Greatest ever blunder in the history of the UK aircraft industry?

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by draken55

Another point worth mentioning is that some heavy nighfighters like the Me110 weighed down with radar and cannon had a heck of a time catching Lancs. Greater speed may have been more of a defence than four 0.303 Brownings.

Very true. As for Schrag Musik, I'm not sure when they knew about it, certainly I hadn't until Alf Price mentioned it. One problem was, I imagine, the lack of survivors.

The other problem with a ventral turret, it would also vie for space with the bomb bay. If it was sited futher back, like the ASV on the Shack, it would have had to be retractable like the B17 which would also increase weight and, as you say, reduce speed.

[draken55]

"If a tail gunner could not see a German night fighter approaching in the dark I fail to see how a ventral gunner would"

A tail gunner could, when in luck, pick up an attack from astern but not one were an aircraft made a climbing attack from below. As the target was the wing fuel tanks, an aircraft was more likely to be lost. However, even after aircraft returned with battle damage that after tests confirmed cannon fire from below, it was not at first believed then seems to have been ignored.

Fitting radar to assist the tail gunner see in the dark had the opposite effect by illuminating the aircraft and with it the bomber stream.

Bomber Command was still being hit hard by the Luftwaffe well into 1945 although NF Mossies helped reduce losses. Electronics were seen as the answer perhaps as it was easier to fit black boxes than make changes to the production line.

Worth comparing this approach to the B-17 where a chin turret was fitted to the B-17G as a direct consequence of head on attacks in daylight.

[tornadoken]

Stirling

jetex #136: the problem, late-1942, was not the inadequacy of Stirling quality but of quantity. British Strategy was for Strategic Bombing as the Second Front NOW!, but despite the wholesale re-casting of the auto industry into 4-Motor shadows, deployment was languid. Minister of Aircraft Production Llewellin was fired and fervent nationaliser Sir R.Stafford Cripps put in, 11/42.

Harris wrote to him, 30/12/42: Stirling Production Group had “virtually collapsed (makes) no worthwhile contribution to our war effort in return for their overheads (should be) wholesale sacking of the incompetents who have turned out (c)50% rogue a/c from (Harland…'T)he incompetent drunk’ who ran (Short.)” C.Bryant,S.Cripps,Hodder,1997, P330; C.Messenger,Bomber Harris,Arms&Armour,1984,P92.

RSC put in AWA to displace Short at S.Marston Agency Factory from the last 108 Stirling III; Oswald Short was evicted from his own patch,11/1/43, but the firm's sloth was irredeemable. RSC sought to implement Defence(General) Regln.78: appropriation to ensure efficiency. War Cabinet Minutes W.M.(43).41,16/3/43,P121, WSC: “is it worth (a Commons) row?” RSC: “Some (production problem cases) are very big concerns. Present difficulty is with the Bristol Co. (on absent Buckingham. Hard) to put a Controller (in: they are scarce. If we resolve the position at Short, it will with others) be easier to make voluntary arrangements.” WSC: “very well, go on then and have your row: it may hamper MAP in future.” Bevin: “I think it will upset the industry”; “I don’t” said RSC. Short's was nationalised and put under Harland management. Stirling remained in (low volume, later in transport variant) production; notions of changeover to Lancaster lapsed as volume grew from the existing Lancaster Production Group.

Stirling was not all bad: : “it could not make a decent operational height (a) pig (on) taking off and landing (but) in the air it was a darling - it could turn inside a Spitfire” D.Richards,The Hardest Victory,Hodder,94,P.311. Not, I suggest, the greatest blunder.

[Jetex_Jim]

tornadoken thanks, as usual for an in depth explanation of the Shorts situation.

That the RAF were baffled for so long by the losses subsequently attributed to Schräge Musik is very odd. During the First World War RFC pilots had used the technique of firing upwards with success against Zepplins. One might have expected a few senior officers to recall that.

The concept of removing all turrets from the 4 engine bomber force was proposed by some junior members of the RAF Operational Research group. (see Freeman Dyson, Disturbing the Universe for more on this). Flying a stripped down Lancaster with a crew of two was viable and the performance advantages might well have kept them clear of most radar equipped nightfighters.

I've read that some Lancasters were initially fitted with a ventral turret but this space was subsequently occupied by the H2S installation. However, German nightfighters were frequently equipped with an H2S detector called Naxos. And there was a tail mounted version to give warning of Mosquitoes equipped with AI Mk4 which operated on the same band.

Bolting kit on, rather than removing it, seems to have been Bomber Command's preferred remedy. Perhaps persuaded, I wonder, by an industry that would sooner add more bits than build a lighter, cheaper plane in the first place.

