C allows the axing of Harrier to be justified on the basis that it only existed of prepare for a STOVL future, and ignoring the fact that most of the issues relating to the deck handling and whole ship aspects of carrier aviation are similar regardless of CTOL or STOVL.
10. Opposing voices are shouted down - "he's an Admiral so he would say that", "well, an ex CVS Captain is going to say that," and so on.
11. 8 to 10 can be clearly seen throughout the Harrier thread, right from the first page.
They can also be seen on every other thread on PPRuNe/ARRSE/etc that talks about these issues.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 30th Sep 2013 at 06:11.
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So in every procurement decision, the poor, honest but simple jolly jack tar is outwitted by the clever, evil scheming crabfat? To be honest, if I had to select an organisation to defend my country, I would pick the clever one with a track record of winning.
Because there was not enough money. The Groupthinkers have to deal with real world events and real world costs.
The picture you paint can only be seen on the Harrier thread because you keep repeating it. Yes a carrier would have been useful during Libya but it was not essential, nor was it an essential for Afghanistan and Iraq both of which required robust sustainable fleets of fast jet. As you have been told ad nauseum, sustainable fleets are a numbers game and NRCs for support of an aircraft fleet are big numbers. NRCs for 2 aircraft fleets are 2 really big numbers which would have required cutting todays wargoing numbers to achieve your target of maintaining a seedcorn capability for the future.
Read your points and take a good look at yourself
Yes, but is entirely different. Groupthink is the problem of poor decision making in organisations, largely as a result of a need to people to conform, hence poor decisions are rationalised after the event, not all alternatives are considered. and leaders exert influence on decision making. For example, why did SDSR have to include a straight choice between Tornado and Harrier, instead of reductions to both? Why was Nimrod MRA4 axed without giving any thought to an alternative MPA - leased P-3s perhaps?
11. 8 to 10 can be clearly seen throughout the Harrier thread, right from the first page.
I am sure that you are aware of the problem of Groupthink.
Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:
1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.
Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:
1. Illusion of invulnerability –Creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks.
2. Collective rationalization – Members discount warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions.
3. Belief in inherent morality – Members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
4. Stereotyped views of out-groups – Negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary.
5. Direct pressure on dissenters – Members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views.
6. Self-censorship – Doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.
7. Illusion of unanimity – The majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.
7. Self-appointed ‘mindguards’ – Members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.
Last edited by engineer(retard); 30th Sep 2013 at 12:35.
As you have been told ad nauseum, sustainable fleets are a numbers game and NRCs for support of an aircraft fleet are big numbers. NRCs for 2 aircraft fleets are 2 really big numbers which would have required cutting todays wargoing numbers to achieve your target of maintaining a seedcorn capability for the future.
The fact that you keep using the word "seedcorn" illustrates the point about rationalising. It was intended that the GR9 would provide a fully deployable force (CVS or land based) post Herrick.
Justanopinion
Apart from the sterling job on HERRICK , can't agree. During HERRICK the FEAR was 18 with 8 required in Afghanistan. The force continued to maintain carrier ops as well as dets to Red Flag / Green Flag. It is a complete myth that Carrier ops were so seriously affected during Afghanistan for the Harriers, I must have imagined my time at sea during that time. Post Afghanistan I remember being briefed many times that the force was going to concentrate on all round regeneration, not a Carrier seed corn capability.
No 1(F) Squadron on Exercise Auriga
After a long period of distinguished service on operations in Afghanistan, Joint Force Harrier has, for the last twelve months, been working hard to regenerate all the important skills which necessarily took a back seat to the primary task of Op Herrick. One such skill, much practiced by 800 Naval Air Squadron(NAS), is the demanding realm of embarked operations. The summer of 2010 sees 1(F) Squadron take their turn by embarking in HMS Ark Royal for Exercise Auriga: two months of carrier flying and simulated fighting off the eastern seaboard of the United States.
