Nimrod MRA4 Being Broken Up

[Jackonicko]

Squirrel

Squirrel

1) No domestic user may be problematic, but perhaps not at the price that these could be offered for. I suspect that ITAR would be the stumbling block.

2) Are you seriously suggesting that MRA4 was incapable of getting a MAR? I suspect the MRA4 would have made a decent replacement for the now very old 1-11s.

3) The RJ may be the right option. An R5 may well have been MUCH cheaper, especially when we already own airframes that will otherwise cost money to scrap. In any case, the question isn't "Why isn't it being done", it's has it been properly examined. I suspect that the scrapping of MRA4 is being done with indecent haste and without proper examination of the alternatives.

4) A great deal of MRA4 money has been spent. The cost of using them above and beyond what has already been saved (and that cannot be recovered) is, in this context, the uncommitted money.

[GrahamO]

Guys, at the risk of stirring the hornets nest...

1. After being nearly a decade late, the posts which say 'it was almost complete' are being disingenuous to say the least. I was consulted in a very very peripheral way about five years ago at Boscombe and it was 'almost ready for test' then. Five years later, 'its still almost ready for test. Who is to say with any reasonable certainty that we wouldn't be having the same conversation in another five years ? More succinctly, would you bet your mortgage on it ? The current govenrment won't.

2. The RAF are intimately involved in every stage of the procurement process. The DPA and the DLO (and MOD-PE in its earlier guise) do not arbitrarily change the specification for the platform, and give the contractor a get out excuse. The services play an integral part n the OR definition and its translation through Assessment and Design. It is the services who have the track record in changing the requirements, daily, weekly and monthly. Many changes are completely necessary but the mantra on aircraft release has always been "better late and over budget, than what we asked for and on time". Suggestions that the services are not to blame are again, misleading.

3. Its is not a logical statement to suggest that if £4 billion has been wasted or spent to date, we should just keep spending to finish the job and that is a sensible thing to do. thats gamblers logic - because I have lost £4 billion on the ponies, I must keep gambling to make it all turn out better.

4. Putting all emotion, excuses, blame, personalities, politics to one side, the defence industry in its widest definition has had £4 billion of taxpayers cash and failed to deliver either what was originally planned or what was latterly agreed. If a builder gave you a quote and ten years later still hadn't finished, and was unable to even give you a 100% guarateed completion date for half the job originally contracted, I would suggest you wouldn't want to give the builder any more money, at all, ever again. the RAF have had their money, blown it and the kitty is dry. All the Merchant *ankers did in relation to this, was cause the issue to drop into stark relief and make people realise the MOD was utterly out of control. Maybe thats the only good thing they did for the UK.

Why is Nimrod any different ?

It isn't.

(just another jockey - 'being a tad expensive' is a unnecessarily highly priced TV. Being billions over budget with someone elses money is not. You appear to have no idea how much money 'billions' is and how its a problem. Us public did not give you a blank cheque and leave you to waste it as you will - your attitude towards good use of us taxpayers money is disappointing. I know a lot more about procurement in MOD and its interaction with the RAF than you might believe - since 1985 in fact.

[Modern Elmo]

The Indians are geeting MAD's on their P-8I's, correct?

13-02-10 01:37 AM #4
Mercator
Member Join Date
Feb 2010
Posts
49

It's a tactics thing. MAD isn't really a search sensor, it's a tracking sensor, so you don't really spend hours combing the ocean at 300 feet hoping for a hit (although it has been done). Instead, you generally use it in the final stages of your tracking so that you can precisely deploy a weapon. Now in the good old days you could do that at 300 feet and there probably wouldn't be any consequences. But these days, submarines have a habit of fighting back with things like surface-to-air missiles that can be tethered in some sort of bouy or perhaps even autonomous, so the trend in the future will be for weapons that are deployed from high-level or with some serious stand-off. If you are using MAD you will probably have to do the same (stand-off) and use a UAV. If you look around you'll see that there are UAVs in development with MAD sensors that can be launched like a sonobouy from maritime patrol aircraft, like the P-3 and the P-8, and that's the future for the sensor.

