RAF future fast jets
Thread Starter
I'd be interested to know if the Navy would really rather have just F-35s along with an empty boat (ship?) for a few years
or
F/A-18E/F (or Rafale) and then with the money saved buy some Hawkeyes? and have them on deck sooner.
or
F/A-18E/F (or Rafale) and then with the money saved buy some Hawkeyes? and have them on deck sooner.
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Engines:
"JFH manning - as one of the staff officers involved in the decision, I can state with utter certainty that lack of engineering manpower was NOT a factor in the problems in standing up two NASs. (We already had two front line NASs plus an 'OCU'). Now, if the problem were reframed as 'standing up two front line NASs complemented to RAF requirements...different beast. I don't mind a grown up discussion over JFH, but rewriting history is not, in my view, productive. "
You are correct, it was an acute lack of aircrew!
"JFH manning - as one of the staff officers involved in the decision, I can state with utter certainty that lack of engineering manpower was NOT a factor in the problems in standing up two NASs. (We already had two front line NASs plus an 'OCU'). Now, if the problem were reframed as 'standing up two front line NASs complemented to RAF requirements...different beast. I don't mind a grown up discussion over JFH, but rewriting history is not, in my view, productive. "
You are correct, it was an acute lack of aircrew!
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PUG,
Ok, aircrew.
The RN had two front liners, running at about 7 jets each (equivalent to 8/9 RAF, as jets at second line were not counted) and a second line squadron 9'OCU') with about 9 jets. These units were manned and declared operational. So, the problem?
The RN's SHAR training pipeline had been underperforming for some time, and needed to be fixed. Some of the best 'joint' interaction I saw at JFH was the way that, at the initiative of highly professional and well respected RAF officers, RAF principles and knowledge of aircrew training were being applied to and exploited by the SHAR force to improve matters. Within the first year, pilot output was more than doubled, and the RN had the RAF to thank for that. But that was what JFH was supposed to be about - using best practice to get the best results.
However, once the decision to remove SHAR was taken, a bunfight started over how the RN and RAF aircrew that had once supported five front liners and two OCUs were going to be rebrigaded into four front liners and one OCU. Deletion of the SHAR wasn't helping with RN retention, but a plan was put together (and very much a joint plan) for the new JFH squadron manning, as I've said before, two front liners RN heavy. two front liners RAF heavy, OCU shared.
That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.
In my view, (and I'm happy if you don't share it) this was the final nail in the coffin for JFH, as trust broke down pretty completely.
Here's my point. The RAF and the RN are two professional services. They were and are both capable of delivering properly manned units to deliver operational capability. They may not do it in the same way, but if there is mutual respect, understanding and flexibility, then they can work together to very good effect. Sadly, that did not happen in JFH, not at the coal face, but at the upper levels (one star and up). And as JFH was owned by the RAF, the RAF bear the responsibility for letting that happen. Blaming the RN aircrew community is not, in my view, right.
I have always, and continue to, make it clear that I have deep respect for the professionalism and expertise of the very many RAF aircrew and engineers I have worked with. The fact that they are not, as a service, really interested in the aviation I spent my working life delivering does not make them bad people in the least. But they shouldn't be entrusted with the future of naval strike aviation.
Best Regards as ever to all those still out there doing the business,
Engines
Ok, aircrew.
The RN had two front liners, running at about 7 jets each (equivalent to 8/9 RAF, as jets at second line were not counted) and a second line squadron 9'OCU') with about 9 jets. These units were manned and declared operational. So, the problem?
The RN's SHAR training pipeline had been underperforming for some time, and needed to be fixed. Some of the best 'joint' interaction I saw at JFH was the way that, at the initiative of highly professional and well respected RAF officers, RAF principles and knowledge of aircrew training were being applied to and exploited by the SHAR force to improve matters. Within the first year, pilot output was more than doubled, and the RN had the RAF to thank for that. But that was what JFH was supposed to be about - using best practice to get the best results.
