F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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As I understood it the GAO thought that the software was one of the major risks in the F35 project, it being the most software integrated plane that there has ever been built with sensor fusion throughout.
What this means to me is that there will be software from a number of different companies interacting with each other. Each of these different sensors / systems will have a requirement for software updates on a regular basis, what is to say that in one of these updates there will not be a Trojan Horse, thinking of the recently in the news Volkswagen software problems.
Obviously one hopes that the F35 is a success, there are many risks on the road to full warfighting capacity at release 3F.
If all the F35s in the world are to be connected through the ALICE system to a central server at LM so that usage data can be collected, what process is there to ensure the security of all the terminals, sometimes at austere bases?
There must be a reasonable risk of the fleet being hacked I would have thought.
What this means to me is that there will be software from a number of different companies interacting with each other. Each of these different sensors / systems will have a requirement for software updates on a regular basis, what is to say that in one of these updates there will not be a Trojan Horse, thinking of the recently in the news Volkswagen software problems.
Obviously one hopes that the F35 is a success, there are many risks on the road to full warfighting capacity at release 3F.
If all the F35s in the world are to be connected through the ALICE system to a central server at LM so that usage data can be collected, what process is there to ensure the security of all the terminals, sometimes at austere bases?
There must be a reasonable risk of the fleet being hacked I would have thought.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
I also don't know anything about the cancelled (or otherwise) Cyber Testing you refer to
........Tom Christie, one of the best directors of DOT&E, served as the director from 2001 to early 2005. As required by law, he produce 32 operational weapons test reports from his office that were sent to the secretary of defense and the Congress. Half of the reports showed enough severe failures to warrant a stop in proceeding to full production of the weapon, but not one of these flawed weapons were stopped and were actually approved for full production. The flaws found in these weapons will show up later in the acquisition cycle or even in the battlefield where there will be very costly modifications or much higher maintenance costs, let alone subjecting our troops to weapons that don't work. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta could save large sums of money if he would be willing to seriously look at the reports of failures coming out of DOT&E and fix problems before just rubber stamping flawed weapons for full production. If he won't do it, the Congress also gets these reports and should hold up the money for full production of the weapons until the flaws found in the report are fixed. General Odierno spent many years overseeing the war in Iraq, so he should be much more sensitive and appreciative of operational testing that can prevent a bad weapon being sent to his troops...........
ORACQuote:
I also don't know anything about the cancelled (or otherwise) Cyber Testing you refer to
Panic in the Pentagon: Can't Pass Weapons Testing? Army Chief Says to Get Rid of It
........Tom Christie, one of the best directors of DOT&E, served as the director from 2001 to early 2005. As required by law, he produce 32 operational weapons test reports from his office that were sent to the secretary of defense and the Congress. Half of the reports showed enough severe failures to warrant a stop in proceeding to full production of the weapon, but not one of these flawed weapons were stopped and were actually approved for full production. The flaws found in these weapons will show up later in the acquisition cycle or even in the battlefield where there will be very costly modifications or much higher maintenance costs, let alone subjecting our troops to weapons that don't work. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta could save large sums of money if he would be willing to seriously look at the reports of failures coming out of DOT&E and fix problems before just rubber stamping flawed weapons for full production. If he won't do it, the Congress also gets these reports and should hold up the money for full production of the weapons until the flaws found in the report are fixed. General Odierno spent many years overseeing the war in Iraq, so he should be much more sensitive and appreciative of operational testing that can prevent a bad weapon being sent to his troops........... 29th Dec 2015 10:48
I also don't know anything about the cancelled (or otherwise) Cyber Testing you refer to
Panic in the Pentagon: Can't Pass Weapons Testing? Army Chief Says to Get Rid of It
........Tom Christie, one of the best directors of DOT&E, served as the director from 2001 to early 2005. As required by law, he produce 32 operational weapons test reports from his office that were sent to the secretary of defense and the Congress. Half of the reports showed enough severe failures to warrant a stop in proceeding to full production of the weapon, but not one of these flawed weapons were stopped and were actually approved for full production. The flaws found in these weapons will show up later in the acquisition cycle or even in the battlefield where there will be very costly modifications or much higher maintenance costs, let alone subjecting our troops to weapons that don't work. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta could save large sums of money if he would be willing to seriously look at the reports of failures coming out of DOT&E and fix problems before just rubber stamping flawed weapons for full production. If he won't do it, the Congress also gets these reports and should hold up the money for full production of the weapons until the flaws found in the report are fixed. General Odierno spent many years overseeing the war in Iraq, so he should be much more sensitive and appreciative of operational testing that can prevent a bad weapon being sent to his troops........... 29th Dec 2015 10:48
I do agree that operational testing needs to be conducted, and preferrably before orders are placed. It does seem we are forever in the "testing" phase with some programs- likely a product of gold plated requirements, under-bidding, over-selling and under-appreciated risk...
