MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE
Antrim Kate:
If you read tuc's post carefully you will see plenty of malevolence from the then AMSO, ACAS and C.Eng who reneged on their duty and together subverted the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations. You will find yet more malevolence described in the link that tuc posted and I repeat here:
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
I commend it and encourage everyone who cares, not only about airworthiness, but about the Royal Air Force itself to study it carefully. This is a warning from history, and the main lesson to be learnt is to never, ever, go down this road again.
You ask how that might be avoided? You have to remove the means by which the Regulations can again be suborned. The only way that can happen is for the MAA (and of course the MAAIB) to be independent of the Operators, which means the MOD and its Service subsidiaries. I often quote the civilian parallel of the CAA and the airlines. They work together to ensure Safety but they are separate and independent. Note that the issue is that the organisations are independent. The personnel can, and indeed should, pass from one to the other, much as an exchange posting takes you from one military organisation to another. So the MAA may be staffed in part by serving personnel, bringing pertinent operational experience and appreciation, but when they are with the MAA they serve it and not, for instance, the RAF. As tuc points out, the higher up the food chain you go, the more this independence matters, so that the DG should be a civvie, or ex Service, or possibly about to be ex Service. That's my take anyway, and just to confirm, the MAA and the MAAIB must be separate and independent of both the MOD and of each other, but of course work closely together to ensure Airworthiness and hence ensure Military Aviation Capability.
What is the first step on this 1000 mile march? Acknowledge the lessons of history, or be forever damned! Lies cost lives!
Good point Chugalug, but it doesn't take malevolence to create a conflict of interest - if you're ACAS one week and MAA DG the next (as Anderson was, and North will be) or you're MAA Tech. Director now (and responsible for overseeing the introduction of Airseeker) but were Head of Air ISTAR last year (and responsible for procuring Airseeker) then, with the best will in the world, there could be problems.
On the other hand an assurance organisation does need both independence and credibility, and MAA do acknowledge that there is a trade-off in this respect. Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance?
On the other hand an assurance organisation does need both independence and credibility, and MAA do acknowledge that there is a trade-off in this respect. Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance?
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
I commend it and encourage everyone who cares, not only about airworthiness, but about the Royal Air Force itself to study it carefully. This is a warning from history, and the main lesson to be learnt is to never, ever, go down this road again.
You ask how that might be avoided? You have to remove the means by which the Regulations can again be suborned. The only way that can happen is for the MAA (and of course the MAAIB) to be independent of the Operators, which means the MOD and its Service subsidiaries. I often quote the civilian parallel of the CAA and the airlines. They work together to ensure Safety but they are separate and independent. Note that the issue is that the organisations are independent. The personnel can, and indeed should, pass from one to the other, much as an exchange posting takes you from one military organisation to another. So the MAA may be staffed in part by serving personnel, bringing pertinent operational experience and appreciation, but when they are with the MAA they serve it and not, for instance, the RAF. As tuc points out, the higher up the food chain you go, the more this independence matters, so that the DG should be a civvie, or ex Service, or possibly about to be ex Service. That's my take anyway, and just to confirm, the MAA and the MAAIB must be separate and independent of both the MOD and of each other, but of course work closely together to ensure Airworthiness and hence ensure Military Aviation Capability.
What is the first step on this 1000 mile march? Acknowledge the lessons of history, or be forever damned! Lies cost lives!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 1st Nov 2012 at 23:08.
From another novice, yes, the MAA is responsible for the FAA and AAC. I believe that, for the front line of both services, it is generally seen as a retrograde step. The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation. This has now been lost.
Last edited by pulse1; 2nd Nov 2012 at 08:31.
4Greens
Sorry, I meant to reply. Pulse1 is correct. One of the positives from the Nimrod Review (and there were many) was that Haddon-Cave accepted the evidence that the failures were systemic, despite MoD's claims it was a one-off. (The problem was he presented it as a revelation). Hence, he recommended a "Military" Airworthiness Authority, not a "Nimrod AA". The Secretary of State had been given the same evidence before Haddon-Cave, and he too deserves credit for accepting the systemic nature of the failings.
What I'd say though, is that the "system" became very RAF-orientated in the late 80s, with MoD(PE)'s specialist airworthiness staffs being transferred to AMSO in 1991. This transfer of independent (from the Services) staff meant PUS's regulations covering independent scrutiny could no longer be met. This conflict meant, for example, that some key airworthiness regulations could not be updated, as MoD policy now contradicted SoS's mandated regs and no-one was prepared to put his name to an update. This explains why conducting independent scrutiny became a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation.
The evidence (see link above) explains that at an HQ level, the RN removed their "Management" role from their own TORs, replacing it with "Monitoring". "Engines" has posted many times regarding the RN approach at 1st and 2nd Line, which remained excellent despite their HQ's abrogation (especially the appalling mess that was ASE). As did the RAF's, although of course they were closer in Command terms to their senior staffs who were hostile to what they were trying to achieve.
The RAF's perspective is best explained in the various Airworthiness Review Team reports, staring with the Chinook/Wessex/Puma one of August 1992. They articulate very well the day to day problems that faced RAF stations at the time, but because the Teams were actively prevented from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists, the underlying reasons for the problems were not explored.
Perhaps the most "entertaining" example is the use of captured Argentinean aircraft pubs. The "system" is heavily criticised, but the underlying reason why our own UK pubs weren't good enough is not explained. The answer was that, quite simply, instructions had been issued not to maintain pubs and funding was withdrawn. You'd have thought the Chief Engineer would at least fix that embarrassment, but it was his policy to chop funding, which may explain why he kept quiet. Most of the failures have similar simple explanations.
