5th C-17 for RAAF

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Given the apparent cost anticipated for an A400M vs the cost of more C-17's, plus set up costs, is it not just as cheap to buy more C-17's rather than A400M's, as counterimntuitive as it may seem at first.

Well, yes...but an A400M will get into almost any strip a C-130 can, which is a lot more strips than a C-17 can get into! Plus, you may not always have C-17 size loads and distances to carry, so an A400M will take those at a more econimical rate.

Same argument applies for C-27J and C-130J.

[Andu]

I'm sure there are quite a few drivers/airframe within the ADF, particularly the AAAvn rotary wing drivers, who'd be happy with damn near anything - that worked.

As for the A400... hmmmmm. Given their previous 'form', I suppose I shouldn't be surprised to learn that the Oz planners, ever after the Tiger, the A330 and the MRH-90 are still considering buying European.

[back end o' the bus]

Excuse me!!

FA 18, mate "you're talking hoop!"

a C-130 can, which is a lot more strips than a C-17 can get into!

[Barry Bernoulli]

Airlift c 2028

6 x C17

5 x KC30

16 x KC390 (inc AAR for CH47) Embraer’s Multinational KC-390 Tactical Air Transport Program

still won't have made a decision on the Caribou replacement


I admit that the above are all a bit fanciful, except the last. With the double tandem landing gear the KC-390 will carry more and bigger stuff than a Herc with a lighter footprint that a C-27 into strips with 40cm potholes. This also makes it ideal for helicopter refuelling because it can provide that service where it is needed. It would be a bit embarrasing for the RAAF to bring the C-27 into service at the same time that less-developed nations are starting to operate something twice as good.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Backender...read my post again...carefully this time!

[scran]

Barry - what Oz said.

FA18 - the lift study was not directly linked to the White Paper (and I'm talking the 2000 WP here), but started sometime after - around early to Mid 2002 from memory.

I'm pleased in a way that AFHQ is looking closely at the A400M. More importantly - is DGAD and his staff?


Opinion back then (early 2000's) was that we would go either A400M or C17. There were a couple of pushes by the A400M team. I'd left IA by the time the C17 buy came around, and while I can't put my hand on my heart and say the C17 buy actually killed any A400M interest (in Capability Development rather than AFHQ) I'm sure it would have certainly cooled it off.........


Certainly I could see where the aircraft might be used as a C130J replacement, but I'd be concerned that the 400 is possibly a bit big (noting Army's requirement to always add weight) and by then there may be a more suitable C130J replacement.

I can't see us ever having C17/A400M/C130J all at the same time but. Would you agree with that?

[Frazzled]

what is the cost of a c27j compared to a C130J??

What's the STOL of the 2 aircraft compared side by side??

Is c27j worth getting or just get more Herc's and let teh chinooks do the caribou type stuff

Frazzled

[BBadanov]

Frazzled: Is c27j worth getting or just get more Herc's and let teh chinooks do the caribou type stuff

That is exactly why the Caribou replacement was put off, after C-295 was selected over C-27J in the first place. No doubt, having seen C-27J at AVN last week doing aeros it is an impressive airframe - but can a C-130J and CH-47F mix do that job? If so, makes sense.

[herkman]

Over the last 40 years we have bought stuff off the European market and in the main it has been a very expensive exercise.

Not only have the aircraft been found to be lacking in performance but the aircraft have been expensive and product back up very poor.

And buying from the USA has no assurances that it will be better. The C130J is a case in point and maybe it is time really to sit down and evaluate what we really need and more importantly whether we get value for money and if the aircraft can meet the role for which is intended,

The A400m is in its early days and I expect it will be very expensive to buy and operate.

Time for us to stop grand standing and take a long hard look at our situation. Our C130J's are not going to give the service that previous models did. We have let the H models go by the way and the E models were ditched because we did not take the hard decisions and upgrade them. Now today six of them fly as Super E's for the PAF who are very happy with them.

When will we ever learn.

Regards

Col

[Barry Bernoulli]

OZ said,

because the more taps the more risks, the more time, the more crews, more damage to the strips, more maintenance, more costs and therefore the less time for more tasks, more rest......
Like the reason we got C17 instead of more Hercs....

"the more risk": risk is a function (multiple)of likelihood of an event and outcome of an event. If you operate a smaller capacity aircraft into an airfield, then the risk will typically be reduced by the square or better of the reduction; for example, the putting a -8 into an airfield that is marginal for B737 may halve the likelihood of an overrun accident. It will also halve the consequence (half the px, half the price etc). So, for the same risk exposure I can put twice the pax through the airport.

"more crews" agreed, but they come into the total cost model, so if they're affordable, why not?

