1968...what would you do differently?
BEages will know more.
Long moment arm movement nearly stopped the early XB-70 flights due to the large vertical motion experienced on the flight deck when taxying.
The nHz natural frequency has led to some nasty infrasound experiments. It was also thought that juddering through the steering of fat-tyred racing cars at around that frequency when cornering hard probably caused a few accidents in the 1960s; also, the spooks developed some infrasound devices using the beat frequency between 2 ghetto blaster speakers radiating sound at slightly different frequencies to 'inconvenience' rioters - and similar beat frequency devices have been built into binoculars to nobble race horses, I gather....
You could often see the node/antinode effect on AAR hoses as they were wound and trailed; fortunately there was usually sufficient damping to avoid any movement becoming divergent - although I've seen recent film of precisely that effect when a new generation tanker with a low inertia drogue encountered mild turbulence which was at just the 'wrong' frequency, causing significant excitation. Both to the drogue and to the tanker and receiver crews!
I also noticed some odd physiological effects when demonstrating stalling in the VC10K flight simulator as the motion rams simulated the vertical bounce motion just prior to stick push. You felt shortness of breath and difficulty in pattering to the student pilot if the regime was maintained for any length of time; however, all was well once the stick pusher operated. I don't think that it did the simulator motion system much good either!
Last edited by BEagle; 30th Dec 2012 at 20:57.
It is also said that "Insanity is repeating the same actions and expecting different outcomes." (Apparently not by Einstein.)
Engines - "It's my view that the Pentagon used STOVL to keep the aircraft single engined single seat to control costs. It's worth remembering that they were coming off the back of a series of major (and really costly) project failures involving large twin engined tactical strike aircraft."
Interesting and possibly true, although I don't remember that from my association with the project in its formative years. What I heard from most people at the time was that the main weapon against cost - and against Augustine's "one tactical aircraft in 2054" theory - was commonality, and consequent high-rate production and unified support.
Of the pre-JSF projects, only A/F-X was a large twin-engine, two-seat aircraft and it was Navy-led. MRF looked bigger than an F-16 (range) but was not to be a two-seater. It was mainly the Navy who had to be talked into a single.
"At some time in the future, there's probably a good book to be written by insiders on the F-35 programme on what went right and what went wrong."
I hope it doesn't take 34 years...
Engines - "It's my view that the Pentagon used STOVL to keep the aircraft single engined single seat to control costs. It's worth remembering that they were coming off the back of a series of major (and really costly) project failures involving large twin engined tactical strike aircraft."
Interesting and possibly true, although I don't remember that from my association with the project in its formative years. What I heard from most people at the time was that the main weapon against cost - and against Augustine's "one tactical aircraft in 2054" theory - was commonality, and consequent high-rate production and unified support.
Of the pre-JSF projects, only A/F-X was a large twin-engine, two-seat aircraft and it was Navy-led. MRF looked bigger than an F-16 (range) but was not to be a two-seater. It was mainly the Navy who had to be talked into a single.
"At some time in the future, there's probably a good book to be written by insiders on the F-35 programme on what went right and what went wrong."
I hope it doesn't take 34 years...
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LO,
Thanks once again for coming back.
The projects I'm referring to were A/F-X, NATF, MRF (yes, single seat, but a large and expensive twin engined design), AX, and not forgetting the A-12. I can confirm that around the time JAST was being developed as a programme, there was real concern in some US quarters that the DoD was becoming institutionally incapable of executing a tactical combat aircraft programme (their words, not mine). Yes, the Navy were really unhappy about going for a single engined design, but don't forget that the USAF had already driven through a large twin engined solution for F-22, and were happy to accept JSF as the 'low end' part of a future combo. In the event, they had to accept that the original '1000 aircraft' F-22 programme was simply unaffordable.
You are, as usual, right on target about the early years, when the JSF mantra was 'commonality and high production rates' - although many of us were less convinced about the need to build one aircraft a day as opposed to say. one every 48 hours.
It's absolutely true that the need to drive weight out (of all three variants, by the way) has reduced the amount of commonality in the airframe area. (Although they are still able to use 'cousin' parts that are machined from common billets and forgings).Where they have achieved commonality is in two major cost drivers - avionics and engines. That will work in their favour going forward.