Sorry, I meant to reply. Pulse1 is correct. One of the positives from the Nimrod Review (and there were many) was that Haddon-Cave accepted the evidence that the failures were systemic, despite MoD's claims it was a one-off. (The problem was he presented it as a revelation). Hence, he recommended a "Military" Airworthiness Authority, not a "Nimrod AA". The Secretary of State had been given the same evidence before Haddon-Cave, and he too deserves credit for accepting the systemic nature of the failings.
What I'd say though, is that the "system" became very RAF-orientated in the late 80s, with MoD(PE)'s specialist airworthiness staffs being transferred to AMSO in 1991. This transfer of independent (from the Services) staff meant PUS's regulations covering independent scrutiny could no longer be met. This conflict meant, for example, that some key airworthiness regulations could not be updated, as MoD policy now contradicted SoS's mandated regs and no-one was prepared to put his name to an update. This explains why conducting independent scrutiny became a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation.
The evidence (see link above) explains that at an HQ level, the RN removed their "Management" role from their own TORs, replacing it with "Monitoring". "Engines" has posted many times regarding the RN approach at 1st and 2nd Line, which remained excellent despite their HQ's abrogation (especially the appalling mess that was ASE). As did the RAF's, although of course they were closer in Command terms to their senior staffs who were hostile to what they were trying to achieve.
The RAF's perspective is best explained in the various Airworthiness Review Team reports, staring with the Chinook/Wessex/Puma one of August 1992. They articulate very well the day to day problems that faced RAF stations at the time, but because the Teams were actively prevented from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists, the underlying reasons for the problems were not explored.
Perhaps the most "entertaining" example is the use of captured Argentinean aircraft pubs. The "system" is heavily criticised, but the underlying reason why our own UK pubs weren't good enough is not explained. The answer was that, quite simply, instructions had been issued not to maintain pubs and funding was withdrawn. You'd have thought the Chief Engineer would at least fix that embarrassment, but it was his policy to chop funding, which may explain why he kept quiet. Most of the failures have similar simple explanations.
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The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation.
Pulse 1:
"From another novice, yes, the MAA is responsible for the FAA and AAC. I believe that, for the front line of both services, it is generally seen as a retrograde step. The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation. This has now been lost. "
Despite the obvious confusion over its published purpose; the MAA is actually responsible for both "Forward and Depth" maintenance of all MOD owned aircraft (that's Line and Base maintenance to most people).
And I totally agree with your second point about the loss of independence.
"From another novice, yes, the MAA is responsible for the FAA and AAC. I believe that, for the front line of both services, it is generally seen as a retrograde step. The FAA safety system was run by middle rank officers with no prospect of further promotion and this gave them the independence which must be an essential component of any safety regulation. This has now been lost. "
Despite the obvious confusion over its published purpose; the MAA is actually responsible for both "Forward and Depth" maintenance of all MOD owned aircraft (that's Line and Base maintenance to most people).
And I totally agree with your second point about the loss of independence.
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Good summary on RAeS web
Just felt the need to join this forum. (perhaps more later about why) I would have liked to have gone to this event. There is a really good summary of proceedings on the RAeS web site added this week.
Good discussion about the personalities and their past and future agenda in the banter but honestly the situation can only get better. let us hope those in authority can learn from their past follies.
The RAF put up the best people they have at the time for the jobs. even if they may be deficient in some quarters. The second division would be far worse and the frames managed less safely.
I do feel there is a lot of weeding to do amongst the people managing safety in the individual IPTs. If the majority had been any good at Engineering they would have jobs where thay had more influence over safe outcomes - the bulk I came across were not even "had beens" -no experience of having done anything to speak of.
If I had just one wish it would be for there never to be another XV230 or Mull of Kintyre. That is just a dream. I am afraid that my confidence is low. they talk the talk but between the lines they are smilling vipers
Good discussion about the personalities and their past and future agenda in the banter but honestly the situation can only get better. let us hope those in authority can learn from their past follies.
The RAF put up the best people they have at the time for the jobs. even if they may be deficient in some quarters. The second division would be far worse and the frames managed less safely.
I do feel there is a lot of weeding to do amongst the people managing safety in the individual IPTs. If the majority had been any good at Engineering they would have jobs where thay had more influence over safe outcomes - the bulk I came across were not even "had beens" -no experience of having done anything to speak of.
If I had just one wish it would be for there never to be another XV230 or Mull of Kintyre. That is just a dream. I am afraid that my confidence is low. they talk the talk but between the lines they are smilling vipers
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What I would give to know that Baz North has read, digested and understood the comments on this forum?!
He, at least, will have a grasp about what is being said wrt Chinook Mk2 intro into Service. I would like to think that he was astounded to hear that the Mk2 had only been given 'switch-on only' clearance by CA in 1993/1994 but that his predecessor (ACAS/CAS/CE) had somehow managed to concoct an almost full RTS, while criminally omitting to tell the crews (esp that of ZD576) that the ac systems were so immature as to be 'positively dangerous'. If AM North accepts that much but also acknowledes the systemic airworthiness failures involving Hercules XV179, Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710/Patriot, Sea Kings XV704/650, I would also hope he is of a mind that drastic action is needed to allow the MAA to work to the correct time frame - i.e to regress to before 1987 and not just 1998. To do so, he would be well advised to ask questions of those who could 'do' airworthiness properly - many of those are retired but still have their vast experience and knowledge. It would be insane not to ask their opinion.
