5th C-17 for RAAF
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Airlift weights and measures
The overriding ADF force deployment priority now seems for sealift, but equipped troop weight and air-portability characteristics of hardware impact significantly on airlift capabilities, both at the sharp end of war-fighting and for regional quick reaction requirements.
Back in Vietnam War days, good infantry commanders kept their troops 'light', I think averaging around 220 pounds just carrying a smallish pack in addition to their other essential kit. When operating with cavalry in direct support, provision of water in particular was a lessened weight problem. If no tracks supporting due to terrain or whatever, the Iroquois were used very well for 1ATF elements routine maintenance demands (hash and trash in US parlance) including water, clothing, rations, etcetera - providing hot meals to the infanteers after a hard day when they were drenched and shivering gave all of the 9SQN aircrew a buzz.
I raise this aspect because the much heavier weights being quoted impact significantly on what fixed and rotary wing might notionally carry. For example, a theoretical infantry squad/section of 10 'light' troops at 220 pounds would require 2,220 pounds of payload availability whereas maybe 3,000 pounds or more would be necessary for heavily encumbered troops with fuel loading perhaps being restricted for some aircraft types. Cabin space is of course also affected by bulkiness. So, all of the idealism regarding necessity for utility helos in particular to carry 10 troops might not be achievable; although I cannot recall prior involvement with any Australian infantry outfit where sections were more than 6 or 7 strong. Having pursued disability pensions for Army guys who have suffered serious musculo-skeletal injuries from being physically overloaded also makes me wonder re the wisdom of present day equipping of ground-pounders.
But back to APCs. See this link regarding another big hardware modification screw-up: Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades . It seems that stretching of the M113 hull by about 0.67 metres was ill-conceived and the question arises what impact might this now have on numbers of vehicles that can be airlifted in C-130 and C-17?
Reacher; I beg to differ re your post #100.
The M113 did a fantastic job in Vietnam ops but Australian cavalry units have been much under-credited because they operated a lot in direct support of other elements and cav unit histories became sparse. A few were lost/damaged by IEDs and RPGs but a pretty low loss rate considering the magnitude of their operations. The threat (risk) from higher technology weaponry such as EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators) or whatever depends on the availability and intensity of such armaments; like MANPADS for instance which have really not substantially dominated battlefields.
The pretty light M113 has essential off-road capabilities for wet tropics operations and is air-transportable, although how now affected by modifications is unknown. But upgrade of 431 vehicles for the ADF is still in train, so presumably they would not just be stored because the Canberra lot might be fearful of some losses and casualties. If committed to military operations at any time, best use has to be made of assets in service.
Back in Vietnam War days, good infantry commanders kept their troops 'light', I think averaging around 220 pounds just carrying a smallish pack in addition to their other essential kit. When operating with cavalry in direct support, provision of water in particular was a lessened weight problem. If no tracks supporting due to terrain or whatever, the Iroquois were used very well for 1ATF elements routine maintenance demands (hash and trash in US parlance) including water, clothing, rations, etcetera - providing hot meals to the infanteers after a hard day when they were drenched and shivering gave all of the 9SQN aircrew a buzz.
I raise this aspect because the much heavier weights being quoted impact significantly on what fixed and rotary wing might notionally carry. For example, a theoretical infantry squad/section of 10 'light' troops at 220 pounds would require 2,220 pounds of payload availability whereas maybe 3,000 pounds or more would be necessary for heavily encumbered troops with fuel loading perhaps being restricted for some aircraft types. Cabin space is of course also affected by bulkiness. So, all of the idealism regarding necessity for utility helos in particular to carry 10 troops might not be achievable; although I cannot recall prior involvement with any Australian infantry outfit where sections were more than 6 or 7 strong. Having pursued disability pensions for Army guys who have suffered serious musculo-skeletal injuries from being physically overloaded also makes me wonder re the wisdom of present day equipping of ground-pounders.