As ever, best regards to those actually working their rear ends off to deliver the capability to the people out there doing the hard stuff,
Engines
Thanks once again for coming back.
The projects I'm referring to were A/F-X, NATF, MRF (yes, single seat, but a large and expensive twin engined design), AX, and not forgetting the A-12. I can confirm that around the time JAST was being developed as a programme, there was real concern in some US quarters that the DoD was becoming institutionally incapable of executing a tactical combat aircraft programme (their words, not mine). Yes, the Navy were really unhappy about going for a single engined design, but don't forget that the USAF had already driven through a large twin engined solution for F-22, and were happy to accept JSF as the 'low end' part of a future combo. In the event, they had to accept that the original '1000 aircraft' F-22 programme was simply unaffordable.
You are, as usual, right on target about the early years, when the JSF mantra was 'commonality and high production rates' - although many of us were less convinced about the need to build one aircraft a day as opposed to say. one every 48 hours.
It's absolutely true that the need to drive weight out (of all three variants, by the way) has reduced the amount of commonality in the airframe area. (Although they are still able to use 'cousin' parts that are machined from common billets and forgings).Where they have achieved commonality is in two major cost drivers - avionics and engines. That will work in their favour going forward.
As ever, best regards to those actually working their rear ends off to deliver the capability to the people out there doing the hard stuff,
Engines
Phantom Speys and other Phantasies
Reverting to the original theme of the thread, I admit to having a vested interest in what might have been done differently. Back in the 1960's I suggest the RAF should have taken the Buccaneer about 5 years earlier, when various options were offered to the UK MoD. HSA should have been allowed to sell the anticipated Buccaneer Mk 50 follow on order to the SAAF. This might have encouraged other potential export customers to take the aircraft rather than be frightened off by the government's attitude to export weapons sales.
For information on the many potential Buccaneer variants see Roy Boot's book, but in summary they included inertial nav much earlier, terrain following radar, replacing the Blue Parrot attack radar, flat screen displays and a new HUD, internal guns, zero zero seats, 8 pylon wings, additional internal fuel, soft field bogie undercarriage, self starting APU, quick acting blow and even, towards the end of its life, a 'Wild Weasel' variant with the bomb bay stuffed with jamming equipment. An opportunity was probably missed when the engine rings were replaced after fatigue cracks were found emanating from some tapped holes where a bleed air duct passed through. If the replacement rings had been made with a bigger internal diameter it would have been possible to fit a 'large turbine' variant of the Spey and increased the thrust. There were even reheated variants suggested but I think by then the ideas were getting a bit silly.
We should have persisted with the proposals for bigger carriers which could have operated a mix of upgraded Buccaneers with the Phantom FG Mk 1 and would probably have prevented or drastically shortened the Falklands war. With a bigger RAF Buccaneer fleet, all the Phantom FGR 2 aircraft could have been dedicated to air defence rather than many starting life in a ground attack role. This would have helped defer some of the fatigue problems that beset the Phantom in later life.
With a bigger, more capable Buccaneer fleet in service with the RAF, our competitors on the other side of the Pennines could have skipped the Multi Racial Compromise Aircraft and moved, via fly by wire Jaguar and EAP to start a UK only Typhoon programme about 10 years sooner.
Moving from phantasy to the Phantom as some of the earlier posters have pointed out, there were several reasons for fitting the UK aircraft with Speys. The engineering reason was that the increased static thrust was required to permit the aircraft to operate at high all up weights from the smaller UK carriers. (Maybe that would not have been required if we had gone on and built the bigger ones?) The political reason was that it provided work for UK industry and there were lots of other areas where the aircraft were 'Anglicised.' If I remember correctly the rear fuselages were buit at Warton which must have been quite a challenging project at the time as its was a complicated titanium tiled, heat resisting structure. I believe that McDonnell Douglas anticipated many more Spey Phantom orders but none materialised so it must have been a very expensive development programme which I guess UK taxpayers funded.
