No cats and flaps ...... back to F35B?

[hval]

Not_a_boffin,

I agree that the additional costs are not credible. You did forget a few items though: -

1/ Project management
1a/ Tea breaks
2/ Transportation
2a/ Tea breaks
3/ Modifications to existing carrier hull and infrastructure
3a/ Tea breaks
4/ Installation of meals
4a/ Guess what?
5/ ITP (instrument and testing plan)
6/ Risk management costs
7/ Project management and team install infrastructure
8/ Cost of all the other dock yard workers who will have to stop what they are doing for a year, and still be paid whilst meals are installed.

Have I forgotten anything?

[Backwards PLT]

Orca - sorry still don't get it. As I understand it, if the money was spent on the C decision (which is confusing in itself because through life most claim the C is cheaper) then that will be with the expectation that the C is the GR4 replacement, surely?

Although I was told that JSF was part of the GR4 replacement well before the last SDSR as part of the 2 FJ fleet plan so it didn't matter if it was the B or the C, except the C is greatly superior of course.

[orca]

Sorry mate, probably the sort of conversation that would take 1 minute over a beer.

F35A could fulfill the criteria for DPOC, the GR4 replacement. £1 billion had been allotted to DPOC. Given the length of gestation these days it was safe to say that any manned solution to DPOC would involve F35A.

SDSR chose Tornado over Harrier/CVS in the knowledge that this would save money in the short term (about £300 million over 3 years) but lose in the long term (£680 million more expensive over 10 years).

Something had to give and the obvious economy was that if we chose the C model for JCA then we could still meet some DPOC criteria - at this point the the F35As you were briefed about disappeared. The £1 billion was folded into the cost of the ship upgrade.

So I guess what I am saying is that you can either view the decision to save Tornado as a decision that consigned its successor to the dust bin. Or you can (to my mind) skew the argument and and start talking about JCA as the de facto GR4 replacement.

The alternative is to revert to STOVL and ask for that DPOC money back - which may eventually result in a mixed A/B fleet for the JCA/ DPOC requirement. It might result in a B that deosn't work and DPOC money already spent on GR4 which (as rumour has it) has eaten a further £1 billion since SDSR.

I personally Lowe Fleiger has it right and I suspect that DC could be aided in growing a pair if he was being briefed honestly and competently. I fail to see how a U-turn is necessary unless someone has dropped an almighty ball, someone has been unable to deliver on a promise or someone no longer likes the deal they made having had 18 months of 'cold light of day'.

The dithering has to be a result of incompetent staff work (when we phoned they said EMALS was a fiver but we've double checked and it's now £1.7 billion), conflicting advice probably due to single service agenda (surely not) or the fact that no-one knows the facts...a known unknown if you will.

There are only two reasons for the U-turn which appear credible to my mind. The first is that industry simply isn't up to the challenge and has had it's bluff called despite ridiculous tariffs. The second is that someone in MoD has realised the full implications of SDSR and wants a new deal.

[Not_a_boffin]

Hval

Yes. Most of those factors even the tea breaks (!) are already in the existing cost. Assuming it's PoW for conversion, the relevant parts of the structure haven't been fabricated yet, so assuming the design teams get cracking (particularly on the detail of the supporting structure) delay is unlikely to affect more than a small proportion of those working on the project. The electrickery elements will also require work, but again mostly in the design stage.

Project and risk mgmt teams are already in place, as is their infrastructure, ITP will largely be supplied as part of the sale and will then fall on the existing test & commissioning team.

There will be no need for anyone else to stop what they're doing while the systems are installed.

Apologies for the slightly intemperate tone last night, post beer-festival posting never a good idea......

[hval]

Not_a_boffin,

I agree that all I listed is already within the project. The emals is an additional package to the main construction project. The sub contractor will have costed their risk, project management etc, but the main contractor certainly has not included meals in their project cost.

Much of the electrickery stuff is well past the design phase. Much hours work to be done, maybe, ooh, I don't know guv, back of a fag packet calc, how about £1 billion? Just for you. Cutting new access routes etc will cost you a lot, you know. We haven't tested the generators under this load, nor type of load before. They're only tested for one six volt light bulb. That's all you asked for, err, signed for in the contract. Talking of which, this is a contract change. Means the lawyers will get involved. There's another £500 million to the costs.

The above is tongue in cheek, but you know how it is.

