Towards the next Defence and Security Review

[vascodegama]

Kitbag

Yes you have misunderstood the point I am trying to make. If the figures are correct and we had continued with the the emals option on the PofW , the resulting ship would end up costing more than the Ford. I would suggest that the Ford would have been a more capable ship as well as cheaper.

[Easy Street]

Originally Posted by Evalu8er

'Give SH to the army' - oh dear. Whilst probably a viable thought in the FJ heavy (it seems now....) 70s/80s it would probably signal the end of the '100 year experiment' today. The SH force is now a large proportion of RAF manpower (not to mention, by far, the most decorated...), to lose it would inevitably drive claims for the AT/AAR assets by the RLC and the vestigial FJ by the RN. Not a good idea....

You worry that the departure of SH would leave the RAF too small to survive. I would point out that on 1 April 1918 the RAF was proportionally far smaller compared to its leviathan parents than a SH-less RAF would be next to the other services today. Why, if it was it a good idea to go independent then, would it not be a good idea to for a SH-less RAF to stay independent now? There are plenty of far, far smaller air forces in the world. The residual assets (ISTAR, AT, air defence, attack) would all have pan-environment utility and would attract competing demands from both Army and Navy - exactly the rationale for the creation of the helicopter-less RAF in the first place.

In any case, breaking up the RAF and redistributing it to the other services would not realise a great deal in the way of savings, which ultimately would be the only political justification for closing down the Service. Fewer blue uniforms, yes (although great swathes of the RAF seem to dress in combats on a daily basis, anyway). Fewer parallel training streams, yes (although that aspect is already being radically streamlined). Fewer bloated RAF HQs, yes. But all of these are a drop in the ocean compared to the vast expense associated with the equipment and its largely-civilian support organisation (of which the scope for trimming is unrelated to who actually flies the things).

I am a definite advocate of the independent air force. However I struggle to see how we have ended up in a position where the Navy has an organic SH fleet (being upgraded with ex-RAF assets), yet we can still argue that the RAF must dispense all of the Army's SH requirements. It doesn't make sense to me; one of these arrangements must be 'wrong' and it surely is illogical for them to co-exist. Both the FAA and the Army have operated RW from ships and from land, in high-threat and low-threat areas, and would presumably give at least as much priority to specialist roles (SF / JPR) as the RAF does, i.e. lots / nil respectively. I would be grateful if somebody more on-message than I could explain exactly why SH must stay as-is... it's a definite chink in my light blue armour.

[high spirits]

Easy,
I would go the other way. It's JHC for a reason, and in times of conflict it has worked very well. I know of few places where the 3 services as operators get on so well as JHF(A). I think if you applied that model to the home sqns and split the individual fleets between them you would see fighting capability increased with mixed Sqns of AH and SH. It would also stop the pathetic bickering....

[Easy Street]

If the services really can agree to share their toys nicely, the need for an independent air force is removed surely? And the reason why the Navy has the CHF, while the Army has no big RW is?

[Roland Pulfrew]

CHF there specifically to support 3 Cdo Bde? Big RW there to support everything else?

[Finningley Boy]

Easy Street,

If you'll allow a shameful plug, you should buy my book Fading Eagle it is an eye opener just how the other two services have fought the existence of the junior service from day one!

Trenchard deserves credit for making the impossible happen. If he hadn't been successful, no matter what, without a dedicated independent air force by 1939, the Battle of Britain would have been a completely different story.

FB

[Heathrow Harry]

yes we might have had an airforce equipped for battlefield interdiction like the Luftwaffe and have stopped the Germans short of Dunkirk................

[Finningley Boy]

I doubt it Harry,

As matters were we didn't have a sufficiently well equipped Army despite no end of re-armament schemes. To imagine that the Army or the Navy would have pursued the development of aircraft to the standard of the JU87 and 88 along with 20 mm cannon armed Fighters... well I somehow doubt. The important lesson from all this is that splitting the R.A.F. into the air components of the other two services would be pursued, as Easy Street pointed out, solely for financial gain and certainly not for any realistic military reasons. Therefore, the air elements in such circumstances would be short of one thing, investment, no four-star officer to make their case, no direct channel to the Defence Secretary, or as was the case, no Air Ministry. The Aeroplane in the hands of the Army, if not the Navy as well, would have been regarded, through to the defeat of British Arms on British Soil by the Wehrmacht, as nothing more than that new-fangled thing.