But back to APCs. See this link regarding another big hardware modification screw-up: Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades . It seems that stretching of the M113 hull by about 0.67 metres was ill-conceived and the question arises what impact might this now have on numbers of vehicles that can be airlifted in C-130 and C-17?
Reacher; I beg to differ re your post #100.
The M113 did a fantastic job in Vietnam ops but Australian cavalry units have been much under-credited because they operated a lot in direct support of other elements and cav unit histories became sparse. A few were lost/damaged by IEDs and RPGs but a pretty low loss rate considering the magnitude of their operations. The threat (risk) from higher technology weaponry such as EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators) or whatever depends on the availability and intensity of such armaments; like MANPADS for instance which have really not substantially dominated battlefields.
The pretty light M113 has essential off-road capabilities for wet tropics operations and is air-transportable, although how now affected by modifications is unknown. But upgrade of 431 vehicles for the ADF is still in train, so presumably they would not just be stored because the Canberra lot might be fearful of some losses and casualties. If committed to military operations at any time, best use has to be made of assets in service.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 30th Mar 2011 at 19:24.
Hi again Lonewolf 50; re your post #92 ...
Somewhere in these forums was mentioned a fully-equipped ADF soldier weighs 300 pounds! ... However, it would be of interest to know just what figures are actually used these days for airlift planning purposes in both fixed and rotary wing realms.
During Vietnam War ops, a fully-equipped RAAF Hotel model Iroquois manned by 4 crew and with full fuel carried 7 troops
Seats out, and quite a few more than 11 troopers per Blackhawk on the outbound missions. No 80 pounds of kit either.
Lots of enhancement options which would trim payload a bit, but H2 has the internal lift capacity for 10 troops (a notional infantry squad/section) with reconfigured simple clip-in fabric seating. A bit crowded which is probably why the UH-1Y cabin has been stretched around 530mm.
The Marines didin't get 13 men to fit into a UH-1Y, which is their notional infantry squad. (Won't digress into the doctrinal arguments between our Marines and Army on whay an 11 or 13 man squad ... )
The H2 cargo hook capacity is 5,000 ...l pretty useful.
Re aircraft crash-worthiness features. I do not take a bean-counter view of war-fighting, but rather having adequate resources and capabilities to get the job done. Having more of employable lower cost assets assures sustainment of operations compared with lesser numbers of very expensive kit.
Part of why I was sad to see Comanche die was that you could deploy quite a few more of those per C-17 than Apache. For RRF, most missions don't require the Full Monty 16 Hellfires Apache load. What you need is more armed birds, and eyes, and sensors, in the air, fast. Comanche carried six, which is most likely enough.
There are differing qualities between UH-60M and Huey II, but obviously much commonality in roles performable. If accepting that some casualties are inevitable in military operations, Huey II at $2million is clearly more cost-effective than UH-60M at maybe $20million.
But when you mention the acceptance of casualties, that gets to some profound cultural and political differences not germane to this thread. On the other hand, as your (Aus) force is far smaller, a significant body bag count may hurt your overall posture than we yanks. This might inform why you have seen a sea change in the "accepting casualties" planning assumptions in the year 2011 that may not have been as dire in 1970 or so.
The overriding ADF force deployment priority now seems for sealift, but equipped troop weight and air-portability characteristics of hardware impact significantly on airlift capabilities, both at the sharp end of war-fighting and for regional quick reaction requirements.
The pretty light M113 has essential off-road capabilities for wet tropics operations and is air-transportable, although how now affected by modifications is unknown.
Cheers.
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Great discussion Lonewolf 50 and concur your thoughts re the Comanche. Also feel that all varieties of AAH would be better suited for majority of intimate battlefield support with multiple cannon/gun systems fitted in lieu of hugely expensive Hellfire rounds and area weapon 2.75in/70mm rockets. Depends of course of what needs to be countered; but I am drifting off thread again!
Cheers for now.
Cheers for now.
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B71.
I'm not arguing, the recent deployment history of ASLAVs, M113s and Bushmasters proves both of our points.
