Australian Army Aviation Corps
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"the AAVN cannot afford to lose a Tiger/MRH-90 airframe in battle."
Well in that case, we either shouldn't have purchased them
or we should get someone with balls up top. Having an assett
but not using it because it might get dented, FMD, what a piss
ant situation.
Agree re the 2nd part. Better to have purchased a Kingswood
with a 202 motor that got from A to B than a Bentley that doesn't
get out of the drive way.
Well in that case, we either shouldn't have purchased them
or we should get someone with balls up top. Having an assett
but not using it because it might get dented, FMD, what a piss
ant situation.
Agree re the 2nd part. Better to have purchased a Kingswood
with a 202 motor that got from A to B than a Bentley that doesn't
get out of the drive way.
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I know this is Navy and sub related but interesting.
I have yet to read other reports to cross check the facts
so any help on whether accurate or not would be good.
Our sub fleet world's worst: report
I have yet to read other reports to cross check the facts
so any help on whether accurate or not would be good.
Our sub fleet world's worst: report
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One of the problems that always gets overlooked in this debate is the essential position of ARH's capability (or any future equivalent) in particular in the combined arms environment. ARH (I'm not specifying Tiger in particular, just the doctrinal capability - could be AH-64 or any other platform) brings so much to the table - sensors, offensive weapons, comms, data xfer.
It is essentially Army in what it does. Does that mean Army has to crew it? It does, but if RAAF also crew it no problems. The essential bit is that Army GSOs have direct experience and understanding of ARH operations, AND that ARH ops have Army experience and understanding. I can see a hypothetical situation where Pilot SSOs are replaced with RAAF aircrew over the course of several years. A lot of the check, training, airworthiness etc stuff could be RAAF. But there must be a stream of ARH Army pilots making it to unit and formation command, and sub-unit ARH must reside in the Army Manoeuvre brigades.
I don't think this argument holds for S-70, MRH or CH-47, and all potentially would benefit from RAAF ownership, crewing, operation, command etc.
The ability to move aircrew around poses a risk to the sustainability of ARH as a capability. If ARH pilots can be taken from ARH and redeployed according to someone beyond FORCOMD's authority, then the Brigades stand to lose a crucial part of their manoeuvre effects. A good reason for NOT being able to redeploy / post / detach ARH pilots for someone else's benefit.
It is essentially Army in what it does. Does that mean Army has to crew it? It does, but if RAAF also crew it no problems. The essential bit is that Army GSOs have direct experience and understanding of ARH operations, AND that ARH ops have Army experience and understanding. I can see a hypothetical situation where Pilot SSOs are replaced with RAAF aircrew over the course of several years. A lot of the check, training, airworthiness etc stuff could be RAAF. But there must be a stream of ARH Army pilots making it to unit and formation command, and sub-unit ARH must reside in the Army Manoeuvre brigades.
I don't think this argument holds for S-70, MRH or CH-47, and all potentially would benefit from RAAF ownership, crewing, operation, command etc.
Originally Posted by BR71
...and allowed the Service greater flexibility in use of aircrew resources
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Australian defence organisation considerations
The crucial issue of organisation, because nothing functions effectively if that feature is deficient, usually gets somewhat missed in defence debate. I did Quality Assurance Auditor (ISO9001) training in the UK a couple of decades back which is oriented toward analysing the charters of management structures, lines of responsibility and why functions do or don't work properly.
Pre-ADF formation in 1974, the respective Australian armed forces were properly subject to political direction with smallish elements of the Public Service embedded in the respective Service headquarters. Command of operations was largely managed remote from Canberra embracing Army Field Force Command, RAN Fleet Headquarters and RAAF Operational Command and all worked very cooperatively in my experience. But now, a hugely expensive (and arguably needless) Joint Force HQ is being established in Canberra that will inevitably result in the ADF being micro-managed from the highest levels rather than command being delegated to the lowest practicable level.
