Nimrod MRA4 Being Broken Up
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The problems are really quite straightforward here.......
The people within the RAF who MAKE the decisions (ie those at the very top, the airships) know very little about what is NEEDED by those on the Sqns. They think they do however and that is the First mistake.
The interface for all this is a bunch of civil serpents, who know even less about operational aircraft and flying, but are out to make a name for themselves in whatever way they can (I have seen it! I have actuially heard a very young CS boasting aboout how he was responsible for getting this widgett changed to that widgett) Second mistake.
This government (any UK government probably) is ALWAYS going to select BWOS over any other builder. Enough said.....Third mistake.
Yes, MRA4 was late and over budget. Who's fault? Probably a combination of all those above, but primarily BWOS, the Airships and CS's.
This constant ethos at MOD that CHEAPNESS = Value for Money has got to stop, once and for all. It was evident on the E-3D, when some bright spark decided that 'they' could purchase lower lobe fans from 'Bodgit and Co' for half the cost of those from Mr Boeing, and indeed they did!! The problem was however that the new fans failed probably 5 times more often than Mr Boeings! Was that VFM? I think not.
Nimrod is gone, I'm ashamed, disgusted and astonished. What will replace it? I'm not sure, but I have little doubt that over the next few years, this appalling decision will come back to haunt those responsible when the number of lives lost, that could have been saved, begins to mount.
Shame on all those responsible, but especially the Airships who between them, couldn't sort out all this ****. Perhaps if they had spent less time stuffing their faces with BWOS hospitality and got off their arses and sorted things out, we wouldn't be in this awful position right now.
Winco
The people within the RAF who MAKE the decisions (ie those at the very top, the airships) know very little about what is NEEDED by those on the Sqns. They think they do however and that is the First mistake.
The interface for all this is a bunch of civil serpents, who know even less about operational aircraft and flying, but are out to make a name for themselves in whatever way they can (I have seen it! I have actuially heard a very young CS boasting aboout how he was responsible for getting this widgett changed to that widgett) Second mistake.
This government (any UK government probably) is ALWAYS going to select BWOS over any other builder. Enough said.....Third mistake.
Yes, MRA4 was late and over budget. Who's fault? Probably a combination of all those above, but primarily BWOS, the Airships and CS's.
This constant ethos at MOD that CHEAPNESS = Value for Money has got to stop, once and for all. It was evident on the E-3D, when some bright spark decided that 'they' could purchase lower lobe fans from 'Bodgit and Co' for half the cost of those from Mr Boeing, and indeed they did!! The problem was however that the new fans failed probably 5 times more often than Mr Boeings! Was that VFM? I think not.
Nimrod is gone, I'm ashamed, disgusted and astonished. What will replace it? I'm not sure, but I have little doubt that over the next few years, this appalling decision will come back to haunt those responsible when the number of lives lost, that could have been saved, begins to mount.
Shame on all those responsible, but especially the Airships who between them, couldn't sort out all this ****. Perhaps if they had spent less time stuffing their faces with BWOS hospitality and got off their arses and sorted things out, we wouldn't be in this awful position right now.
Winco
Winco
You make some very valid points but I fear the 'rot' sets in far earlier than you suggest. Perhaps with career orientated sqn cdrs (and to some extent flt cdrs) who have the "not on my watch" mentality for it is they who feed the information to the CS and the airships. On my first GR1 tour I watched the colour drain out of the sqn cdrs face when the AOC ordered him, and his execs, out of the crew room so that he could have an honest chat with the sqn junta on what was good and what was bad. Of course, whether the AOC actually took any of it on board or was just undertaking a PR exercise who knows!
And then there are those who say one thing to those below them but report something completely different up the chain of command. Bit like the days of the truly confidential report when the verbal debrief and the written report may be at opposite ends of the spectrum!