"more damage to strips". Bollocks! If a bridge on a highway says '20t limit', I can run an 18 ton truck over it as often as I want (based on the maintenance and inspection schedule for the bridge), but I may damage it if I put a 25t truck across it. Impact is an inverse function of load.

"more maintenance". What does that mean? More effort, more money, more down time? It is only a factor if it adversely affects productivity. Look at the total cost model.

"more costs". I suggest you compare operating cost models. I would like to see an analysis that supports this.

"less time for more tasks" I don't understand.

"more rest", for who?

A couple of other points.

- To add, say, 10t to the cargo capacity of a vehicle, you generally have to add substantially more than 10t to the gross weight in engineering of the vehicle; ie: you add weight to carry weight; eg, to carry 10t more payload you will be putting 20t more into the strip each movement. That kills pavements.

- the argument for more payload is only relevant if you need to deliver the payload. What is the demand across that sector? Its a bit pointless putting a 767 into Rockhampton because you can if you are only going to have an average pax load of 75.

- more taps (flights) = more choices for the customer. They can travel at 5:00pm rather than 4:00pm. Couriers have more options to make a flight for critical consignments. Customers like that!

I reckon that what is happening is like FedEX letting the truck drivers choose the fleet instead of the distribution managers. That would see FedEx trying to squeeze a Kenworth K200 B-double down a suburban street near you. "Here is your jiffy back Maam, sorry about the Magnolia and your kerb...but damn she's a nice rig eh?" or "Hello Maam, I left your jiffy bag down at the corner of Bruce Hwy and Main Street 'cause I couldn't make the turn, but damn I've got a lot of jiffy bags".

[500N]

I see we now have 4 C-17's in Japan after 2 more left Perth at the request of Japan.

So now that leaves how many for Ops ?

.

[herkman]

The fifth C17 should be delivered to the RAAF by the third quarter of this year.

This will happen as the USAF has agreed we can one of the frames that is in build now.

The reason that this can happen is that are buying aircraft that are of a stock standard and so we really are buying off the shelf. Maybe we are learning and the "aces" are being ignored.

The case for the A400M is indeed a cause of concern.

The aircraft is totally unproven in military service, could be a dream but every aircraft including the C130 and C17, had a settling down period early in its life. Even the C130J has had and still has development problems. The C130H was in the total picture the best C130 model we brought. Shame they have been flogged to death, meeting what the army considered to be their needs.

The A400M is an expensive aircraft to buy.

It will be an expensive aircraft to both fly and operate.

I hope for all the operators sakes that I am wrong and it goes a dream.

What should be done as a matter of urgency, is to have a proper freight floor fitted to the KC30 and that too will be good value for money.

Regards

Col

[500N]

Interesting re the A400M

Also, since we seem to operate 90% of the time with the US, does anybody factor in to the equation the logistics trail required if something goes wrong while OS ?

At least with an "off the shelf" C-17, at least the opportunity exists that parts and / or qualified staff are likely to be on the ground.


Or maybe someone wants to retire and hang the A400M hat on the rack as "his" baby.

.

[Frazzled]

I'd settle for more J's - flip top rollers, electronic locks, high speed ramp - maybe a couple set up for gunship role to support SOTG

Frazzled

[TBM-Legend]

My C-17 RAAF friend tells me that generally the support for the machine is great. Parts are supplied globally by Boeing and users pool parts/engines/maintenance to keep em flying.

J model Herc could be like that but with A400M being limited to Europe [???] the logistics tail kills it.

Bit like robots in A/Stan were all operators of Talon and Dragon Runners use a common robot hospital. Broken ones in a serviceable ones out...

[Bushranger 71]

There seems a realisation in some quarters that Australian military force deployments are more likely to bend toward company group scale requirements than larger brigade or battalion group expeditionary forces. And, like it or not, military chiefs will have to become more accountable for the operating costs of mounting operations.

Larger scale deployments to ports and airheads require significant overheads in cargo handling gear and provision of in theatre secondary transportation, so the desirable capability for swift deployment is direct airland into multiple rudimentary airfields around our regional area of military interest.

The MRTT may be suited for operations into some airheads, but my sombre view is the JSF/Wedgetail/MRTT constellation will collectively prove another hugely costly debacle, although let's not digress.

More C-17s would be good and they can go to some places beyond airliner capable airheads, but not to all airfields that might take a C-130 for direct deployment closer to potential scenes of action. The C-130J has not been the quality aircraft like predecessor models with some former RAAF C-130A & E models refurbished by other nations and still operating worldwide. Australia's C-130H may have been flogged but would be quickly snapped up by other nations for refurbishment; so why not put them through a factory rebuild program rather than buy more of the still deficient C-130J?