Primary use of LAVs in 'stan are in the gun car role with Bushy's to tpt troops due to IED threat. I currently have mates over there and more about to go, one in particular is very happy he's going over as the boss of a Bushy Tp rather than a LAV Tp primarily for the survivability of the Bushys.
M113s deployed to Timor in '99 and again in '06 where the treat level dictated it would be survivable and suitable.
As for fitting the streched M113s in a Herc I was always under the assumption that the Hercs required a COMD waiver before lifting one, which was driven by the load factor. Granted extra length will equal greater weight it's kind of redundant when the original M113s required COMD ALG waiver anyway. As for fitting more or less into a C17......
I'm not arguing, the recent deployment history of ASLAVs, M113s and Bushmasters proves both of our points.
Primary use of LAVs in 'stan are in the gun car role with Bushy's to tpt troops due to IED threat. I currently have mates over there and more about to go, one in particular is very happy he's going over as the boss of a Bushy Tp rather than a LAV Tp primarily for the survivability of the Bushys.
M113s deployed to Timor in '99 and again in '06 where the treat level dictated it would be survivable and suitable.
As for fitting the streched M113s in a Herc I was always under the assumption that the Hercs required a COMD waiver before lifting one, which was driven by the load factor. Granted extra length will equal greater weight it's kind of redundant when the original M113s required COMD ALG waiver anyway. As for fitting more or less into a C17......
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J model absolutely brilliant
Cougar I hope you are not including me in those whom you claim "are willing to stick the dagger in the back of the J". Truth is, it is not as well developed as were the, A and H especially, previous variants. The reasons for that may well be as you claim. I am sure the J model is not mediocre in any sense and it obviously should be able to be utilised in any role it's predecessors were. I don't know with whom you serve or what you have flown. I do know that the C130A-E-H all performed remarkably well in the roles for which they were each used and, in their day, were equally as "brilliant" as the J model.
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The Marines didin't get 13 men to fit into a UH-1Y, which is their notional infantry squad. (Won't digress into the doctrinal arguments between our Marines and Army on whay an 11 or 13 man squad ... )
Correct.
I was drifting off into an old (90's era) dispute regarding why a Blackhawk variant was NOT chosen for the replacement for the CH-46, Marines, as it was for the CH-46 Navy, VERTREP, and got myself a bit mixed up. UH-1Y was never going to be the prime vertical assault aircraft. Sorry for the confusion there.
Part of why the Marines were not in the least bit interested was that the doctrinal squad of 13 wasn't going to fit in a Blackhawk ... but the real reason was that V-22 was coming.
In the mid to late 90's, the engine and airframe issues with the Frog were serious business. Boeing was approached with the idea of repoening that line, and as I understand it, the amount (in billions of dollars, half a billion, two billion? can't recall which figure was correct) Boeing (Philadelphia) was going to charge NAVAIR to do that was, this being Clinton years austerity, a non starter. At that point, V-22 was all that was possible, since in about 1999 or so, the last CH-53E was delivered from Sikorsky ... there had been some talk about going "all CH-53" but I don't think the Marines, nor NAVAIR, were ever serious about that.
"Marinized Blackhawk" (CH-60S now MH-60S) for VERTREP was a crap idea and remains a crap idea ... but since that is what was purchased, the Navy had adapted and gotten good service from a basically sound airframe.
How doesthat digression fit into this topic? The issue of cost for things that move people, parts, and petrol for a Rapid Reaction mission. The Clinton era austerity (in a relative sense) drove some curious DoD decisions (see also the KMAX non night, non IFR proposal for VERTREP flown by contract civ pilots, another idiotic idea, Clinton era, mid 90's, a decision finally scrapped) on final equipment and kit acquisition ... similar to the general fiscal austerity AUS faces on an annual basis while having to make hard decisions, program and otherwise, on how to get the kit needed for the mission with scarce dollars.
I was drifting off into an old (90's era) dispute regarding why a Blackhawk variant was NOT chosen for the replacement for the CH-46, Marines, as it was for the CH-46 Navy, VERTREP, and got myself a bit mixed up. UH-1Y was never going to be the prime vertical assault aircraft. Sorry for the confusion there.