Some programs should have been cancelled, but where do we draw the line if something underperforms during testing? We can cancel the entire program (rare), go back for modifications (costly), dumb down the requirements and declare the requirements are now met, quietly ignore the failure and live with it and perhaps fix a later date.
Personally I would like to see a few more cancellations and really holding manufactures to task a bit more.
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Fleet-wide F-35 fix targets fuel tank over-pressurisation
Flight Global - Fleet-wide F-35 fix targets fuel tank over-pressurisation
On the other hand, Flight also have rather more positive news as well.
F-35 training at Luke AFB gathers pace with 34 jets
The concurrency curse has struck the Lockheed Martin F-35 again, this time during lightning protection qualification, when it was discovered the jet’s fuel tanks could over-pressurise “beyond design limits” in certain flight profiles.
F-35 training at Luke AFB gathers pace with 34 jets
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F35 trashes new year resolution
Found this on Duffel Blog this morning. Very funny..
[url]http://www.duffelblog.com/2016/01/f-35-gains-25-billion/
[url]http://www.duffelblog.com/2016/01/f-35-gains-25-billion/
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2015: Another Terrible Year for the F-35
Another article showing the benefits of purchasing this wondrous new toy...
2015: Another Terrible Year for the F-35
2015: Another Terrible Year for the F-35
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Ho Hum..... 2015......2016..... plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose....
Testing Chief Warns Of JSF Software Delays
Development of the Block 3F version of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) cannot be completed on the current schedule—by July 31, 2017—without shortcuts that risk failure in the initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) program, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of OT&E (DOT&E). Block 3F is the culmination of the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase and conforms to the requirements set at the start of the program.
A Dec. 11 memorandum from Gilmore to Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, and Gen. Paul Selva, vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also warns that the program is risking trouble by attempting to define Block 4, the first post-service-entry upgrade, early this year, when Block 3F and its predecessor, Block 3i, are still “problematic” and performing poorly in testing. Also, the program office has yet to order essential equipment for specialized software laboratories that are needed to support operational testing and initial operational capability (IOC), with the result that there will not be enough capacity when it is required.
The JSF Program Office (JPO) acknowledges it has pulled tests out of the program and that each of the software blocks—including Block 3F-—will enter service with deficiencies. In the case of Block 3F, these will have to be remedied as part of Block 4, JPO says, and it will be up to customers to decide whether all the deficiencies need to be fixed and when. Gilmore’s memo, a copy of which was obtained by Aviation Week, lists multiple problems that threaten the program’s ability to deliver a reliable and mature product on schedule. Gilmore traces many of the issues to “schedule-driven decisions” made during the 2010-12 rebaselining of the program, under the leadership of current program director Lt. Gen. Chris Bogdan and his predecessor, Rear Adm. David Venlet. Brought in after the previous program director, Marine Maj. Gen. David Heinz, had been fired, Venlet, Bogdan and a renewed leadership team defined a phased program to permit a limited, early IOC for the U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force, while meeting the program’s full requirements later. This involved two interim IOC standards: Block 2B for the Marines and the Air Force’s Block 3i.