You make some very valid points but I fear the 'rot' sets in far earlier than you suggest. Perhaps with career orientated sqn cdrs (and to some extent flt cdrs) who have the "not on my watch" mentality for it is they who feed the information to the CS and the airships. On my first GR1 tour I watched the colour drain out of the sqn cdrs face when the AOC ordered him, and his execs, out of the crew room so that he could have an honest chat with the sqn junta on what was good and what was bad. Of course, whether the AOC actually took any of it on board or was just undertaking a PR exercise who knows!
And then there are those who say one thing to those below them but report something completely different up the chain of command. Bit like the days of the truly confidential report when the verbal debrief and the written report may be at opposite ends of the spectrum!
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Wrathmonk
I would agree with your comments, but do you really think that Sqn Cdrs are concerned about 'their' career enough to continue with the sharade of (mis) informing the airships about things?
You may be a lot more current than I am so you may well be correct, but I would have felt that, a Sqn Cdr, would have had enough gumption to tell it 'as it is'. Certainly, in the Maritime world that was the way I believed things were done.
The other major 'problem' area I see is this stupidity of posting Officers after 3 years or so. As has been pointed out here, a new guy comes in and everythihg changes. Not literally, but it would appear that the changes are somewhat significant and lead to extra costs and delays. The RAF must learn to put someone in place at the begining of a project and leave them there until the end of it, or at least close to the end.
We have this culture of posting people to 'broaden' their careers and 'enlightening' them to other apsects of service life etc. But it is a disaster for major projects such as aircraft procurement. There becomes no accountability when things go wrong and overrun and should be stopped IMHO.
Likewise, I think there is an argument NOT to allow anyone to be involved in a project such as Nimrod, who has NOT come from a Maritime background and understands what is trying to be achieved. Time after I have seen people come from the FJ world into significant positions with the Maritime world or the AT world or whatever. They are all very nice people, but are out of their depth frankly. It happened all the time on the AEW fleet; you would get some ex FJ Pilot or Nav come because there was nowhere else to go! Simple as that.
But despite all of that, I still put the majority of the blame onto the airships. After all, they were once Flt Cdrs and Sqn cdrs and probably Stn cdrs and should have known better. the problem is however, that when you get up to the star ranks, the appeal for a position on the board of BWOS and other defence companies starts to glow!!
Very sad days indeed
Winco
edited because of rubbish grammar!
I would agree with your comments, but do you really think that Sqn Cdrs are concerned about 'their' career enough to continue with the sharade of (mis) informing the airships about things?
You may be a lot more current than I am so you may well be correct, but I would have felt that, a Sqn Cdr, would have had enough gumption to tell it 'as it is'. Certainly, in the Maritime world that was the way I believed things were done.
The other major 'problem' area I see is this stupidity of posting Officers after 3 years or so. As has been pointed out here, a new guy comes in and everythihg changes. Not literally, but it would appear that the changes are somewhat significant and lead to extra costs and delays. The RAF must learn to put someone in place at the begining of a project and leave them there until the end of it, or at least close to the end.
We have this culture of posting people to 'broaden' their careers and 'enlightening' them to other apsects of service life etc. But it is a disaster for major projects such as aircraft procurement. There becomes no accountability when things go wrong and overrun and should be stopped IMHO.
Likewise, I think there is an argument NOT to allow anyone to be involved in a project such as Nimrod, who has NOT come from a Maritime background and understands what is trying to be achieved. Time after I have seen people come from the FJ world into significant positions with the Maritime world or the AT world or whatever. They are all very nice people, but are out of their depth frankly. It happened all the time on the AEW fleet; you would get some ex FJ Pilot or Nav come because there was nowhere else to go! Simple as that.
But despite all of that, I still put the majority of the blame onto the airships. After all, they were once Flt Cdrs and Sqn cdrs and probably Stn cdrs and should have known better. the problem is however, that when you get up to the star ranks, the appeal for a position on the board of BWOS and other defence companies starts to glow!!
Very sad days indeed
Winco
edited because of rubbish grammar!
Last edited by Winco; 1st Feb 2011 at 11:49.
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Winco
The RAF must learn to put someone in place at the begining of a project and leave them there until the end of it, or at least close to the end.