However, once the decision to remove SHAR was taken, a bunfight started over how the RN and RAF aircrew that had once supported five front liners and two OCUs were going to be rebrigaded into four front liners and one OCU. Deletion of the SHAR wasn't helping with RN retention, but a plan was put together (and very much a joint plan) for the new JFH squadron manning, as I've said before, two front liners RN heavy. two front liners RAF heavy, OCU shared.
That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.
In my view, (and I'm happy if you don't share it) this was the final nail in the coffin for JFH, as trust broke down pretty completely.
Here's my point. The RAF and the RN are two professional services. They were and are both capable of delivering properly manned units to deliver operational capability. They may not do it in the same way, but if there is mutual respect, understanding and flexibility, then they can work together to very good effect. Sadly, that did not happen in JFH, not at the coal face, but at the upper levels (one star and up). And as JFH was owned by the RAF, the RAF bear the responsibility for letting that happen. Blaming the RN aircrew community is not, in my view, right.
I have always, and continue to, make it clear that I have deep respect for the professionalism and expertise of the very many RAF aircrew and engineers I have worked with. The fact that they are not, as a service, really interested in the aviation I spent my working life delivering does not make them bad people in the least. But they shouldn't be entrusted with the future of naval strike aviation.
Best Regards as ever to all those still out there doing the business,
Engines
One detail point: Although the C does carry more fuel than the A, I suspect that the difference is not so much the capacity of the wing tanks as the elimination of the gun and ammo feed system. And any aero gain from the bigger wing in cruise will be offset to a great extent by 5,500 pounds more OEW and more fuel used if the profile calls for supersonic.
If you want a long-range JSF in the strike role, buy an A/C hybrid without a gun. Unless you think you're going to get into, and win, a guns fight against an Su-35...
If you want a long-range JSF in the strike role, buy an A/C hybrid without a gun. Unless you think you're going to get into, and win, a guns fight against an Su-35...
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Engines, we need to lance this boil once and for all, because the bitterness to which you refer is being fed by lies by certain individuals who actually shoulder the blame for non-delivery and the lack of a coherent counter argument:
“That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.”
The plan for the RN to fill half the OCU and the lion’s share of 800 and 801 was agreed, accepted and supported. There is documentary evidence with Joint signatures and I challenge you to give evidence where this was not the case.
The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.
The RAF (and RN endorsed) requirement for the correct number of senior supervisors and instructors (flying and weapons) on each Squadron made that challenge even harder. The RAF had accepted the slower RN growth path and was backfilling to facilitate. If it had wanted to kill the FAA FW it could have done it there and then. When JFH took its first reduction under PR10 (and a 2 squadron front-line (effectively ending any hope of 801 growing)), the RAF took a disproportional hit on the reductions; to my knowledge not a single RN pilot was removed from the cockpit when the first reduction happened. In other words, 801 existed in name only.
The key to this argument is two-fold:
The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.
What does this mean for an even smaller force in the future – can the RN sustain such a small cadre without RAF support?
By all means supply some evidence that the RAF restricted FAA FW growth. It may have set high standards but the FAA was at liberty to meet them.
“That plan was on track, and 800 established, when the decision was taken to delete 3 Group and the dark blue AOC post. Once 1 Group had the reins, a unilateral RAF (not joint) review of JFH squadron manning added a number of senior aircrew posts to the squadrons that the RN wasn't in a position to fill straight away. This situation was used, openly and at short notice by senior RAF officers, to delay and then cancel the formation of the second RN heavy front liner. Once that had gone, the rationale for more RN aircrew was, obviously, weakened.”
The plan for the RN to fill half the OCU and the lion’s share of 800 and 801 was agreed, accepted and supported. There is documentary evidence with Joint signatures and I challenge you to give evidence where this was not the case.
The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.
