RAF future fast jets
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Engines,
You said:
My understanding was that it was the RN who decided that the SHAR should go early - RADM S L, though a nice chap, was rather instrumental in its early demise for the FAA. Although the RN aspiration was to man two FLS the truth was they could not. They barely had enough aircrew (though by the end they were around 1.5 sqns worth) but the critical point was engineering manpower which the RN did not have in sufficient numbers and experience to stand up two full NASs. The fact that there were draftings from NMA to both 800 and 801 NAS was seen more as preservation of FAA history rather than anything meaningful to Ops.
I think there are many who feel the RAF want to see the FAA go but I don't think that's true - maybe at the top there is a battle for resource and identity but it should NOT be forgotten that if the current First Sea Lord had been correctly staffed with credible arguments (of the required potency) to win him over, he would have saved Carrier Strike/GR9 for the RN and sacrificed other ships/programmes to pay HM Treasury their kilo of flesh at the time. He did not. The RN should therefore look inward at their leadership at the time and admit that if CS was that vital their arguments weren't robust enough. 1SL even admitted he'd reverse his decision if given the chance in a public statement but, alas, it's too late now. I don't care if anyone states that the arguments were there and were strong enough; they blatantly weren't or the FAA would be having a cocktail party on the quarterdeck in some far-flung port right now.
A lesson for all...if you want something that badly you have to fight for it tooth and nail. The RAF ARE willing to fight for it because, simply, it is the air power of the next 50 years with the capacity for growth to keep it value for money over its life. It is a game-changing platform to everything out there on t'other side and it is worth the oodles of effort being spent making it work. Yes FCBA was a requirement 15 years ago but requirements change and have a habit of being behind the times - as I've said, my opinion is that the RN no longer need huge carriers as much as they did when the CVF requirement was written. We're selling one for God's sake! Again, if the arguments were there and sacrifice was willing to be made we'd pay everything we could muster to get two flat-tops, but we aren't.
Through various cost options the RAF lost an entire type (and the FW FAA was a victim too sadly) in order to look ahead to afford what we need...ahead. We lost 2 sqns of GR4 and probably will lose more in a few years; all to pay for Typhoon growth and F-35; people are wasting precious energy on conspiracy theories now and it's bordering comedic.
Bismark,
That may be across the board (i.e. Helos) but on JFH it certainly wasn't so. I operated on both light and dark blue for years with many ship dets there but my opinion and examples against this statement would be unfair on a public forum. Stats also have a habit of being susceptible to what the compiler WANTS them to say...assuming everything gets reported in full.
Capt P U G - I agree! I never ever encountered an ethos of not being willing to embark....ever, ever so again, people need to stop peddling urban myth - there were teething issues in the late 90s with embarking and an attitude by those who did but it was not there shortly afterwards (bit of do it once, remember it forever syndrome by some)
You said:
When the RAF took the decision to retire the SHAR, the plan to re-brigade into four front line units was taken so as to be able to maintain that dual air/land capability, two RAF heavy, two RN heavy, with the RN heavy units maintaining embarked capability.
I think there are many who feel the RAF want to see the FAA go but I don't think that's true - maybe at the top there is a battle for resource and identity but it should NOT be forgotten that if the current First Sea Lord had been correctly staffed with credible arguments (of the required potency) to win him over, he would have saved Carrier Strike/GR9 for the RN and sacrificed other ships/programmes to pay HM Treasury their kilo of flesh at the time. He did not. The RN should therefore look inward at their leadership at the time and admit that if CS was that vital their arguments weren't robust enough. 1SL even admitted he'd reverse his decision if given the chance in a public statement but, alas, it's too late now. I don't care if anyone states that the arguments were there and were strong enough; they blatantly weren't or the FAA would be having a cocktail party on the quarterdeck in some far-flung port right now.
A lesson for all...if you want something that badly you have to fight for it tooth and nail. The RAF ARE willing to fight for it because, simply, it is the air power of the next 50 years with the capacity for growth to keep it value for money over its life. It is a game-changing platform to everything out there on t'other side and it is worth the oodles of effort being spent making it work. Yes FCBA was a requirement 15 years ago but requirements change and have a habit of being behind the times - as I've said, my opinion is that the RN no longer need huge carriers as much as they did when the CVF requirement was written. We're selling one for God's sake! Again, if the arguments were there and sacrifice was willing to be made we'd pay everything we could muster to get two flat-tops, but we aren't.
