BBC2 Tonight, 22 September: BoB from a "New perspective".

[Tankertrashnav]

The blurb says that the programme will give new perspectives,

Wonder if they'll mention the Blenheims, Beaufighters, Defiants etc etc.

Not holding my breath.

[BOAC]

Not holding my breath.

- good job too

[Unixman]

The BoB prevented the Germans from even attempting Sealion; if they had attempted it it is probable that given the complete unpreparedness of the Germans for amphibious warfare the RN would have slaughtered them.

[proplover]

My take is that;
1) The Germans came up a well organised air defence system - unknown elsewhere at that time
2) The UK had very good short range combat aircraft although limited in numbers but fighting over home land
3) The change of German tatics from Sept 7th was crucial to the outcome.
4) The use of resouces by Park was crucial in so much that nearly all the incomming raids were met with some resistance which undermined moral as the Luftwaffe crews were constantly being given the impression that the RAF were a beaten force.

The German High Command seemed more concerened about weather conditions in the Channel for September than the British Navy especially as they didnt really have the best type of troop transport for a cross Channel expedition.

I think that if the surface ships of the Navy had sailed down the North Sea towards the Channel without RAF air cover the Luftwaffe and U boats may well of actually 'slaughtered' them. I seem to recall that certainly in the early part of the war the RN ships didnt do to well when up against a concentrated air attack.

It would of been imperative for the Germans to capture and hold a port and airfields to make the invasion work and then keep the troops supplied. I dont think that in 1940 they had that capability - they would of relied heavily on a British collapse similar to the French.

[angels]

Pontius - quite right. Quite a few people call the BoB a draw. Cobblers. The German aim was air superiority. They didn't get it. Ergo they lost.

The point unixman makes is a good one.

The barges in the Channel ports were just that - barges, crudely adapted to carry things they weren't made to (tanks etc).

They were made for canals, not the open sea. Any hint of a swell, waves, chop etc and they would have floundered without any help from the RN (who would have inflicted heavy damage anyway).

Also, look at the German plans for invasion -- even the scaled back ones. They would have been too thinly stretched and even our battered army would have inflicted sufficient casualties on the beaches to have probably stopped an invasion in its tracks. Parachutists would have made a difference, but in somewhere as large as SE England?

Thankfully all my conjecture is just thatl!!

[Gainesy]

Well, to damn it with faint praise, it wasn't as crap as I thought it would be.

High point for me was wondering how much Billy Drake wants for that fantastic house?

I think he should have made a programme about the bugged school where all the German PoWs were held, now that would have been new.

[Avitor]

During the time Sea Lion was on the table, Stalin's guard was somewhat relaxed!!!

[Wokkafans]

Many of you will be familiar with this but for those who aren't...

In 1974 an exercise was held at the Staff College, Sandhurst using a scenario based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940. The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox.

'Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry.

The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert. The main problems the Germans face are that: a) the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy; b) the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides (for a high water attack) and c) it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping.

22nd September - morning. The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Div landed at Lympne to take the airfield. The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings, which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified. Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into the Pas de Calais.

22nd - 23rd September. The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in France. The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel. German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.

23rd Sept dawn - 1400 hrs. The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German build up in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West. The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce commanders were jubilant however, and preperations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Div, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%. The 22nd Div airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Div supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Div in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Div was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with stickybombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Div had retaken Newhaven (the only German held port), however the New Zealand Div arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Div. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties.

Sep 23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs. Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort, with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs and 7 E-Boats. The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was referred up the chain of command.

23rd Sep 1900 - Sep 24th dawn. The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the Channel indefensible without air support. Goring countered this by saying it could only be done by stopping the terror bombing of London, which in turn Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by. The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures. On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Div and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave, but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be reinforced at all.

Sep 24th dawn - Sep 28th. The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time. The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment on reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British attacks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.'

Dons tin hat....

[airborne_artist]

Compare the numbers trained and the times they trained for, for D-Day, and then look at the Sealion training, equipment etc. There's a possible argument that if the BoB had been lost and Sealion had been launched that Germany would have been quite literally dead in the water in 1940, and the rest of the war might not have happened?

[Pontius Navigator]

A_A, in other words, like North Africa, the campaign could have been one of attrition on a larger scale than the BoB alone. Allow the landings, fall back and extend the German LOC and then chop off the head.

[airborne_artist]

Allow the landings, fall back and extend the German LOC and then chop off the head.

Or if the RN and what was left of the RAF had destroyed the Sealion initial forces as they landed and the phase two forces already in the Channel, would the German High Command then have turned in on Adolf?

[BEagle]

Wokafans, that would make a very good movie, in my opinion.

How lucky we were that der dicke Hermann was such an utter buffoon - and that Hitler was more concerned with revenge than strategy!