Gilmore has warned of delays in this process since 2013, because 2B and 3i have consumed time and resources to the detriment of 3F. To stay on schedule, the program allowed 2B to be delivered with “hundreds” of deficiencies, and eliminated tests, including an operational utility evaluation that was to have preceded Marine sea trials last May and—in a recent action—two-thirds of the weapon release events that were planned to support Block 3F. The current Block 3F schedule is not realistic, Gilmore argues. “It could be achieved only by eliminating a significant number of currently planned test points, tripling the rate at which weapons delivery events have historically been conducted, and deferring resolution of significant operational deficiencies to Block 4.” He notes that the latest decision to cut weapon release trials—considered to be the “graduation exercise” in a fighter program—“constitutes a very high risk of failing IOT&E.”
The JPO says that it “recognizes about four months of potential risk” in the Block 3F schedule, that the “removal of test points occurs only after a thorough and disciplined review of what is required to deliver the promised capabilities,” and that “the objective is to deliver full Block 3F capabilities” at the end of SDD. Also, “critical must-fix deficiencies” were remedied before Block 2B was delivered, the JPO says, and “the final determination whether to fix deficiencies immediately, fix them in later increments, or not fix them at all, rests with the warfighters.” (Blocks 2B and 3i are due to be retired after 3F is available.)
But Block 3F is buggy and expected to get worse, Gilmore says, and the schedule does not take account of this. Development of this critical software—which marks the end of the system development and demonstration program and delivery of the capabilities contracted for in 2001—“ends far too early,” with the planned release of Block 3FR8 in mid-2016. “Additional Block 3F releases will clearly be needed to address critical deferred deficiencies and the new discoveries which will inevitably occur between 2016 and the end of developmental testing, as well as the discoveries occurring during operational testing,” Gilmore writes.
The JPO disagrees on the need for more 3F releases, and says that it will be up to the customers to decide which“critical deficiencies” that might emerge during testing must be fixed, most likely in Block 4. “There is ample opportunity to correct deficiencies from Block 3F IOT&E in the early stages of Block 4,” says the JPO, adding that “safety-critical deficiencies will take priority.”
At the root of the problem, Gilmore says, is an incremental software development process. First, Block 2B—used exclusively on a single squadron of Marine Corps F-35Bs—was fielded with “hundreds” of operational deficiencies. Block 3i was then created by rehosting 2B capabilities on new processes, leading to “avionics instabilities and other new problems [and] poor performance during developmental testing.” The JPO acknowledges deficiencies in 3i but says the latest version is being tested with “improved results” and that “future must-fix deficiencies” will be dealt with by porting changes back from 3F. Finally, the JPO chose to develop 3F by adding capabilities incrementally to the deficient 3i software. Block 3F is already “demonstrating poor performance,” Gilmore says, bolstering his prediction that more changes and revisions will be needed.
Another overarching problem concerns the mission data reprogramming laboratory which produces mission data file (MDF) software that allows the F-35’s sensors and processors to identify and display threats and targets. “The lab does not and will not have the required equipment to adequately develop and test the mission data loads” to support the Air Force’s IOC configuration (Block 3i) and IOT&E of Block 3F. This, Gilmore says, is because the JPO has not completed the work needed to order, build and install the specialized equipment that the labs need, “a process that will take at least two years after the equipment is ordered.” Gilmore has been highlighting the slow progress with the labs in reports since 2014: The delays can be traced to holdups in development, which meant that key software and hardware was three years late in being transferred from Lockheed Martin to the government.
The JPO responds by saying that one Block 3i MDF package will be delivered in time for the Air Force IOC objective date (August 2016) and that it has accelerated the development of MDF packages for Block 3F.
Planning for Block 4, the start of the intended rolling upgrade program, also comes in for criticism. For example, there is a four-year gap between the fielding of Block 3FR8 (intended to be the final Block 3 release) and the service entry of Block 4.1. Incremental Block 3 releases will be needed to smooth the transition, Gilmore suggests. The Block 4 plan is at once too aggressive and underresourced, Gilmore writes. The content of 4.1 and 4.2 is due to be finalized in the first half of this year, with development contracts being issued in 2018 while IOT&E of Block 3F is still underway. This, Gilmore says, means that the first Block 4 packages will not fully reflect lessons learned from 3F development. At the same time, however, the Block 4 plan does not “accurately depict the schedule and resources for operational testing.”
Gilmore’s annual report on Pentagon development programs is due within weeks and is likely to include elements of this criticism, as well as recapitulating the DOT&E’s commentary during the year. In July, for example, Gilmore issued a scathing memo on the Marines’ at-sea Operational Test 1 that took place in May.