Through various cost options the RAF lost an entire type (and the FW FAA was a victim too sadly) in order to look ahead to afford what we need...ahead. We lost 2 sqns of GR4 and probably will lose more in a few years; all to pay for Typhoon growth and F-35; people are wasting precious energy on conspiracy theories now and it's bordering comedic.
Bismark,
Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF.
Capt P U G - I agree! I never ever encountered an ethos of not being willing to embark....ever, ever so again, people need to stop peddling urban myth - there were teething issues in the late 90s with embarking and an attitude by those who did but it was not there shortly afterwards (bit of do it once, remember it forever syndrome by some)
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i just do not believe we can afford the F-35 package - the airframes in sufficient numbers (what? 200 airframes to give a land based strike force, a CVF based force, attrition replacements and training aircraft?) and all the enabling capabilities - the ELINT, Tankers, AWACS, and the CVF (and all support that it needs) to make having F-35 justifable.
having a sharp spearhead is useless if the shaft is rotten.
having a sharp spearhead is useless if the shaft is rotten.
Pug
merely to take our time in the US CV deployment rota is to completely misunderstand the political and influence impact that might bring.
I suggest that actually being able to shoulder some of the load on a regular basis may be more useful and deliver more daily effect, as opposed to running a standard training cycle out of Lossie, once current Herrick ops have finished.
To suggest that would lead to it being taken as a "savings measure" emphasises that light blue don't "get it".
As for operating with one deck, we've done it before from 72-78 and the MN have done it from 2000 onwards. What is being suggested are ways to reduce the Carqual load for the CAG, such that the single operational ship spends more time available for deployment / ops.
merely to take our time in the US CV deployment rota is to completely misunderstand the political and influence impact that might bring.
I suggest that actually being able to shoulder some of the load on a regular basis may be more useful and deliver more daily effect, as opposed to running a standard training cycle out of Lossie, once current Herrick ops have finished.
To suggest that would lead to it being taken as a "savings measure" emphasises that light blue don't "get it".
As for operating with one deck, we've done it before from 72-78 and the MN have done it from 2000 onwards. What is being suggested are ways to reduce the Carqual load for the CAG, such that the single operational ship spends more time available for deployment / ops.
ICBM,
can F-35 fly to Tripoli and back with 2x AMRAAM and 2x 1000LB JDAM without tanker support?
how much tanker support would 4 F-35 require to get to the Falklands on a re-inforcement operation?
how much tanker support would an F-35 in an ELINT role require to sit off Pakistan for 6 hours?
or, is that not what you meant by 'it doesn't need tankers'?
can F-35 fly to Tripoli and back with 2x AMRAAM and 2x 1000LB JDAM without tanker support?
how much tanker support would 4 F-35 require to get to the Falklands on a re-inforcement operation?
how much tanker support would an F-35 in an ELINT role require to sit off Pakistan for 6 hours?
or, is that not what you meant by 'it doesn't need tankers'?
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Cokecan
Re-read. I never wrote 'it doesn't need tankers' at all. It has less reliance - greater range and fuel efficiency that's all chap.
ELINT isn't just sitting off PK for 6 hours. How about up close without the need to stand off? Be less traditional wouldn't it?
Less reliance on traditional assets doesn't render them obsolete or replace. It does make things very efficient though
Re-read. I never wrote 'it doesn't need tankers' at all. It has less reliance - greater range and fuel efficiency that's all chap.
ELINT isn't just sitting off PK for 6 hours. How about up close without the need to stand off? Be less traditional wouldn't it?
Less reliance on traditional assets doesn't render them obsolete or replace. It does make things very efficient though
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Bismark
“ It wasn't the last savings measure that killed off a viable JFH…it was the vindictive one before it which was aimed solely at removing the RN from the force by making the numbers unviable....the ploy didn't work.”
Using the RAF Squadron model for JFH wasn’t designed to kill of the FAA, if anything it was a challenge to grow to 50% of the Force – a challenge they accepted but failed to meet.
“… the FAA … delivers in spades and far more efficiently than the RAF - fact. Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF. The most recent study by the MAA has shown that the FAA understand and treat safety and risk better than either the RAF or AAC.”
Care to back that one up! My answer to your first point suggests your efficient force might be cheap but not more effective. You are in danger of using the Treasury definition of efficient! You will be calling savings efficiencies next.
From my experience the FAA and the RAF have an equally enviable record in safety issues – so I would not seek to point score there (although the last few years of JFH may not back up your case). You may be referring to recent MAA audit; the FAA were done last so they had all the other audits to learn from and a lot more time to prepare for the Admirals audit! I would be surprised if they hadn’t been best in show – but since the reports are personal neither you or I have seen them!