[Unixman]

proplover

Actually the British would have been very effective for the following reasons:

• You mention U-Boats... They would have had to operate against fast warships in extremely shallow water and in a very confined space. It is probable that the RN would have initially used light forces from Harwich and Portmouth against which the U-Boats would have been far far less effective that you think. Once the light forces had got amongst the invasion traffic it would have been slaughter, especially given that the number of German escorts would have been very very low.

• The Luftwaffe at that stage of the war were pretty ineffective against surface ships (yes there were some losses - 12 IIRC - at Dunkirk but that operation succeeded) and even later at Crete where the RN did sustain heavy losses from the air they still forced back the amphibious invasion fleet. Twice.
  Anyway if SeaLion had been attempted Dowding had plans to withdraw all of the fighters to the South Midlands where the airfields would have initially at least been out of range of the Germans but we still could have covered the beaches.
• The RN's night fighting capability had improved massively since WW1 where basically er er they didn't have any. If the RN had got amongst the traffic at night then both U-Boats and air power would have been negated.
• The Germans couldn't bring heavy equipment across in anything like the amount needed. The plan was to land 10 infantry divisions and then somehow get the armour across... the dotty plans were to basically plonk a tank on a barge and take a flying leap at the shore .... and all of that against the RN. You light-blue jobs might well take the p*ss of the RN (in a friendly way ) but I strongly suspect that if there was an invasion in the offing then they would uphold their "Engage the enemy more closely" traditions ....
• Also the number of fully equipped British troops in the area was much higher than supposed. by September most of the losses incurred at Dunkirk had been made up and there also were 3 fully equipped Canadian divisions in the area.

It would in all probability have been a mangle for the Germans

[Wokkafans]

For those that haven't read it the Richard Cox book makes for an interesting read. What it outlines is that the British strategy of defence in depth, i.e., the GHQ lines, probably would have been succesful in delaying the German advance for sufficient time to allow for reserve forces in the Midlands and North to join the fray. Unlike the allies in 1944, the German plan did not appear to take into account the significance of transport links, such as the railways, which would allow rapid British reinforcement en masse.

Undoubtably, the Southern counties would have taken a pasting and British military and civilian casualties would have been high. However, once the RN had reached the channel, with the support of RAF top cover, and combined with the German's lack of suitable seabourne transport, it does seem likely that any initial landing would be contained, starved of supplies, and eventually defeated.

BEAg's - agree, it would make a great movie - just make sure Spielberg isn't involved or it will be G.I's fighting off the massed German hordes.

[Pontius Navigator]

Originally Posted by Wokafans

the German plan did not appear to take into account the significance of transport links, such as the railways, which would allow rapid British reinforcement en masse.

Which is odd given the influence that the Russian railways had had on the decision to start WW1 and the subsequent use to maintain the western front.

[Wokkafans]

PN - I suspect that the Germans likely did reconise the importance of the rail network but at that time didn't have the resources to take it out to any significant degree, their efforts being focussed on the main cities, airfields, and industrial facilities.

I can't comment on the Russian railway system but could it also have been a factor that the UK rail system (pre Beeching) would allow rail traffic to divert around any areas that were taken out? (perhaps analogous to how the internet routes info around busy nodes).

[mmitch]

I have read a copy of the German intelligence survey for the invasion. They point out the complex railway system in the UK and how difficult it would be to disrupt it as the routes could be diverted.
mmitch.

[Gainesy]

The Luftwaffe was very effective against ships. After virtually wiping out the Dover-based 4th Destroyer Flotilla (nine ships plus two replacements, not all were sunk but all were put out of action), mainly by Stuka attacks, and sinking other warships in and around Portland (Foylebank, a brand-new AAA ship and the destroyer Delight), the Admiralty specifically forbad destroyer ops in the Channel in daylight.

This was weasel worded by the RN Historic Branch chap in the programme as:" the navy had good night fighting capability", or some such.

Also liked use of the "Euro Anthem" as background to Hitler and goose-stepping Nazis post France campaign.

[BEagle]

They point out the complex railway system in the UK and how difficult it would be to disrupt it....

A few low-flying Heinkels carrying bomb loads of wet leaves would do the trick these days...

At least real choo-choos didn't seem to be concerned by 'leaves on the line', 'the wrong kind of snow' or 'engineering work' in those days.

[pasir]

...

Further to the points raised about the importance of the Luftwaffe smashing
our UK rail network in order to forstall the 'rushing of reinforcements' - One
may be excused for enquiring - What reinforcements ? - other then men.

The BEF had left all of their heavy equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk
-most of the 335,000 troops that returned to the UK were nearly all
minus even rifles. Had German troops estabished a foothold on
our beaches - other than the RAF I fear it would have been a walkover
for them.

Without wishing to belittle the Home Guard/ LDV a further indication of
just how desperate things were in those day being my fathers HG
platoon had One Rifle and 5 rounds to be shared between some dozen men
who would be called upon to defend the Croydon Airport area. The
remainder of the 'force' were each armed with pickaxe handles.


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