C-27 and Chinook are principally intra-theatre capabilities for locations not accessible by C-17 or C-130. The question arises will the RAAF ever see the C-27, which I much doubt because the intended compounding increases in defence expenditure will simply be unaffordable and some roles will probably have to be shed by all 3 of the ADF arms. As some say, expansion of the Chinook fleet may be an alternative, but at what cost in additional numbers to provide an adequate force?

What might add some more substance to this interesting thread is detailing of operating costs per flying hour for C-17, C-130, MRTT, Chinook, Caribou and an estimate for C-27. For too long now, the Service Chiefs have got away with ignoring this aspect in force structures planning and conduct of operations.

The message re operating costs may soon be driven home when they are realized for Tiger, MRH90 and whatever is acquired for the so-called naval combat helicopter.

[500N]

Bushranger

The Helicopter Landing Ships, if and when they ever get operational plus Chinnooks should be able to get enough soldiers to most places needed
as would a Caribou but that's in the past.

[Old Fella]

HLS v's C130

500N, HLS/Chinook combination is far too limited to even mention in the same breath as the C130. For over fifty years the C130 has proven to be extremely versatile in operations from deserts to Antarctica and all points in between. Just as the C130/Caribou/Huey all working in concert provided the airlift capability to keep the people of the New Guinea Highlands fed when their crops have failed, the C17/C130/Blackhawk combination would be equally capable. The C130 is a much more valuable asset than many realise. As Bushranger 71 has stated, the C130 A-E-H models have operated/are operating with distinction. The J model is still not capable of doing some of what the H model is capable of doing.

[Andu]

It would seem like a major step forward if those with the last say in purchasing major defence equipment for Australia could get their heads around the rather startling idea that we, as a regional player with a limited defence budget, would often (always?) be far better off with the not absolutely cutting edge, (and therefore all too often unproven), futuristic Big Boys' Toy but rather something that has been proven to work. And resist tweaking any such purchase (as has all too often been our defence purchasers' habit) to make it different from the proven product.

The C-17, (unfortunately, the lone exception that proves the rule), is perhaps the prime example of how our major defence purchases should be done.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi 500N; re your post #78. The point I keep trying to make here is the need for suitable fixed wing airlift capacity to swiftly deploy/redeploy modest size (company group) forces cost-effectively and as close as practicable to prospective scenes of action throughout the neighbouring archipelago, limiting the amount of in-theatre secondary transportation necessary. In other words; timely and cost-effective operations.

Amphibious support ships of whatever class are more of a somewhat sluggish though valuable follow-up capability and can of course provide a range of helo services in particular for in theatre support.

I have been jousting re the submarine requirement in another forum and some extracts perhaps worth repeating here.

DWP2009 embraces the following bits re Australian Defence Policy:

'...Central to this policy would be a capacity and willingness on Australia's part to employ military power when required to deter and defeat armed attack on Australia without relying on foreign combat or combat support forces.

In terms of military strategy, it means the ability to conduct independent military operations in the defence of Australia by way of controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia, and denying an adversary the ability to operate, without disruption, in our immediate neighbourhood, to the extent required to ensure the security of our territory and people'...

Deterrence of interference with regional trade corridors is realistic; but defeat of armed attack on Australia is militarily impractical. The primary emphasis in foregoing policy is on capabilities for regional operations and not for wandering the world, although governments might choose to also engage in international combined operations, if Australia has suitable capacity. But the taxpayer rightly deserves that adequate and credible military capabilities for regional operations be continually maintained.

Hoping not to get too much thread drift here, but methinks Australian defence capabilities planning got skewed in the aftermath of East Timor intervention. For what its worth, the 'Planning and Selection' detail on this Wikipedia link Canberra class landing helicopter dock - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia illustrates how an arguable over-emphasis on sealift capacity has been allowed to override adequate fixed wing airlift considerations. What seemed a logical requirement for some smallish replacement amphibious support ships with about 6 helicopters embarked (perhaps something akin to the beaut Chinese Type 071 LPD outlined on this link: India Defence Update: Article) somehow morphed into aircraft carriers capable of embarking between 16 and 24 helicopters.

There still seems a notion among defence planners that there must be helo capacity for so-called combat air assault which was largely discredited as a concept of operations during the Vietnam War, albeit that some nations still apparently believe LPH style warships are a worthwhile military asset. No credible military commander would entertain assaulting any military objective considering the inevitable scale of casualties and likely hardware losses, so sensible amphibious concepts are more ship to shore shuttling of troops and gear plus providing offshore basing for logistic and other support.

Henceforth, the ADF will not have the most suitable balance of military transportation capabilities for regional operations in my view, although what is being/will be introduced must of course be made workable. But fixed wing airlift capacity warrants urgent reconsideration, before C-130 resources in particular degrade further.