The P-8 Programme



(Source: Naval Air Systems Command; issued January 21, 2011)

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, PATUXENT RIVER, Md. --- The U.S. Navy announced today the award of a $1.6 billion contract to Boeing for P-8A Poseidon aircraft Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of six aircraft.

This first LRIP contract also includes spares, logistics and training devices. Production of the first LRIP aircraft will begin this summer at Boeing’s Renton, Wash. facility.

“In 2004, the U.S. Navy and the Boeing Company made a commitment to deliver the next generation maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to support a 2013 Initial Operational Capability (IOC),” said Capt. Mike Moran, PMA 290 Program Manager. “This contract and these aircraft keep that commitment on track.”

Three of the six flight test aircraft, built as part of the System Development and Demonstration contract awarded to Boeing in 2004, are in various stages of testing at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. The Integrated Test Team has conducted sonobuoy releases and counter measures deployments.

Recently, one of two static test planes completed full scale testing on the P-8A airframe. The first static test aircraft underwent 154 different tests with no failure of the primary structure. The second aircraft will begin fatigue testing this year.

The U.S. Navy plans to purchase 117 production P-8A aircraft to replace its P-3 Fleet. IOC is planned for 2013 at NAS Jacksonville, Fla.

[AQAfive]

GrahamO

I fear sir that that is the problem within defence procurement, everyone knows a lot about the procurement process, but very little about the product being procured. At least that was my experience.

BEagle

The reason for lack of AAR of USN P3's was not that it couldn't be done, but that the cost of training all the pilots was the stumbling block. That was the reason given to AOC 18 Gp in 1987. (He often confided in me ---well we spoke on an ac once or twice during deployment). Remember, the USN had 100's of P3's to chose from and the P3 could go a bit further than the MR2, albeit somewhat slower.

The MRA4 had such long legs it was considered unnecessary to qualify the AAR facility until needed, to save money.

[Flarkey]

The register looks on the bright side of MRA4 scrappage

An interesting point of view from the Register - admittedly as reactionary and sensationalist as the National Enquirer - but at least it is an optimistic view..

Antique Nimrod subhunters scrapped ? THANK GOODNESS! ? The Register

Antique Nimrod subhunters scrapped – THANK GOODNESS!
World's biggest vintage aircraft club finally shut down
By Lewis Page

Comment The UK press is bursting with indignation today as the process of scrapping the Nimrod MRA4 submarine-hunting aircraft begins. But in fact the four planes now being broken up were a financial and engineering disaster. Had they gone into service they would have become a terrible, cripplingly expensive millstone around the neck of the Ministry of Defence. We are much, much better off without them.

This plane cost us more than two Space Shuttles – and would have cost a lot, lot more if we'd kept it.
Certainly not everyone agrees. We can forget leader-writers fulminating idiotically about Russian submarines and world-beating British engineering: some more serious people have entered the fray. A group of former senior officers writes to the nation that "a massive gap in British security has opened".

But one should note that the signatories – including the air marshals one would naturally expect to find condemning cuts to the RAF, but also the admiral and general who won the Falklands war – don't actually state that they think the Nimrod itself should have been saved. They write:

The vulnerability of sea lanes, unpredictable overseas crises and traditional surface and submarine opposition will continue to demand versatile, responsive aircraft ...
Other countries are actually seeking to reinforce their maritime patrol capacity, with the new Boeing 737 P8A a strong contender ...

It is not perverse to suggest that the gap left by broken Nimrods should be readdressed.

What the ex-brasshats are bemoaning is the UK's loss of long-range maritime patrol aircraft in general, not the Nimrod MRA4 in particular. They're wise to draw this distinction, as the MRA4 project has now achieved the unwelcome distinction of producing the most expensive aircraft ever made: with a reported £4.1bn spent, just one is airworthy.

By comparison, a new Space Shuttle would cost about £1.75bn at current rates if it were built today1. Even the staggeringly expensive B-2 nuclear Stealth bombers only cost £1.3bn apiece.