FB

[Justanopinion]

Therefore, the air elements in such circumstances would be short of one thing, investment, no four-star officer to make their case, no direct channel to the Defence Secretary, or as was the case, no Air Ministry

And how did maritime air power fare in the lead up to the Second World War when "air elements" were under the control of an Air Force? How has maritime air power fared since 2006 and back under the control of an Air Force?

I am not one bit in favour of removing the RAF but I would suggest your argument is flawed

[orca]

FB,

I completely agree in most cases, but in the specific case of SH why would the best model be the status quo? i.e. a helicopter operating customer (Land) has the lion's share of it's light and medium RW lift provided by someone else, (Air) - whilst the provider doesn't appear to provide for anyone else?

I am sure JHC has performed - but is it really the best way, and if so, why?

Hoping for enlightenment but fearing the usual...

[HAS59]

Army UAV's

Okay...

why do the RAF have the UAV/RPV/RPAS assets and not the Army?
They are about direct support to soldiers (mostly) are they not?
After all they're not real aeroplanes flown by real pilots are they?

H

[Easy Street]

Originally Posted by high spirits

I would go the other way. It's JHC for a reason, and in times of conflict it has worked very well. I know of few places where the 3 services as operators get on so well as JHF(A). I think if you applied that model to the home sqns and split the individual fleets between them you would see fighting capability increased with mixed Sqns of AH and SH. It would also stop the pathetic bickering....

I don't find the success of JHC and JHF(A) a persuasive argument for the involvement of the RAF in the SH business. If the army and navy consistently demonstrate that they can share their toys nicely, and make strides in the development of capability, there is no need for independent air force involvement, shurely?

Originally Posted by HAS59

why do the RAF have the UAV/RPV/RPAS assets and not the Army?
They are about direct support to soldiers (mostly) are they not?

Since they were acquired, yes, they have been employed exclusively in support of land activity. However, Reaper could easily be employed in support of naval objectives (in the Straits of Hormuz, for example) and thus there is a strong case for it to be maintained as an air force asset, rather than being organic to either service.

The same argument could easily be applied to helicopters. All medium- and heavy-lift helicopters, operated by the air force, to be apportioned according to operational priorities between the navy and army. Exactly aligned with the Trenchard model. Except that it seems to have become accepted that the navy should operate its own SH fleet, which has left the RAF operating in practically 100% support of the army.

Originally Posted by Roland Pulfrew

CHF there specifically to support 3 Cdo Bde? Big RW there to support everything else?

Why? Both the RAF and the Army have operated RW from ships and into the littoral. Allowing 3 Cdo its own organic SH whilst denying the same to the Army is incoherent and blows a hole in the Trenchard model, making defence of RAF ownership of big RW somewhat awkward.

Until the rationale for all this contradiction is explained to me, I cannot put together a decent argument why the RAF either should or should not keep SH, which leaves me in a somewhat individious position as an officer in an air force now led by a SH pilot... perhaps I should ask him?!

Originally Posted by justanopinion

How has maritime air power fared since 2006 and back under the control of an Air Force?

The RN chose to discard the Sea Harrier in a political miscalculation. The GR9 vs Tornado debate has been done to death elsewhere. Suffice to say that the decision was taken based on short-term operational requirements, with the long-term future of maritime fast air already secure (ruthless prioritisation, yes, but is that not the point of an independent air arm? The decision was vindicated only months later). The Nimrod saga would have played out exactly the same under the FAA since the failings were in the Centre and the support organisations, and emphatically not in Air Command, the groups or the squadrons. What would the navy have given up to fund an alternative?

Originally Posted by Finningley Boy

To imagine that the Army or the Navy would have pursued the development of aircraft to the standard of the JU87 and 88 along with 20 mm cannon armed Fighters... well I somehow doubt.

Agree. I'm 100% sold on the need for an independent air force, most particularly in the fields of air defence and attack, but also AT and ISTAR. The notion that an air force consisting only of these elements might be broken up is plainly wrong.