I feel that, at the moment, the MAA is a bit like an alcoholic who can't quite admit their drinking problem and is 'just cutting back'. Once the MAA openly admit that the systemic failures go deeper and farther back, only then can they go 'cold turkey' and begin proper rehabilitaion and recovery.
Please stand up........
He, at least, will have a grasp about what is being said wrt Chinook Mk2 intro into Service. I would like to think that he was astounded to hear that the Mk2 had only been given 'switch-on only' clearance by CA in 1993/1994 but that his predecessor (ACAS/CAS/CE) had somehow managed to concoct an almost full RTS, while criminally omitting to tell the crews (esp that of ZD576) that the ac systems were so immature as to be 'positively dangerous'. If AM North accepts that much but also acknowledes the systemic airworthiness failures involving Hercules XV179, Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710/Patriot, Sea Kings XV704/650, I would also hope he is of a mind that drastic action is needed to allow the MAA to work to the correct time frame - i.e to regress to before 1987 and not just 1998. To do so, he would be well advised to ask questions of those who could 'do' airworthiness properly - many of those are retired but still have their vast experience and knowledge. It would be insane not to ask their opinion.
I feel that, at the moment, the MAA is a bit like an alcoholic who can't quite admit their drinking problem and is 'just cutting back'. Once the MAA openly admit that the systemic failures go deeper and farther back, only then can they go 'cold turkey' and begin proper rehabilitaion and recovery.
Please stand up........
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Guys,
After a break, I'd like to post a few observations (having recently been mentioned, which I very much appreciate). Tuc, as ever, makes a number of excellent points. I'd like to pick up on a couple of them. The first is the 'safety/airworthiness/fitness for purpose(FFP)' angle that he rightly exposes.
I have a concern that these areas continue to be confused, mixed and in some cases badly understood. I'd suggest that one way of approaching the airworthiness issue is to consider three related categories, namely 'safety', 'fit for purpose' (FFP) and 'operational effectiveness'.
Taking an example, a radio modification (or baseline design) meets 'safety' criteria if it meets the basic regulations available to contractors and PTs. If met, it won't blow up, melt wiring, fall out of the aircraft, irradiate the crew, set other devices off, and so on. (For EFP, this would have been making sure it didn't screw up fuel supplies). This is core QinetiQ/ITE stuff
Next up is FFP. That means that the radio meets its specified performance targets, can be used by the aircrew in an operational environment, doesn't screw up NVGs, meets reasonable maintenance criteria, is sufficiently reliable, and so on. (For EFP, this would have involved any maintainability aspects). This is also an ITE area, but OEUs should get involved here.
Finally, Operational effectiveness - this means that it meets the needs of a particular operation - for a radio does the secure programming work, are the frequency ranges correct, and so on. (This category is more applicable to things like DAS systems and weapons, but hopefully you get the drift) (For EFP, this would have involved meeting a specified (and testable) level of ballistic protection). Testing in this area will mainly be the province of AWC and possibly Dstl for other areas.
These three categories of 'airworthiness' are complementary, and some overlap is inevitable. Nevertheless, I've found them to be a useful way to 'slice and dice' the complex area of development, testing and acceptance into chunks that one can handle one at a time. I'd be interested to hear from others on what they think of this approach.
The next important issue Tuc highlights, which went so badly wrong on the Chinook Mk2, is the function of the RTS and the role of the RTSA. This has also attracted comments from others. I'm not at all surprised that the MAA have still not published a formal statement of the roles and responsibilities of the RTSA, as it's such a political subject.
The function of the RTS, in my view, was to allow the user (service operating authority on old speak) to take the output from the PE (or DLO, or DPA, or DE&S), add in any items not covered by the PE owned configuration (i.e. SEMs, NSMs) add in any other instructions or cautions that the operators deemed necessary, and publish them to the users in a clear and auditable form. (I will declare my hand here - after some excellent work between the PE and my team in DGA(N), we prepared the first of the 'new' RTS documents in 1993 for the Sea Harrier FA2).
The big question is who should be the RTSA. In my view, compilation and ownership of the RTS needs to rest with an organisation and people that (in MAA yuckspeak) are 'SQEP'. That is, they can build, understand, and manage a complex technical document. Again, my view only, but that needs to be engineers, working with pilots. Building an RTSR and running an RTS require basic systems engineering expertise, deep technical knowledge of the platform, and a full understanding of how the RTS must mirror configuration. Sorry, but that's engineer land. Yes, there has to be a lot of pilot input to get the limits and other aspects right, but 90% of an RTS is tech stuff.
That's why the RN used engineers in DGA(N) to produce and own the RTS. These RN engineers are the 'middle rank officers' mentioned by Pulse1, who now reside at Fleet and run the RTSs for FAA aircraft. Once DGA(N) was canned, that's where they had to go.
After a number of years doing this sort of stuff, I honestly and soberly conclude that the RAF's system of having the RTS owned by ACAS and managed by aircrew is flawed. It failed for the Chinook Mk2, and I have watched it continue to fall short to this day. (Aircraft still entering service with 'switch on' clearances for operationally essential equipment - still happening. RAF aircrew officers 'signing off' on use of time expired weapons to meet deployment dates - seen it, objected to it, got the t-shirt).