That after the war the policy of flying high and fast with the unarmed V-Bombers and the Canberra seems to show the wisdom of those Operational Researchers who were ignored in war time.

[tanimbar]

Freeman Dyson, Schrage Musik and turrets

Freeman Dyson wrote of his experiences during WWII. He joined, aged 19, the Operational Research Section (ORS) of the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command on July 25, 1943.

Read his account here - Freeman Dyson, operational research and the night bomber offensive - Topic Powered by Social Strata

It covers Schrage Musik, and how it was missed, together with comments on the effectiveness of removing, essentially useless, turrets.

Opportunities missed ..... Sad, very sad ............

Regards, Tanimbar

[Jetex_Jim]

Thanks, tanimbar. Dyson on those proposed turret-less Lancasters.

Smeed and I agreed that Bomber Command could substantially reduce losses by ripping out two gun turrets, with all their associated hardware, from each bomber and reducing each crew. The gun turrets were costly in aerodynamic drag as well as in weight. The turretless bombers would have flown 50 miles an hour faster and would have spent much less time over Germany. The evidence that experience did not reduce losses confirmed our opinion that the turrets were useless. The turrets did not save bombers, because the gunners rarely saw the fighters that killed them

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by Jetex_Jim

Thanks, tanimbar. Dyson on those proposed turret-less Lancasters.

Which probably accounted for the subsequent post-war unarmed bombers when everyone else added guns from B-36 onwards and the Russians to this day even on transports. That tail gun certainly worried the old DF guys and still worried the F4 guys closing for a VID or even a Fox 2.

[Mike7777777]

The benefits of hindsight: remove defensive armament from RAF heavy bombers in 1943. Subsequent news headlines "our boys have no defence over Germany".

As per several (many) previous posts on Pprune, the Mossie (or similar) should have been the bomber of choice over Germany (with hindsight), but no-one in a position of authority at the time would have instructed Avro et al to build twin engined bombers with no defensive weapons instead of four engined aircraft bristling with machine guns, in case the decision was wrong.

Perhaps the greatest blunder is - as always - building aeroplanes designed to win the previous conflict.

[Jetex_Jim]

"our boys have no defence over Germany".

Quite, but they can outrun every nightfighter in the sky and turrets don't help much against anti aircraft guns.

but no-one in a position of authority at the time would have instructed Avro et al to build twin engined bombers with no defensive weapons instead of four engined aircraft bristling with machine guns, in case the decision was wrong.

Perhaps, but there would have been little cost to removing all the turrets from one squadron of Lancs, and then see how they got on. That is what the OR boys wanted. Moreover, this was not hindsight but a conclusion made at the time but not passed to Harris.

As far as I can recall no one suggested an entire bomber force composed of Mosquitoes. (I don't see a Mosquito carrying a Grand Slam, for examle.) The suggestion was to strip the turrets out of the 4 engined bomber force.

Of course, if all the numerous RF transmitters that the RAF habitually flew to Germany with - making them easy prey for even none-AI equipped nightfighters that were fitted with RF homers, were removed or turned off, then, so much the better.

[Pontius Navigator]

Remember too that the Wellington could fly as high as 40000 feet pressurized as early at 1941. At that height it would have been invulnerable but admittedly not able to carry much or a bomb load but is could have flown over Germany in daylight which would have eased the navigational problems.

[Mike7777777]

Quite, but they can outrun every nightfighter in the sky and turrets don't help much against anti aircraft guns.

With hindsight, with regards to Me110 and JU88, yes. Other, faster, nightfighters were available. But from the info at the time it would have taken a brave man to make the decision to remove armament from heavies.

Moreover, this was not hindsight but a conclusion made at the time

That conclusion could not be valid (at the time) because the full info re: causes of bomber losses was not available (at the time) eg Schrage Musik

As far as I can recall no one suggested an entire bomber force composed of Mosquitoes

Previous threads (perhaps Nostalgia). See Mosquito losses in WW2. Grand Slam was not particularly effective at shortening the war, more an exercise in "Can we build it? Yes we can!" Lots, or even several Mossies bombing the U-boat pens when under construction on the French coast would have been a more effective use of resource IMHO (with hindsight!)

But as with all these things, the Germans would have responded. Windows was very effective over Hamburg, the Luftwaffe modifed their tactics, Windows was subsequently not as effective. If the average speed of the bomber stream increases then, eventually, more high performance nightfighters would appear. Me262s (probably) caused a sharp increase in Mossie NF losses at the end of the conflict.