Although the Spey had more static thrust and better SFC than the J79, the increased air mass flow and bigger intakes meant there was was more momentum drag as speed increased. In addition the reheat variable nozzle was quite a dirty design and the translating shroud and petals created a significant 'dead' area which caused a relatively large base drag penalty. There were proposals for uprated Spey 200 series engines with true convergent/divergent nozzles but they never materialised. However Rolls Royce did eventually allow the Chinese to licence build the engine - I wonder how many are still in service and what changes they made?
Its surprising how threads sometime drift off on a seemingly irrelevent tangent but then miraculously return to the original theme. Mention of low frequency vibration is a case in point. One of the early problems with the Phantom Spey was reheat buzz which was a low frequency, around 6 Hz, combustion instability. I think it was first seen during extended reheat runs during the early testing of the water cooled jet bast deflectors eventuially fitted to Ark Royal. People in close proximity to the aircraft just keeled over and collapsed on the floor as their innards were excited by the resonant frequency pressure waves. I can't remember what fixed it but I think there was some association with 'red standard' engines.
The FAA aircraft were fitted with fast reheat to improve their ability to bolt from the deck if they missed the arrester wires. This was not achieved with a catalytic igniter as suggested earlier as all the reheated Speys had that system. I can't remember all the details but one change was to ensure the throttle valve at the inlet to the reheat vapour core pump was held fully open whenever the engine was above 80% Nh. When reheat was selected, fuel rushed into the vapour core pump inlet as designed, but once the initial demand was satisfied the fuel in a long length of 3 inch pipe had accelerated up to high speed and suddenly had to slow down again. This generated a whopping water hammer pressure spike in the engine fuel feed system and began to damage all the flexible sections of pipework where braided bellows had been fitted to provide some installation compliance. This gave me some very interesting work for a few years and a particularly entertaining visit to RAF Leuchars.
I look back on my association with these two iconic aircraft with great affection and I learned a lot of valuable engineering lessons from my involvement. However with hindsight I have also come to realise just how risky aviation was in that era. When you look at the number of Buccaneer and Phantom aircraft and crews lost because of airframe structural failures or uncontained engine failures it brings home just how far military aircraft engineering has progressed. Whether that justifies todays astronomical costs is perhaps a subject for another discussion
For information on the many potential Buccaneer variants see Roy Boot's book, but in summary they included inertial nav much earlier, terrain following radar, replacing the Blue Parrot attack radar, flat screen displays and a new HUD, internal guns, zero zero seats, 8 pylon wings, additional internal fuel, soft field bogie undercarriage, self starting APU, quick acting blow and even, towards the end of its life, a 'Wild Weasel' variant with the bomb bay stuffed with jamming equipment. An opportunity was probably missed when the engine rings were replaced after fatigue cracks were found emanating from some tapped holes where a bleed air duct passed through. If the replacement rings had been made with a bigger internal diameter it would have been possible to fit a 'large turbine' variant of the Spey and increased the thrust. There were even reheated variants suggested but I think by then the ideas were getting a bit silly.
We should have persisted with the proposals for bigger carriers which could have operated a mix of upgraded Buccaneers with the Phantom FG Mk 1 and would probably have prevented or drastically shortened the Falklands war. With a bigger RAF Buccaneer fleet, all the Phantom FGR 2 aircraft could have been dedicated to air defence rather than many starting life in a ground attack role. This would have helped defer some of the fatigue problems that beset the Phantom in later life.
With a bigger, more capable Buccaneer fleet in service with the RAF, our competitors on the other side of the Pennines could have skipped the Multi Racial Compromise Aircraft and moved, via fly by wire Jaguar and EAP to start a UK only Typhoon programme about 10 years sooner.
Moving from phantasy to the Phantom as some of the earlier posters have pointed out, there were several reasons for fitting the UK aircraft with Speys. The engineering reason was that the increased static thrust was required to permit the aircraft to operate at high all up weights from the smaller UK carriers. (Maybe that would not have been required if we had gone on and built the bigger ones?) The political reason was that it provided work for UK industry and there were lots of other areas where the aircraft were 'Anglicised.' If I remember correctly the rear fuselages were buit at Warton which must have been quite a challenging project at the time as its was a complicated titanium tiled, heat resisting structure. I believe that McDonnell Douglas anticipated many more Spey Phantom orders but none materialised so it must have been a very expensive development programme which I guess UK taxpayers funded.