Part of why the Marines were not in the least bit interested was that the doctrinal squad of 13 wasn't going to fit in a Blackhawk ... but the real reason was that V-22 was coming.
In the mid to late 90's, the engine and airframe issues with the Frog were serious business. Boeing was approached with the idea of repoening that line, and as I understand it, the amount (in billions of dollars, half a billion, two billion? can't recall which figure was correct) Boeing (Philadelphia) was going to charge NAVAIR to do that was, this being Clinton years austerity, a non starter. At that point, V-22 was all that was possible, since in about 1999 or so, the last CH-53E was delivered from Sikorsky ... there had been some talk about going "all CH-53" but I don't think the Marines, nor NAVAIR, were ever serious about that.
"Marinized Blackhawk" (CH-60S now MH-60S) for VERTREP was a crap idea and remains a crap idea ... but since that is what was purchased, the Navy had adapted and gotten good service from a basically sound airframe.
How doesthat digression fit into this topic? The issue of cost for things that move people, parts, and petrol for a Rapid Reaction mission. The Clinton era austerity (in a relative sense) drove some curious DoD decisions (see also the KMAX non night, non IFR proposal for VERTREP flown by contract civ pilots, another idiotic idea, Clinton era, mid 90's, a decision finally scrapped) on final equipment and kit acquisition ... similar to the general fiscal austerity AUS faces on an annual basis while having to make hard decisions, program and otherwise, on how to get the kit needed for the mission with scarce dollars.
Thread Starter
going once, twice, to the RAN..
Australia is to buy a near-new surplus British navy amphibious landing ship at what appears a bargain $100 million pricetag.
Defence Minister Stephen Smith said Australia had been successful in its bid for RFA Largs Bay, a 16,000 tonne landing ship launched in 2003 and commissioned in 2006.
The ship is set to be decommissioned as a cost saving measure under the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review released last October.
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Mr Smith said Australia would pay 65 million pounds or $A100 million at the current exchange rate.
He said the book value was around 130 million pounds.
Defence Minister Stephen Smith said Australia had been successful in its bid for RFA Largs Bay, a 16,000 tonne landing ship launched in 2003 and commissioned in 2006.
The ship is set to be decommissioned as a cost saving measure under the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review released last October.
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Mr Smith said Australia would pay 65 million pounds or $A100 million at the current exchange rate.
He said the book value was around 130 million pounds.
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Thank goodness for a well proven vessel and a well proven design.
Saw an article recently on this very vessel.
Lot to be said for buying product with a proven history of service.
Better than those two rust buckets the USN conned us into buying,
Regards
Col
Saw an article recently on this very vessel.
Lot to be said for buying product with a proven history of service.
Better than those two rust buckets the USN conned us into buying,
Regards
Col
Thread Starter
The USN did not con us. A friend of mine was on the initial review of these vessels and they were effectively told what to write by the RAN who desperately wanted a helo amphib platform quickly.
He said they knew of the rust issues then. The USN were moving out of them because they were at the end of their lives.
He said they knew of the rust issues then. The USN were moving out of them because they were at the end of their lives.
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If they wanted one that quickly, then why not create another Atlantic Conveyor ? Better than the wasted $ on the 2 rust buckets !!!
TBM
You seem to know a bit about it, why wasn't the requirement planned well in advance or was it just another Major purchase cock up ?
.
TBM
You seem to know a bit about it, why wasn't the requirement planned well in advance or was it just another Major purchase cock up ?
.
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"Yeah but can a C-17 land on it??"
As per usual, the ADF had wild and wonderful ideas about capability, so it was asked for in the tender document, the supplier said yes it could, it was delivered and paid for and then 6 months later the ADF found it couldn't do it.
So all is normal, our purchasing and procurement hasn't changed
As per usual, the ADF had wild and wonderful ideas about capability, so it was asked for in the tender document, the supplier said yes it could, it was delivered and paid for and then 6 months later the ADF found it couldn't do it.