Not a Boffin:
so what happens when we take our turn in the NAG deployment cycle and another UK priority turns up (Falklands, Libya etc). If we commit our readiness cycle to someone else's needs we will not have the flexibility of use we desire. So, not a light blue issue, but one for the politicians. Not sure if you have read the US newest strategy but they are heading further East and I am not sure the MoD's budget can stretch to filling US holes as they appear. Are you recommending the UK can now afford a Pacific policy? I am afraid you are thinking old alliances and they may not be as relevant when QE2 turns up. Now work share with the French might be another matter......try that with JSF!
“ It wasn't the last savings measure that killed off a viable JFH…it was the vindictive one before it which was aimed solely at removing the RN from the force by making the numbers unviable....the ploy didn't work.”
Using the RAF Squadron model for JFH wasn’t designed to kill of the FAA, if anything it was a challenge to grow to 50% of the Force – a challenge they accepted but failed to meet.
“… the FAA … delivers in spades and far more efficiently than the RAF - fact. Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF. The most recent study by the MAA has shown that the FAA understand and treat safety and risk better than either the RAF or AAC.”
Care to back that one up! My answer to your first point suggests your efficient force might be cheap but not more effective. You are in danger of using the Treasury definition of efficient! You will be calling savings efficiencies next.
From my experience the FAA and the RAF have an equally enviable record in safety issues – so I would not seek to point score there (although the last few years of JFH may not back up your case). You may be referring to recent MAA audit; the FAA were done last so they had all the other audits to learn from and a lot more time to prepare for the Admirals audit! I would be surprised if they hadn’t been best in show – but since the reports are personal neither you or I have seen them!
Not a Boffin:
so what happens when we take our turn in the NAG deployment cycle and another UK priority turns up (Falklands, Libya etc). If we commit our readiness cycle to someone else's needs we will not have the flexibility of use we desire. So, not a light blue issue, but one for the politicians. Not sure if you have read the US newest strategy but they are heading further East and I am not sure the MoD's budget can stretch to filling US holes as they appear. Are you recommending the UK can now afford a Pacific policy? I am afraid you are thinking old alliances and they may not be as relevant when QE2 turns up. Now work share with the French might be another matter......try that with JSF!
Pug
If you look at where the US CVBG are currently deployed away from CONUS, ALL of them are in the 5th or 7th Fleet area. The ones in 2nd/3rd Fleets (CONUS) are either in post deployment stand-down, refit / refuel or pre deployment work up. That means that there is a gap EastLant and the Med (6th Fleet) that would usually have a US carrier deployed and that is precisely where we (and the FR) can add real value.
I'm not for one minute suggesting that we fill a slot in 5th/7th Fleet as a matter of routine, or resurrect the Far East Fleet - far from it. The Pacific-centric nature of future US engagement is old news, they have been working towards this since 2006, it's just that Europe hasn't listened. A UK/FR commitment to provide a "real carrier" in areas where the US recognises a need to have presence, but due to commitments elsewhere cannot actually provide a carrier is what I meant by "effect". Might have to take a turn occasionally in other areas, but that is more likely to be when all is going to ratsh1t, in which case the UK is unlikley to have higher priorities.
As far as UK priorities are concerned, as with all these things, it's a matter of making choices. If SouthLant became an issue, you disengage from your presence mission and head south, with all your stores, airgroup personnel and log support already in place. No different from having a land-based squadron committed to a particular op and then being confronted by another priority - only potentially more supportable.
You'd think that a co-ordinated UK/FR carrier force able to operate in the EastLant, SouthLant, Med would take care of most of the likely UK areas of interest.
If you look at where the US CVBG are currently deployed away from CONUS, ALL of them are in the 5th or 7th Fleet area. The ones in 2nd/3rd Fleets (CONUS) are either in post deployment stand-down, refit / refuel or pre deployment work up. That means that there is a gap EastLant and the Med (6th Fleet) that would usually have a US carrier deployed and that is precisely where we (and the FR) can add real value.
I'm not for one minute suggesting that we fill a slot in 5th/7th Fleet as a matter of routine, or resurrect the Far East Fleet - far from it. The Pacific-centric nature of future US engagement is old news, they have been working towards this since 2006, it's just that Europe hasn't listened. A UK/FR commitment to provide a "real carrier" in areas where the US recognises a need to have presence, but due to commitments elsewhere cannot actually provide a carrier is what I meant by "effect". Might have to take a turn occasionally in other areas, but that is more likely to be when all is going to ratsh1t, in which case the UK is unlikley to have higher priorities.
