No cats and flaps ...... back to F35B?
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LO/Spaz,
Is your debate about why SRVL existed for the UK F-35B?
Yes, it's because of marginal F-35B performance in the UK (and US) 'hot/tropical' day criteria.
Do you need more?
FB11
Is your debate about why SRVL existed for the UK F-35B?
Yes, it's because of marginal F-35B performance in the UK (and US) 'hot/tropical' day criteria.
Do you need more?
FB11
FB - Thanks.
In your view, was there a reason that the UK was leading on SRVL (with, IIRC, the National Accounting Office mentioning its necessity)?
Different emphasis, or a different flight deck shape that provided the opportunity?
In your view, was there a reason that the UK was leading on SRVL (with, IIRC, the National Accounting Office mentioning its necessity)?
Different emphasis, or a different flight deck shape that provided the opportunity?
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LO,
The UK would never do something purely because opportunity presented itself. Not when it costs money.
SRVL is required if a B model is to ever safely carry a useful warload and have an option of bringing it back to a QEC in operationally representative environmental conditions.
The QEC deck is big enough for SRVL. Other STOVL decks are not.
The UK would never do something purely because opportunity presented itself. Not when it costs money.
SRVL is required if a B model is to ever safely carry a useful warload and have an option of bringing it back to a QEC in operationally representative environmental conditions.
The QEC deck is big enough for SRVL. Other STOVL decks are not.
"SRVL is required if a B model is to ever safely carry a useful warload and have an option of bringing it back to a QEC in operationally representative environmental conditions.
"The QEC deck is big enough for SRVL. Other STOVL decks are not."
There is a lot there to ponder, FB.
Are we saying that "other STOVL decks" (do we mean the narrow LHA/LHD?) don't have the option of returning a "useful warload" under "operationally representative environmental conditions"?
Because VLBB including weapons... was sorta why we got into this in the first place.
"The QEC deck is big enough for SRVL. Other STOVL decks are not."
There is a lot there to ponder, FB.
Are we saying that "other STOVL decks" (do we mean the narrow LHA/LHD?) don't have the option of returning a "useful warload" under "operationally representative environmental conditions"?
Because VLBB including weapons... was sorta why we got into this in the first place.
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LO,
If you look at the deck layout of an LHA or LHD and consider the other assets on board you will be able to make your own sensible judgement on the safe recovery of an aircraft doing around 35 knots along the deck on landing with no arrested 'hold back' from a conventional cable.
VLBB is physics limited as you know. A F-35B isn't going to get lighter and the current VLBB KPP is challenging. With the assumption you will always want at least the 'standard' load (already a pretty limited loadout in a B) this simply means you have a tighter margin for fuel and the motor wears out quicker.
If we go back to the B, it would be good if we could look at where we will be in 10 or 15 years time when we will have tired engines and a heavier basic aircraft. On an aircraft that will have another 15 to 20 years ahead of it. It won't be pretty for those who can only VL onto their landing spot if they want to bring anything useful back to their ship.
You could also look now at how you are going to bring back anything other than 2 firecrackers in the belly from the first day of service if all you can do is VL.
If you look at the deck layout of an LHA or LHD and consider the other assets on board you will be able to make your own sensible judgement on the safe recovery of an aircraft doing around 35 knots along the deck on landing with no arrested 'hold back' from a conventional cable.
VLBB is physics limited as you know. A F-35B isn't going to get lighter and the current VLBB KPP is challenging. With the assumption you will always want at least the 'standard' load (already a pretty limited loadout in a B) this simply means you have a tighter margin for fuel and the motor wears out quicker.
If we go back to the B, it would be good if we could look at where we will be in 10 or 15 years time when we will have tired engines and a heavier basic aircraft. On an aircraft that will have another 15 to 20 years ahead of it. It won't be pretty for those who can only VL onto their landing spot if they want to bring anything useful back to their ship.