I didn't notice any intemperate tone. In fact you should drink more often and then post. Nice humour.

[Bastardeux]

Could this turn out to be the most blatant mismanagement of resources my generation sees?

Interestingly, for the first time that I've seen, firm figures are mentioned...

British Study Determines F-35C Would be More Economical Option Despite Costly Carrier Upgrade | Defense Update

Fighter jets about-turn 'will harm capability’ - Telegraph

[oldspool]

Following on from the previous post I noticed another link regarding the USMC purchase of B's and C's. The story isn't new but is significant in that it indicates further unit cost increases for the B model.

Five Marine Corps F-35Cs Units to Fly Off Navy Carriers | Defense Update


''Under the agreement, the two services will maintain the planned acquisition of 680 F-35s but change the proportion between the carrier based and STOVL variants. Under the new plan the Navy will buy 260 of the F-35C carrier variant, with the Marine Corps adding additional 80, along with 340 F-35Bs STOVL versions. Reduction of 80 ‘B’ aircraft is expected to further increase the unit cost of the STOVL version, already blamed to be the most complex, expensive and troubled part of the JSF program.''

[Engines]

Both the articles linked use similar figures, but they are, in my view, examples of selective leaking of figures plus uninformed 'spin'.

Leaking a DSTL 'secret' document is a serious matter in itself. However, the figures that are being revealed are not all that surprising. If anyone takes a look at the KPPs for the F-35 variants (open source and dating back to 07) the difference in range of the B and the C have been there for all to see. I have also seen open source briefs from LM detailing fuel capacities of the B and the C. I know that, because I delivered one of them to the RAeS in 2006. From these, it's not hard for a competent performance engineer to derive quite accurate estimates for 'time on station'.

Some errors mixed in with these old facts. The CVF deck surface does not need to be modified to 'protect it' from vertical anding jet blast. Catapults and arresting gear were included in the original CVF design. F-35C increased fuel capacity comes from larger wing tanks as much as the extra fuselage tank. And some partiality as well. The F-35B landing is not 'fuel-guzzling' - do the detailed calculations on fuel burn for a normal STOVL recovery and a normal CV trap recovery, and you find not much difference.

I really do agree with Bastardeaux that this recent 'B vs C' saga has been badly handled by the Government and the MoD. Objective analysis appears to have gone out of the window, and in my view it was a victim of inter-service politics, lack of technical grasp at at higher levels, and plain poor execution of the SDSR. Not good, and seriously damages the Uk's reputation for competence in defence acquisition. Bernard Gray will be looking for a new job soon, in my view.

Best regards as ever

Engines

[Widger]

F35B = more aircraft= more bums on seats for the two -winged, future leaders of the RAF Master Race.

F35C = Less aircraft and more competency required = more time at sea= more navy pilots = less bums on seats for the two-winged, future leaders of the RAF Master Race and an obsolete platform in the Typhoon. SHAR FA2 vs F3 all over again!!

[BEagle]

And would your fishy-folk flying the F35C have also been trained at an FAA EFTS, FAA BFTS, FAA AFTS and FAA TWU? Or do you expect the 'crabs' to have done all that for you?

[alfred_the_great]

Nah, it's ok, the USN are all good.

[salad-dodger]

Could this turn out to be the most blatant mismanagement of resources my generation sees?

It'll take some doing to beat MRA4, but anything's possible when the MoD get involved

S-D

[dat581]

You would have to try hard to beat the RAN's Sea Sprite debarcle, $1.1 Billion wasted on eleven refurbished helicopters that never entered service.

[Widger]

and that is the other mistake in assuming all the 'schools' are RAF as opposed to 'Central'.

[WillDAQ]

Originally Posted by dat581

You would have to try hard to beat the RAN's Sea Sprite debarcle, $1.1 Billion wasted on eleven refurbished helicopters that never entered service.

I dunno, MRA4 was less aircraft, refurbished, for 4 times the price, all scrapped.

[LowObservable]

I wonder if some of the inter-service aspects of this kerfuffle were sparked after the SDSR, when people realized that there would not (for a very long time) be enough UK JSFs, regardless of variant, to do more than maintain the carrier air wing. (Note that the Froggies have 60 Rafales for one carrier.) However, that problem (for the RAF) is less with the more "jointly operable" B...

[Not_a_boffin]

Who is the budget holder for JCA? I think we have a winner.......

