Floods & MRH90

[ftrplt]

where the S76's from AMB deployed? Seems like a great cab for the mission in their area.

The SAR contractor tends to re-deploy the S76 they are basing at AMB during periods of reduced activity; I dont believe the S76 was in AMB at the time.

despite them not having a notice to move

That is the point - they should have a NTM, even if it is 48 hours. Seems stupid to have a base full of capable assets that are not on a formal NTM for DACC]

Its not a point - its an opinion. Response to civil emergency is not the primary responsibility of Defence; therefore to expect the entire ADF to be on a NTM ridiculous. Notwithstanding, the POINT is that there were sufficient assets available for search and rescue & flood support as the weather allowed and as crew recall was able to be actioned. More assets in theatre WOULD NOT have provided more support, they would have struggled with deconfliction and I expect assets would have sat around unutilised.

And my point made earlier still stands:


Quote:
Did Oakey for example call the local councils (and their parent HQ) and say íf you ask through official channels we can have XX Blackhawks and XX Kiowas and a 412 ready in XX days'

Again, its not a POINT, its a question. DACC doesnt work that way, if the civil agencies cannot support the contingency with civilian assets, then they approach Defence for support. Defence commits assets that are on NTM to support the effort requested. Again, the weather on the day of the Lockyer Valley flash floods was so poor that I doubt any more airborne support could have been provided over and above the support that WAS provided - Sea Kings and Blackhawks.

The comments are based on the overall preparation for disasters etc plus where are the new [fantastically over rated????] MRH-90's bought at great cost by the Australian taxpayers for Her Majesty's ADF......they were supposed to be operational years ago.... ]

The ADF was prepared, and provided the support that was requested BY the civil agencies - there were 20 or so helo's operating from AMB for at least 10 days, I doubt more assets could have been utilised. The MRH-90 (which isnt in service) wasnt needed.

Whther or not the MRH-90 is fantastically over-rated, expensive, or late; is irrelevant to the question of preparedness and the overall Defence response.

[reacher]

If you have more questions about the MRH project TBM, I would again direct you to question your local MP as the A SQN guys are working with what they've got. The fact that IOC might have moved right has nothing to do with the guys operating them, or even the upper management. I'm sure it's a very familair story to ADF aviation.

A SQN achieved a lot of inital aircraft quals towards the end of year working around the various limitations imposed from AA. They are in a much better place now than 12 months ago.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

ftrplt - nice handle. Done much operational work yourself apart from airshows.....? Now that's a POINTed question!

Of course I expect the whole of the ADF to be on NTM, whether its a VHR of 60 mins or 3 months, everybody has to be on a NTM of some kind.

Again, the weather on the day of the Lockyer Valley flash floods was so poor that I doubt any more airborne support could have been provided over and above the support that WAS provided - Sea Kings and Blackhawks.

According to the RAN CDR on TV this morning the viz was 800m, so really not that bad and as for deconfliction, there were a few more assets than 4 operating over central Baghdad and it seemed to be manageable; perhaps you juts haven't had the experiences to coordinate and deconflict appropriately.

You also seem to be able to quote current doctrine quite well, obviously been to Staff College. Its a shame that the doctrine didn't meet the operational requirement; not doubt the LI Team will be updating the books over the next decade....!

I hope you don't quote ''but the doctrine doesn't let us do that'' when the Chinese come over the fence!

[finestkind]

Hmm quite right HTP. If you haven't got operational experience then you aint got nothing. Excuse me a minute while I throw up.

Also quite right, the whole of the ADF should be on NTM. I mean let’s not be logical about this, just because we don't have the assets to move the whole ADF doesn't mean anything, we'll just march them everywhere.

Also quite right about a lot more than 4 assets operating over Baghdad and they probably just launched everyday without clearance or authorisation or anything else. Makes sense to me.

When the Chinese come over the fence you had better have your chopsticks ready. Do you honestly believe we would be able to mount any real resistance.
.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

If you haven't got operational experience then you aint got nothing. .

Some would be helpful...

Excuse me a minute while I throw up

So you don't have any either....?

Also quite right, the whole of the ADF should be on NTM. I mean let’s not be logical about this, just because we don't have the assets to move the whole ADF doesn't mean anything

If they are not on NTM then the ADF must be a most effective fighting force....?!

we'll just march them everywhere

Unimog/M1/Landrover?

Also quite right about a lot more than 4 assets operating over Baghdad and they probably just launched everyday without clearance or authorisation or anything else.

The point made (or was it an opinion) was weather and deconfliction not clearance or authorisation.