----
After the initial qualification period, the squadron was involved in the dropping of freefall bombs and live 1000lb bombs mixed with air-to-air fighting with Canadian Hornet fighters. For many aircrew this was the first drop of a live bomb, and as such it is a great testament to the ship’s weapon suppliers, the squadron armourers and the deck crew that all the bombs were dropped successfully.
But how is it on board ship? For the vast majority of 1(F) this is the first experience of life at sea. The biggest challenge has been changing the normal daily routine to fit in with the ship’s equally busy activities including live firing of the ship’s defences, practice man-overboard drills and damage control exercises. Equally though, it is very satisfying for the members of the Squadron who would ordinarily not see flying directly to be involved with deck operations. They work in close proximity to aircraft launching and recovering, an area fraught with danger demanding high standards of professionalism. This professionalism is reflected in the rest of the ship’s company who are very keen to make sure that everyone from the air group feels a true part of the ship. SAC Howe was heard to say, “The whole CVS environment has turned out to be much better than I had anticipated. Once you get used to the way the Navy do things you can just get along with enjoying such a novel experience.”
As Ark Royal prepares for the month of July, 1(F) look forward to further exercises alongside the Americans, and will include the dropping of 1000lb laser guided and freefall bombs, training in urban close air support of troops, and the additional possibility of being involved in beach head assaults with 3 Commando brigade. This will be a chance to exercise one of the Harrier’s key skill sets: to be involved in amphibious landings from the sea in direct support of troops on the ground.
Seedcorn?
The picture you paint can only be seen on the Harrier thread because you keep repeating it.
Read your points and take a good look at yourself
The Auriga write-up is a good read, as are most squadron deployments and training exercises. Point is, I'm not sure anyone here is saying that 1Squadron weren't as good as any other UK fast jet unit, or indeed, any UK squadron. But I'm not sure what the issue is here. No matter how it happened, the Harriers have gone and they won't be coming back.
I'm probably missing something deep and meaningful here, but I can't see it.
As for Italy and Spain, I don't think they took the same decision that the MoD took to ensure future capability - which, funding permitting, we should be able to do. Again. Maybe time to face reality, accept that decissions have been taken and acted upon. Now start working out how, REALISTICLY, we're going to get the new kit into service and train up the personnel. That would be constructive. Trying in vain to lay blame at various doors and prove how wrong the decissions were - all to late and pointless.
I'm sure you'll tell me if you think I'm wrong.
I'm probably missing something deep and meaningful here, but I can't see it.
As for Italy and Spain, I don't think they took the same decision that the MoD took to ensure future capability - which, funding permitting, we should be able to do. Again. Maybe time to face reality, accept that decissions have been taken and acted upon. Now start working out how, REALISTICLY, we're going to get the new kit into service and train up the personnel. That would be constructive. Trying in vain to lay blame at various doors and prove how wrong the decissions were - all to late and pointless.
I'm sure you'll tell me if you think I'm wrong.
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I think your problem is not that you made a stunningly poor decision to dispense with Harrier too early, but that a significant number of you refuse to acknowledge this fact.
Everyone makes mistakes. Most of us manage to learn from them.
Everyone makes mistakes. Most of us manage to learn from them.
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How do Italy and Spain run their smaller Harrier fleets? I know that have a support MOU with the US, but there must be more to it? To resolve the issue would have required real out of the box thinking, and looking at lessons from our allies?
What about the comments of Bismark, Not_a_boffin, and many others?
There were 3 problems to be faced when the decision was taken, money, money and money and the aim was to maintain defence commitments within budget. As far as I can see they have been met. Would they have been met if wargoing numbers had been cut to maintain harrier at sea? Any answer would have to be speculative but the Thin Pin Strip blog remains the best critique that I have seen.
Can an outsider be prone to Groupthink?
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NUSHIP Canberra Prepares FLYCO for OPS via RN
An example how RAN is preparing for LHD Av Ops. I hope they do not get infected with group think. Probably not - they look like a bolshy lot. 