Our sole flying Nimrod MRA4 (pictured above) has wound up costing us no less than £4.1bn – and it is not even a new aircraft. All the MRA4s are refurbished and re-equipped Nimrod MR2s, which had already been purchased by the RAF long ago at inflated prices.

Even if the project had continued as planned, we would have received just nine refurbished Nimrods in total for our £4bn-odd – each of them would have cost almost half a billion pounds plus what was paid for it in the first place. One should note that this would have represented a more-than-quadrupling of the original "fixed price" agreed per plane by the last Tory government when it kicked off the programme back in the 1990s. Given the project's disastrous history of cost and time overruns, there's no reason to believe than the latest estimates would be any more accurate that the ones which preceded them - we'd probably have wound up spending at least the purchase price of a new fleet of NASA space shuttles to get our nine antisubmarine planes.

The air marshals and generals do well to mention the Boeing P-8, as it shows what an antisubmarine plane of the Nimrod type ought to cost: India is buying P-8s for £160m each at the moment, well under one-third of what we were set to pay for our MRA4s. And the P-8, using sensors, computers and so on selected recently rather than back in the 1990s will be much more capable as well.

"These planes [the Nimrods] are no longer state of the art. Cheaper alternatives are emerging," says Keith Hayward, head of research at the Royal Aeronautical Society, talking to the BBC.

And make no mistake, scrapping the Nimrods will save money – a lot of money. Support and maintenance of a normal military aircraft can be expected to cost two to three times the acquisition price over its service life – and the Nimrod was far from normal.

In fact, the MRA4s would have been the last nine De Havilland Comet airliner airframes left flying in the world. The Comet, designed in the 1940s, failed commercially and went out of airline service many decades ago – and since then large aircraft have no longer been made in the UK.

The Nimrod/Comet is so old that it belongs to a lost era of manufacturing: this is the main reason why the MRA4 project was so horrifically late and over budget. The planes supplied for upgrading by the RAF had significant differences in size and shape – they had been essentially coach-built, bodged together with the blueprints used more as a guide than followed with any accuracy in the modern sense. Trying to rebuild, re-equip and re-engine them, with no real idea what the physical dimensions and internal layout of any given plane actually were, was a technical nightmare.

The previous Nimrod was doing frightfully hush-hush stuff in Afghanistan – but 'hush-hush' isn't the same as 'appropriate' or 'cost effective'
The MRA4 fleet, had it ever gone operational, would have been the world's biggest and most expensive vintage aircraft enthusiasts' club. Every time a spare part was needed it would have had to be custom made. Thousands of esoteric experts would have had to be kept on staff. Support costs would have been well outside the ordinary two-to-three-times-acquisition range: we would have spent many more billions keeping the last nine Comets flying in decades to come.

Still, at least it provided a chance for British high-tech equipment to be used – a bit of a boost for Blighty's industry?

Not so much. The planes' combat computer architecture was by Boeing. Their electronic-warfare fit was from Israel. Most of the MRA4's weapons were to be made in America. Its engines had "Rolls Royce" stamped proudly upon them, but were in fact made in Germany. The only British industry to get much of a boost from the project was that of restoring old aeroplanes.

So if we actually need or needed maritime patrol planes, we should definitely buy P-8s at a third of the upfront cost and much less than a third running cost (the P-8 is based on the 737 airliner, in service round the world in large numbers: parts for it will mostly be as cheap as chips).

The former generals and air-marshals quoted above think we definitely do need maritime-patrol planes. It's not a totally foolish point of view: patrol planes are probably a good bit more valuable than Tornado low-level-penetration bombers, which we have bizarrely decided to keep.

But you have to remember that what a maritime patrol plane is mainly for is hunting submarines. And in fact, predictions of disaster to the contrary, the British armed forces have an almost unbelievably large armoury of almost-brand-new submarine hunting kit remaining once Nimrod is gone.

Most of the Royal Navy's surface fleet right now is made up of Type 23 anti-submarine frigates, delivery of which completed only in 2002 – and these ships have since been expensively upgraded with low-frequency active sonar and other new tools since. The navy also has the latest Merlin anti-submarine helicopters, which have only been fully operational for a few years and which can also operate from land bases or fleet auxiliaries. Perhaps an even better answer than these to enemy submarines are our own fleet of nuclear powered fast-attack subs, even now being joined by the very latest and arse-kickingest Astute class boats. The RAF's long-ranging AWACS planes can also do much of the Nimrod's job.