There becomes no accountability when things go wrong and overrun and should be stopped IMHO
Classic mistake there Winco, they should never be relieved from their position until delivery is achieved plus 1 year, as the expectation that they will be able to slide away into the long grass, is the reason we can never pin the
to their catastrophic decisions. 
The RAF must learn to put someone in place at the begining of a project and leave them there until the end of it, or at least close to the end.
There becomes no accountability when things go wrong and overrun and should be stopped IMHO
Classic mistake there Winco, they should never be relieved from their position until delivery is achieved plus 1 year, as the expectation that they will be able to slide away into the long grass, is the reason we can never pin the
to their catastrophic decisions.
Not Long Here
Disagree with you fella. Nobody wanted a refurbished MR2 but when the BAe team rolled out the MRA4 model at Fincastle 95, I think it was sufficiently impressive to change opinions. Effectively a brand new Nimrod with fantastic (relatively) range and endurance and bags of potential as a weapons carrier. Great internal layout and the best sensors available, including a neat EO design. Certainly from where I stood, this was by far and away the best option and preferred choice amongst fellow operators. 21ac for 2Bn was also a very good deal.
Had it been achieved, I have no doubt that it would have been streets ahead of any other option including the P8 - just as the MR2 was way ahead of any other opposition, although I accept that the costs of operating a Rolls Royce are far more than a Ford Fiesta. Sadly, we will never know now will we?
The wish at EGQK at the time was for the GEC solution even given our affection for the MR2 airframe.
Had it been achieved, I have no doubt that it would have been streets ahead of any other option including the P8 - just as the MR2 was way ahead of any other opposition, although I accept that the costs of operating a Rolls Royce are far more than a Ford Fiesta. Sadly, we will never know now will we?
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Mod Elmo
Submariners can hear a large aircraft nearby and at low altitude, you know.
Not strictly true in all cases old fella but heh there is a lot of that on here just now
Charlie sends
Submariners can hear a large aircraft nearby and at low altitude, you know.
Not strictly true in all cases old fella but heh there is a lot of that on here just now
Charlie sends
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What party animal wrote in post 148 encapsulates the problem entirely. If BAE had presented their plan to a room full of engineers of Corporals and below, they would have been laughed out of the room. To take a British vintage aircraft, replace the wings and engines, upgrade the electronics, and turn it into a 21st century MPA was an utterly preposterous idea.
Anyone who has even minimal experience of maintaining British aircraft, and, especially vintage British aircraft such as the Comet, knows that even the simplest of jobs can, and often does, turn into a task of epic proportions. So to believe that BAE could deliver the product, you would have to be on extremely strong mind altering drugs, or be totally ignorant.
The problem was that BAE pitched to aircrew, and as aircrew run the show, anything that is shiny and has bright lights on it, and lots of wup wup noises coming from the flightdeck is possible.
BAE knew its audience well, and the only audience it could sell a polished turd to was a group of RAF aircrew. Something BAE has done with amazing regularity and success over the years. Whatever the merits of the re-engineered comet, it was the wrong aircraft, chosen by the wrong people, and yet again the RAF is now paying the price for being suckered into buying one of BAE's polished turds.
Anyone who has even minimal experience of maintaining British aircraft, and, especially vintage British aircraft such as the Comet, knows that even the simplest of jobs can, and often does, turn into a task of epic proportions. So to believe that BAE could deliver the product, you would have to be on extremely strong mind altering drugs, or be totally ignorant.
The problem was that BAE pitched to aircrew, and as aircrew run the show, anything that is shiny and has bright lights on it, and lots of wup wup noises coming from the flightdeck is possible.
BAE knew its audience well, and the only audience it could sell a polished turd to was a group of RAF aircrew. Something BAE has done with amazing regularity and success over the years. Whatever the merits of the re-engineered comet, it was the wrong aircraft, chosen by the wrong people, and yet again the RAF is now paying the price for being suckered into buying one of BAE's polished turds.
davejb wrote:
He's got the negatives!!! 
MPs, in my view, are the ultimate evolution of 'know **** all, have limitelss power' management. With all due respect to John Prescott (as one recent example) how the **** do you get to be (ostensibly) the second most important decision taker in the country based firmly on a career as a ship's steward?