Although the Spey had more static thrust and better SFC than the J79, the increased air mass flow and bigger intakes meant there was was more momentum drag as speed increased. In addition the reheat variable nozzle was quite a dirty design and the translating shroud and petals created a significant 'dead' area which caused a relatively large base drag penalty. There were proposals for uprated Spey 200 series engines with true convergent/divergent nozzles but they never materialised. However Rolls Royce did eventually allow the Chinese to licence build the engine - I wonder how many are still in service and what changes they made?
Its surprising how threads sometime drift off on a seemingly irrelevent tangent but then miraculously return to the original theme. Mention of low frequency vibration is a case in point. One of the early problems with the Phantom Spey was reheat buzz which was a low frequency, around 6 Hz, combustion instability. I think it was first seen during extended reheat runs during the early testing of the water cooled jet bast deflectors eventuially fitted to Ark Royal. People in close proximity to the aircraft just keeled over and collapsed on the floor as their innards were excited by the resonant frequency pressure waves. I can't remember what fixed it but I think there was some association with 'red standard' engines.
The FAA aircraft were fitted with fast reheat to improve their ability to bolt from the deck if they missed the arrester wires. This was not achieved with a catalytic igniter as suggested earlier as all the reheated Speys had that system. I can't remember all the details but one change was to ensure the throttle valve at the inlet to the reheat vapour core pump was held fully open whenever the engine was above 80% Nh. When reheat was selected, fuel rushed into the vapour core pump inlet as designed, but once the initial demand was satisfied the fuel in a long length of 3 inch pipe had accelerated up to high speed and suddenly had to slow down again. This generated a whopping water hammer pressure spike in the engine fuel feed system and began to damage all the flexible sections of pipework where braided bellows had been fitted to provide some installation compliance. This gave me some very interesting work for a few years and a particularly entertaining visit to RAF Leuchars.
I look back on my association with these two iconic aircraft with great affection and I learned a lot of valuable engineering lessons from my involvement. However with hindsight I have also come to realise just how risky aviation was in that era. When you look at the number of Buccaneer and Phantom aircraft and crews lost because of airframe structural failures or uncontained engine failures it brings home just how far military aircraft engineering has progressed. Whether that justifies todays astronomical costs is perhaps a subject for another discussion
Before taking this back to a JSF thread...
"Where they have achieved commonality is in two major cost drivers - avionics and engines."
The latter, we already had, with basically the same donk in F-16, F-15, F-14, U-2 and B-2. (And, nearly, F-18 and A-6F.)
Avionics could have been done - although most of the US had a bias towards an integrated approach, which was a hard way to go and has been somewhat overhauled by Moore's Law, which favors federated avionics: hence the Super Hornet's large bag of tricks today.
(Getting back on subject, it does seem the UK backed away from centralization after TSR.2.)
The final bit that would have made sense would have been a common tool-kit of subsystems, specs and standards, materials (including RAM) and processes.
And I would add "in hindsight" but I was saying that in 1998...
"Where they have achieved commonality is in two major cost drivers - avionics and engines."
The latter, we already had, with basically the same donk in F-16, F-15, F-14, U-2 and B-2. (And, nearly, F-18 and A-6F.)
Avionics could have been done - although most of the US had a bias towards an integrated approach, which was a hard way to go and has been somewhat overhauled by Moore's Law, which favors federated avionics: hence the Super Hornet's large bag of tricks today.
(Getting back on subject, it does seem the UK backed away from centralization after TSR.2.)
The final bit that would have made sense would have been a common tool-kit of subsystems, specs and standards, materials (including RAM) and processes.
And I would add "in hindsight" but I was saying that in 1998...
Walbut - Note all the comments about the Bucc's relative sloth in the big TSR2 history document, talking about a max low level speed of 0.85.
On the other hand, you're not going to sustain a speed much faster than that (.05-.10 Mach faster, tops) and the faster you go, the harder you're going to work to follow terrain. And the difference is more marked as you get into TA rather than pure TF. From talking to Rafale people, they seem to do low-level at 550 kt, which is about 0.85 on the deck.