When you also reflect that the Russian submarine fleet is now no more than a pale shadow of its mighty Cold War self, and even so it remains far and away the most dangerous non-allied sub force on the planet ... well. If our boys and girls can't stave off this much diminished threat with all the many, many billions of poundsworth of antisubmarine gear they still possess, that's a bloody poor show.

Hey, but hold on! The Nimrod also did load of other great stuff. Why, the BBC call it a "spy plane" – it was hard at work doing super top-secret stuff in the war against the Taliban.

This too is fallacy. A lot of the confusion results from the existence of the three seldom-mentioned Nimrod R1s, which actually were spy planes - they didn't carry subhunting kit like the mainstream Nimrod MR2s and new MRA4s, they were packed with electronic-intelligence gear. But they are to be replaced by US-made "Rivet Joint" planes: the MoD couldn't afford to pay British industry to import or reinvent all the Yanks' new trickery, and are very glad to simply buy it off the shelf.

But it's also true that the old Nimrod MR2s were flying above Afghanistan alongside the infinitely more useful R1s. The subhunter planes were typically employed on secret missions, too, perhaps adding to the media's understandable confusion.

But in fact the MR2s weren't doing anything which would justify the vast expense – in money and lives – of having them there. They were mainly relaying radio communications between units on the ground, which would otherwise struggle to get a signal past intervening mountains. A few of them had been fitted with basic optical spy-eye kit, allowing them to offer the same sort of observational capability as an enormously cheaper unmanned Hermes 450 (but not as good as an unmanned, still cheap Reaper, which also has man-tracker radar).

The secrecy regarding this work typically came from the fact that the Nimrods were acting in support of special-forces units - nothing more. But they were not doing anything or providing any help which couldn't have been supplied by much, much cheaper aircraft.

The only reason you would bother having Nimrods or something like them on the strength really is hunting submarines. And that task genuinely isn't very important right now: and we have a lot of other tools for the job anyway. If the world changes and submarines become a big issue again for some reason, we can easily buy some better, cheaper P-8s in years to come – the production line for those will be running for a good long time and prices will only fall.

And in the mean time we can applaud the MoD and the Tories – if not for the cretinous decision to order the Nimrod MRA4s in the first place (thanks, Michael Portillo), if not for the myriad things they got wrong in the recent defence review – then at least for axing Nimrod now and saving us from having to pay for the most expensive vintage aircraft club in the world. ®

[Small Spinner]

AQA5

Not sure that you are right about knowing about the procurement process. Engineers don't know about it, and PTs don't know about engineering, however each try to do both, and that's where financial constraints get into the mix.

The result is a complete muddle. Second guessing engineers under the guise of 'we don't want to think about that now, as it will cost money' is the main problem. Things get missed, delay sets in, through lack of proper forward planning. If safety gets compromised then it really gets messy.

I can't believe that British engineers are worse than others throughout the world, and many believe we have the best, so where do the problems lie??
Management?? Answers on a postcard!!

[Modern Elmo]

The only reason you would bother having Nimrods or something like them on the strength really is hunting submarines. And that task genuinely isn't very important right now: and we have a lot of other tools for the job anyway.

Say what?

This Lewis Page is right about some things and very wrong about other things.

[Mend em]

Graham O,

I trust you are already chomping at the bit to see the cancellation of the A400M, and the F35, both 'a bit late' and 'a bit' over budget or the FSTA which is actually TWICE the anticipated in-service cost of MRA4, and is 'a bit late' and 'a bit over budget', plus I assume you'd turn your nose up at a few F22's, which have in effect nearly doubled in unit cost to the US as the number ordered has been slashed.

[AQAfive]

Procurement problems

Lets see if I can put this another way.