NUSHIP Canberra aviation team prepares to be first of class 30 Sep 2013 by LEUT Emily Kennedy (author), CMDR Paul Moggach (photographer)
NUSHIP Canberra aviation team prepares to be first of class | Navy Daily
Imagery is available on the Royal Australian Navy Media Library at: Navy Imagery - FotoWeb 7.0
NUSHIP Canberra aviation team prepares to be first of class 30 Sep 2013 by LEUT Emily Kennedy (author), CMDR Paul Moggach (photographer)
"The Air Department in the Royal Australian Navy’s first Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ship, NUSHIP Canberra, has taken another step towards achieving operational capability following a period with the Royal Navy (RN) developing multi-spot helicopter operating procedures.
NUSHIP Canberra’s Commander Air, Commander Paul Moggach, Lieutenant Commander Flying, LCDR Paul Hannigan, Deputy Lieutenant Commander Flying, Lieutenant Matt Schroder and the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer, Squadron Leader Mark Rowe conducted a two phase visit to the RN which took Canberra another step closer to being ready for next year’s first of class flight trials.
The first phase involved a week at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton where the teams examined the theory and courseware used to qualify Flying Control (FLYCO) personnel in safely and effectively controlling multiple aircraft to multi-spot ships. Royal Australian Navy’s Training Authority – Aviation’s training developer Lieutenant Commander Lucito Irlandez accompanied the group during this phase to help develop the RAN’s first LHD FLYCO training program which will be used to train the FLYCO team in the RAN’s second LHD, NUSHIP Adelaide.
The Canberra team then embarked in the RN helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious for ten days as part of the United Kingdom’s Response Force Task Group’s Cougar 13 deployment to the Mediterranean Sea. The timing of the trip coincided with amphibious operations during Exercise ALBANIAN LION - a two week major exercise conducted around Albania’s Vlorë Bay. The exercise involved seven ships, 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, Royal Artillery and aircraft from the Navy, Army Air Corps and Royal Air Force. The exercise commenced with an amphibious raid and culminated in a non-combatant evacuation operation.
Commander Moggach said that this was a highly valuable experience.
“The embarkation of both Army and Navy helicopters gave us a great view of the challenges of conducting amphibious aviation, particularly when overlaid against the movement of landing craft in a dynamic operating environment,” said Commander Moggach.
“A key element of the visit to Illustrious was to provide a level of education in FLYCO operations to enable our team to be authorised to commence at sea aviation operations during the First of Class Flight Trials in 2014.
“As the Canberra class’ air operations and procedures will be adapted for the RAN based on the RN framework, the opportunity to witness a variety of aircraft operations including launch, recovery, deck movements and emergency procedures greatly aided the development of Canberra’s own procedures,” he said.
Canberra’s Lieutenant Commander Flying, LCDR Paul Hannigan said that the work being undertaken now is the baseline for the next 30 years.
“Our Air Department faces the complex task of developing and testing the operating procedures that will be the standard for aviation operations for the life of the RAN’s two Canberra class LHDs,” said Lieutenant Commander Hannigan.
“Canberra is now well placed to meet all airworthiness and operational training requirements that will lead to aviation operations commencing in 2014,” he said...."
NUSHIP Canberra’s Commander Air, Commander Paul Moggach, Lieutenant Commander Flying, LCDR Paul Hannigan, Deputy Lieutenant Commander Flying, Lieutenant Matt Schroder and the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer, Squadron Leader Mark Rowe conducted a two phase visit to the RN which took Canberra another step closer to being ready for next year’s first of class flight trials.
The first phase involved a week at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton where the teams examined the theory and courseware used to qualify Flying Control (FLYCO) personnel in safely and effectively controlling multiple aircraft to multi-spot ships. Royal Australian Navy’s Training Authority – Aviation’s training developer Lieutenant Commander Lucito Irlandez accompanied the group during this phase to help develop the RAN’s first LHD FLYCO training program which will be used to train the FLYCO team in the RAN’s second LHD, NUSHIP Adelaide.
The Canberra team then embarked in the RN helicopter carrier HMS Illustrious for ten days as part of the United Kingdom’s Response Force Task Group’s Cougar 13 deployment to the Mediterranean Sea. The timing of the trip coincided with amphibious operations during Exercise ALBANIAN LION - a two week major exercise conducted around Albania’s Vlorë Bay. The exercise involved seven ships, 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, Royal Artillery and aircraft from the Navy, Army Air Corps and Royal Air Force. The exercise commenced with an amphibious raid and culminated in a non-combatant evacuation operation.