However, it was really only the RN and the USN which managed to resist the lure of supersonic speed (Bucc, A-4 and A-6). Probably for the same reason - supersonic, A/G-payload and long range off a carrier could be done, but at vast cost and not in a very flexible manner.
Personal view: the Bucc could have done the RAF strike mission at least as well as the Tonka, which added a lot of complexity in order to cover the interceptor role (which eventually involved a lot of Sturm und Drang and massive redesign. Or did the 800 kt capability add a lot to the Tonka's capabilities? I am truly all ears and would be ready to be corrected.
(At least the RAF didn't try to make a low-level strategic bomber do 2.2, and then finally field the bu$$er in a configuration that was to all intents and purposes subsonic.)
On the other hand, you're not going to sustain a speed much faster than that (.05-.10 Mach faster, tops) and the faster you go, the harder you're going to work to follow terrain. And the difference is more marked as you get into TA rather than pure TF. From talking to Rafale people, they seem to do low-level at 550 kt, which is about 0.85 on the deck.
However, it was really only the RN and the USN which managed to resist the lure of supersonic speed (Bucc, A-4 and A-6). Probably for the same reason - supersonic, A/G-payload and long range off a carrier could be done, but at vast cost and not in a very flexible manner.
Personal view: the Bucc could have done the RAF strike mission at least as well as the Tonka, which added a lot of complexity in order to cover the interceptor role (which eventually involved a lot of Sturm und Drang and massive redesign. Or did the 800 kt capability add a lot to the Tonka's capabilities? I am truly all ears and would be ready to be corrected.
(At least the RAF didn't try to make a low-level strategic bomber do 2.2, and then finally field the bu$$er in a configuration that was to all intents and purposes subsonic.)
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(Could we pass lightly over ulterior motives {Wilson as Red stooge or worse; TPs with career agendas; Benn in any context}. In the Committee-haggles that decide such things as Defence/Procurement Policy, consensus emerges around a least worst option. No conspiracies).
So, it's January,1968 and Cabinet decides to let India, Malaysia &tc. face up to sovereign Defence Budgets. UK will do Luneberge Heide, Bodo, Akrotiri, SSBN, N.Atlantic, and bits of colonial baggage. Quite enough. Onway was a pile of good kit largely on fixed price/deferred terms from US. Overwhelming logic was to inter-operate (=mercenary crew) with US everywhere, and just add F-newest every few years to the never-never $ invoice. Some UK jobs in inventory ownership: repair much, make little (some licence build if quantities are there - say ATM), because Economics favour US volume. Put UK engineering industry someplace US can't catch us: say sensible autos.
What Healey/Wilson actually did was invest vast resources into UK Defence, favouring Aero. Chevaline, Jaguar, Tornado, 26 new to add to 65 ex-RN Buccs for RAF, Hawk, Seawolf, Rapier, a UK-solo NDB, 8xT.21 Amazon, DDG 14xT.42 Sheffield...and on...and on...all initiated/continued despite the Nation being broke. Before 1971 kids could leave school at 15 and most did: only in 1970 did Education at last overtake Defence's share of GDP (5.1% cf. 4.8%). They did all that because they knew quite as much about the Red Threat as did anyone, and they did their best to gird...affordably. That Threat went away in 1990 because Reds did not know how much was enough, and spent their regime to death.
I would have chopped Puma post-AFVG and bought whatever USArmy/Germany had. Leave the rest alone.
So, it's January,1968 and Cabinet decides to let India, Malaysia &tc. face up to sovereign Defence Budgets. UK will do Luneberge Heide, Bodo, Akrotiri, SSBN, N.Atlantic, and bits of colonial baggage. Quite enough. Onway was a pile of good kit largely on fixed price/deferred terms from US. Overwhelming logic was to inter-operate (=mercenary crew) with US everywhere, and just add F-newest every few years to the never-never $ invoice. Some UK jobs in inventory ownership: repair much, make little (some licence build if quantities are there - say ATM), because Economics favour US volume. Put UK engineering industry someplace US can't catch us: say sensible autos.