When the Chinese come over the fence you had better have your chopsticks ready. Do you honestly believe we would be able to mount any real resistance

No, just stay at home, don't respond to the non-existent call out system, don't bother being proactive!

[cj0203]

How handy would 5 or 6 Iroquois be for exactly this type of work. Invaluble.

Bushranger wrote;

Several mentions this thread re a Bell 412 operated by Army Aviation; yet this media bit on 6 July 2010 said 5 Iroquois were being retained for training purposes: Army Iroquois choppers become national treasures - Defence News - Department of Defence

Can somebody please explain?

I know one of those 'training aids' (A2-279) is sitting on the firepad at the Raaf Amberley fire school. Sadly, I think in the name of 'training' it's going to get torched. Damn shame.



National Treasures, yeah right.

[finestkind]

HPT

Hmm maybe I am incorrect but it seems to me that the tone of your post is that without operational experience a persons experience and professionalism is lacking.

You sound like one of my old FLTCDR when giving reasons as to why crew, that were not part of his purple circle, could not do an Op i.e “you haven’t done this before so you haven’t got the experience to do it (how does one get the experience) Or you’ve done this before, we need to give someone who hasn’t done it a go”.

If they are not on NTM then the ADF must be a most effective fighting force....?!
I am sorry but I just don’t get your point. Do you believe the ADF should always be on NTM. When this occurs assets are set aside to be utilised if called upon. We do not have enough shiny toys or personal to set aside for all the ADF to be on NTM whilst carryout other duties. There are areas that have a certain amount of ready to go stuff but from the aviation side if you wish for this capability we probably need to double our strength in a lot of areas.

The point made (or was it an opinion) was weather and deconfliction not clearance or authorisation.
Are you suggesting that weather and deconfliction has nothing to do with authorisation or clearances? Well my lack of operational experience is certainly showing as in all my flying authorisation and clearances always, as main brief points, had significant relevance on weather and deconfliction.

No, just stay at home, don't respond to the non-existent call out system, don't bother being proactive.

Proactive, lovely word. Shall we invade China?

There is a recall list which all personal are on, which is significantly different to a NTM.

Apologise for thread creep and dick swinging

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

finestkind

without operational experience a persons experience and professionalism is lacking.

No, I said but some would helpful.

Do you believe the ADF should always be on NTM.

Yes, of course. It could be 90 days, but it is still a notice to move.

Are you suggesting that weather and deconfliction has nothing to do with authorisation or clearances? Well my lack of operational experience is certainly showing as in all my flying authorisation and clearances always, as main brief points, had significant relevance on weather and deconfliction.

You know that is not what I said, so stop trying to turn around the fact that you clearly have no idea about operational risk management rather than authorising a training trip in the local area. It could have been worth risking the lives of additional crews to save those that were in peril; it might not have been That is what balanced risk management is about. have you ever authorised a sortie where the odds of the crew coming home were less than 50/50?

Mate, you can probably speak for Amberley, but are you so certain that Oakey had a recall plan and that the details in the duty officer's folder were correct........

[finestkind]

HPT

If something is helpful and you haven’t got it isn’t that lacking?
More hair splitting. Isn’t NTM, not just pack you kit and go, about having the resources to do so?
My apologise for misinterpreting the below.
Quote:
They cannot just take off to give hand, with or without equipment.

Of cause they can. That is why they have a Commanding Officer and risk management profiles....''I'm sorry I can't get airborne to rescue the family on the roof in Oakey as CDF hasn't said I can....'' what a load of horse brasses! Why do we give people rank, command and authority if they cannot use common sense.

My experience and knowledge in risk management profiles is obviously seriously lacking. How do we do a RMP without knowledge of the area of operations, the number of assets involved, the conditions, threat, and actual target, the number of targets involved. I would have thought that there would have been a bit of planning and not just the CO has given the ok to go and said the risk is mitigated because we are saving lives.

No I have had the luxury of not having to place aircrew in a 50/50 situation. Does that mean I am not capable of doing so, basically who gives a flying f what I can or cannot do. What is your point? That you have been there and done that.
Fantastic well done and congratulations if you have and I sincerely mean that.

However if you have all this knowledge and experience why are you bothering posting here and not being pro active and sorting out the mess?

[Bushranger 71]

Some lessons learned

Hello all; herewith some anecdotal stuff which might be of interest.

The Australian military (not ADF until post-1974) only acquired significant helicopter capabilities in the early 1960s and there was a paucity of civil emergency service helos around the country in those days, as some have mentioned. The RAAF in particular then very frequently became involved in what was termed 'national commitment' tasking, which also embraced support for regional nations such as famine relief and influenza epidemics in PNG.