So all is normal, our purchasing and procurement hasn't changed
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ADF sea lift capacity
Digressing from air lift to sea lift; 4 x Bay Class LSD amphibious support ships cost the Brits roughly $500million (Bay Class Large Amphibious Landing Ships Alternative Landing Ship Logistic [ALSL]). 2 x Canberra Class LPD aircraft carriers will cost Australia around $2billion plus.
4 x Bay Class (or similar capacity ships) would have been pretty well-suited for Australia's regional amphibious support requirements and a helo hangar could be fitted to accommodate say some optimised Sea Kings (which have foldable rotor blades, etcetera).
DoD and Navy have both stated there will be significant escort/protection resource penalties to support Canberra Class operations (intelligence brief, RAN Canberra class LHD's. - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History) with the LPDs also requiring about 4 times the crew complement of Bay Class.
Australian defence planners seem to have lost the plot re what would have been adequate and cost-effective sea lift capacity.
4 x Bay Class (or similar capacity ships) would have been pretty well-suited for Australia's regional amphibious support requirements and a helo hangar could be fitted to accommodate say some optimised Sea Kings (which have foldable rotor blades, etcetera).
DoD and Navy have both stated there will be significant escort/protection resource penalties to support Canberra Class operations (intelligence brief, RAN Canberra class LHD's. - Armchair General and HistoryNet >> The Best Forums in History) with the LPDs also requiring about 4 times the crew complement of Bay Class.
Australian defence planners seem to have lost the plot re what would have been adequate and cost-effective sea lift capacity.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Apr 2011 at 21:28.
Naval Procurement - Canadian Shipbuilding - JSS Project - Landing Ship Dock - Bay Class LSD(A) - Modest Proposal - CASR - Enforcer Class - Damen Schelde - Albion Class - Defence Procurement - Cantabria AOR - Protecteur Class - Canadian Shipyards - Jo
Close but not quite..... more like £500M at time of purchase for the 4.
At A$100M today its a bargain compared to what we have paid out before.
Close but not quite..... more like £500M at time of purchase for the 4.
At A$100M today its a bargain compared to what we have paid out before.
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Hi Twotbags. Agree a Bay Class is great value at $100million and final all-up cost for 4 ships seems as you have said; but see the first link in my post #116. Initial overall cost projection for 4 ships was GBP300million - at present exchange rate of around 1.57, a bit less than AUD500million.
On those indications, I ponder whether we will see a cost escalation of the Canberra Class LPD project to somewhere around $3.5billion overall for just 2 ships?
On those indications, I ponder whether we will see a cost escalation of the Canberra Class LPD project to somewhere around $3.5billion overall for just 2 ships?
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Apr 2011 at 23:05.
Thread Starter
B71 seems to miss the point that the ex-RN ship is not a combat assault vessel but rather a support vessel. It only carries small numbers of troops compared to a battalion plus uplift on the Canberra class vessels. Also looking again at a Timor type situation the LSD complements the larger vessels.
For once defence has made a good decision....
For once defence has made a good decision....
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Hi TBM-L. Mate; no credible military commander in his right mind would 'assault' anything anymore, which is why many nations are moving toward smallish amphibious support vessels.
Heliborne combat assault is a discredited concept of operations and amphibious ops are generally ship to shore streaming of resources and provision of floating logistic bases. Largish embarked helo air components are not really necessary.
The resource penalties involved in operating aircraft carrier style LPH or LPD are prohibitive within realistic defence expenditure, as Australia will once again learn when the LPDs are introduced.
Heliborne combat assault is a discredited concept of operations and amphibious ops are generally ship to shore streaming of resources and provision of floating logistic bases. Largish embarked helo air components are not really necessary.
The resource penalties involved in operating aircraft carrier style LPH or LPD are prohibitive within realistic defence expenditure, as Australia will once again learn when the LPDs are introduced.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Apr 2011 at 23:00.