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Yep,
I'd have to agree with you there - John Prescott had lots of negatives...
(Slight change of emphasis <g>)
Oh well, it's just cynical old me - as I've aged I've gone from disliking politicians to thinking they should have big, floodlit targets on them as a matter of course. Reminds me of that joke about 'what do you call a busload of lawyers at the bottom of the sea? A good start....'
Dave
I'd have to agree with you there - John Prescott had lots of negatives...
(Slight change of emphasis <g>)
Oh well, it's just cynical old me - as I've aged I've gone from disliking politicians to thinking they should have big, floodlit targets on them as a matter of course. Reminds me of that joke about 'what do you call a busload of lawyers at the bottom of the sea? A good start....'
Dave
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Party Animal
Speak for yourself matey. Plenty of aircrew there present in 95 would find a great deal of sympathy with Kapton's view.
Kapton,
Harshly put, but a great deal of truth in what you say.
PS
I personally showed a senior Lockeed engineer around a MR2 circa 95. His comment, in a suitably Southern drawl...
"Ain't seen engineering like this since I last stripped down a tractor..."
Speak for yourself matey. Plenty of aircrew there present in 95 would find a great deal of sympathy with Kapton's view.
Kapton,
Harshly put, but a great deal of truth in what you say.
PS
I personally showed a senior Lockeed engineer around a MR2 circa 95. His comment, in a suitably Southern drawl...
"Ain't seen engineering like this since I last stripped down a tractor..."
TOFO
Despite 2 weeks of relentless drinking during Fincastle, I well remember the many crewroom/VPI bar/scruffs bar discussions that took place during that time on the merits of the 4 options available. From my peer group, the Atlantique was a non starter closely followed by the old P3 from the Arizona desert. I think a brand new P3 was the general favourite as the Nimrod offering was perceived as 'just an upgrade'. However, when the BAe team (Bob n Harry) unveiled the MRA4 model at Industry Day and pitched it as a brand new aircraft, many of my sqn colleagues were suitably impressed and this seemed to become the favoured choice.
Clearly, we all have our own opinions. Mine was this one:
Sadly it was never one of the options!
Kapton is right that anything that is shiny and bright and goes wup wup will appeal to most aircrew but how did the decision making process reach it's conclusion in those days? Was it a beancounter call or did aircrew actually make the decision?
Despite 2 weeks of relentless drinking during Fincastle, I well remember the many crewroom/VPI bar/scruffs bar discussions that took place during that time on the merits of the 4 options available. From my peer group, the Atlantique was a non starter closely followed by the old P3 from the Arizona desert. I think a brand new P3 was the general favourite as the Nimrod offering was perceived as 'just an upgrade'. However, when the BAe team (Bob n Harry) unveiled the MRA4 model at Industry Day and pitched it as a brand new aircraft, many of my sqn colleagues were suitably impressed and this seemed to become the favoured choice.
Clearly, we all have our own opinions. Mine was this one:
Sadly it was never one of the options!
Kapton is right that anything that is shiny and bright and goes wup wup will appeal to most aircrew but how did the decision making process reach it's conclusion in those days? Was it a beancounter call or did aircrew actually make the decision?
Last edited by Party Animal; 3rd Feb 2011 at 01:44.
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Originally Posted by kapton
If BAE had presented their plan to a room full of engineers of Corporals and below, they would have been laughed out of the room.
From a reliable source who was closely involved from the outset (some names removed to protect the innocent):
Was I surprised (wrt the decision to buy Nimrod)- No, and I await my invitation to appear on Panorama to explain why the disaster happened. As OR **, I made it perfectly clear to all, including the then ACDS OR , the MoD PE Team, headed by an RN 1 Star, that a decision to go with BAE would be a disaster. I was strongly backed up by the 2nd ***, Boscombe Down etc. The corruption and fraudulent activity that took place to make it a political win for BAE rather than LM is inexcusable and should be publically investigated. If we recall that the contract value was for £2B for 21 aircraft with an in-service date for the first Sqn of March 2003 the outcome has been unbelievable. I should add that the LM price was £1.85B
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GBZ
Ummmm that, on first look, seems quite insulting. I know/knew quite a lot of lineys who are of sgt rank and below who were the only reason we got airborne on many an occasion. The rank held was pretty irrelevant to the skill set they owned. Back bone of the RAF what was.