The Tange Re-organisation in 1974 diluted ministerial representation for each of the armed forces and instituted a structure wherein the Public Service component of DoD has grown prodigiously and now dominates the military. In the words of a colleague at a lunching of eagles yesterday, 'The Public Servants now have the whole defence scene well and truly by the balls'. He retired as a 2 Star recently but got called back temporarily to help assess the RAN ship maintenance quagmire, so has his finger on the pulse.
The political nouse or will to curb this Public Service domination seems absent, but neither have there been any military chiefs in recent decades prepared to fall on their swords if necessary to publicly propose remediation of the DoD structure. Prima facie, some of the senior military seem so brainwashed by the DoD culture that they have been complicit in the origination of flawed planning, like the disastrous ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan.
Decaying helo fleet operational capacity must be remedied which seems unlikely to happen in timely fashion by awaiting doubtful full operational capability of Tiger and MRH-90. Better to look at cost-effective optimisation of other assets still available. The big problem though is to get DoD to admit that military preparedness is declining because the Defence Capability Plan spawned by DWP2009 was ill-conceived.
Foreseeable constraints on defence expenditure will ultimately force some rationalisation of the Australian military and the ADF helo force would be a good start point. It will become increasingly more difficult to justify retention of 3 separate air arms.
Pre-ADF formation in 1974, the respective Australian armed forces were properly subject to political direction with smallish elements of the Public Service embedded in the respective Service headquarters. Command of operations was largely managed remote from Canberra embracing Army Field Force Command, RAN Fleet Headquarters and RAAF Operational Command and all worked very cooperatively in my experience. But now, a hugely expensive (and arguably needless) Joint Force HQ is being established in Canberra that will inevitably result in the ADF being micro-managed from the highest levels rather than command being delegated to the lowest practicable level.
The Tange Re-organisation in 1974 diluted ministerial representation for each of the armed forces and instituted a structure wherein the Public Service component of DoD has grown prodigiously and now dominates the military. In the words of a colleague at a lunching of eagles yesterday, 'The Public Servants now have the whole defence scene well and truly by the balls'. He retired as a 2 Star recently but got called back temporarily to help assess the RAN ship maintenance quagmire, so has his finger on the pulse.
The political nouse or will to curb this Public Service domination seems absent, but neither have there been any military chiefs in recent decades prepared to fall on their swords if necessary to publicly propose remediation of the DoD structure. Prima facie, some of the senior military seem so brainwashed by the DoD culture that they have been complicit in the origination of flawed planning, like the disastrous ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan.
Decaying helo fleet operational capacity must be remedied which seems unlikely to happen in timely fashion by awaiting doubtful full operational capability of Tiger and MRH-90. Better to look at cost-effective optimisation of other assets still available. The big problem though is to get DoD to admit that military preparedness is declining because the Defence Capability Plan spawned by DWP2009 was ill-conceived.
Foreseeable constraints on defence expenditure will ultimately force some rationalisation of the Australian military and the ADF helo force would be a good start point. It will become increasingly more difficult to justify retention of 3 separate air arms.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 12th Dec 2012 at 23:01. Reason: Context
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Three sadly all too predictable unproductive posts in response to Bushranger's VERY sensible post.
Statements such as those expressed by BR71 must be supported with fact and tested. I don’t doubt his historical recollections though.
BR71 stated that ARH should be transferred to Navy. I don’t quite know how ARH will then be integrated into the combined arms team to win the land battle? Presumably BR71 has a very simple and well thought out response.
He also stated that further training was needed for some aircrew. Presumably he knows what that training entails? What tasks does he consider deficient?
Furthermore, if he feels that boring holes in the sky is wasted and ADF assets need to be involved in combat operations would he not be consistent with that argument for all ADF assets? Or is offering the government an option (well trained and ready) the role of the ADF?
Re the further training, it would be that required to standardise Army graduates to the 2FTS standard as achieved by RAAF and RAN; eg high-low TOT nav, more advanced formation, high(er) speed and altitude IFR work etc.
Ideally, I'd want all ADF pilots graduating from 2FTS. As BR71 has previously alluded, RAAF helicopter people have moved with a good deal of success between types, many on to fast jets over the years.