In our vast continent, flood events are very frequent either side of the Great Dividing Range. The big river systems that flow inland are fed by the annual monsoon and similarly the shorter northern rivers flowing to the coast; and both lots of waterways are impacted by cyclonic storms which vary in frequency and intensity. The southern eastward flowing rivers flood pretty often due to east coast low weather events.

Without tracking back through unit histories, it seemed that Air Force Iroquois became involved in flood relief operations, perhaps around every 2 or 3 years. After the historic 1974 floods, 9SQN based at Amberley was also active again in this role in 1976 or 1977. I recommended several pilots and crewmen for awards for their efforts, which they duly received. Hopefully, there might be appropriate recognition for some of the ADF personnel involved in the recent happening.

Operating lessons always emerge from such situations and herewith mention of some that may have got lost in the mists of time.

When operating over virtual inland seas and in low visibility conditions, navigation can of course become a problem so we included older 'Shell' road maps in the nav bag. They had the locations of service stations marked thereon which usually had a conspicuous oil company logo mounted on a very high pole and these were quite visible in flooded surrounds.

Scene of action co-ordination sometimes became difficult with many emergency services agencies then in their infancy and somewhat 'boy scoutish', so the best person to deal with was the senior local Police Officer. Those guys are very much in touch with their local/regional communities, cool in handling crisis situations and most importantly, have the power to act unilaterally.

A Sea King driver mentioned limited visibility of 800 metres in the recent flood event being a difficulty, but that is okay for helo ops; although rescue hoist activities in driving rain can be tricky which is why some aircrew were decorated for previous efforts. The image illustrates some wet season conditions encountered during Vietnam War operations. Large dead trees poking above the jungle canopy were often very hard to see and my safe operating height for all considerations (in fair or foul weather) was about 100 feet above the foliage or terrain. The tracer at centre frame was I think door-gun suppression.



Command and control has been aired. Years back when exercised at functional command levels (Fleet Headquarters, Field Force Command, RAAF Operational Command) authority to act was appropriately delegated; although going further down the chain, some local 'warlord' base commanders tended to interfere too much in unit responses to their parent command directions. Flying unit executives who were good leaders (and perhaps unambitious) had no qualms about acting unilaterally when appropriate; for example, I recall an occasion at Amberley when a private phone call was received at the squadron advising a nursing sister had been seriously injured in a vehicle accident not far from the base. Nobody hesitated: aircrew bolted out of the crewroom and 9SQN swiftly launched an Iroquois with some Air Force medical people on board. The casualties were very quickly deposited into medical care. Unfortunately, the very popular lady succumbed to brain stem injury.

A potentially big problem I see with ADF organization is the virtual sucking up of much decision-making into Canberra, especially the new Joint Force Headquarters, where even the CDF seems likely to get involved in the tasking of say one piddling C-130. Command should be exercised at the lowest practicable levels, to get the job done efficiently.

Just thoughts that may help foster debate.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Well said Bushranger. In my opinion AAAvn is risk averse in the extreme and really doesn't understand about delegated authority. The trouble is that this attitude was caused by the witch hunt type inquiries following a number of aircraft losses.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Just to clarify, and despite the report in the Herald Sun, the MRH 90 has NOT been placed on the list of Projects of Concern....yet...

[finestkind]

Bushranger,

Totally agree and as stated the ADF has become risk adverse. But can you really blame the CO's, XO's? There is no need to imagine what would happen if someone launched an asset and it was lost or worst still lost with civilians on board without the CDF giving his approval. Minimum would be a manslaughter charge I would think. Back to fix the blame not the fault.

Undoubtedly under review of the recent events if new procedures are needed they will be forthcoming.

Bushranger what would have happened if the Iroquois had come to grief? It would have be unquestioned that the action was acceptable and unless something stupid had occurred (an out of cat captain or similar) then that’s just part of the role and risk. Same scenario today and someone will get hung drawn and quartered for not waiting for the appropriate authorisation which has been taken out of the hands that should control it.

Apart from the 1974 flood has any other flood been as catastrophic as this one. We do, even if in different parts of the country, have floods on a regular basis but do we have floods and if we do how often, of the type that hit Lockyer Valley and Toowoomba?

[Bushranger 71]

Hi finestkind; you raise some interesting points.

Firstly; disaster relief events all differ in nature and scale so cannot really be accurately categorized as one being worse than another and the risk of flying feats required might vary significantly between smaller happenings and larger commitments. Dare I say, the overriding bulk of helo effort required in most flood relief situations will be airland recovery of people and logistic support which some might term pretty routine stuff depending on weather conditions. Initial response efforts may of course involve more rescue activities in adverse weather situations. We should also look beyond flood relief at bushfire, regional volcanic eruptions and earthquake intervention operations and maybe ask the question: 'Does the ADF any longer have an adequate capability for swift tactical air deployment of helos for regional aid to the civil power requirements?'