Moreover, and here is where the MAA is, i suspect, having a problem or two. First off, ACAS will be jealously guarding his RTSA role. It's a 'badge of honour' sort of thing, and is linked to the 'run by pilots, for pilots' aspect of the RAF I've posted on before. The problem, in my view, is that ACAS owning the RTSA opens up all sorts of potential for operational demands to drive issue of defective RTSs. I'm afraid I think it's still happening.
Moreover, I'm having some difficulty working out what you now need an RTSA for. PTs produce the RTS recommendation (RTSR). We have an MAA that issues Military Type Certificates for all aircraft (and mods). We have SDHs, ODHs and DDHs that use the RTS. Would it nor be logical for the PT's to produce an RTSR as per the MAA regs, get the MTC 'tick' and submit it to the ODHs for approval and use? What is the rationale for having ACAS involved in approving and managing a core safety management document, when the DHs are responsible for managing safety in service? I really think the time's come to 'pull the plug' on this arrangement.
I'm quite aware that I could be criticised for coming to these conclusions based on my own FAA background. However, having worked closely with all three services for a number of years, i honestly think that the time has come to remove the RAF from this area of the airworthiness management chain.
Sadly, given the RAF's success in getting control of the MAA (and I do, reluctantly, tip my hat to them for a quite excellent campaign) I think the chances of this happening are about zero. (I'm dismayed to see an ex ACAS getting the MAA, but if you write the SQEP specs to require a 3 star military aviator, well I suppose that means the RAF.)
I'd be interested to hear from others on these thoughts - this is a forum, let's exchange honest and polite views for mutual benefit. I certainly learn a lot from this stuff.
Best Regards as ever to all those at the pointy end doing the pointy stuff
Engines
After a break, I'd like to post a few observations (having recently been mentioned, which I very much appreciate). Tuc, as ever, makes a number of excellent points. I'd like to pick up on a couple of them. The first is the 'safety/airworthiness/fitness for purpose(FFP)' angle that he rightly exposes.
I have a concern that these areas continue to be confused, mixed and in some cases badly understood. I'd suggest that one way of approaching the airworthiness issue is to consider three related categories, namely 'safety', 'fit for purpose' (FFP) and 'operational effectiveness'.
Taking an example, a radio modification (or baseline design) meets 'safety' criteria if it meets the basic regulations available to contractors and PTs. If met, it won't blow up, melt wiring, fall out of the aircraft, irradiate the crew, set other devices off, and so on. (For EFP, this would have been making sure it didn't screw up fuel supplies). This is core QinetiQ/ITE stuff
Next up is FFP. That means that the radio meets its specified performance targets, can be used by the aircrew in an operational environment, doesn't screw up NVGs, meets reasonable maintenance criteria, is sufficiently reliable, and so on. (For EFP, this would have involved any maintainability aspects). This is also an ITE area, but OEUs should get involved here.
Finally, Operational effectiveness - this means that it meets the needs of a particular operation - for a radio does the secure programming work, are the frequency ranges correct, and so on. (This category is more applicable to things like DAS systems and weapons, but hopefully you get the drift) (For EFP, this would have involved meeting a specified (and testable) level of ballistic protection). Testing in this area will mainly be the province of AWC and possibly Dstl for other areas.
These three categories of 'airworthiness' are complementary, and some overlap is inevitable. Nevertheless, I've found them to be a useful way to 'slice and dice' the complex area of development, testing and acceptance into chunks that one can handle one at a time. I'd be interested to hear from others on what they think of this approach.
The next important issue Tuc highlights, which went so badly wrong on the Chinook Mk2, is the function of the RTS and the role of the RTSA. This has also attracted comments from others. I'm not at all surprised that the MAA have still not published a formal statement of the roles and responsibilities of the RTSA, as it's such a political subject.
The function of the RTS, in my view, was to allow the user (service operating authority on old speak) to take the output from the PE (or DLO, or DPA, or DE&S), add in any items not covered by the PE owned configuration (i.e. SEMs, NSMs) add in any other instructions or cautions that the operators deemed necessary, and publish them to the users in a clear and auditable form. (I will declare my hand here - after some excellent work between the PE and my team in DGA(N), we prepared the first of the 'new' RTS documents in 1993 for the Sea Harrier FA2).
The big question is who should be the RTSA. In my view, compilation and ownership of the RTS needs to rest with an organisation and people that (in MAA yuckspeak) are 'SQEP'. That is, they can build, understand, and manage a complex technical document. Again, my view only, but that needs to be engineers, working with pilots. Building an RTSR and running an RTS require basic systems engineering expertise, deep technical knowledge of the platform, and a full understanding of how the RTS must mirror configuration. Sorry, but that's engineer land. Yes, there has to be a lot of pilot input to get the limits and other aspects right, but 90% of an RTS is tech stuff.
That's why the RN used engineers in DGA(N) to produce and own the RTS. These RN engineers are the 'middle rank officers' mentioned by Pulse1, who now reside at Fleet and run the RTSs for FAA aircraft. Once DGA(N) was canned, that's where they had to go.
After a number of years doing this sort of stuff, I honestly and soberly conclude that the RAF's system of having the RTS owned by ACAS and managed by aircrew is flawed. It failed for the Chinook Mk2, and I have watched it continue to fall short to this day. (Aircraft still entering service with 'switch on' clearances for operationally essential equipment - still happening. RAF aircrew officers 'signing off' on use of time expired weapons to meet deployment dates - seen it, objected to it, got the t-shirt).