The RAF (and RN endorsed) requirement for the correct number of senior supervisors and instructors (flying and weapons) on each Squadron made that challenge even harder. The RAF had accepted the slower RN growth path and was backfilling to facilitate. If it had wanted to kill the FAA FW it could have done it there and then. When JFH took its first reduction under PR10 (and a 2 squadron front-line (effectively ending any hope of 801 growing)), the RAF took a disproportional hit on the reductions; to my knowledge not a single RN pilot was removed from the cockpit when the first reduction happened. In other words, 801 existed in name only.
The key to this argument is two-fold:
The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.
What does this mean for an even smaller force in the future – can the RN sustain such a small cadre without RAF support?
By all means supply some evidence that the RAF restricted FAA FW growth. It may have set high standards but the FAA was at liberty to meet them.
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PUG,
Thank you for a courteous and constructive reply. I absolutely agree that 'lancing the boil' is the right way forward. (and by the way, I think you are being very honest here.)
Yes, I absolutely agree that the plan for filling aircrew posts in the new 'non-SHAR' JFH was agreed and signed off. I saw the papers myself, as I was involved in the early efforts to do the same for the engineering side. However, there were issues with the plans.
JFH had made no real progress in moving to a 'Joint' way of working. RN aircraft were operated under basically RN rules, RAF aircraft under RAF rules. 3Gp GASOs (an entirely foreign beast that the FAA had never required) had been built so as to preserve these two distinct rules. Even the JAPs had failed to do much more than merely list out the RN/Army/RAF ways of doing 'aviation'. Plugging two sets of people together on RAF owned units without that progress in place generated some major issues.
One early problem was that RAF squadrons had many more aircrew per aircraft than RN. (Not worse, but different). They also had more people at higher ranks in squadrons (Wg Cdrs in command drove that structure), although the RN had started moving that way. The JFH team agreed to 'move the RN towards' an RAF style manning structure, but to be honest they did not have the time to flesh out exactly how that was going to happen. It was a case of 'we're going to get to here and we'll work out the details along the way, with a bit of give and take'. Very much the JFH ethos.
Sadly, that ethos did not survive the abolition of 3Gp and the integration of JFH into 1 Group HQ. At that point, things started going downhill rapidly.
I stand by my view that the RAF hierarchy took a deliberate and orchestrated decision to stop 801 forming by sudden imposition of RAF rules for senior aircrew manning levels. I have solid evidence for that. I won't 'supply' it on this forum in public. Happy to PM if you want to but probably not the point now.
You are right that the RN could not meet their share of the force. The reason was that the 'share' was suddenly and arbitrarily changed to a figure that the RN could not meet for some months. The cancellation of 801 forming then followed at the rush, as we navy types say. (The fact that senior 801 squadron RN personnel had already been appointed and were in the process of moving up to Cottesmore to set up the unit shows how sudden this move was).
I'm really sorry that you seem to infer that the problem was with the RN meeting RAF standards. As you know, I make it a point never to belittle the RAF's professionalism, in fact I go out of my way to recognise it.
Where we should try to agree (if I might suggest) is that JFH was a sad affair that reflected badly on all concerned. It takes two to make an argument, and I believe that JFH was set up to fail by a lack of genuine commitment from all parties to go for a truly 'Joint' unit with new and better ways of doing things.
Going forward (and that's got to be the focus now), I feel that everyone needs to realise that when a new and different way of doing aviation is being considered, any organisation needs to react, adapt and change to meet that challenge. But first it has to recognise it. My concern is that the RAF is interested in, understands and professionally executes land based air power. However, it has no reason, desire or inclination to do the same for maritime aviation, as it really does not recognise that it's any different to a land base. I say again that this does not make the RAF bad, evil or of a lower standard than the FAA or the AAC. It just makes them poorly equipped to meet the challenge that (like it or not) our leaders have set the Armed Forces - to generate an effective and sustainable maritime strike capability.