As far as UK priorities are concerned, as with all these things, it's a matter of making choices. If SouthLant became an issue, you disengage from your presence mission and head south, with all your stores, airgroup personnel and log support already in place. No different from having a land-based squadron committed to a particular op and then being confronted by another priority - only potentially more supportable.
You'd think that a co-ordinated UK/FR carrier force able to operate in the EastLant, SouthLant, Med would take care of most of the likely UK areas of interest.
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Boffin, I cannot fault your analysis; but I don't think that your conclusion is watertight.
Whilst I recognise that the US approach insists on a little bit of good ole USA ready to respond; I just done think we have the luxury or money to attempt a forward deployed posture. In any event in many cases the US CVBG assets may not be the first to respond. ISTAR will come from elsewhere and strike assets may be back in CONUS. Moreover, even the USN will admit that they are heavily reliant on land based air to support.
So a UK forward QEC posture is going to cost a lot - far more than the cost of the units themselves. That coupled with the challenge of both maintaining ship currency and airborne competencies will not survive contact once the facts become clear... IMHO.
Whilst I recognise that the US approach insists on a little bit of good ole USA ready to respond; I just done think we have the luxury or money to attempt a forward deployed posture. In any event in many cases the US CVBG assets may not be the first to respond. ISTAR will come from elsewhere and strike assets may be back in CONUS. Moreover, even the USN will admit that they are heavily reliant on land based air to support.
So a UK forward QEC posture is going to cost a lot - far more than the cost of the units themselves. That coupled with the challenge of both maintaining ship currency and airborne competencies will not survive contact once the facts become clear... IMHO.
Why is there such an utter obsession with minimum different aircraft types across the services these days? Does a GR4 replacement really need to be carrier-capable? Or a fleet defence interceptor really need to be 'day one' stealthy?
Wouldn't F-18E/F/G for the RN's carrier strike wings and CF-35A for the RAF's Tornado GR4 replacement be a more cost-effective mix?
And an end to all this purple 'Joint Force' bolleaux!
The Andrew does jets on ships best - let's have both the QE class carriers with CATOBAR systems and capable Sea Hornet strike wings operated by the FAA. The RAF can afford to wait until Lockheed Martin have got their $hit together and then follow the RCAF's lead with the probe-equipped CF-35A a few years down the road.
Then and only then, perhaps in 15 years time, it might be sensible to replace the F-18E/F/G with F-35C?
Wouldn't F-18E/F/G for the RN's carrier strike wings and CF-35A for the RAF's Tornado GR4 replacement be a more cost-effective mix?
And an end to all this purple 'Joint Force' bolleaux!
The Andrew does jets on ships best - let's have both the QE class carriers with CATOBAR systems and capable Sea Hornet strike wings operated by the FAA. The RAF can afford to wait until Lockheed Martin have got their $hit together and then follow the RCAF's lead with the probe-equipped CF-35A a few years down the road.
Then and only then, perhaps in 15 years time, it might be sensible to replace the F-18E/F/G with F-35C?
Pug
We may have to agree to disagree. The land-based support you refer to tends to be theatre product from true national assets like the EC/RC135s, and LRMP by P3. The AAR aspect is heavily used when you're supporting OEF from the IO, or in other combat ops, but not necessarily in normal presence deployments. We don't have access to those assets nationally, but we could probably get support / the product from those US (or FR!?) units deployed in the Med.
There will be an increased consumables bill for the ships and probably the aircraft (as fuel dump to optimise landing weight will be needed), but other than that no reason to suspect that there will be massive cost differentials. People are paid for, ships and aircraft paid for (a/c will be flying possibly at a higher rate), no 5* hotel bills (
) - what's not to like?
We may have to agree to disagree. The land-based support you refer to tends to be theatre product from true national assets like the EC/RC135s, and LRMP by P3. The AAR aspect is heavily used when you're supporting OEF from the IO, or in other combat ops, but not necessarily in normal presence deployments. We don't have access to those assets nationally, but we could probably get support / the product from those US (or FR!?) units deployed in the Med.
There will be an increased consumables bill for the ships and probably the aircraft (as fuel dump to optimise landing weight will be needed), but other than that no reason to suspect that there will be massive cost differentials. People are paid for, ships and aircraft paid for (a/c will be flying possibly at a higher rate), no 5* hotel bills (
) - what's not to like?