If we were to go towards an ADF air organisation with more fluid transfer between services, it would be greatly beneficial to have this pool of pilots all with nominally equal starting status. Of course, it'd be costly, which would probably put the kibosh on it, but in a small setup like ours, flexibility is a bloody good thing to have.
Ideally, I'd want all ADF pilots graduating from 2FTS. As BR71 has previously alluded, RAAF helicopter people have moved with a good deal of success between types, many on to fast jets over the years.
If we were to go towards an ADF air organisation with more fluid transfer between services, it would be greatly beneficial to have this pool of pilots all with nominally equal starting status. Of course, it'd be costly, which would probably put the kibosh on it, but in a small setup like ours, flexibility is a bloody good thing to have.
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Some feedback from 2 eagles luncheons this week.
Regarding RAAF pilot issues. Super Hornet training at 6SQN is grinding to a halt due resignation of several instructor pilots recruited by Middle East militaries. They are being offered a 4 year contract at $150K per year tax free plus a $40K accommodation consideration and other perks, compared with their roughly $100K p.a. in the ADF, which is fully taxable. Few also like the role of flying with back-seaters very much.
Several new aircraft have been recently introduced, namely C-17, KC-30, Wedgetail. This has soaked up pilot resources as new aircraft do while building up to full squadron strength which can take 2 or 3 years. There is apparently some shortage of pilots for Wedgetail at present.
Many of us at a mid-week luncheon had a multiple role Air Force flying career and ponder why the RAAF has moved away from this more flexible approach to separate streaming of pilots for strike/fighter roles. Broader flying career possibilities would be more likely to encourage continued service due to greater job satisfaction.
Airline recruiting has had a lesser effect recently than in the past. About mid-2012, it seemed likely that Qantas would soon retrench about 300 to 500 pilots, but that action may have been stalled due to the machinations going on within that company.
Back to the thread theme. I do not really see any great difficulty integrating Army pilots into Air Force or Navy, if that was desirable as an efficiency measure and the possible need for some additional flying training has been adequately explained by others.
Methinks there is a sort of blind doctrinal following of how the US Army thinks regarding integration of ARH for example into the Army so-called combined arms package. Both the RAAF and RAN were pretty intimately involved with aviation support for the Army over decades and the jointery bit generally worked pretty well at the operating level in my view. Army has often had other forces air elements under their operational control and any notion that Air Force and Navy aircrew could not adequately understand Army operations is somewhat astray, particularly considering the now more unified nature of the ADF with joint force emphasis.
The ADF seems stuck with the Tiger for now, but it is arguably a less effective platform for intimate close air support and armed scout/reconnaissance capabilities than types previously operated in those roles that were easily enhanceable at modest cost. Sensors can be retro-fitted to many platforms to optimise role flexibility. Government policy and national strategic assessments of course govern which of say F-18 air defence/ground attack and Tiger weapons capabilities would have priority if economy measures are deemed necessary.
If present helo force structure planning proceeds, easy deployability and field supportability of cost-effective types will be forfeited. The Canberra class aircraft carriers were ostensibly acquired to enable transportation of expeditionary forces, but that might become a lesser priority for the ADF in DWP2013. However, that seaborne force concept was used to justify a whole bunch of MRH-90 (although not marinised), so perhaps better to lump the LPDs, MRH-90 and Tiger together for that purpose within Navy. Only modest spending would be necessary to enhance Kiowa, Blackhawk and any remaining Iroquois to retain their very versatile capabilities, whichever air arm operates those land-based platforms.
Regarding RAAF pilot issues. Super Hornet training at 6SQN is grinding to a halt due resignation of several instructor pilots recruited by Middle East militaries. They are being offered a 4 year contract at $150K per year tax free plus a $40K accommodation consideration and other perks, compared with their roughly $100K p.a. in the ADF, which is fully taxable. Few also like the role of flying with back-seaters very much.