[Justanopinion]

The RN chose to discard the Sea Harrier in a political miscalculation. The GR9 vs Tornado debate has been done to death elsewhere; suffice to say that the decision was taken based on short-term operational requirements (vindicated only months later)

We will never know what the RN would have given up to pay for requirements and I'm not interested in getting into an RAF vs RN slanging match (steering clear of GR9 vs Tornado although interesting that Libya is seen as vindicating the decision). The RN did not "choose" to discard the Sea Harrier, rather their hand was forced (and I have to say in favour of the correct platform). The fact is (as demonstrated through history) with an airforce in charge of maritime platforms, maritime activity is seem as of secondary importance. The example of JSF is already demonstrating this with an aircraft specifically ordered based on a Maritime Strike capability being seen as something that is based ashore and happens to go to sea rather than the other way round, not to mention F35 A being discussed as an option.

[Justanopinion]

14. With the introduction of the QE class of aircraft carrier the subject of UK fixed wing air power is no longer a matter just for the RAF. Indeed, the MoD decision to buy 48 of the F35B Lightning II short take-off and rolling landing (STORAL) version must be factored into the overall picture and UK air power doctrine (the two Fast Jet policy) revisited. The RAF operational requirement (OR) is for a medium range (1500 – 1800 nm) Tornado GR4 replacement which frankly none of the F35 variants (not least the F35B) can meet. Further, the NSS calls for 12 F35B to be routinely embarked upon a carrier with the ability to surge to 36 in an emergency. With a fleet of only 48 F35B and the necessary establishment of an operational conversion and trials unit (OCTU) it is unlikely that more than 40 aircraft will ever be available for operations, of which, some 25% will be unavailable for maintenance reasons, making the DPA requirement to surge to 36 a 'pipe dream'. Whether the RAF has a role in flying the F35B alongside the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) is academic. To meet the NSS commitment and to achieve combat ready (CR) status whilst maintaining flying currency the majority of F35B, crews and maintainers will have to be dedicated to FAA carrier operations. This leaves the RAF with a single FJ (Typhoon) and no medium range Tornado GR4 replacement.

This quote from the original document also makes interesting reading

[Backwards PLT]

Kind of interesting in a "author clearly displaying he is clueless" sort of way. Really, it probably isn't his fault but if you know very little on a subject it is probably best to refrain from commenting on it. Of course that would kill PPRuNe contributions by 90%+ but written statements to parliament?

[high spirits]

Easy,
I don't mean to be patronising, but the JHC could be so much more potent if Sqns were mixed fleet (with whatever Sqn number). Carry on letting the politicians divide and conquer if you want, but the fact remains that all the independent services offer something to the overall party. If you cut the RAF out of the helicopter picture, you will have very few assets below FL100, after which you will lose further arguments on why the RAF exists. Presently, there is a lot of jealousy internally about the successes of the RAF SH force. Have a look at the names, dates and DFCs on the 18, 27 and 28 Sqn honours boards and the appointment of latest CAS to back this up. The RN are in a similar position with a top bod with aviation experience at the helm(as opposed to an escort ship driver). It shows how far both services have come.....

Stop giving the pollies another excuse to cut the Armed Forces.

[Finningley Boy]

Backwards PLT,

Does the author not make a coherent and quite obvious point that 48 F35Bs would be woefully insufficient to provide the minimum requirement as stated? Unless of course things like OCU, OEU and aircraft for qinetiq are not to be drawn from the figure of 48. But even then, with maintenance and other operational commitments beyond having 12 constantly, or for the most part, at Sea it doesn't seem likely. It does appear that an awful lot of reliance is being placed on such projects as the yet to fly technology demonstrator the Taranis new fangled thing. Further, it would appear that as a result, another capability gap from 2019 forward is certain.

There seems to be an over certain mood that the future can and should be relied upon with the most technologically advanced equipment that can be found i.e. F35 or nothing. The newer, the more unorthodox, the better. Even if we will rely upon a precious tiny number of assets. The thinking seems to be that HM Forces certainly will not be used to confront any but the most primitive insurgent force and that supporting the Army is all that we need be concerned about far round the corner into the future.

If we should find ourselves actually on a war footing with an industrialized state ever again, I think there will be a reluctance to employ a carrier with F35s anywhere in harms way, far too much will have been invested by the treasury.

FB

[alfred_the_great]

HS - Adm Z has nearly as much time Commanding Warships as he does flying Lynx.

[high spirits]

Alfred,
Ok, just trying to point out his aviation experience, as opposed to purely ship experience.....

[Backwards PLT]

FB, yes some of his conclusions I actually agree with but many of his arguments are flawed. My main issue is that he is clearly ill informed and inexperienced.