Beags wrote ''Why is there such an utter obsession with minimum different aircraft types across the services these days? Does a GR4 replacement really need to be carrier-capable? Or a fleet defence interceptor really need to be 'day one' stealthy?''.
the obvious answer is £££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££, but another is flexibilty.
lets say we had, as you suggest, an RN CVF with F/A-18F, and the RAF went with Typhoon, GR4, and then further down the road swapped GR4 for CF-35A. if we subsequently faced an adversary, or series of adversaries, against which land-based airpower was the answer, then the RN's F/A-18's could join the party in a surge capability. if however we found ourselves engaging in a series of conflicts in which carrier based aviation was the only way to engage the enemy, then the RN's F/A-18's are quickly going to get shagged out, with the RAF's great pool of hugely capable fast jets unable to assist.
the real answer is a single type fast-jet fleet that can undertake all the fast jet roles. F-35C can do land and carrier based strike and AD, as can F/A-18F. Typhoon, even at T3, is much more of a one trick pony.
i wouldn't be remotely surprised if its one of the reasons the Indians went for Rafale over Typhoon. being carrier capable may not have been part of the requirement, but having a carrier capable multi-role aircraft in the back pocket gives them options in the future - an aircraft that's tied to one basing type does not give you the same options...
the obvious answer is £££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££££, but another is flexibilty.
lets say we had, as you suggest, an RN CVF with F/A-18F, and the RAF went with Typhoon, GR4, and then further down the road swapped GR4 for CF-35A. if we subsequently faced an adversary, or series of adversaries, against which land-based airpower was the answer, then the RN's F/A-18's could join the party in a surge capability. if however we found ourselves engaging in a series of conflicts in which carrier based aviation was the only way to engage the enemy, then the RN's F/A-18's are quickly going to get shagged out, with the RAF's great pool of hugely capable fast jets unable to assist.
the real answer is a single type fast-jet fleet that can undertake all the fast jet roles. F-35C can do land and carrier based strike and AD, as can F/A-18F. Typhoon, even at T3, is much more of a one trick pony.
i wouldn't be remotely surprised if its one of the reasons the Indians went for Rafale over Typhoon. being carrier capable may not have been part of the requirement, but having a carrier capable multi-role aircraft in the back pocket gives them options in the future - an aircraft that's tied to one basing type does not give you the same options...
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Could someone who knows enlighten me on the commonality of the F35A and C and the potential relative cost of each.
I've been mulling Beags and Cokecan's response and a have pondered on the efficacy of a "mixie-buy" of both types. Thus keeping all content: a decently strengthed (a word I've made up btw) RAF OS force and a well placed FAA and Carrier Strike
Fleet.
Just an idle ponderance.....
I've been mulling Beags and Cokecan's response and a have pondered on the efficacy of a "mixie-buy" of both types. Thus keeping all content: a decently strengthed (a word I've made up btw) RAF OS force and a well placed FAA and Carrier Strike
Fleet.
Just an idle ponderance.....
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Beags etc,
What GR4 replacement? The currently funded FE@R does not allow for a GR4 replacement - it will be provided by Typhoon from land and JSF from the sea...that's yer lot.
PUG re recent audits, talk to the MAA.
What GR4 replacement? The currently funded FE@R does not allow for a GR4 replacement - it will be provided by Typhoon from land and JSF from the sea...that's yer lot.
PUG re recent audits, talk to the MAA.
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Bismark,
The FE@R will be provided by Typhoon and F-35C, that's it. It has nothing to do with where it comes from. The F-35C element could equally be provided from land basing.
The FE@R will be provided by Typhoon and F-35C, that's it. It has nothing to do with where it comes from. The F-35C element could equally be provided from land basing.
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Foghorn,
That's an SBO! I differentiated as Typhoon cannot operate from CVF.
Turbine,
The A has bigger wings, thus more fuel. It would be nonsense to buy a mixed fleet of As and Cs even if there was funding for increased numbers (which there isn't).
That's an SBO! I differentiated as Typhoon cannot operate from CVF.
Turbine,
The A has bigger wings, thus more fuel. It would be nonsense to buy a mixed fleet of As and Cs even if there was funding for increased numbers (which there isn't).
I thought the C was the big-wing variant, lower approach speeds at lower alpha and all that.....
However, Bismark is right - no sense at all in buying mixed fleet. Every UK fast jet or UCAV from now on ought to be specified as CV-capable from the off.
However, Bismark is right - no sense at all in buying mixed fleet. Every UK fast jet or UCAV from now on ought to be specified as CV-capable from the off.