Secondly; in the incident I referred to in post #51, it may not have even been a squadron executive who decided on immediate response, just a more experienced pilot exercising some common sense and good judgement and he would have been supported to the hilt by his CO and flight commanders, whatever the outcome. In those days, there was adequate flying to maintain currency and thus categorization status whereas today, AAAvn boys and girls seem to be struggling to get more than a few hours a month. This of course is a direct consequence of foolish ADF helicopter force rationalization planning instead of progressively optimizing the proven cost-effective types that were in service. The flying currency scenario will likely worsen downstream when the Defence hierarchy eventually wake up to the huge jump in operating costs for outrageously expensive types being introduced.

I do feel very sorry for those serving today regarding the culture that has emerged within Defence concerning military justice in particular. Air Force Courts of Inquiry into aircraft accidents/incidents were generally very equitable and objective processes and subject to further review at higher levels of authority and there was seldom if ever to my knowledge any persecution of some aviators whose judgement may have been astray in particular happenings and many subsequently achieved well career-wise; but that management approach may no longer be in vogue in the ADF. If military officers are vested with the responsibility to run flying units, they must also be able to exercise the authority to effectively perform their roles. Threat of career damaging sanction if their actions do not conform with the current Defence version of 'political correctness' is unlikely to see the best aircraft operators and leaders remain within the military.

[finestkind]

Thanks Bushranger,

Totally agree, but a combination of an expanding population with development in areas that are questionable makes it more likely that more aid will be required. Very difficult to plan on an agency (whether ADF or civilian) when we don't know the size of the aid requirement. Do we plan on tsunami evacuation for Sydney, Brisbane or Townsville and have a capability that is big enough to do so but then may well remain semi idle( very helpful for minor disasters) for decades awaiting the disaster, basically over compensating. I would suggest we just don't have the economy for that. How do you plan for something like New Orleans, Katrina? We may be able to have a quick reaction time for an event but will we have enough assets?

Fully agree that with authority comes the right to exercise it, from a basic aircraft Captain to an exc. But that was even being eroded in my time. By the time I had completed my first tour it had changed. Once the Captain made the decision but then it was phone home and get approval. The days are gone whereby and operator could say go and get the job done.

Unfortunately that has become our culture and I know of a few officers how have stuffed their careers by making a stand. I don’t think it’s just about careers though, there are a number of actions that can end up with someone standing trail and being prosecuted. Losing a career is one thing, wiping out your life through either financial penalties or jail term is something else.

[Bushranger 71]

Adequacy of air assets

Hi again finestkind. The question of sufficient resources gets back to effective usage considerations. Initial response usually requires resources suited for rescue activities; but thereafter, the requirement is mainly logistic support, as proven in multiple flood relief involvements over the past 40 years. Although a differing scenario; during 1ATF Vietnam operations, a single UH-1H Iroquois could provide most of the routine daily logistic support requirements for 2 infantry battalions and other supporting arms deployed outside Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy Province in about 6 to 8 hours flying. Pallets of artillery ammunition, coiled barbed wire, diesel fuel bladders, etcetera were usually externally loaded by Chinook.

Pre-1989, rescue hoist equipped Air Force Iroquois squadrons were based at Fairbairn (Canberra), Amberley and Townsville with additional permanent SAR detachments at Darwin, Williamtown NSW and Pearce WA. In those days, Iroquois equipped squadrons generally achieved aircraft on-line availability between about 75 and 83 percent and Hueys were also often deployed by C-130 where necessary for military training and aid to civil power needs. Resources usually available for disaster relief tasking were generally then quite adequate and would be today, if that force structure still existed.

At risk of drift toward the thread 'Why no helo transport...?', Australia would have adequate military capacity for aid to the civil power requirements had continuous credible military preparedness been maintained through progressive optimization of types in service, particularly regarding the tactical airlift and helicopter fleets. Instead, a defence industry benefit policy aiming toward creation of a mythical Force 2030 structure has generated capability gaps and deficiencies. If ADF equipments are now less suited than previously for speedy reaction to requests for aid to civil powers, particularly regarding assistance to regional nations, then the national capacity for appropriate swift assistance in military scenarios has also diminished.