Many years ago I worked on a computer system that used magnetic tape as a programming medium. The equipment was also used by another team (Commonwealth) who decided that magnetic tape was too slow and mechanically inefficient. So they designed and built a solid state programming device that worked well.


The magnetic tape device became an engineering maintenance headache and so it was decided to adopt a new programming device.


The team, you and I and in fact most people would have chosen the existing system used by the other team because it worked and therefore the risks were low if indeed not negligible and costs accordingly so.


But no, the projected cost was above a certain limit and therefore under the rules it had to go through the competitive tendering process. This added 18 months at least to the project and of course increased costs. The device ended up with was the solid state device used by the other team with, of course, an on shore UK company producing it.


Whilst the process of competitive tendering is there for good reason, it seems that no one is able to sign it off when the need is clearly not there.


That is a simple example, when the project is more complex, the costs are amplified.


If I seem to criticise individuals, then I apologise. I have to admit it took me a long while to realise that it is the system that is at fault, not individuals.

[Mend em]

AQAfive - bob on; and the main developers of the 'system' in the UK are the Treasury who put rules in place to minimise spend, in year, ultimately putting up overall costs.

[Small Spinner]

AQA5
the self licking lollipop that is project management, kicks in, and what gets me is that no one quantifies how much they actually cost, and the delays that accrue.
The MOD have adopted the process for all contractors, sometimes when it is totally inappropriate, either on their part, or the contractors part.

Don't get me wrong decent project management can be worth it's weight in gold, but there are many poor examples out there.

[davejb]

This is a very personal opinion,
and I can't really support it with data, other than rather a lot of 'stories', but, the biggest stumbiling block, in my opinion, is management.

In my (not very humble) opinion the major problem with virtually anything that goes wrong is management - specifically giving the decision making process, and final say, to people who simply do not understand the task, or how the proposed solution(s), work.

There's actually a sort of tenet still in place that says management skills are management skills, and it's almost harmful to know too much about what you are managing - that (perhaps) holds good provided the management stay out of the nuts and bolts decisions, and restrict themselves to overall strategy... in the UK we seem to be devoted to ensuring management delve into the tactical level.

MPs, in my view, are the ultimate evolution of 'know **** all, have limitelss power' management. With all due respect to John Prescott (as one recent example) how the **** do you get to be (ostensibly) the second most important decision taker in the country based firmly on a career as a ship's steward?


(Or take Tony Blair - number one, apparently based on a solid career as a ... dunno, sponge?)

Still, as long as there's a decent bottle of port at the end, who cares?

Dave

[Small Spinner]

Spot on davejb

I used to think it was because the project managers did not know enough about engineering, but actually they are too close, and too involved in the engineering decisions, regardless of their past experience.
PMs should keep to their spreadsheets, and project plans, and leave the engineering decisions to the engineers. Put them in physically different locations to make sure they don't interfere.
Management by exception is the PMs mantra, but I see little evidence of it

[Ivan Rogov]

Lewis Page is funny!

I will be looking for a new job soon, looks like being an Ex forces expert is easy. Just write even less informed drivel than half my Pprune posts
The only point he is right about (accidently I'm sure!) is that we did not specifically need the Nimrod MRA4 as our future LRMPA, however it was the cheapest and quickest option to bring in from September 2010. All other options from that date would have cost more and take much longer.

All this hindsight is wonderful, but it is the tool of tools

[davejb]

Thankyou Spinner,
and I think Ivan Rogov is spot on (I presume you too are ex MPA, or somewhere within that world?) How hard can it be to become the 'defence expert' for a paper or news channel, considering the absolute drivel that is promulgated these days?

Should any national,.... hey, international, news outlet require 2000 words on pretty much any subject under the Sun, feel free to PM me.

'How the chariot dangerously undermines the cavalry - phalanx balance in modern warfare, a 2500 year old retrospective analysis of the bloody obvious, by our defence correspondent Lunchtime O' Booze.....*

Dave

* Apologies to Private Eye, I Hislop, Lord Gnome and co...