Several new aircraft have been recently introduced, namely C-17, KC-30, Wedgetail. This has soaked up pilot resources as new aircraft do while building up to full squadron strength which can take 2 or 3 years. There is apparently some shortage of pilots for Wedgetail at present.
Many of us at a mid-week luncheon had a multiple role Air Force flying career and ponder why the RAAF has moved away from this more flexible approach to separate streaming of pilots for strike/fighter roles. Broader flying career possibilities would be more likely to encourage continued service due to greater job satisfaction.
Airline recruiting has had a lesser effect recently than in the past. About mid-2012, it seemed likely that Qantas would soon retrench about 300 to 500 pilots, but that action may have been stalled due to the machinations going on within that company.
Back to the thread theme. I do not really see any great difficulty integrating Army pilots into Air Force or Navy, if that was desirable as an efficiency measure and the possible need for some additional flying training has been adequately explained by others.
Methinks there is a sort of blind doctrinal following of how the US Army thinks regarding integration of ARH for example into the Army so-called combined arms package. Both the RAAF and RAN were pretty intimately involved with aviation support for the Army over decades and the jointery bit generally worked pretty well at the operating level in my view. Army has often had other forces air elements under their operational control and any notion that Air Force and Navy aircrew could not adequately understand Army operations is somewhat astray, particularly considering the now more unified nature of the ADF with joint force emphasis.
The ADF seems stuck with the Tiger for now, but it is arguably a less effective platform for intimate close air support and armed scout/reconnaissance capabilities than types previously operated in those roles that were easily enhanceable at modest cost. Sensors can be retro-fitted to many platforms to optimise role flexibility. Government policy and national strategic assessments of course govern which of say F-18 air defence/ground attack and Tiger weapons capabilities would have priority if economy measures are deemed necessary.
If present helo force structure planning proceeds, easy deployability and field supportability of cost-effective types will be forfeited. The Canberra class aircraft carriers were ostensibly acquired to enable transportation of expeditionary forces, but that might become a lesser priority for the ADF in DWP2013. However, that seaborne force concept was used to justify a whole bunch of MRH-90 (although not marinised), so perhaps better to lump the LPDs, MRH-90 and Tiger together for that purpose within Navy. Only modest spending would be necessary to enhance Kiowa, Blackhawk and any remaining Iroquois to retain their very versatile capabilities, whichever air arm operates those land-based platforms.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 14th Dec 2012 at 17:28.
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Attended a similar function myself earlier in the week and spoke to someone best left unnamed here who had been to Spain to do some work on the new carrier. I won't go into anything controversial, but one thing he said is worth repeating here. He said he was not expecting it to be so BIG. 50% bigger than the old Melbourne, it will take some filling.
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"the AAVN cannot afford to lose a Tiger/MRH-90 airframe in battle."
Well in that case, we either shouldn't have purchased them
or we should get someone with balls up top. Having an assett
but not using it because it might get dented, FMD, what a piss
ant situation.
Well in that case, we either shouldn't have purchased them
or we should get someone with balls up top. Having an assett
but not using it because it might get dented, FMD, what a piss
ant situation.
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Except for a few (damn near empty*) empires that would disappear, and a higher initial cost (in all pilots competing 2FTS), I can't see a single argument against having every pilot in the ADF available to be posted anywhere within the whole ADF system.
The old RAAF system, where almost every pilot, within six years of graduating from FTS, was cross-trained in at least two separate branches of the system, allowed for enormous flexibility in times of crisis. As an outsider looking in, what we have now seems to be an unmitigated shambles. Is it true that AAVN pilots are averaging 5 hours a month, to say nothing of year long (and longer) waits for conversion courses? How in the world can you hope to maintain recency, let alone develop - and pass on - skills, with that little flying? I've heard of similar delays for conversions in RAAF units.
*to explain "damn near empty empires": the Army fought long and hard (and some would say dirty) to take over the rotary wing part of the ADF. What they've done - or, more to the point, HAVEN'T done - with it since gaining it beggars belief. All they have is a giant Potemkin village - glossy pieces of kit with great facades, but nothing of substance - or able to deliver an operational result - behind them.