Australian DoD planners perhaps now have a mindset that 2 smallish aircraft carriers (LPDs) - and maybe another platform from the UK according to recent reports - will eventually suffice for providing regional disaster relief assistance, but questions arise regarding responsiveness and of course cost-effectiveness. Assuming one such ship was in home port, how long would it take to round up a crew, embark a suitable helo component with associated support gear and transit to a regional scene of activity? Methinks too long for immediate response needs, but some of our Fleet Air Arm colleagues might elaborate.

[Felix the Cat]

And now, back to the topic.

I am no great fan of the green machine but much of this thread is speculation and conjecture. I guess that it is why it's called a rumour network.

you clearly have no idea about operational risk management rather than authorising a training trip in the local area. It could have been worth risking the lives of additional crews to save those that were in peril; it might not have been That is what balanced risk management is about. have you ever authorised a sortie where the odds of the crew coming home were less than 50/50?

You should ask a couple of them. The training centre aircrew conducted very appropriate and timely operational risk management to conduct rescues and save lives, particularly on the Tue of the Lockyer Valley flood. Expect to see more about this after all of the investigations are complete.

That is the point - they should have a NTM, even if it is 48 hours. Seems stupid to have a base full of capable assets that are not on a formal NTM for DACC.

Everyone in the ADF, except trainees, is on some sort of NTM. This is, in the case of Army, determined by Forces Command. The training centre was placed on a 24 hour NTM before the floods but reacted to the Condamine floods in about 2 hours.

Mate, you can probably speak for Amberley, but are you so certain that Oakey had a recall plan and that the details in the duty officer's folder were correct........

Well I am certain and can say that it was achieved with a pre-prepared 'recall plan' as you call it, by a duty officer who had all of the correct information.

According to the RAN CDR on TV this morning the viz was 800m, so really not that bad

The RAN CDR is hardly going to point out on national TV that they were flying below helicopter VMC is he? You yourself would know how the ADF can go after its own kind Several pilots I know (army, navy & civil) spoke of the worst weather they had ever flown in.

Did Oakey for example call the local councils (and their parent HQ) and say íf you ask through official channels we can have XX Blackhawks and XX Kiowas and a 412 ready in XX days'

Yes.

I am not sure the level of readiness that you needed to maintain in order to support the civil community 30 years ago is really needed now. The East coast of Australia these days has probably a dozen very capable multi engine IFR machines (many of which utilise NVDs, automatic appraoch and hover etc) whose core job is SAR/EMS on call 24/

Spot on Turkey. And imagine the outcry from operators if the ADF starting moving in and displacing paid civil operators in some of those lucrative areas such as bushfire fighting etc

Those that spent last Christmas away got leave following that duty, and would, I'm sure have given their stand down to potentially save a life or assist with the recovery.

There were literally hundreds of training centre members ringing up to ask to be recalled and another sizeable number who just turned up to work anyway.

Oakey helos are training assets on a training base, hence no winches and no crews on duty during Xmas stand down period.

Incorrect. All S70s are fitted with a winch and the centre did have crews on 24 hr NTM.


There is absolutely no disputing that the recall of personnel and the employment of ADF assets could have been much better but lets work from a basis of fact not prejudice eh HPT?

As for MRH-90, irrespective of the reasons why, they are not operational yet. Simple.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Felix. Why on earth has the ADF become locked into this ridiculous 'risk management' jargon? It has forever been the case that the risks of any aircraft operation should be evaluated by aircraft commanders and/or flying unit executives before launch. The guys doing the job have to be vested with the authority to make sensible decisions.

Some seem a bit off track re the potential availability of so-called emergency services helos. Many of these operators are sponsored by big business primarily for aero-medical evacuation purposes and where we reside, one often goes past for recovery of road accident casualties. A slightly different situation for those funded by governments like the Queensland EMS where there may be more flexibility in operational usage; although there would likely be some public criticism if they were not expeditiously available for medevac functions which is their primary utilization (some of my Air Force colleagues have been flying with them for years). The military usually only gets called upon for helo support when civil air resources cannot be committed, are insufficient or unsuited.

And, why is Army Aviation now operating a Bell 412?

[BBadanov]

Defence Press Conference today talking about troubled projects with Def Min, and Min for Def Procurement. They said MRH90 was delayed 12 months in entering Navy service (ie Sea King replacement) and 18 months in entering Army service.

The journo question about how the poor record of MRH90 would impact the NH90 decision (ie S-70B replacement) was completely lost on the junior minister !! They really are aware of what's going on.

[cj0203]

Bushranger,

Would you believe I think Army aviation is using 412's (not in Army colours though) for loadmaster training since the UH-1H's were retired. Not completely certain but I was told that. Seems ridiculous that the Army Hueys were 'replaced' in 2007 with a helicopter still not operational. Classic!

Chris