[GrahamO]

"I trust you are already chomping at the bit to see the cancellation of the A400M, and the F35, both 'a bit late' and 'a bit' over budget or the FSTA which is actually TWICE the anticipated in-service cost of MRA4, and is 'a bit late' and 'a bit over budget', plus I assume you'd turn your nose up at a few F22's, which have in effect nearly doubled in unit cost to the US as the number ordered has been slashed."

Yes, as I am sure there are alternatives out there which are less likely to be an issue. Don;t kid yourself that the A400M isn't going to be cancelled yet .... at least cancelling MRA4 makes this less likely.

No to the F35, as we have no practical alternative.

No and yes to the F22, as the taxpayer isn't paying anything at the moment, so cost overruns are irrelevant until we find out the final price and can decide then. If the unit price trebles, then we order less as thats all we can afford, simples.

No would be if an F22 came on the market (unlikely IMO) , our jolly RAF chums would want to modify the best aircraft in its field, "as it doesn't meet our standards". Thats where UK arrogance comes in.

Yes would be, if we bought it as is, with full US certification, weapons platforms and subsystems and with our pilots trained using US systems and in effect swapping a US pilot for a UK pilot. Just buy them and use them the as the US does and stop fecking around with something that is already proven to work 'as is'.

The UK sadly has a track record of taking something that works, and buggering about with it until it is masively overspent - as a colleague once told me about software development "if it aint broke, we haven't added enough features yet".

Punching above your weight is fine but if it costs massively more than the overweight punch delivers, then its at best a zero sum game.

[Diablo Rouge]

If the world changes and submarines become a big issue again for some reason, we can easily buy some better, cheaper P-8s in years to come – the production line for those will be running for a good long time and prices will only fall.

I wonder if the same airframe sales room will have off-the-shelf AEOps for sale. There is no doubting that alternative and probably better airframes exist, and it appears that the UK industries are no longer 'world beating' at providing the mission kit, but once experience amongst the human part of this scenario is lost, it will be difficult to replace.

Of course there may have been an improvement in fixed underwater detection assets that mere mortals are blissfully unaware of that make this entire thread dead in the water (pardon the pun:-accidental ones are usually the best) or indeed redundant (I'm on a role now!). Of course detection is one thing; delivering depth charges and torpedoes is a differant story.


Boeing P-8. If I was an ASW crewmember (and I am not nor ever will be) then I feel four engines would be nice when operating mid Atlantic. I know Nimrod often closed down two, but at least they were there if needed. Or is salt ingestion not a factor on bypass turbofans?

[engineer(retard)]

GrahamO

For someone who has been in the system since 1985, you've missed out on a lot. UK defence standards are not written by the RAF, they are produced by the DStan Agency under the direction of the MOD. The direction to fit national products is not provided by the services but is usually more to do with political directive or security of supply. Also whilst the user gererates most of the URD, they have a limited input into the SRD and in the majority of the project do not have day to day control, that tends to be CS. There is also no requirement for a uniform to sign off contract changes at the SRD level unless it compromises a URD requirement.

Having sat on both sides of the fence, you do not see many uniforms at meetings unless it is directly related to service use. I suspect that many people who post here have voiced their opinions at programme meetings and have often been ignored.

The procurement process is a behmoth that is so layered with regulation that very few can understand it in its entirety. Trying to point the finger at an individual failing is a waste of time. The system has been built up over several hundred years and has been progressively added to, without sufficient housekeeping to keep it manageable. The result is a beast of such complexity that blame is abrogated across the entire structure and that is why it never gets better.

SS

Being a good PM is as much of a skill as being a good engineer. Unfortunately, design decisions are not cost or time independant and someone has to be responsible for both. The discipline was invented to provide project control, it is in the implementation that it falls over. Looking across industry, you will see organisations that get is consistently right as well as wrong.

regards

retard

[Small Spinner]

it is in the implementation that it falls over.

Absolutely. Where that implementation goes wrong is where PTs or PMs make decisions about airworthiness, when they don't have the knowledge, training or background, and on a financial basis.

[engineer(retard)]

SS


It may be just personnel experience but I have never seen that happen as design changes can only be signed off by the chief engineer where I have worked. However, if it is significant cost or risk then I imagine it is done in the boardroom.

regards

retard