[TBM-Legend]

Many Lancs were 'field' modified to fit .50 guns in the ventral position. .303 and even a 20mm was tried. The early Lanc ventral turret was limited by the sighting mechanism and was removed. The H2S radar created a problem for a ventral gun due to its position however not all Lancs flew with them. The Lanc in the Australian War Memorial was not fitted eg.

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by TBM-Legend

The Lanc in the Australian War Memorial was not fitted eg.

Not fitted or fitted and removed?

The BBMF Lancaster does not have the radom whereas Queenie at East Kirkby does. Given BBMF Lancaster's post-war role it is highly likely that it was removed.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

However, even after aircraft returned with battle damage that after tests confirmed cannon fire from below, it was not at first believed then seems to have been ignored.

It seems shocking that the Int Os and those above them refused to believe the eye-witness accounts of numerous crews - "vertical fire followed by destruction of a bomber", and even came up with the totally spurious concept of Scarecrows, rather than investigate the accounts of Schrage Musik properly. A similar attitude was experienced by those Fighter Command pilots who first encountered the Fw 190 in 1941, but were told that the radial-engined aircraft which were decimating them were "just Hawk 75s which the Germans captured from the French". Did the hierarchy really believe that Hawk 75s, which had proved inferior to the Bf109E in 1940, would be used by the Germans on the Channel Front? And that, if the Germans did this, the H75 would suddenly be able to beat Spitfire Vs? Good to see those on the front line getting the support they needed from on high...some things never change...

[chiglet]

Remember too that the Wellington could fly as high as 40000 feet pressurized as early at 1941. At that height it would have been invulnerable but admittedly not able to carry much or a bomb load but is could have flown over Germany in daylight which would have eased the navigational problems

So what about the Junkers Ju86p [Recce, Service Cieling 39500ft] at least one shot down by a modified Spitfire? Could a Luftwaffe fighter not be modded? if so, end of

Sharage Musik, why no countermeasures? The Luftwaffe did NOT use tracer ammo! Ergo... wtf?
As always, I stand to be corrected [Matron.... ]

[tanimbar]

Turrets needed for invasion-support operations?

First, Freeman Dyson's account makes it clear he thinks there was a failure of insight, not hindsight, regarding Schrage Musik - a failure he believes he shared. An honest and brave assessment of his involvement. But, he was only 19 or so and straight from school.

And, just posssibly, the higher-ups in Bomber Command made the right decision in not removing the turrets. By 1943 they would have known that the bombers would be called upon to strike infrastructure etc. in France/Low Countries in support of the invasion. Many of these ops were at lower elevation than those over Germany, and turret guns might prove very useful against German fighters. Plus, there might be daylight raids.

Those responsible for strategy in Bomber Command might have thought that removing turrets would aid the bombing campaign in Germany, but would then have to be retro-fitted to suit the invasion campaign and later low-level efforts.

If so, they would reason that ripping out turrets is far easier than putting them back in: hence, for strategic reasons, do nothing!

And, did they have an eye on later, low-level, operations against the Japanese?

Just a thought (but I don't expect it is new).

[Al R]

Plus ca change.

Not sure if its a blunder, but this (from 1995) resonates.

RAF may lease US jets if Tornado is scrapped - News - The Independent

[Jetex_Jim]

Originally Posted by Mike7777777

That conclusion could not be valid (at the time) because the full info re: causes of bomber losses was not available (at the time) eg Schrage Musik

Nevertheless, the decision to remove the turrets would have been the correct one. (you never reach a point where full information is available.) Turret-less Lancs would have flown faster and higher. To suggest that this would have been pointless because eventually a fighter would have come along to catch them isn't much of an argument against. Had the war gone on long enough the German Wasserfall surface to air missile might have come along and it had a projected maximum altitude of 60000ft but that didn't stop designers striving for higher altitudes until the 1960s.

Originally Posted by Mike7777777

Grand Slam was not particularly effective at shortening the war, more an exercise in "Can we build it? Yes we can!"

Really, and what of the other weapons that Barnes Wallace designed, Tallboy and Upkeep? It took a Lanc to lift them. Perhaps you consider the sinking of the Tirpitz, the Operation Crossbow attacks, oh and the Dams raids to have been trivial?


The ability of High Command to delude itself is related by Dr RV Jones in his story of the battle of the beams. Knickebein, etc. In this Jones explains how his first problem was to persuade the British High Command that the Germans actually needed electronic bombing aids. They were convinced, in 1940, that accurate bombing could be done, at night, using conventional techniques. Surely a breathtaking example of hope over experience? Later, of course, Harris still endorsed only area bombing, even though by 1944 617 squadron were capable of such precision as the Saumur tunnel raid:

June - August 1944
Saumur rail tunnel — The sole operational north-south route on the Loire. Nineteen Tallboy-equipped and six conventionally-equipped Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron attacked on the night of 8/9 June 1944. This was the first use of the Tallboy bomb and the line was destroyed — one Tallboy bored through the hillside and exploded in the tunnel about 60 ft (18 m) below, completely blocking it. No aircraft were lost during the raid.