I'm tempted to say they're up there with the current government in having grand and imposing plans, but no idea in how to implement them. I don't think I'm the only one who believes Australia made an enormous mistake in 'going European' for both a troop carrier and armed recce/gunship helicopters, but accept that, short of the government and DMO accepting another major and incredibly costly embarrassment a la the Seasprite backdown - (about as likely as Julia Gillard 'fessin' up to anything) - we're stuck with them for some years to come and will have to made do.
I'd love to believe those who are now assuring us that the problems with the Tiger and the MRH-90 are behind us, (how many years has it been now?), but again to use the Rudd/Gillard analogy, going on past performance, I just can't bring myself to believe anything they say, 'they' in this case being those telling us all is well and 'give us another 'n' years and we'll get it all right'. (Does that last line sound familiar?)
The old RAAF system, where almost every pilot, within six years of graduating from FTS, was cross-trained in at least two separate branches of the system, allowed for enormous flexibility in times of crisis. As an outsider looking in, what we have now seems to be an unmitigated shambles. Is it true that AAVN pilots are averaging 5 hours a month, to say nothing of year long (and longer) waits for conversion courses? How in the world can you hope to maintain recency, let alone develop - and pass on - skills, with that little flying? I've heard of similar delays for conversions in RAAF units.
*to explain "damn near empty empires": the Army fought long and hard (and some would say dirty) to take over the rotary wing part of the ADF. What they've done - or, more to the point, HAVEN'T done - with it since gaining it beggars belief. All they have is a giant Potemkin village - glossy pieces of kit with great facades, but nothing of substance - or able to deliver an operational result - behind them.
I'm tempted to say they're up there with the current government in having grand and imposing plans, but no idea in how to implement them. I don't think I'm the only one who believes Australia made an enormous mistake in 'going European' for both a troop carrier and armed recce/gunship helicopters, but accept that, short of the government and DMO accepting another major and incredibly costly embarrassment a la the Seasprite backdown - (about as likely as Julia Gillard 'fessin' up to anything) - we're stuck with them for some years to come and will have to made do.
I'd love to believe those who are now assuring us that the problems with the Tiger and the MRH-90 are behind us, (how many years has it been now?), but again to use the Rudd/Gillard analogy, going on past performance, I just can't bring myself to believe anything they say, 'they' in this case being those telling us all is well and 'give us another 'n' years and we'll get it all right'. (Does that last line sound familiar?)
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Some good debate this thread concerning a thorny issue so well done to contributors. The Australian DoD is probably monitoring, but are they heeding?
This link poses another interesting question re the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan:
Photos: Bell UH-1H Huey II (205) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
This link poses another interesting question re the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan:
Photos: Bell UH-1H Huey II (205) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 15th Dec 2012 at 18:05. Reason: Grammar
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Bushranger
The DoD, ASIO and the Fed Police ARE monitoring / reading,
have no illusions about that.
We are all listed on lists in databases !!!
The DoD, ASIO and the Fed Police ARE monitoring / reading,
have no illusions about that.
We are all listed on lists in databases !!!
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The DoD, ASIO and the Fed Police ARE monitoring / reading
Although the Labour Party spin doctors certainly do monitor this website
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Methinks there is a sort of blind doctrinal following of how the US Army thinks regarding integration of ARH for example into the Army so-called combined arms package.
Operating attack aviation assets as part of the combined arms team integrated into Land Manoeuvre is neither blind doctrine or espoused by US army aviation only. It is the common method used by the vast majority of Land Manoeuvre assets i.e. Brit army, US Marine Corps and Heer. The use of the term “so called combined arms package” is interesting.
BR71 clearly stated that he felt ARH should be transferred to the Navy. Presumably, since he has not addressed this query, he continues to support that stance.
Furthermore, he felt that because ARH may not be deployed, they were simply “being burned up…boring holes in the sky” in some sort of wasteful and extravagant way.