You could also look now at how you are going to bring back anything other than 2 firecrackers in the belly from the first day of service if all you can do is VL.
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I agree. It's already pushing its mass limit and we know it will only keep getting heavier. The vertical option comes with too many capability limitations. Mind you, so does being single engine. Options are being examined very carefully.
FB, thanks again.
Having had some involvement in the early service intro of Concorde, there's an interesting parallel with the B: Concorde's nominal payload (100 pax and bags, 20-25000 klb) was a tiny fraction of TOW (408 klb IIRC), so very small percentage increases in OEW, or declines in aero-propulsion efficiency, could wipe it out. And TOW was maxed.
Likewise, the B's weapon bringback is a small fraction of VL weight, which cannot itself be increased without upgrading the entire propulsion system - engine, fan, transmission.
Conversely, if you look at history's more successful aircraft, many either started with a very healthy payload margin or were adapted through-life to have one, through higher operating weights and more power.
Having had some involvement in the early service intro of Concorde, there's an interesting parallel with the B: Concorde's nominal payload (100 pax and bags, 20-25000 klb) was a tiny fraction of TOW (408 klb IIRC), so very small percentage increases in OEW, or declines in aero-propulsion efficiency, could wipe it out. And TOW was maxed.
Likewise, the B's weapon bringback is a small fraction of VL weight, which cannot itself be increased without upgrading the entire propulsion system - engine, fan, transmission.
Conversely, if you look at history's more successful aircraft, many either started with a very healthy payload margin or were adapted through-life to have one, through higher operating weights and more power.
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LO,
Thanks. It's lucky that we are focussed on the cost of cats and traps and not the cost and capability of the aircraft.
Strange that the B costs more to buy, costs more to fly each hour, you need more of.them, carries less over a shorter distance and we're worried about a low risk installation of EMALS and AAG because it's cost is more than anticipated.
Penny wise dollar foolish.
Thanks. It's lucky that we are focussed on the cost of cats and traps and not the cost and capability of the aircraft.
Strange that the B costs more to buy, costs more to fly each hour, you need more of.them, carries less over a shorter distance and we're worried about a low risk installation of EMALS and AAG because it's cost is more than anticipated.
Penny wise dollar foolish.
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The cost of conversion is more than the cost of keeping Queen Elizabeth as a STOVL carrier no matter how much the CV conversion cost has been skewed.
The point is that you are not hearing anyone commenting on the long term financial impact of F-35B yet the costs of that aircraft are increasing by the minute. Odd that we are tumbling towards a decision to revert STOVL with no apparent concern for the bigger 30 year F-35B mortgage payments for less capability.
The point is that you are not hearing anyone commenting on the long term financial impact of F-35B yet the costs of that aircraft are increasing by the minute. Odd that we are tumbling towards a decision to revert STOVL with no apparent concern for the bigger 30 year F-35B mortgage payments for less capability.
Agreed. And that's if F35B survives.......
Snatching defeat from the jaws of a victory springs to mind.
My point was, some are being seduced by the no conversion = two operable carriers argument on the basis of flawed (inflated) conversion costs. For the budgetted amount, suspect you could get two conversions, particularly with QE done post 2020 (far end of EPP).
Snatching defeat from the jaws of a victory springs to mind.
My point was, some are being seduced by the no conversion = two operable carriers argument on the basis of flawed (inflated) conversion costs. For the budgetted amount, suspect you could get two conversions, particularly with QE done post 2020 (far end of EPP).
Indeed, but the viewpoint here is a Treasury one, not a military capability one. Treasury thinking probably goes something like:
Cost of F35 - not known, but nothing like predictions and higher than we want.
Cost of converting QE's - not certain but significant and MoD always gets taken for a ride by Contractors.
Probability of killing off both QE's in SDR 2015- High.
Optimum Treasury solution:
Opt for F35B now (real costs of which are later) so no conversion costs now to be wasted in next SDR.
Hope to Cancel F35 entirely later. Then buy cheap manufacturing licence for something else to deal with industrial issues if needed.