Moreover, and here is where the MAA is, i suspect, having a problem or two. First off, ACAS will be jealously guarding his RTSA role. It's a 'badge of honour' sort of thing, and is linked to the 'run by pilots, for pilots' aspect of the RAF I've posted on before. The problem, in my view, is that ACAS owning the RTSA opens up all sorts of potential for operational demands to drive issue of defective RTSs. I'm afraid I think it's still happening.
Moreover, I'm having some difficulty working out what you now need an RTSA for. PTs produce the RTS recommendation (RTSR). We have an MAA that issues Military Type Certificates for all aircraft (and mods). We have SDHs, ODHs and DDHs that use the RTS. Would it nor be logical for the PT's to produce an RTSR as per the MAA regs, get the MTC 'tick' and submit it to the ODHs for approval and use? What is the rationale for having ACAS involved in approving and managing a core safety management document, when the DHs are responsible for managing safety in service? I really think the time's come to 'pull the plug' on this arrangement.
I'm quite aware that I could be criticised for coming to these conclusions based on my own FAA background. However, having worked closely with all three services for a number of years, i honestly think that the time has come to remove the RAF from this area of the airworthiness management chain.
Sadly, given the RAF's success in getting control of the MAA (and I do, reluctantly, tip my hat to them for a quite excellent campaign) I think the chances of this happening are about zero. (I'm dismayed to see an ex ACAS getting the MAA, but if you write the SQEP specs to require a 3 star military aviator, well I suppose that means the RAF.)
I'd be interested to hear from others on these thoughts - this is a forum, let's exchange honest and polite views for mutual benefit. I certainly learn a lot from this stuff.
Best Regards as ever to all those at the pointy end doing the pointy stuff
Engines
Engines
Correct in every respect.
You mention DGA(N). It was no surprise that it was a retired DGA(N) (Admiral Ron Holley RIP) who was initially most vocal about the fundamental airworthiness failures on Chinook Mk2. He was one of those people whom you could rely on 100% - if he said it wasn't airworthy, it wasn't.
The very last time I saw him he was standing on a table at an RPC in DGA(N) HQ telling his junior officers (up to senior Captain!) exactly what you've just said about engineers. Later, he was appalled at the new concept that emerged in MoD (not just RAF); that non-engineers were permitted to self-delegate technical and airworthiness approval, and over-rule safety/design decisions in the interest of achieving Time and Cost targets.
But what the system does not legislate for is senior officers, of whatever persuasion and specialism, lying through their back teeth to further their own careers, and protect their predecessors. A madness overcomes some of them when they acquire power. Do we not have a form of assessment that can divert their career paths to somewhere like Broadmoor?
I just don't think the MAA has the bottle to go there. For all they are doing, I do not think they can prevent another Bagnall, Alcock and Graydon, whereby CA's Switch On Only clearance was magically converted into a full operational RTS; and when challenged, their successors in D/Air Staffs denied the very existence of an RTS (in 1993, so according to them you can't possibly have prepared one for FA2!!).
Min(AF) issued a grovelling apology to the family (the first I've ever seen), but no action was taken against the perpetrators. The beautiful irony is that in their attempt to protect their VSO predecessors and blame the pilots, they actually shot themselves in the foot, because Lord Philip was utterly disgusted at the lie (and the attempt to blame Sir Donald Spiers). Now, what the MAA needs to do is acknowledge all this; only then can it move forward in the right direction.
Correct in every respect.
You mention DGA(N). It was no surprise that it was a retired DGA(N) (Admiral Ron Holley RIP) who was initially most vocal about the fundamental airworthiness failures on Chinook Mk2. He was one of those people whom you could rely on 100% - if he said it wasn't airworthy, it wasn't.
The very last time I saw him he was standing on a table at an RPC in DGA(N) HQ telling his junior officers (up to senior Captain!) exactly what you've just said about engineers. Later, he was appalled at the new concept that emerged in MoD (not just RAF); that non-engineers were permitted to self-delegate technical and airworthiness approval, and over-rule safety/design decisions in the interest of achieving Time and Cost targets.
But what the system does not legislate for is senior officers, of whatever persuasion and specialism, lying through their back teeth to further their own careers, and protect their predecessors. A madness overcomes some of them when they acquire power. Do we not have a form of assessment that can divert their career paths to somewhere like Broadmoor?
I just don't think the MAA has the bottle to go there. For all they are doing, I do not think they can prevent another Bagnall, Alcock and Graydon, whereby CA's Switch On Only clearance was magically converted into a full operational RTS; and when challenged, their successors in D/Air Staffs denied the very existence of an RTS (in 1993, so according to them you can't possibly have prepared one for FA2!!).
Min(AF) issued a grovelling apology to the family (the first I've ever seen), but no action was taken against the perpetrators. The beautiful irony is that in their attempt to protect their VSO predecessors and blame the pilots, they actually shot themselves in the foot, because Lord Philip was utterly disgusted at the lie (and the attempt to blame Sir Donald Spiers). Now, what the MAA needs to do is acknowledge all this; only then can it move forward in the right direction.
Engines, as ex-RAF pilot may I say that your lucid and critical expose of the ACAS/RTS system really hurts, as it is so true! The RAF has a lot to account for in this scandal, in that where the guilty party is the "MOD" it was often serving RAF VSOs that were the perpetrators of the deliberate subversion of the Airworthiness process. That peoples lives might still be unnecessarily hazarded because of inter Service politics is unacceptable. As you say, the whole RTS procedure needs to be challenged by the MAA, but by an MAA that is independent and separate of the MOD and not RAF dominated!