[Widger]

CAP TA probably and the TA Programme Board in Main Building. I think we have a winner!

[Engines]

Gentlemen,

It might be useful to remember the circumstances that led to FJCA, and the intentions for the UK F-35 fleet.

Cast your minds back to 2000 and the heady days of 'Joint Force Harrier' standing up. The RAF and RN had agreed that, in return for the RN relinquishing ownership of its fixed wing fleet, the RAF would command, operate and develop JFH as a two aircraft fleet, bringing AD and Strike assets together into a fleet of aircraft that would support both land and sea based ops, using STOVL aircraft.

We had also committed to the JSF programme via a special 'STOVL MoU' which recognised the UK/US long partnership (over 45 years) on STOVL, and in which the UK stated that it saw the STOVL JSF as a key element of future UK tactical aircraft force planning. JFH was to be the 'route through' to those sunny uplands, building a true joint ethos ready to receive an aircraft that could deliver both AD capability and strike power from land or sea.

And to complete the picture, CVF was moving towards contract, built around a requirement that specified two large STOVL carriers with the capability to accept cat and trap as a fallback.

It was against that picture that the original Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) programme, Navy owned, turned into FJCA - Future Joint Combat Aircraft. No change to requirements, just a change of title. Still a joint STOVL future. Sounded great. Then the wheels began to fall off the wagon.

First wheel off - within weeks of formation of JFH, the RAF, who now owned the SHAR, decided to offer it up as a savings measure to pay for the huge cost overruns on the GR9 programme. Sadly, the RN went along with this, reassured that a 'Joint Air Wing' would form up to maintain two FAA front line GR9 units to maintain embarked currency. Incidentally, a plan that was not even discussed with the engineering Fleet Managers for the GR7/9 fleet before it was approved. (But hey, the pilots said it was possible, and who was going to argue with them?)

Second wheel off - The RAF decided to block formation of the second RN commanded front line unit. At about the same time, the RAF decided that the Harrier fleet FEAR should be reduced, and thus effectively withdraw their commitment to maintain embarked currency. Result - marked reduction in ability of JFH to effectively embark in CVS and fight. But not a problem for the RAF, who understandably gave priority to the Afghan ops.

Third wheel off - SDSR 2010, and the RAF (CAS, with CDS support) makes a decision to dispense with Harrier to preserve its entire Tornado fleet. This decision was not discussed with CNS before it was given to the PM.

Now add in the final element - the RAF's hidden problem that it had blown all its future tactical aircraft budget (and a few other budgets as well) on Typhoon, leaving the square root of s*d all for a Tornado replacement. The failure of a number of options and programmes (FOAS, etc.) followed.

The result of all these is that the decision to for cat and trap (and I am not saying it's the wrong one) was not accompanied by the important discussion on what the future F-35C force was now going to do. All the public discussions to date have revolved around the impact on the carriers, but the impact on land based strike has hardly been mentioned. And when it does, we get the sort of single service language ('fishy', 'crabs') that prevent any rational discussion.

So, just for stamps, here's my put. First, having decided to go for F-35C, the UK should now see it through. Another reversal of course would, I think, involve even more expense and we would end up with a less capable jet. Second, accept that cat and trap can't be handled like JFH tried (and utterly failed) to do naval aviation. The RAF just isn't interested, nor in my view should it be expected to be. Leave the F-35C force to the RN to own and command, with a secondary role to go land based if required (which all FAA units had in the past). Third, meet the RAF GR4 replacement requirement with F-35A. It's radius of action is only 10 miles less than the 35C, and it's cheaper. Reduced RAF requirement, as the RN F-35Cs could, in some cases, come in as backup. Finally, task DE&S set up a joint training, support and sustainment model for the two F-35 customers. Lots of reaL commonality to exploit there.

Result? a mixed F-35A/C buy. The country gets what it needs - effective strike capabilities based on land and at sea, and both owned by people who are competent and committed. Pipe dream? Probably. But better than the 'ferrets in a sack' spectacle the country is watching now.

Best Regards as ever to those who, while all this is being played out, are in harm's way...

Engines

[Not_a_boffin]

And (as ever) put logically and in a nutshell by Engines.

That argument (and history) is what should be in the forefront of the debate / debacle regarding the ships and JCA.

I wonder how many of the higher-up non-service protagonists are actually aware of this?