[Mike7777777]

A decision to remove turrets may have been the correct one when viewed 70 years on, such is the benefit of hindsight, but it would have been seen as gambling with men's lives at the time. The German response to Allied successes was (generally) fairly rapid and effective where resources permitted, tactics for dealing with Window (I might have typed Windows previously, the shame) being a prime example, Tiger tank in response to Red Army T34 and KV-1 another.

The average speed and height of the RAF bomber stream over Germany certainly increased during the conflict, the average speed of German nightfighters increased by a significantly greater amount, compare RAF (night) losses with USAAF (day) over Germany in the last few months of the airwar

The balance of the airwar at night always fluctuated, even as late as Jan 1945; after Big Week it was all over for the Luftwaffe day fighters. And with hindsight(!), Bomber Command should have switched the heavies to daylight raids, leaving the Mossies to operate at night.

Certainly Tallboy was an effective weapon, but it was never going to win the war in the West in 1943/44, although effective area bombing of industrial targets might have (Speer). Alternatively, finish Berlin by Jan 1944 with a force comprising primarily of Mossies, each able to carry 8000lbs of munitions to Berlin on a dark winter's night ..

There's no doubt that Upkeep was a magnificent example of British engineering, created by a tenacious designer and delivered in perhaps the finest and most inventive feat of arms in the airwar 1939 to 1945. But it wasn't followed up, allowing the Germans to rebuild the dams (Wallis was reportedly furious), so the overall effect on German industrial production was minimised.

Re: Saumur raid: very effective use of the Tallboy, but it doesn't win the war in the West.

Re: Tirpitz, the Tallboys were again certainly effective, but against a target that no longer presented a serious threat to the Allies. The sinking freed RN assets (particularly capital ships) to prepare for service in the Far East, which - in hindsight(!) - made little difference to the outcome.

Re: Crossbow, Mossies were the most effective means of dealing with V1 launch sites.

Re: had the war gone on long enough? What-if scenarios - by definition - are opinion. Type XX1 wins the Battle of the Atlantic, Red Army rolls into Berlin? Wasserfall stops USAAF day bombing, night raids intensify, Red Army rolls into Berlin?

[JonnyT1978]

So many to choose from!

1957 Defence White Paper. So many promising aircraft and projects consigned to history. Reportedly the Saunders-Roe was a very viable contender for the contract for the West-German Luftwaffe eventually won by the F104G ('Widow Maker'). The only projects to survive were the Lightning, which although 'survived' could have been developed much further, and the ill-fated TSR-2.

Failure to properly rationalise the industry in the post-war period. Too many small manufacturers facing up to the 'big Americans' and therefore lacking industrial and financial clout. When the firms were rationalised, it was done poorly and inefficiently, leaving us with perhaps too few and just BAC (lately BAe) which has proved perhaps too big and powerful (in political circles at least...)

Wilson Govermnent Defence Cuts (mid 1960s). I could have just gone down the TSR-2 route with this one but that's a well trodden path so I thought I'd keep it broad. Granted the P1154 had its flaws, not least the conflicting requirements of the RAF and RN but to bin all that indigenously developed technology - such as Plenum Chamber Burning - and instead burn the cash on the most powerful, largest and yet slowest Phantoms in the world does seem somewhat mad. TSR-2 was a terrible shame but yet I can't help feeling that it wouldn't have quite matched up to the expectations. That said the way the cancellation was handled was nothing short of shameful and again we lost a lot of good technology in the process. Granted (again) the UK government couldn't have envisaged the protracted development of the F-111 and the associated cost-escalations, but the bigger problem was the 'capability gap' it left us with meaning the Vulcan had to soldier on for nearly 20 more years until the Tornado replaced it.

Scrapping of the 'conventional' carriers. Pretty simple this one. 'Proper' carriers with Phantoms (I never said they weren't good aircraft!) and Buccaneers and a very competent maritime AEW aircraft in the Gannet = a pretty good deterrent to Argentina even contemplating invading 'Las Malvinas'

Some others in brief:

Failure to see the Miles M-52 through to completion

Giving the Americans and the Soviets jet engines 'on a plate'

Lack of development of the Buccaneer (perhaps Mountbatten was right?)

Failure of De Havillands to engineer the first Comets properly, given that metal fatigue was a known phenomenon by this time - pilots of Hawker Typhoons whose tails parted company will testify to that!