Best Regards as ever to those still out there doing the job - whatever views we exchange on these forums, let's all try to maintain our unflinching support for them.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
Thank you for a courteous and constructive reply. I absolutely agree that 'lancing the boil' is the right way forward. (and by the way, I think you are being very honest here.)
Yes, I absolutely agree that the plan for filling aircrew posts in the new 'non-SHAR' JFH was agreed and signed off. I saw the papers myself, as I was involved in the early efforts to do the same for the engineering side. However, there were issues with the plans.
JFH had made no real progress in moving to a 'Joint' way of working. RN aircraft were operated under basically RN rules, RAF aircraft under RAF rules. 3Gp GASOs (an entirely foreign beast that the FAA had never required) had been built so as to preserve these two distinct rules. Even the JAPs had failed to do much more than merely list out the RN/Army/RAF ways of doing 'aviation'. Plugging two sets of people together on RAF owned units without that progress in place generated some major issues.
One early problem was that RAF squadrons had many more aircrew per aircraft than RN. (Not worse, but different). They also had more people at higher ranks in squadrons (Wg Cdrs in command drove that structure), although the RN had started moving that way. The JFH team agreed to 'move the RN towards' an RAF style manning structure, but to be honest they did not have the time to flesh out exactly how that was going to happen. It was a case of 'we're going to get to here and we'll work out the details along the way, with a bit of give and take'. Very much the JFH ethos.
Sadly, that ethos did not survive the abolition of 3Gp and the integration of JFH into 1 Group HQ. At that point, things started going downhill rapidly.
I stand by my view that the RAF hierarchy took a deliberate and orchestrated decision to stop 801 forming by sudden imposition of RAF rules for senior aircrew manning levels. I have solid evidence for that. I won't 'supply' it on this forum in public. Happy to PM if you want to but probably not the point now.
You are right that the RN could not meet their share of the force. The reason was that the 'share' was suddenly and arbitrarily changed to a figure that the RN could not meet for some months. The cancellation of 801 forming then followed at the rush, as we navy types say. (The fact that senior 801 squadron RN personnel had already been appointed and were in the process of moving up to Cottesmore to set up the unit shows how sudden this move was).
I'm really sorry that you seem to infer that the problem was with the RN meeting RAF standards. As you know, I make it a point never to belittle the RAF's professionalism, in fact I go out of my way to recognise it.
Where we should try to agree (if I might suggest) is that JFH was a sad affair that reflected badly on all concerned. It takes two to make an argument, and I believe that JFH was set up to fail by a lack of genuine commitment from all parties to go for a truly 'Joint' unit with new and better ways of doing things.
Going forward (and that's got to be the focus now), I feel that everyone needs to realise that when a new and different way of doing aviation is being considered, any organisation needs to react, adapt and change to meet that challenge. But first it has to recognise it. My concern is that the RAF is interested in, understands and professionally executes land based air power. However, it has no reason, desire or inclination to do the same for maritime aviation, as it really does not recognise that it's any different to a land base. I say again that this does not make the RAF bad, evil or of a lower standard than the FAA or the AAC. It just makes them poorly equipped to meet the challenge that (like it or not) our leaders have set the Armed Forces - to generate an effective and sustainable maritime strike capability.
Best Regards as ever to those still out there doing the job - whatever views we exchange on these forums, let's all try to maintain our unflinching support for them.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
Cap’n Pugwash
What an excellent post. As one who was intimately involved in both RN and RAF Harrier pilot training for the duration of JFH, ( and many years before that during the initial setting up of the SHAR force), I totally agree with you.
In particular:
“The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.” (My italics)
And finally:
“The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.”
What an excellent post. As one who was intimately involved in both RN and RAF Harrier pilot training for the duration of JFH, ( and many years before that during the initial setting up of the SHAR force), I totally agree with you.
In particular:
“The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew. This was necessary because the RN had the added challenge of only being able to recruit against a demanding single seat role – failure rates were higher as a result. The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA.” (My italics)
And finally:
“The RAF did not stop FAA aircrew meeting their share of the Force – they couldn’t meet it.”