Sadly many of the good ones are off now as they perceive themselves as undervalued (?!) and with their expertise can earn good money elsewhere.
I'd swap a shift of old school techies for a large swath of high ranking policy makers and, ahem, managers at Air Command in a jiffy.
Pretty condescending comment really, reference the Chief bit, however if it was humour that has gone right over my head my apologies.
Ummmm that, on first look, seems quite insulting. I know/knew quite a lot of lineys who are of sgt rank and below who were the only reason we got airborne on many an occasion. The rank held was pretty irrelevant to the skill set they owned. Back bone of the RAF what was.
Sadly many of the good ones are off now as they perceive themselves as undervalued (?!) and with their expertise can earn good money elsewhere.
I'd swap a shift of old school techies for a large swath of high ranking policy makers and, ahem, managers at Air Command in a jiffy.
Pretty condescending comment really, reference the Chief bit, however if it was humour that has gone right over my head my apologies.
From a reliable source who was closely involved from the outset (some names removed to protect the innocent):
Quote:
Was I surprised (wrt the decision to buy Nimrod)- No, and I await my invitation to appear on Panorama to explain why the disaster happened. As OR **, I made it perfectly clear to all, including the then ACDS OR , the MoD PE Team, headed by an RN 1 Star, that a decision to go with BAE would be a disaster. I was strongly backed up by the 2nd ***, Boscombe Down etc. The corruption and fraudulent activity that took place to make it a political win for BAE rather than LM is inexcusable and should be publically investigated. If we recall that the contract value was for £2B for 21 aircraft with an in-service date for the first Sqn of March 2003 the outcome has been unbelievable. I should add that the LM price was £1.85B
Quote:
Was I surprised (wrt the decision to buy Nimrod)- No, and I await my invitation to appear on Panorama to explain why the disaster happened. As OR **, I made it perfectly clear to all, including the then ACDS OR , the MoD PE Team, headed by an RN 1 Star, that a decision to go with BAE would be a disaster. I was strongly backed up by the 2nd ***, Boscombe Down etc. The corruption and fraudulent activity that took place to make it a political win for BAE rather than LM is inexcusable and should be publically investigated. If we recall that the contract value was for £2B for 21 aircraft with an in-service date for the first Sqn of March 2003 the outcome has been unbelievable. I should add that the LM price was £1.85B
Everyone will, of course, have their own view on what was happening at the time. While I didn't work on Nimrod after 1991, I recognise much of the above in general terms.
One must remember there were many components and interdependencies to the N2000 programme, not just a simple "Modify 21 aircraft" contract. In particular, the "2000" bit was always nonsense; for example, a pre-requisite programme's ISD was April 2001. One good reason why the above quote rings true.
My abiding memory of the time was the political interference. On one of the dependent programmes a competition was run and the winner was as clear cut as you could wish for (the wish being that the losers don't complain and delay the programme, which they didn't).
Their senior directors pitched up for the announcement and left crest fallen. We were more gobsmacked than they were. After the dust settled, we were told of the "Industrial Impact Paper" (i.e. Political lobbying) which was utterly laughable in the assumptions it made. One of which was Ferranti (now everyone's heard of them, right?) had no relevant business with MoD, which presumably came as a surprise to their 14,000 employees on MoD contracts. Anyway, the contract was awarded to a company who had never bid in the first place - which hadn't been a surprise to us as they had no track record. (Work that out).
There is not one person in PE/DPA/DE&S who has the clout to overrule such a political decision. And this is where the difference between "procurement" and "acquisition" comes in. The former are left in the lurch by the decision, while those in acquisition who know nothing about procurement move on and up, having satisfied their political masters.