Safety, be it Flight, Air, Aerospace, or whatever today's buzz word is, has got to stop being a football booted around the corridors of power and instead become once again the military asset that it used to be, a Force Multiplier, to use a very ancient expression. It isn't soft to try to make military aircraft safe for their occupants, it's sound military thinking. Time we started getting more of that in the High Command, instead of yet more of these endlessly smooth presentations.
Safety, be it Flight, Air, Aerospace, or whatever today's buzz word is, has got to stop being a football booted around the corridors of power and instead become once again the military asset that it used to be, a Force Multiplier, to use a very ancient expression. It isn't soft to try to make military aircraft safe for their occupants, it's sound military thinking. Time we started getting more of that in the High Command, instead of yet more of these endlessly smooth presentations.
I've read all the evidence linked above. I'd have loved to be a fly on Phillip's wall when he was digesting the section that dissected the Chinook RTS and listed about 50 critical failures. I can imagine he wouldn't know what to make of it and may even have tried to ignore it, but MoD's denial that an RTS existed at all would have had him salivating. If you're going to challenge an assessment of a document you've supplied under freedom of info, for God's sake don't deny it's existence! What a bloody own goal. I hope none of these idiots work in the MAA.
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As always Engines sums up the situation beautifully. Sadly the common thread always seems to be senior RAF officers. In my long career in the FAA I can never remember a senior RN aviator ever putting pressure on the RTSA to release a capability to service that was unsafe. In general the "junior" engineers and aircrews' advice was trusted and acted upon. The same was true for the way BoIs were conducted.
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Tuc, Chug and others,
Thanks for the positive replies. Yes, Ron Holley was a fine officer, great engineer and a gentleman. He always stood 100% behind his junior air engineers, and gave us the confidence to do our jobs with the aircrew (not FOR the aircrew, but WITH the aircrew).
Chug, you make a good point - it's easy to blame 'the MoD', but I do honestly think that the RAF's core approach to 'engineering airworthiness' has not been up to the demands of modern aviation. In some ways, strangely, the RAF can be 20 years behind the 'curve' - I vividly remember my wife coming home in a foul mood from a High Wycombe lunch in 2001 - she had been asked to move over to another table because she was a 'junior officer's wife' - I was an SO1 in JFH. Un believable.
Basically, you HAVE to give engineers the backing to 'do the job right'. They will always strive mightily to get the job done on time. But if they are having problems, good leaders listen and adjust. They don't bully, harangue and then use dishonest devices like 'ICARs' and 'training releases (and my special pet hate, STFs) to deliver a half arsed job. It pains me to say it, because I have many friends in the Air Force that I respect and like, but the RAF has a cultural problem with managing airworthiness that only its engineers can fix. And part of that will be getting the pilots' 'tanks' off the airworthiness 'lawn'.
I'd like to offer a possibly hopeful thought. In my honest view, the MAA has not fundamentally changed the way military aviation is discharged. It has changed some regulations, but the basic job remains the same for engineers. My 'to do' list is as follows: Set the requirements. Manage the programme. Ruthlessly control configuration. Work the detail. Understand the detail. Understand the risks. Fix them if required. Listen to the pilots, but do not obey them. Get the paperwork right. Control modifications. Never neglect the pubs and the spares. Aim to meet schedules, but never be a schedule slave.
I honestly think that our young engineers are up to the job - leadership, guidance and the occasional size nine two lace holes in will do the rest. Senior officers will do what senior officers have always done - at the coal face, do your job professionally and to the best of your abilities and things will, I think, turn out OK. Oh, and whatever you do don't listen to old farts like me.
All the very best to all those young engineers out there at the front, doing stuff we never could have,
Engines
Thanks for the positive replies. Yes, Ron Holley was a fine officer, great engineer and a gentleman. He always stood 100% behind his junior air engineers, and gave us the confidence to do our jobs with the aircrew (not FOR the aircrew, but WITH the aircrew).
Chug, you make a good point - it's easy to blame 'the MoD', but I do honestly think that the RAF's core approach to 'engineering airworthiness' has not been up to the demands of modern aviation. In some ways, strangely, the RAF can be 20 years behind the 'curve' - I vividly remember my wife coming home in a foul mood from a High Wycombe lunch in 2001 - she had been asked to move over to another table because she was a 'junior officer's wife' - I was an SO1 in JFH. Un believable.
Basically, you HAVE to give engineers the backing to 'do the job right'. They will always strive mightily to get the job done on time. But if they are having problems, good leaders listen and adjust. They don't bully, harangue and then use dishonest devices like 'ICARs' and 'training releases (and my special pet hate, STFs) to deliver a half arsed job. It pains me to say it, because I have many friends in the Air Force that I respect and like, but the RAF has a cultural problem with managing airworthiness that only its engineers can fix. And part of that will be getting the pilots' 'tanks' off the airworthiness 'lawn'.
I'd like to offer a possibly hopeful thought. In my honest view, the MAA has not fundamentally changed the way military aviation is discharged. It has changed some regulations, but the basic job remains the same for engineers. My 'to do' list is as follows: Set the requirements. Manage the programme. Ruthlessly control configuration. Work the detail. Understand the detail. Understand the risks. Fix them if required. Listen to the pilots, but do not obey them. Get the paperwork right. Control modifications. Never neglect the pubs and the spares. Aim to meet schedules, but never be a schedule slave.
I honestly think that our young engineers are up to the job - leadership, guidance and the occasional size nine two lace holes in will do the rest. Senior officers will do what senior officers have always done - at the coal face, do your job professionally and to the best of your abilities and things will, I think, turn out OK. Oh, and whatever you do don't listen to old farts like me.