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Mud,
So they should have done - the RAF already had a full force and was in fact in reduction mode, the throughpput should have been wholly in the RN favour.
But Engines is nearer the truth in this matter. The QFI issue became a major sticking point where the RN operated their Sqns differently but the Senior RAF (AOC 1Gp etc knew it was a means to make the RN force unviable. They also stopped the creamy route and the route for "almost theres" to complete a tour in the Tornado force prior to returning to Harrier.
If there was an obstacle that could have been put in the way, it was. There is shedloads of evidence for this which may be available under foi.
The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew.
But Engines is nearer the truth in this matter. The QFI issue became a major sticking point where the RN operated their Sqns differently but the Senior RAF (AOC 1Gp etc knew it was a means to make the RN force unviable. They also stopped the creamy route and the route for "almost theres" to complete a tour in the Tornado force prior to returning to Harrier.
If there was an obstacle that could have been put in the way, it was. There is shedloads of evidence for this which may be available under foi.
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Bismark, PUG and others,
I really feel that this is now water under the bridge. I took the time to reply to PUG solely because I don't think that offering various partial views of what went on helps in any way now, as it just keeps polarised views going. What I really am sorry about is that the debate seems to force some people to question each others' professional capabilities.
The fact is that JFH, by any objective view, failed. Personally, (and I know it's a view that some will disagree with) I feel that the idea of putting a 'Joint' force into a single service HQ is basically flawed. There's no pressure or desire to develop new ways of doing things, nor to look at other ways of doing things. Shame, but true. And in my direct and informed experience, it didn't save the taxpayer a single penny - in fact, the growth in numbers of staff officers required to service 'Joint' HQs has been significant.
I'd propose capability elements that are clearly 'owned' by one service, using 'joint' arrangements (like training and logs support) to reduce costs where those arrangements can support the targets, which wil include reducing costs.
Let's try to agree that ownership of the capabilities, going forward, needs to be decided on a 'best athlete' basis. My put? If the RAF want to operate F-35s to replace GR4 as land based strike assets, just fine - they are the best qualified to do that. If the RN want to do the same for maritime aviation, let them go ahead and do that. I don't see why having separate duty holder chains would be a problem.
Commonality of aircraft, logs support and basic training can deliver the cost savings. Separation of command and organisation chains could generate 'virtuous competition' that the Centre could use to drive down costs. It's more likely, in my view, to deliver capabilities more efficiently than the failed 'Joint' model.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
I really feel that this is now water under the bridge. I took the time to reply to PUG solely because I don't think that offering various partial views of what went on helps in any way now, as it just keeps polarised views going. What I really am sorry about is that the debate seems to force some people to question each others' professional capabilities.
The fact is that JFH, by any objective view, failed. Personally, (and I know it's a view that some will disagree with) I feel that the idea of putting a 'Joint' force into a single service HQ is basically flawed. There's no pressure or desire to develop new ways of doing things, nor to look at other ways of doing things. Shame, but true. And in my direct and informed experience, it didn't save the taxpayer a single penny - in fact, the growth in numbers of staff officers required to service 'Joint' HQs has been significant.
I'd propose capability elements that are clearly 'owned' by one service, using 'joint' arrangements (like training and logs support) to reduce costs where those arrangements can support the targets, which wil include reducing costs.
Let's try to agree that ownership of the capabilities, going forward, needs to be decided on a 'best athlete' basis. My put? If the RAF want to operate F-35s to replace GR4 as land based strike assets, just fine - they are the best qualified to do that. If the RN want to do the same for maritime aviation, let them go ahead and do that. I don't see why having separate duty holder chains would be a problem.
Commonality of aircraft, logs support and basic training can deliver the cost savings. Separation of command and organisation chains could generate 'virtuous competition' that the Centre could use to drive down costs. It's more likely, in my view, to deliver capabilities more efficiently than the failed 'Joint' model.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 4th Feb 2012 at 13:55. Reason: Clarification
Bismark
IIRC this was only on offer when the RAF had shortfalls in cockpit manning themselves. As you say
so why on earth should they offer up cockpits to the RN "almost theres".