What Healey/Wilson actually did was invest vast resources into UK Defence, favouring Aero. Chevaline, Jaguar, Tornado, 26 new to add to 65 ex-RN Buccs for RAF, Hawk, Seawolf, Rapier, a UK-solo NDB, 8xT.21 Amazon, DDG 14xT.42 Sheffield...and on...and on...all initiated/continued despite the Nation being broke. Before 1971 kids could leave school at 15 and most did: only in 1970 did Education at last overtake Defence's share of GDP (5.1% cf. 4.8%). They did all that because they knew quite as much about the Red Threat as did anyone, and they did their best to gird...affordably. That Threat went away in 1990 because Reds did not know how much was enough, and spent their regime to death.
I would have chopped Puma post-AFVG and bought whatever USArmy/Germany had. Leave the rest alone.
I think we should have made lots of Viggens at Warton ( I think they would have been gutless with Speys though, unless you squeezed in two!) and pretty much replaced the fast jet inventory with them
Helped out by a few sqns of new Buccs and taken a clue from the Germans with the Alpha jet and built a dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.
Helped out by a few sqns of new Buccs and taken a clue from the Germans with the Alpha jet and built a dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.
Pretty much - not sure it would have needed a radar though (in this role)
Surely something cheap and cheerful but that could be afforded in numbers for the last ditch CAS role if Ivan had drove across Germany.
Save the radar for AD - I imagine a handfull of radar equiped Hawks (as formation leaders) would have dramtically improved the usefulness of the trainer version in AD
Surely something cheap and cheerful but that could be afforded in numbers for the last ditch CAS role if Ivan had drove across Germany.
Save the radar for AD - I imagine a handfull of radar equiped Hawks (as formation leaders) would have dramtically improved the usefulness of the trainer version in AD
What would I have done differently in 1968? Well, I probably wouldn't have believed my mate when he told me the toy parachute in his soldier's dressing up outfit was a real one and not jumped off the garage roof.
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Quote:
I don't see much space to put fuel other then behind the cockpit.
Internal fuel capacity was 25425 litres, of which roughly 80% was in the fuselage, with the other 20% in the wing. Additional fuel could be carried in under wing tanks or in a fuselage ferry tank.
I don't see much space to put fuel other then behind the cockpit.
Internal fuel capacity was 25425 litres, of which roughly 80% was in the fuselage, with the other 20% in the wing. Additional fuel could be carried in under wing tanks or in a fuselage ferry tank.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
TSR2:
Structurally TSR.2 consisted of five main elements: two centre fuselage sections, the nose section housing the two crew in tandem, the tail section with the fin, and the complete wing. Since about 80% of the fuel was carried in the fuselage, the structure was designed as an integral tank, with fuel in the forward tanks extending aft from the equipment bay to a point between the air intakes, and with rear tanks built around the engine tunnels......
Aircraft empty weight was 54750 lb (24442kg). Take-off weight for an 1125 mile (1800km) sortie would have been about 96000lb (42800kg). Maximum take-off weight would have been about 102200lb (45625kg).......
Total internal fuel capacity was 5588 gallons. Extra fuel was available in the form of 450 gallon under-wing drop tanks, a 570 gallon tank in the weapons bay and a jettisonable ventral tank holding 1000 gallons under the fuselage. Production aircraft would have had an in-flight refuelling capability......
Rounded figures:
5588 Gal = 25400L
450 gal x2 = 4000L
570 Gal = 2600L
1000 Gal = 4500L
Structurally TSR.2 consisted of five main elements: two centre fuselage sections, the nose section housing the two crew in tandem, the tail section with the fin, and the complete wing. Since about 80% of the fuel was carried in the fuselage, the structure was designed as an integral tank, with fuel in the forward tanks extending aft from the equipment bay to a point between the air intakes, and with rear tanks built around the engine tunnels......
Aircraft empty weight was 54750 lb (24442kg). Take-off weight for an 1125 mile (1800km) sortie would have been about 96000lb (42800kg). Maximum take-off weight would have been about 102200lb (45625kg).......
Total internal fuel capacity was 5588 gallons. Extra fuel was available in the form of 450 gallon under-wing drop tanks, a 570 gallon tank in the weapons bay and a jettisonable ventral tank holding 1000 gallons under the fuselage. Production aircraft would have had an in-flight refuelling capability......