All the very best to all those young engineers out there at the front, doing stuff we never could have,
Engines
I've had a foot in all the camps stated above and whilst I agree with a lot of the narrative so far I think a lot of the failings are due to a lack of integrity by key individuals in the airworthiness chain. When I see very senior people making knowingly false claims regarding airworthiness to protect their own personal interest or professional standing I cringe. When I see no enforcement of standards or no action against those who make false statements I cry.
I do not think it is fair to lay the blame at the pilots in RTSA. Day in and day out I see them challenge the actions of DE&S. They seem to clash heads regarding the integrity and honesty with the same few senior individuals in DE&S on a routine basis. As described above I still see DE&S recommend 'switch-on only' clearances with no evidence, only to see these uplifted to full clearances after a period of use with the frontline with little or no independent evidence. RTSA catches some of these, but not all and the suggestion of adding engineering knowledge to the RTSA team is well made. But my point is that no action is taken against those who repeatedly subvert the airworthiness system. At times it seems that some in DE&S are playing games to see what they can get away with. I wish we had a system where a tally was kept when false airworthiness claims were made - 3 strikes and you are out kind of thing.
As we stand a number of senior people in DE&S are continuing the same self-serving agenda noted in the H-C report. RTSA and MAA should not be called upon to be the DE&S police, especially when the only punishment is a wry smile for those who are caught.
I do not think it is fair to lay the blame at the pilots in RTSA. Day in and day out I see them challenge the actions of DE&S. They seem to clash heads regarding the integrity and honesty with the same few senior individuals in DE&S on a routine basis. As described above I still see DE&S recommend 'switch-on only' clearances with no evidence, only to see these uplifted to full clearances after a period of use with the frontline with little or no independent evidence. RTSA catches some of these, but not all and the suggestion of adding engineering knowledge to the RTSA team is well made. But my point is that no action is taken against those who repeatedly subvert the airworthiness system. At times it seems that some in DE&S are playing games to see what they can get away with. I wish we had a system where a tally was kept when false airworthiness claims were made - 3 strikes and you are out kind of thing.
As we stand a number of senior people in DE&S are continuing the same self-serving agenda noted in the H-C report. RTSA and MAA should not be called upon to be the DE&S police, especially when the only punishment is a wry smile for those who are caught.
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JTO,
I'd like to sincerely and fully apologise if it appeared that I was criticising the pilots in the RTSA in any way. My concerns lie with the ownership of the RTSA, and the basic function of an ACAS owned RTSA with the advent of the DH system. Expert pilot input into the RTSR is absolutely vital to a decent product.
I have had the pleasure of working with a set of absolutely outstanding RAF SO2s in the RTSA over the past few years. As ever, once you get to the working level (and by that I mean SO2) my experience is that you find dedicated and very able service personnel doing the very best job they can.
But JTO opens up a very important point, which is the relationship between the RTSA and the DE&S staffs providing the product. I absolutely agree that RTSA must not try to 'police' the DE&S. It's absolutely not ACAS's job to do that. MAA regulate the DE&S (and everybody else in the airworthiness chain), and also carry out a 'policing' function of sorts. However, any organisation MUST (do discharge its safety management obligations) have an effective internal system to assure delivery of safe products.
I do think (and have advised teams so) that DE&S should consider setting up a more effective internal project review system to ensure that its teams are doing what they should be. If an effective and thorough process is followed (and as Tuc often points out, it's not an especially hard thing to do - just work the detail, record the results and properly manage the risk) ten there should be no room for the sort of shenanigans that JTO describes.
Despite the hammering they often get in these forums, BAE Systems have a very effective 'phase review' system where projects get very thoroughly 'peer reviewed' by qualified and trained experts at a number of stages. I've taken projects through these and it's my considered conclusion that if DE&S ran something along these lines, many of the problems described would be bowled out at an early stage. It would also help prevent the 'integrity' issues you describe. I do think that DE&S could learn a thing or two from it.
Best Regards as ever to all those hard working SO2s doing the spadework,
Engines
Engines
I'd like to sincerely and fully apologise if it appeared that I was criticising the pilots in the RTSA in any way. My concerns lie with the ownership of the RTSA, and the basic function of an ACAS owned RTSA with the advent of the DH system. Expert pilot input into the RTSR is absolutely vital to a decent product.
I have had the pleasure of working with a set of absolutely outstanding RAF SO2s in the RTSA over the past few years. As ever, once you get to the working level (and by that I mean SO2) my experience is that you find dedicated and very able service personnel doing the very best job they can.
But JTO opens up a very important point, which is the relationship between the RTSA and the DE&S staffs providing the product. I absolutely agree that RTSA must not try to 'police' the DE&S. It's absolutely not ACAS's job to do that. MAA regulate the DE&S (and everybody else in the airworthiness chain), and also carry out a 'policing' function of sorts. However, any organisation MUST (do discharge its safety management obligations) have an effective internal system to assure delivery of safe products.
I do think (and have advised teams so) that DE&S should consider setting up a more effective internal project review system to ensure that its teams are doing what they should be. If an effective and thorough process is followed (and as Tuc often points out, it's not an especially hard thing to do - just work the detail, record the results and properly manage the risk) ten there should be no room for the sort of shenanigans that JTO describes.
