Dam Busters: The Race to Smash the German Dams
Bomber Command ... achieving air superiority in the East and the West for the Allies, and finally in the skies above Germany itself.
I would tend to agree. Post war analysis showed that Germany's weapons output month to month increased throughout the war until January 1945 in spite of the relentless bombing. The level of resources dedicated to the Allied air offensive was simply not offset by the level of damage on the ground.
The greatest contribution to victory by the Allied air offensive was the eventual grinding down of the Luftwaffe by the daytime bombing offensive (which the RAF had little to do with), leading to Allied air superiority. Although the Germans were still able to produce fighter aircraft in large quantities, they eventually ran out of the skilled pilots to fly them.
While achieving air superiority was certainly a welcome result - I seriously doubt it was the primary outcome envisioned for the strategic bombing campaign in 1941/42.
This is in now way intended to downplay the heroism of the RAF airmen - just pointing out that historical 20-20 hindsight suggests those resources might have been better used.
The greatest contribution to victory by the Allied air offensive was the eventual grinding down of the Luftwaffe by the daytime bombing offensive (which the RAF had little to do with), leading to Allied air superiority. Although the Germans were still able to produce fighter aircraft in large quantities, they eventually ran out of the skilled pilots to fly them.
While achieving air superiority was certainly a welcome result - I seriously doubt it was the primary outcome envisioned for the strategic bombing campaign in 1941/42.
This is in now way intended to downplay the heroism of the RAF airmen - just pointing out that historical 20-20 hindsight suggests those resources might have been better used.
You often read about how German weapons production grew throughout the war but I haven't seen any studies on what they might have achieved had there not been the disruptions caused by the bombing.
It was the lack of air superiority that forced the RAF to switch to night bombing. In the same way that the Luftwaffe's night bombing of Britain's cities did nothing for their air superiority, night bombing of German cities did little for ours.
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Isn't that called peacetime output? Or better if you include slave labour and forced production.
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An air force defending its own skies day and night is not free to attack yours.
There are a lot of entrenched views being expressed here. First, Harris was carrying out the directives of his superiors, willingly of course (until he was ordered to tactical bombing pre D-Day perhaps) but part of an RAF High Command that ditched him as soon as it became expedient to do so. Second, the rival Services resented the resources directed to Bomber Command and used every opportunity to belittle its efforts. Third, you don't only achieve local air superiority by shooting down enemy planes. You simply oblige him to move them elsewhere. Where was the Luftwaffe in the main when the Red Army made its advance to Germany, when the Western Allies invaded Italy and France? In Germany! Yes of course it was countering the USAAF by day as well as Bomber Command by night, and both of them paid dearly in that bloodbath, but they ensured that Germany was successfully invaded and defeated. Without the Bomber Offensive victory would have been delayed or, worse still, denied. No amount of switching resources to the Atlantic or elsewhere would have compensated for that!
I don't have any entrenched views. I don't have a problem with the bombing of the cities. I don't necessarily believe the results of that strategy were worth the cost. I think it had more to do with Harris's belief that Bomber Command was unable to reliably and accurately hit strategic targets by night, instead relying on widespread carpet bombing. The forming of the Pathfinder's is evidence they needed to tighten up where the bombs were ending up, and when this was used against defined tactical targets prior to D-Day, it worked. Admittedly air superiority was assisted by the Bombing offensive, but it was achieved by the introduction of long range fighters in overwhelming numbers.
TIEW, yes of course the local air superiority above the Reich proper was gained by LR escort fighters, I'm not quibbling about that. But long before then the Luftwaffe had to withdraw an enormous amount of its fighters (and bombers, converted to nightfighters) together with the complementary flak batteries (think of all the 88's that could have been aimed at Russian tanks rather than adding to the ever enhanced barrage over Germany). That NAZI air power withdrew to Germany to wither and die there meant that Allied armies could advance from East, South, and West in great measure unmolested by it, and that the Wehrmacht retreated unprotected by it. In the end it is boots on the ground that bring victory (a point that Harris might indeed have had issues with) but they did so under generally benign skies. To a very great degree that had been achieved by the Bomber Offensive, by Bomber Command, and by the USAAF.
As to bombing accuracy, it was appalling by day and by night (though especially by night) but that just came with the limitations of navigation then. Blackouts, obscured skies, moonless conditions, all made for difficulties in finding a city, let alone a target outside it. The Nav had a sextant, an API, a Drift Sight, and forecast winds that were largely guess work. He couldn't even simply tell the captain to follow the stream ahead as it couldn't be seen, other than when those below were silhouetted by the target's fires. A lot of cows died in the service of the Fuhrer as a result. Later on radio and radar aids helped it is true, but only when security allowed for it, and even then enemy counter measures made their use questionable. Carpet bombing, Area bombing, call it what you like, it was simply bowing to the inevitable. Bomber Command was not so much a big stick as a cudgel. There was no precision about it. we could find cities, we even had targets and aiming points within the cities, and yes the Pathfinders could finesse those in the midst of a raid, but in the final resort Bomber Command destroyed German cities because that is what it could do.