Flying advanced aircraft means specialising. Indeed, the flying side of the house is simpler than ever. On the other hand, ‘operating’ the aircraft has become more complex. Those who have flown complex aircraft in complex missions understand this irrespective of service or type. Most militaries now stream pre wings – for good reason including economics but also to deliver a trained product within a reasonable time frame. I think it is safe to assume the likelihood of cross streaming is becoming very remote given the specialist nature of the aircraft and battlefield.
That does not preclude the concept of a single, unified aviation combat force.
the Tiger…is arguably a less effective platform for intimate close air support and armed scout/reconnaissance capabilities than types previously operated in those roles that were easily enhanceable at modest cost. Sensors can be retro-fitted to many platforms to optimise role flexibility.
We will agree to disagree on this point which presumably is the crux of your discourse. I won’t be drawn on discussing the merits or otherwise of any platforms mentioned. I won’t be discussing tactical tasks or missions. I won’t be discussing sensors or weapons.
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Hello R&H.
Each of the Australian armed forces has been guilty over time of being too ambitious and wanting to always involve in bigger scale conflicts rather than focus more on regional needs. Well before 1989, Australian Army Aviation aspired to emulate US Army Aviation, which is a huge organisation with concepts of operation well beyond what Australia could afford or operate. Australia's focus should be on doing more with much less; in other words, greater versatility and cost-effectiveness of platforms and enhanced tactical flexibility, much of which has been sacrificed by choice of inappropriate hardware, as evidenced by glaring capability gaps.
As the Brits and others have proved in Afghanistan, the support tail for a few AAH is huge and it would be interesting to compare that with the Huey II being operated on behalf of the US State Department in that theatre. See again this link and note what is probably some form of defensive sensor fitted at the end of the tail boom: Photos: Bell UH-1H Huey II (205) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
In my view, there was an overkill reaction to East Timor intervention with both Army and Navy pushing strongly for expeditionary force deployment capabilities. As a result came the LPDs and MRH-90, both dubious merit platforms that are likely to create costly operating difficulties downstream for both of those Services. Tiger is arguably much less suited for possible regional tactical intimate fire support than an easier deployable Huey II Bushranger (or even a Blackhawk equivalent). Better therefore to mate Tiger with the LPDs and MRH-90 so the same shipborne supportability can be utilised in lieu of cumbersome support on the ground that would not be cost-effective. If any Australian government assigns higher priority to air resources for deterrence against interference with sea corridors, then conducting costly ongoing continuous training with Tiger would be wasteful whereas occasional weapons camps conducted for more versatile utility platforms was a more cost-effective way of maintaining basic skills.
Your 'complexity' argument is dubious. Similar technological advances apply across the whole spectrum of military hardware and operations. As in airlines, militaries have always adapted very quickly to such change, for example, the introduction of unmanned platforms. If the insular approach was taken of not continually feeding new blood through all air capabilities, difficulties would compound regarding job satisfaction and flexible utilisation of manpower, which have already become evident with the aircrew streaming approach. Your 'reasonable timeframe' argument also fails considering the now long delays for ADF pilots awaiting conversion courses post-graduation.
Australian Army Aviation was in much better shape in 1989 when it first received battlefield support helos from the Air Force than it is today. Since then, vast sums of money have been spent on that Air arm to the detriment of the other Army fighting arms and I guess it remains to be seen whether AAAvn endures as pressure for economies builds. As previously proven, aviators do not have to be brainwashed Army types to provide effective air support for that Service.
Each of the Australian armed forces has been guilty over time of being too ambitious and wanting to always involve in bigger scale conflicts rather than focus more on regional needs. Well before 1989, Australian Army Aviation aspired to emulate US Army Aviation, which is a huge organisation with concepts of operation well beyond what Australia could afford or operate. Australia's focus should be on doing more with much less; in other words, greater versatility and cost-effectiveness of platforms and enhanced tactical flexibility, much of which has been sacrificed by choice of inappropriate hardware, as evidenced by glaring capability gaps.