Commander Moggach said that this was a highly valuable experience.
“The embarkation of both Army and Navy helicopters gave us a great view of the challenges of conducting amphibious aviation, particularly when overlaid against the movement of landing craft in a dynamic operating environment,” said Commander Moggach.
“A key element of the visit to Illustrious was to provide a level of education in FLYCO operations to enable our team to be authorised to commence at sea aviation operations during the First of Class Flight Trials in 2014.
“As the Canberra class’ air operations and procedures will be adapted for the RAN based on the RN framework, the opportunity to witness a variety of aircraft operations including launch, recovery, deck movements and emergency procedures greatly aided the development of Canberra’s own procedures,” he said.
Canberra’s Lieutenant Commander Flying, LCDR Paul Hannigan said that the work being undertaken now is the baseline for the next 30 years.
“Our Air Department faces the complex task of developing and testing the operating procedures that will be the standard for aviation operations for the life of the RAN’s two Canberra class LHDs,” said Lieutenant Commander Hannigan.
“Canberra is now well placed to meet all airworthiness and operational training requirements that will lead to aviation operations commencing in 2014,” he said...."
Imagery is available on the Royal Australian Navy Media Library at: Navy Imagery - FotoWeb 7.0
engineer(retard)
Groupthink is when a group tries to prevent information being considered. All of the those you mention are the opposite, attempting to flag up very real issues that potentially grave implications. Groupthink is saying "we can safely ignore that.....[whole ship aspects]". and launching ad hominem attacks against anyone expressing doubts - such as former CVS Captains or retired Admirals.
Perhaps if the SDSR had no been changed so much in the last minute, better decisions could have been made?
Courtney
Agree! The past is the past, and we need to focus on preparing for the future. I just hope attention is paid to the expert views expressed on various pages of various threads, such as this from Bismark here and here, Not_a _boffin, WhiteOvies, and orca.
As is always the case, we have made it a lot harder for ourselves than it need be. The quote from the 1(F) squadron write up proves that they got it, and appreciated the whole ship aspects. Not everyone on PPRuNe, and not all of those involved in last minute SDSR, understood the importance of these issues.
Moving forward must include learning from the past, taking a systems type approach to ship/aircraft integration and the skills that different personnel will needed, and considering new and imaginative ideas that reduce uncertainities and risks.
Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.
Groupthink is when a group tries to prevent information being considered. All of the those you mention are the opposite, attempting to flag up very real issues that potentially grave implications. Groupthink is saying "we can safely ignore that.....[whole ship aspects]". and launching ad hominem attacks against anyone expressing doubts - such as former CVS Captains or retired Admirals.
Perhaps if the SDSR had no been changed so much in the last minute, better decisions could have been made?
Courtney
Agree! The past is the past, and we need to focus on preparing for the future. I just hope attention is paid to the expert views expressed on various pages of various threads, such as this from Bismark here and here, Not_a _boffin, WhiteOvies, and orca.
As is always the case, we have made it a lot harder for ourselves than it need be. The quote from the 1(F) squadron write up proves that they got it, and appreciated the whole ship aspects. Not everyone on PPRuNe, and not all of those involved in last minute SDSR, understood the importance of these issues.
Moving forward must include learning from the past, taking a systems type approach to ship/aircraft integration and the skills that different personnel will needed, and considering new and imaginative ideas that reduce uncertainities and risks.
Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 7th Oct 2013 at 07:55.
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Groupthink is when a group tries to prevent information being considered. All of the those you mention are the opposite, attempting to flag up very real issues that potentially grave implications. Groupthink is saying "we can safely ignore that.....[whole ship aspects]". and launching ad hominem attacks against anyone expressing doubts - such as former CVS Captains or retired Admirals.
Perhaps if the SDSR had no been changed so much in the last minute, better decisions could have been made?