The result was that on D-Day the assaulting troops could be told, "Don't worry about aircraft overhead, they will be all ours!".
As to bombing accuracy, it was appalling by day and by night (though especially by night) but that just came with the limitations of navigation then. Blackouts, obscured skies, moonless conditions, all made for difficulties in finding a city, let alone a target outside it. The Nav had a sextant, an API, a Drift Sight, and forecast winds that were largely guess work. He couldn't even simply tell the captain to follow the stream ahead as it couldn't be seen, other than when those below were silhouetted by the target's fires. A lot of cows died in the service of the Fuhrer as a result. Later on radio and radar aids helped it is true, but only when security allowed for it, and even then enemy counter measures made their use questionable. Carpet bombing, Area bombing, call it what you like, it was simply bowing to the inevitable. Bomber Command was not so much a big stick as a cudgel. There was no precision about it. we could find cities, we even had targets and aiming points within the cities, and yes the Pathfinders could finesse those in the midst of a raid, but in the final resort Bomber Command destroyed German cities because that is what it could do.
The result was that on D-Day the assaulting troops could be told, "Don't worry about aircraft overhead, they will be all ours!".
I think that to go on losing aircrew at the rate that BC was doing in late 43/ early 44 for no discernable result shows that the tactics/ strategy were wrong. Many BC men knew their chances were very slim, some described it as plain murder. Freeman Dyson, who died recently , worked for the BC Operational Research Section. It was staffed by about 30 civil servants and young academics. His first day was the day after the first raid of the Battle of Hamburg.He said the staff that day were elated, they were never elated again until the end of the war. It makes interesting reading, if it didn't agree with BC doctrine, then the powers that be didn't want to know. Many thousands of men died needlessly.
I think the question should be - if the primary objective was to destroy the Luftwaffe - could we have done it more efficiently and effectively.
For example, in the early part of the Battle of Britain, the primary German targets were British airfields, radar, and other air defense facilities. It was working - the RAF was on the verge of collapse until Hitler decided to bomb London instead. Might the Allies have been more effective at destroying the Luftwaffe with a similar campaign had they gone after airfields and the like instead of factories? Granted the necessary level of accuracy likely couldn't be achieved with night bombing.
For example, in the early part of the Battle of Britain, the primary German targets were British airfields, radar, and other air defense facilities. It was working - the RAF was on the verge of collapse until Hitler decided to bomb London instead. Might the Allies have been more effective at destroying the Luftwaffe with a similar campaign had they gone after airfields and the like instead of factories? Granted the necessary level of accuracy likely couldn't be achieved with night bombing.
tdracer, as I recall - and its been many years since I studied this - the Germans knew this. The airfields were rather well defended and any attack on them would come at a high price. Also, bearing in mind towns were hard to find, landing bombs on an airfield and putting it out of commission would be a tall order to say the least. Finally, the Luftwaffe had a small number of key locations in the South East of England to target. Shutting, and keeping shut airfields across Germany, France and the low countries would be a gigantic task - especially as the aircraft could always just operate from grass fields anyway!
[QUOTE=Chugalug2;10800176]TIEW, and forecast winds that were largely guess work.
BOLLOCKS!
They were state of the art and informed by every aid and theory that science could provide. The forecasters [as ever] carried a heavy burden of expectation. Whatever else, guesswork was and is not a part of it.
BOLLOCKS!
They were state of the art and informed by every aid and theory that science could provide. The forecasters [as ever] carried a heavy burden of expectation. Whatever else, guesswork was and is not a part of it.
Have you watched the film, LB? Losses on Chastise started when coasting in, let alone making the dams. They were blown south into heavily defended airspace and suffered accordingly. One of your successors even produced the Met charts to prove it. A northerly 30kt wind that was forecast as calm.
Sorry if I offended your sensibilities, and gladly withdraw guess work for state of the art. They still got shot down as a result of it though.
Sorry if I offended your sensibilities, and gladly withdraw guess work for state of the art. They still got shot down as a result of it though.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 2nd Jun 2020 at 22:30.
Final resort Bomber Command destroyed German cities because that is what it could do.
[QUOTE=langleybaston;10800371]
Langley, I think to be fair weather reconnaissance evolved during the war, accelerating towards the end. 1409 flight was formed in April 43 to provide a meteorological service. The Jetstream and it's effects were not really understood until very late in the war. Aircraft crossing the Atlantic below the Jetstream from the west noted 100mph tailwinds, but the phenomenon was not fully understood
TIEW, and forecast winds that were largely guess work.
BOLLOCKS!
They were state of the art and informed by every aid and theory that science could provide. The forecasters [as ever] carried a heavy burden of expectation. Whatever else, guesswork was and is not a part of it.
BOLLOCKS!
They were state of the art and informed by every aid and theory that science could provide. The forecasters [as ever] carried a heavy burden of expectation. Whatever else, guesswork was and is not a part of it.