Despite the hammering they often get in these forums, BAE Systems have a very effective 'phase review' system where projects get very thoroughly 'peer reviewed' by qualified and trained experts at a number of stages. I've taken projects through these and it's my considered conclusion that if DE&S ran something along these lines, many of the problems described would be bowled out at an early stage. It would also help prevent the 'integrity' issues you describe. I do think that DE&S could learn a thing or two from it.
Best Regards as ever to all those hard working SO2s doing the spadework,
Engines
Engines
Engines, I have a lot of respect for what you have said, but I do question your suggestion that you could delete RTSA and go directly to the ODHs. By doing this, you're going directly to where the operational pressure is and, surely, run the risk of the ODH making their own interpretations to suit those pressures. I think there needs to be a step back from that and RTSA can fulfil that need, albeit with changes in its manning and, possibly, reporting chain.
Excellent posts by JTO and Engines. For those who haven’t read the evidence, the point with the Chinook RTS was that the Switch On Only clearance applied to the ENTIRE Nav and Comms systems; brought about primarily because there was no supporting certification to even permit the FADEC to be fitted to the aircraft, because its Safety Critical Software did not have a Certificate of Design.
Forget for a moment about the hundreds of anomalies found by Boscombe; it was far more basic than that. There was no certificate, therefore it wasn’t allowed within a country mile of a production standard aircraft. End of. Controller Aircraft reflected this in his CA Release of November 1993. The AAIB confirmed the software standard remained in this condition (“positively dangerous”) at the time of the accident.
The regulations stated that ACAS was NOT permitted to sign an RTS and grant authority to fly operationally against such an Interim CAR. He did. Lord Philip confirmed the Switch On Only clearance was “mandated” (i.e. not permitted to rely in any way whatsoever on those items which were SOO). The CAR and supporting papers (Oct/Nov 1993) described an aircraft that was over two years away from sufficient maturity to fly operationally. A legal RTS was only issued in 1996, confirming this.
As JTO so rightly says, this was down to the integrity of key individuals. As those individuals had the same degree of control over all RAF aircraft (and some of them, like Alcock, over all MoD aircraft), then the failure was systemic. Until resolved, it remains so. It has not been resolved – again, JTO cites ongoing failures in DE&S. As I’ve said before, I look at the DE&S hierarchy and equate certain fatal accidents to names. The MAA will never change this cultural problem until those individuals and, I submit, anyone trained or influenced by them, are gone.
As the evidence to Philip describes, a Switch On Only clearance is designed to apply to, for example, a known airworthy build standard to which you add, say, a single radio. The SOO applies to that one radio. In simple terms, if you switch it on and it causes an EMC problem, then you know if you switch it off again you revert to a known safe configuration. At no point could the ZD576 pilots revert to a known safe configuration. Thus, the "gross negligence" was committed long before 2.6.94.
The very fact Boscombe felt the need to apply it to entire systems like Nav and Comms is indicative of (a) gross immaturity of design and (b) the pressure being applied by the RAF to declare it airworthy. One could criticise the Superintendent at Boscombe for not refusing, but I think he did the right thing – issued an Interim report “in the form of a CAR” and firmly stated the aircraft was not airworthy. After that, he would not conceive ACAS being foolish enough to turn that round as an operational RTS.
If the MAA or MoD are to address such behaviour, then they need to cite examples. This means criticising retired VSOs. They won’t.
Forget for a moment about the hundreds of anomalies found by Boscombe; it was far more basic than that. There was no certificate, therefore it wasn’t allowed within a country mile of a production standard aircraft. End of. Controller Aircraft reflected this in his CA Release of November 1993. The AAIB confirmed the software standard remained in this condition (“positively dangerous”) at the time of the accident.
The regulations stated that ACAS was NOT permitted to sign an RTS and grant authority to fly operationally against such an Interim CAR. He did. Lord Philip confirmed the Switch On Only clearance was “mandated” (i.e. not permitted to rely in any way whatsoever on those items which were SOO). The CAR and supporting papers (Oct/Nov 1993) described an aircraft that was over two years away from sufficient maturity to fly operationally. A legal RTS was only issued in 1996, confirming this.
As JTO so rightly says, this was down to the integrity of key individuals. As those individuals had the same degree of control over all RAF aircraft (and some of them, like Alcock, over all MoD aircraft), then the failure was systemic. Until resolved, it remains so. It has not been resolved – again, JTO cites ongoing failures in DE&S. As I’ve said before, I look at the DE&S hierarchy and equate certain fatal accidents to names. The MAA will never change this cultural problem until those individuals and, I submit, anyone trained or influenced by them, are gone.
As the evidence to Philip describes, a Switch On Only clearance is designed to apply to, for example, a known airworthy build standard to which you add, say, a single radio. The SOO applies to that one radio. In simple terms, if you switch it on and it causes an EMC problem, then you know if you switch it off again you revert to a known safe configuration. At no point could the ZD576 pilots revert to a known safe configuration. Thus, the "gross negligence" was committed long before 2.6.94.
The very fact Boscombe felt the need to apply it to entire systems like Nav and Comms is indicative of (a) gross immaturity of design and (b) the pressure being applied by the RAF to declare it airworthy. One could criticise the Superintendent at Boscombe for not refusing, but I think he did the right thing – issued an Interim report “in the form of a CAR” and firmly stated the aircraft was not airworthy. After that, he would not conceive ACAS being foolish enough to turn that round as an operational RTS.
If the MAA or MoD are to address such behaviour, then they need to cite examples. This means criticising retired VSOs. They won’t.
Last edited by tucumseh; 9th Nov 2012 at 06:14.