All easily spun as MoD balancing budget, achieving F35 IOC with first QE, maintaining interoperability with USMC etc etc.
Cynical? Moi?
Still, I hope I'm wrong. The old Ark's Roof was a fun place to be once you got up the learning curve. The Invincibles and Hermes with SHAR were much more relaxed, even nearly forgiving by comparison.
N
Cost of F35 - not known, but nothing like predictions and higher than we want.
Cost of converting QE's - not certain but significant and MoD always gets taken for a ride by Contractors.
Probability of killing off both QE's in SDR 2015- High.
Optimum Treasury solution:
Opt for F35B now (real costs of which are later) so no conversion costs now to be wasted in next SDR.
Hope to Cancel F35 entirely later. Then buy cheap manufacturing licence for something else to deal with industrial issues if needed.
All easily spun as MoD balancing budget, achieving F35 IOC with first QE, maintaining interoperability with USMC etc etc.
Cynical? Moi?
Still, I hope I'm wrong. The old Ark's Roof was a fun place to be once you got up the learning curve. The Invincibles and Hermes with SHAR were much more relaxed, even nearly forgiving by comparison.
N
Operating cost?
I don't know anything about any of this so my question should be seen purely as one arising from reading this discussion:
It has been said that operations with a catapult are about a great combination of all the elements. Lots of training is needed and crews need to remain current. I was reading about the pre deployment training of one of the US carriers recently and it seemed very extensive. Could this be the cost that's making people pause for thought? i.e. a very large fixed cost that cannot ever be put aside?
In the computing world I see lots of systems of great capability and cheap unit cost whose running cost is moderate but which don't run well unless you maintain about 10 very expensive people to look after them and those people have to stay on the system to maintain their knowledge. The system has to be running continuously for them to be able to do this. The company could buy simple, crappier software and much more expensive hardware to run it and be able to put those skilled people to use in generating new revenue.
I know this isn't the same but I am wondering if there is any similarity. Is the B something that is expensive to buy and fly but doesn't need such large and continuously commited and trained group of people to be effective?
It has been said that operations with a catapult are about a great combination of all the elements. Lots of training is needed and crews need to remain current. I was reading about the pre deployment training of one of the US carriers recently and it seemed very extensive. Could this be the cost that's making people pause for thought? i.e. a very large fixed cost that cannot ever be put aside?
In the computing world I see lots of systems of great capability and cheap unit cost whose running cost is moderate but which don't run well unless you maintain about 10 very expensive people to look after them and those people have to stay on the system to maintain their knowledge. The system has to be running continuously for them to be able to do this. The company could buy simple, crappier software and much more expensive hardware to run it and be able to put those skilled people to use in generating new revenue.
I know this isn't the same but I am wondering if there is any similarity. Is the B something that is expensive to buy and fly but doesn't need such large and continuously commited and trained group of people to be effective?
t43562 - That has been the theory. Because the B is much easier to land (an operation which is automated to a remarkable degree) the carrier group spends less time working up in home waters and more time available to generate sorties at full rate, anywhere that it might be.
It's also been suggested here that the RAF liked the idea of Joint Force F-35B because you don't have to be a full-time carrier pilot (locked inside big grey floaty thing with a bunch of matelots) to be ship-capable.
However, you're not just training pilots, but the whole wing - maintenance, armourers, deck crew, helo crews - all performing a complicated ballet in a confined space, on a much bigger scale than SHAR or JFH.
And even if you don't go all the way to autoland - surely FBW and full-time autothrottle have to make the job easier? Typhoon, I believe, has a landing mode where you basically dial in the airspeed and hold a HUD pipper on the landing spot, to reduce scatter if you want to use a short runway.
It's also been suggested here that the RAF liked the idea of Joint Force F-35B because you don't have to be a full-time carrier pilot (locked inside big grey floaty thing with a bunch of matelots) to be ship-capable.