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ICBM,
As I've pointed out many times before (but don't mind in the least saying again) the decision to retire the SHAR was taken by the RAF, who owned the aircraft. The RN agreed, sure, but the driver was the fact that the GR7/9 upgrade programme ran hundreds of millions over, and the SHAR needed a DAS upgrade. The RAF then mandated that JFH had to solve its own problems, (nice) so the only course available TO THE RAF was to can the SHAR.
As far as the recent Carrier Strike decision went, again, the decision to can the GR7/9 force was taken by the RAF to meet its own budget cuts. The decision to do so was taken at short notice and sprung on CNS from high level (PM office) after intervention from CDS and CAS. It was not up to the RN to give up Navy funds to retain an RAF asset. Of course, had the Harriers belonged to the RN a different set of decisions may have taken place.
JFH manning - as one of the staff officers involved in the decision, I can state with utter certainty that lack of engineering manpower was NOT a factor in the problems in standing up two NASs. (We already had two front line NASs plus an 'OCU'). Now, if the problem were reframed as 'standing up two front line NASs complemented to RAF requirements...different beast. I don't mind a grown up discussion over JFH, but rewriting history is not, in my view, productive.
But that's all in the past now. The people on the front line are buckling down and doing what is required, and the work is in hand to regenerate a FW naval aviation element. let's just all try to support that.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
As I've pointed out many times before (but don't mind in the least saying again) the decision to retire the SHAR was taken by the RAF, who owned the aircraft. The RN agreed, sure, but the driver was the fact that the GR7/9 upgrade programme ran hundreds of millions over, and the SHAR needed a DAS upgrade. The RAF then mandated that JFH had to solve its own problems, (nice) so the only course available TO THE RAF was to can the SHAR.
As far as the recent Carrier Strike decision went, again, the decision to can the GR7/9 force was taken by the RAF to meet its own budget cuts. The decision to do so was taken at short notice and sprung on CNS from high level (PM office) after intervention from CDS and CAS. It was not up to the RN to give up Navy funds to retain an RAF asset. Of course, had the Harriers belonged to the RN a different set of decisions may have taken place.
JFH manning - as one of the staff officers involved in the decision, I can state with utter certainty that lack of engineering manpower was NOT a factor in the problems in standing up two NASs. (We already had two front line NASs plus an 'OCU'). Now, if the problem were reframed as 'standing up two front line NASs complemented to RAF requirements...different beast. I don't mind a grown up discussion over JFH, but rewriting history is not, in my view, productive.
But that's all in the past now. The people on the front line are buckling down and doing what is required, and the work is in hand to regenerate a FW naval aviation element. let's just all try to support that.
Best Regards as ever,
Engines
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I think we have reached the nub of the issue here.
The future of RAF FW is an equitable share of JCA plus the Typhoon force. Even to a fishy type that sounds appalling.
So where are the 'Sons of Trenchard' going to get their day 1 fighter from. Answer: A little bit more of JCA - hence RN anxiety.
Why are the RAF anxious? Because JCA is being bought to go to sea. Doesn't really sound like the RAF's patch. (Although they've been there before)
Why are both anxious? Because Joint was a great idea, but actually turned out to be a goat. And the buy is now so small that Joint really isn't needed at all.
And as a parting shot. I have personal experience of the staff environment and the frontline both in the formulation and delivery of JF2000 which became JFH. I don't think it worked brilliantly. You don't have to believe me but my view from someone who 'lived in the nightmare' is that the RAF hierarchy weren't committed to Maritime Strike, and I was personally there when 1, 2 and 4 starred RAF officers demonstrated it in public.
The future of RAF FW is an equitable share of JCA plus the Typhoon force. Even to a fishy type that sounds appalling.
So where are the 'Sons of Trenchard' going to get their day 1 fighter from. Answer: A little bit more of JCA - hence RN anxiety.
Why are the RAF anxious? Because JCA is being bought to go to sea. Doesn't really sound like the RAF's patch. (Although they've been there before)
Why are both anxious? Because Joint was a great idea, but actually turned out to be a goat. And the buy is now so small that Joint really isn't needed at all.
And as a parting shot. I have personal experience of the staff environment and the frontline both in the formulation and delivery of JF2000 which became JFH. I don't think it worked brilliantly. You don't have to believe me but my view from someone who 'lived in the nightmare' is that the RAF hierarchy weren't committed to Maritime Strike, and I was personally there when 1, 2 and 4 starred RAF officers demonstrated it in public.