Rounded figures:
5588 Gal = 25400L
450 gal x2 = 4000L
570 Gal = 2600L
1000 Gal = 4500L
Last edited by ORAC; 1st Jan 2013 at 10:34.
I think we should have made lots of Viggens at Warton ( I think they would have been gutless with Speys though, unless you squeezed in two!) and pretty much replaced the fast jet inventory with them
Helped out by a few sqns of new Buccs and taken a clue from the Germans with the Alpha jet and built a dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.
Helped out by a few sqns of new Buccs and taken a clue from the Germans with the Alpha jet and built a dedicated CAS version of the Hawk.
Damn fine aircraft though I've always thought.
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#79, BEagle: Rotodyne. Funded not as a LCY downtown girl -economics would make no sense, but as upfront military inserter. We tussled with the legacy of Heavy Gliders and of paras excreting from Daks. Expensive, in every way. We had an on/off thought in 1953 of (free) C-119 Packets, then in 1957 contemplated DHC-4 Caribou...or Rotodyne. We chose to take SAL TwinPins. Rotodyne dribbled on a MoS Research budget where RAE's bright ideas sat, as yet unwanted by Requirors (V/STOL, jet flap, BLC by suction...those things). Hovercraft sat there too. By 1960, as Westland took over all UK rotors, big turboshaft helis were becoming credible (to be Chinook was in hand!) UK chose to put its money into turbine S.58 (to be Wessii), some, not much, into Belvedere as inducement to WAL to take Bristol Helicopter Divn. Rotodyne as orphan.
#52 SOSL: Spey into Phantom as dole. No. RN wanted out of P.1154 and told Ministers that Spey, and only Spey, could handle the bolter case on Ark Small. (It doesn't actually matter whether anyone here cares to contest that. Ministers accepted professional advice, remembering the very public loss of O/C of first Scimitar Squadron embarkation).
When P.1154(RAF) was chopped, RAF wanted 175 F-4D, bog (J79)-standard, offered at fixed price, fixed delivery, on credit. Roy Jenkins, MoA, turned that into 66 Harrier GR.1 and 116 F-4M/Spey: he knew TSR.2 was about to expire, and saw this package as means of preserving, not dole for some, but any industry at all.
#52 SOSL: Spey into Phantom as dole. No. RN wanted out of P.1154 and told Ministers that Spey, and only Spey, could handle the bolter case on Ark Small. (It doesn't actually matter whether anyone here cares to contest that. Ministers accepted professional advice, remembering the very public loss of O/C of first Scimitar Squadron embarkation).
When P.1154(RAF) was chopped, RAF wanted 175 F-4D, bog (J79)-standard, offered at fixed price, fixed delivery, on credit. Roy Jenkins, MoA, turned that into 66 Harrier GR.1 and 116 F-4M/Spey: he knew TSR.2 was about to expire, and saw this package as means of preserving, not dole for some, but any industry at all.
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Wiki, citing Burke 2010, says:
BTW Viggens mentioned proved to have excellent short field performance.
Wiki also says Viggens they had no problem locking SR71s.
The last statement is unlikely IMO. The huge FoxHound radars should also have had a good chance IMO..
Costs continued to rise, which led to concerns at both company and government upper management levels, and the aircraft was also falling short of many of the requirements laid out in OR.343, such as takeoff distance and combat radius. As a cost-saving measure, a reduced specification was agreed upon, notably reductions in combat radius to 650 nmi (1,200 km), the top speed to Mach 1.75 and takeoff run up increased from 600 to 1,000 yards (550 to 910 m).
Wiki also says Viggens they had no problem locking SR71s.
Swedish JA 37 Viggen fighter pilots, using the predictable patterns of Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird routine flights over the Baltic Sea, managed to lock their radar on the SR-71 on numerous occasions. Despite heavy jamming from the SR-71, target illumination was maintained by feeding target location from ground-based radars to the fire-control computer in the Viggen. The most common site for the lock-on to occur was the thin stretch of international airspace between Öland and Gotland that the SR-71 used on the return flight. The Viggen is the only aircraft to this day to get a radar lock on the SR-71.[26]
Last edited by keesje; 3rd Jan 2013 at 09:26.