However, you're not just training pilots, but the whole wing - maintenance, armourers, deck crew, helo crews - all performing a complicated ballet in a confined space, on a much bigger scale than SHAR or JFH.
And even if you don't go all the way to autoland - surely FBW and full-time autothrottle have to make the job easier? Typhoon, I believe, has a landing mode where you basically dial in the airspeed and hold a HUD pipper on the landing spot, to reduce scatter if you want to use a short runway.
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see this weeks "Flight" for further discussion of operations afloat
basically if the RN try and re-invent the wheel after 40++ years instead of following USN practices it will be a terrible cock-up
basically if the RN try and re-invent the wheel after 40++ years instead of following USN practices it will be a terrible cock-up
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t43562,
I'm afraid you don't get something for nothing.
There are indeed less personnel directly related to the launch and recovery of a B vice a C but you need more in other areas if we revert to B.
In order to produce the same effect as a C with a B, you will either need more aircraft (= more maintainers) or fly the same aircraft more often (= more maintainers).
And the training burden reduction inherent in C operations when compared with legacy (even the USN is looking at reducing the training burden with a C) will offer relative savings.
I'm afraid you don't get something for nothing.
There are indeed less personnel directly related to the launch and recovery of a B vice a C but you need more in other areas if we revert to B.
In order to produce the same effect as a C with a B, you will either need more aircraft (= more maintainers) or fly the same aircraft more often (= more maintainers).
And the training burden reduction inherent in C operations when compared with legacy (even the USN is looking at reducing the training burden with a C) will offer relative savings.
basically if the RN try and re-invent the wheel after 40++ years instead of following USN practices it will be a terrible cock-up
Thanks
Thanks very much, for that explanation, LO and FB11. It makes the whole thing more comprehensible.
It is obviously an argument that needs a spreadsheet model and accurate data. Danger of having insufficiently powerful capability vs trying to operate a model that only the Americans have a big enough margin of wealth to be sure they can always maintain.
Might be a question of how fragile each option is. e.g. how easily can one lose capability how hard to regain it. Is all the complexity at the dangerous end or in some hangar where there is time. Is there any way to operate a degraded capability or do you need every bit of a big operation to be perfect for it to work at all. If the americans solve problems with money then that might present problems for anyone else and their experience might be no more than interesting.
Hence the incredible difficulty for someone without any experience like me or the rest of the public in knowing what to think.
It is obviously an argument that needs a spreadsheet model and accurate data. Danger of having insufficiently powerful capability vs trying to operate a model that only the Americans have a big enough margin of wealth to be sure they can always maintain.
Might be a question of how fragile each option is. e.g. how easily can one lose capability how hard to regain it. Is all the complexity at the dangerous end or in some hangar where there is time. Is there any way to operate a degraded capability or do you need every bit of a big operation to be perfect for it to work at all. If the americans solve problems with money then that might present problems for anyone else and their experience might be no more than interesting.
Hence the incredible difficulty for someone without any experience like me or the rest of the public in knowing what to think.
t...
There's also a strategic issue. Carriers have had a longer service life than fighter aircraft types. Only two US carriers have been commissioned since the Super Hornet became operational.
It is as close to certain as we get in this business that there will be CATOBAR aircraft in service and under development through the life of the QEs, because that is a major US strategic capability.
There are few who would argue seriously that the Marine STOVL capability is at the same level of importance. The B came close to being chopped in 2010. Given its performance, likely operating costs and the budget environment, its survival is not a given.
There's also a strategic issue. Carriers have had a longer service life than fighter aircraft types. Only two US carriers have been commissioned since the Super Hornet became operational.
It is as close to certain as we get in this business that there will be CATOBAR aircraft in service and under development through the life of the QEs, because that is a major US strategic capability.
There are few who would argue seriously that the Marine STOVL capability is at the same level of importance. The B came close to being chopped in 2010. Given its performance, likely operating costs and the budget environment, its survival is not a given.