As the Brits and others have proved in Afghanistan, the support tail for a few AAH is huge and it would be interesting to compare that with the Huey II being operated on behalf of the US State Department in that theatre. See again this link and note what is probably some form of defensive sensor fitted at the end of the tail boom: Photos: Bell UH-1H Huey II (205) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
In my view, there was an overkill reaction to East Timor intervention with both Army and Navy pushing strongly for expeditionary force deployment capabilities. As a result came the LPDs and MRH-90, both dubious merit platforms that are likely to create costly operating difficulties downstream for both of those Services. Tiger is arguably much less suited for possible regional tactical intimate fire support than an easier deployable Huey II Bushranger (or even a Blackhawk equivalent). Better therefore to mate Tiger with the LPDs and MRH-90 so the same shipborne supportability can be utilised in lieu of cumbersome support on the ground that would not be cost-effective. If any Australian government assigns higher priority to air resources for deterrence against interference with sea corridors, then conducting costly ongoing continuous training with Tiger would be wasteful whereas occasional weapons camps conducted for more versatile utility platforms was a more cost-effective way of maintaining basic skills.
Flying advanced aircraft means specialising. Indeed, the flying side of the house is simpler than ever. On the other hand, ‘operating’ the aircraft has become more complex. Those who have flown complex aircraft in complex missions understand this irrespective of service or type. Most militaries now stream pre wings – for good reason including economics but also to deliver a trained product within a reasonable time frame. I think it is safe to assume the likelihood of cross streaming is becoming very remote given the specialist nature of the aircraft and battlefield.
Australian Army Aviation was in much better shape in 1989 when it first received battlefield support helos from the Air Force than it is today. Since then, vast sums of money have been spent on that Air arm to the detriment of the other Army fighting arms and I guess it remains to be seen whether AAAvn endures as pressure for economies builds. As previously proven, aviators do not have to be brainwashed Army types to provide effective air support for that Service.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Dec 2012 at 20:36. Reason: Grammar
R&H
I would not bother attempting any logical discussion with BR - he will always default to his outdated and myopic view that the Army cannot operate aviation assets effectively. He is still smarting over the transfer of assets to Army in 1989. Any reasoned debate over where aviation assets are best placed doctrinally will always end up in a dick measuring contest.
I would not bother attempting any logical discussion with BR - he will always default to his outdated and myopic view that the Army cannot operate aviation assets effectively. He is still smarting over the transfer of assets to Army in 1989. Any reasoned debate over where aviation assets are best placed doctrinally will always end up in a dick measuring contest.
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BR - and others
You mention the support tail. Everything we use has a support tail,
isn't it a matter of making sure the structure is in place so that it works,
just like it would be a truck, Armoured vehicle et al ?
It's not like they haven't operated Helos, just a lot more complicated
- and if that wasn't seen beforehand considering we interact with the UK
and US, then isn't that a failure of the leadership to plan, implement and
war game such a structure ?
You mention capability - but have the wrong assets or assets that
are not working as they should. Plenty has already been said about that.
I think the big issue is that we buy the asset - ie Tiger - but no one
wants to send it to war in case it gets dented. That is so wrong it is
not funny, especially when it might be costing our soldiers lives.
Why buy the thing in the first place then ?
A bit like buying Chinooks and then trucking soldiers to places !
You mention the support tail. Everything we use has a support tail,
isn't it a matter of making sure the structure is in place so that it works,
just like it would be a truck, Armoured vehicle et al ?
It's not like they haven't operated Helos, just a lot more complicated
- and if that wasn't seen beforehand considering we interact with the UK
and US, then isn't that a failure of the leadership to plan, implement and
war game such a structure ?
You mention capability - but have the wrong assets or assets that
are not working as they should. Plenty has already been said about that.
I think the big issue is that we buy the asset - ie Tiger - but no one
wants to send it to war in case it gets dented. That is so wrong it is
not funny, especially when it might be costing our soldiers lives.
Why buy the thing in the first place then ?
A bit like buying Chinooks and then trucking soldiers to places !