When it had to operate by night, then pretty well, yes. When it could operate by day it could take out precision targets, witness Tirpitz, Bielefeld Viaduct, etc, but with specialised weapons and specially trained crews and with potentially very great risk. There were exceptions of course, Chastise per this thread and Peenemunde at night for example. The latter used main force bombing from 8000ft and in a full moon, a very hazardous combination ameliorated by diversionary signs of a raid on Berlin and intruder attacks on the nightfighter bases that protected the target. Peenemunde was made possible by being on the coast and utilising H2S, and excellent work by the pathfinders. It was a very high risk operation justified by the importance of disrupting V2 production and testing.
When it had to operate by night, then pretty well, yes. When it could operate by day it could take out precision targets, witness Tirpitz, Bielefeld Viaduct, etc, but with specialised weapons and specially trained crews and with potentially very great risk. There were exceptions of course, Chastise per this thread and Peenemunde at night for example. The latter used main force bombing from 8000ft and in a full moon, a very hazardous combination ameliorated by diversionary signs of a raid on Berlin and intruder attacks on the nightfighter bases that protected the target. Peenemunde was made possible by being on the coast and utilising H2S, and excellent work by the pathfinders. It was a very high risk operation justified by the importance of disrupting V2 production and testing.
The debate seems to be becoming rather over simplified and binary if I may say, but to continue in similar vein, Bomber command did what it could and what it was ordered to do.
What it could do changed during the course of the war: at the start, it could barely hit the proverbial barn door , day or night. As equipment, technology, and of course experience developed, there evolved some extraordinary capability, of which the Dambusters raid stands out. We can debate the long term impact of it on the German war effort, but as a bit of bomb tossing it remains exceptional.
As for what Bomber Command was ordered to do, that also developed during the war. From dropping propaganda leaflets through to 1000 bomber raids. In the beginning, its mission was little more than "hitting back" when we had few other means at our disposal to do so, and as much for national morale rather than substantive military objectives.
Prompted by what we now know to be the inadvertent dropping of bombs on London by a single aircraft, Churchill ordered a raid on Berlin, again for symbolic rather than substantive purposes. The rest we know. Whilst we did persist with military targets, area bombing didnt take long to emerge and eventually dominate Bomber Command activities. Agree or disagree with it, it was considered a legitimate tactic at the time in the context of "total war" although it was not aimed at achieving superiority over the Luftwaffe, albeit a diminution of the Luftwaffes offensive capabilities would have seemed a likely by product.
In my view, Bomber Commands post war "image" problems start and finish with Harris. A very difficult guy to like at the best of times apparently, he was a devout believer in area bombing, and persisted with it after it was clear that there were better targets available which would have had a more direct bearing on the end of the war. It has been suggested that he refused to countenance a shift from area bombing to attacking oil refining capacity, up to and including refusing direct orders to do so. That he was not removed was testament to his status within public opinion and Churchills direct intervention.
This was not forgotten post war, and the ensuing "snubbing" of Bomber Command" was in my view simply a snubbing of Harris. The subsequent revisitation of the morality of area bombing with the benefit of hindsight, detailed accounts of what it was like to experience it, and evidence of its limited effects on morale have simply added fuel to the fire. Grossly unfair to those who served in Bomber Command, and even, to a degree, to Harris
What it could do changed during the course of the war: at the start, it could barely hit the proverbial barn door , day or night. As equipment, technology, and of course experience developed, there evolved some extraordinary capability, of which the Dambusters raid stands out. We can debate the long term impact of it on the German war effort, but as a bit of bomb tossing it remains exceptional.
As for what Bomber Command was ordered to do, that also developed during the war. From dropping propaganda leaflets through to 1000 bomber raids. In the beginning, its mission was little more than "hitting back" when we had few other means at our disposal to do so, and as much for national morale rather than substantive military objectives.
Prompted by what we now know to be the inadvertent dropping of bombs on London by a single aircraft, Churchill ordered a raid on Berlin, again for symbolic rather than substantive purposes. The rest we know. Whilst we did persist with military targets, area bombing didnt take long to emerge and eventually dominate Bomber Command activities. Agree or disagree with it, it was considered a legitimate tactic at the time in the context of "total war" although it was not aimed at achieving superiority over the Luftwaffe, albeit a diminution of the Luftwaffes offensive capabilities would have seemed a likely by product.
In my view, Bomber Commands post war "image" problems start and finish with Harris. A very difficult guy to like at the best of times apparently, he was a devout believer in area bombing, and persisted with it after it was clear that there were better targets available which would have had a more direct bearing on the end of the war. It has been suggested that he refused to countenance a shift from area bombing to attacking oil refining capacity, up to and including refusing direct orders to do so. That he was not removed was testament to his status within public opinion and Churchills direct intervention.
This was not forgotten post war, and the ensuing "snubbing" of Bomber Command" was in my view simply a snubbing of Harris. The subsequent revisitation of the morality of area bombing with the benefit of hindsight, detailed accounts of what it was like to experience it, and evidence of its limited effects on morale have simply added fuel to the fire. Grossly unfair to those who served in Bomber Command, and even, to a degree, to Harris
I have always found it bizzare that Britain's post war defence doctrine was built on the ability to send V Bombers to the Soviet Union to potentially kill millions of civilians, yet we were somewhat ashamed of the fact we had killed 500k Germans in WW2.