BTW, a well worded FOI request would also reveal the number of additional 'flex' hours given to RN "almost theres" at RAF Valley to try to get them "there" which weren't on offer or available to RAF "almost theres"....
the route for "almost theres" to complete a tour in the Tornado force
the RAF already had a full force and was in fact in reduction mode
BTW, a well worded FOI request would also reveal the number of additional 'flex' hours given to RN "almost theres" at RAF Valley to try to get them "there" which weren't on offer or available to RAF "almost theres"....
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The only posts the RN struggled to fill were the QFI slots.
Why? Because as Engines has said, the RN SHAR Squadron set up was different and did not include the requirement for a QFI on 800 or 801. It then took a long period of time to "grow" a QFI , front line tour, Linton /Valley for a tour then back for another year or so on the Harrier before C to I.
RN students entered the OCU at the same time as their RAF counterparts and finished at the same time on courses that were 50/50 split RN RAF.
Not withstanding the fact that pilots at the time of the Harrier would have been in need of a single seat recommendation for Harrier and not Typhoon, the pilots "recruited" by the RN were;
An RAF QWI (already Harrier Qualified)
Two RAF QFIs (already Harrier Qualified)
An Ex Jag Pilot (had left the RAF and rejoined the RN)
An ex GR1 Pilot and QFI who had spent many years at Valley (did not pass 20 Sqn)
An ex GR4 Pilot (did not start/complete 20 Sqn due to the closure of the Harrier)
Yes, the RN were in need of QFIs on the GR7/9.
Don't forget that the RN also had Squadron execs on IV(AC) and 1(F) as well as junior pilots and engineers, just as 800 had RAF pilots.
Why? Because as Engines has said, the RN SHAR Squadron set up was different and did not include the requirement for a QFI on 800 or 801. It then took a long period of time to "grow" a QFI , front line tour, Linton /Valley for a tour then back for another year or so on the Harrier before C to I.
The RAF bent over backwards to allow RN aircrew through the system at a faster proportional rate than RAF aircrew
The RN even had to recruit ex-RAF aircrew who had failed to gain a single seat recommendation for Typhoon, thus seeing an opportunity to go single seat through the FAA
An RAF QWI (already Harrier Qualified)
Two RAF QFIs (already Harrier Qualified)
An Ex Jag Pilot (had left the RAF and rejoined the RN)
An ex GR1 Pilot and QFI who had spent many years at Valley (did not pass 20 Sqn)
An ex GR4 Pilot (did not start/complete 20 Sqn due to the closure of the Harrier)
Yes, the RN were in need of QFIs on the GR7/9.
Don't forget that the RN also had Squadron execs on IV(AC) and 1(F) as well as junior pilots and engineers, just as 800 had RAF pilots.
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On the topic of JSF vs F18/Typhoon, with airframe orders down to 50 (and realistically, more cost increases waiting to jump out at us and possibly further cuts to numbers?), I'm incredulous to the fact that the RAF are willing to sacrifice so much for an aircraft that is completely unproven and is showing some very worrying problems...and it still has the rump of its testing to fulfill. The only thing that, to me, makes this worse, is that we'll only be capable of deploying them in a laughably small number.
I agree that it will inevitably end up being a superb aircraft, but isn't the F35 going to be in production until 2035? If it was my reich, I wouldn't be getting it until it's a war-winning aircraft in practice rather than just on paper...chin off the F35 for the F18 & Typhoon and re-visit an F35 order next decade.
Keep the actual capabilities alive, in significant numbers and then replace them in significant numbers with working, proven, capabilities next decade.
I agree that it will inevitably end up being a superb aircraft, but isn't the F35 going to be in production until 2035? If it was my reich, I wouldn't be getting it until it's a war-winning aircraft in practice rather than just on paper...chin off the F35 for the F18 & Typhoon and re-visit an F35 order next decade.
Keep the actual capabilities alive, in significant numbers and then replace them in significant numbers with working, proven, capabilities next decade.
Bastardeux,
"with airframe orders down to 50.."
Why does this bolleaux keep getting spouted? NO production order has been placed and will not need to be placed for quite some time. The only UK order has been for three development airframes.
"with airframe orders down to 50.."
Why does this bolleaux keep getting spouted? NO production order has been placed and will not need to be placed for quite some time. The only UK order has been for three development airframes.
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Although it's not official, it's the number that has been generally accepted in the MoD, with reasonable assumptions on post 2015 budget... Whether a second or 3rd tranche of orders are made after 2020 isn't something I have any knowledge about, but certainly the planning at the moment is for 20/25 frontline aircraft. Does the order not have to be placed by 2014...get deliveries 2016???? and IOC 2018?...I don't know the exact timetable.
the ????? signifies that I think this delivery date is complete and utter bolleaux. Canada have just come out and said they don't expect to declare their jets operational until after 2020.
the ????? signifies that I think this delivery date is complete and utter bolleaux. Canada have just come out and said they don't expect to declare their jets operational until after 2020.
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Engines, you are a proper gent and I will let sleeping dogs lie.
I suppose the differences over structures and standards are, to a degree, to be resolved by the formation of the MAA. We also have a chance to start from scratch as both services learn new skills on a new aircraft and carrier.
Who knows the next generation might just make work what our generations failed to do.
I suppose the differences over structures and standards are, to a degree, to be resolved by the formation of the MAA. We also have a chance to start from scratch as both services learn new skills on a new aircraft and carrier.
Who knows the next generation might just make work what our generations failed to do.
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Pug,
Nicely put and thank you for your gentlemanly understanding.
I wholeheartedly join you in wishing only the best for the future team. Land based air power is vital to this country's interests. I'm just thankful that we have a great service like the RAF looking after it. I think sea based air power is just as vital. Let's hope that the country gets the right team, of all the talents, running that bit.
Very best regards as always,
Engines
Nicely put and thank you for your gentlemanly understanding.
I wholeheartedly join you in wishing only the best for the future team. Land based air power is vital to this country's interests. I'm just thankful that we have a great service like the RAF looking after it. I think sea based air power is just as vital. Let's hope that the country gets the right team, of all the talents, running that bit.
Very best regards as always,
Engines
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Typerated-
This is excellent news, absolutely excellent... so even having 6 jets deployed on our humungo-carriers seems highly questionable.
But hey-ho at least we can say "we've got stealth planes", at which point the reply will be "yes, but how many?"..."err a deployable force of"
(The number is muttered under the breath so quietly, it didn't qualify being included in the quote)
This is excellent news, absolutely excellent... so even having 6 jets deployed on our humungo-carriers seems highly questionable.
But hey-ho at least we can say "we've got stealth planes", at which point the reply will be "yes, but how many?"..."err a deployable force of"
(The number is muttered under the breath so quietly, it didn't qualify being included in the quote)
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Engines, PUG:
Can we at least hope for the future that by the time the new 'Joint Force' comes into frontline service, it will be run by those who served at the coal face of JFH in both shades of blue and made the herculean effort necessary to make it work for the good of the country, and not those who worked to make it fail for the percieved good of their service, having by then risen to the higher levels of command and brought their experience to bear.
Echoing Engines sign off, best wishes to all doing the job in harms way.
Can we at least hope for the future that by the time the new 'Joint Force' comes into frontline service, it will be run by those who served at the coal face of JFH in both shades of blue and made the herculean effort necessary to make it work for the good of the country, and not those who worked to make it fail for the percieved good of their service, having by then risen to the higher levels of command and brought their experience to bear.
Echoing Engines sign off, best wishes to all doing the job in harms way.