“The event was not an operational test in either a formal or an informal sense of the term,” Gilmore wrote. “It did not and could not demonstrate that the F-35B is operationally effective or suitable for use in any type of limited combat operation.” OT-1, according to Gilmore, relied on extensive contractor support, did not test weapons or many sensors, and did not use standard support equipment, and public Marine statements included unusual terminology in which, for example, one flight event, from engine start to shutdown, would have been counted as six sorties.
Blocks by the Numbers
Under the revised JSF schedule announced in 2013, there are three operational software blocks leading to the end of the system development and demonstration program.
Block 2B will be used exclusively on a single squadron of Marine Corps F-35Bs. It is hosted on an early processor configuration (Technology Refresh 1, or TR-1). It does not support external weapons or a gun, and includes three internal weapons: the AIM-120C air-to-air missile, the GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munition and the GBU-12 Paveway. IOC was declared in July 2015.
Block 3i has the same functions and weapons as 2B (apart from supporting the 2,000-lb. GBU-31), but is hosted on the current standard TR-2 processor. It is due to reach IOC with the Air Force between August 2016 (the objective date) and December 2016 (the threshold date).
Block 3F includes external weapons and the gun (for all three versions). It is the IOC standard for the U.S. Navy and export customers and is due to be operational between August 2018 (objective) and February 2019 (threshold).
Block 4 is the first of a continuing series of upgrades. Early in 2015, it was announced that Block 4 would be divided into four segments, 4.1 through 4.4. Block 4.1, mostly software, arrives in late 2019, and will include fixes from Block 3F. Block 4.4 is due for IOC in mid-2025. The contents of the first two segments, 4.1 and 4.2, are to be defined by mid-2016.
Testing Chief Warns Of JSF Software Delays
Development of the Block 3F version of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) cannot be completed on the current schedule—by July 31, 2017—without shortcuts that risk failure in the initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) program, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of OT&E (DOT&E). Block 3F is the culmination of the system development and demonstration (SDD) phase and conforms to the requirements set at the start of the program.
A Dec. 11 memorandum from Gilmore to Frank Kendall, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, and Gen. Paul Selva, vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also warns that the program is risking trouble by attempting to define Block 4, the first post-service-entry upgrade, early this year, when Block 3F and its predecessor, Block 3i, are still “problematic” and performing poorly in testing. Also, the program office has yet to order essential equipment for specialized software laboratories that are needed to support operational testing and initial operational capability (IOC), with the result that there will not be enough capacity when it is required.
The JSF Program Office (JPO) acknowledges it has pulled tests out of the program and that each of the software blocks—including Block 3F-—will enter service with deficiencies. In the case of Block 3F, these will have to be remedied as part of Block 4, JPO says, and it will be up to customers to decide whether all the deficiencies need to be fixed and when.
DOT&E GILMORE’S VERDICT ON F-35 SOFTWARE DEMONSTRATIONS
- Block 2F for Marine Corps F-35B IOC in 2015 delivered with “hundreds of deficiencies”
- Block 3i for Air Force F-35A IOC in 2016 “problematic” and performing poorly in development testing
- Block 3F to complete F-35 system development in 2017 “demonstrating poor performance”
- Block 4, first post-service-entry upgrade, too aggressive and under-resourced
Gilmore has warned of delays in this process since 2013, because 2B and 3i have consumed time and resources to the detriment of 3F. To stay on schedule, the program allowed 2B to be delivered with “hundreds” of deficiencies, and eliminated tests, including an operational utility evaluation that was to have preceded Marine sea trials last May and—in a recent action—two-thirds of the weapon release events that were planned to support Block 3F. The current Block 3F schedule is not realistic, Gilmore argues. “It could be achieved only by eliminating a significant number of currently planned test points, tripling the rate at which weapons delivery events have historically been conducted, and deferring resolution of significant operational deficiencies to Block 4.” He notes that the latest decision to cut weapon release trials—considered to be the “graduation exercise” in a fighter program—“constitutes a very high risk of failing IOT&E.”
The JPO says that it “recognizes about four months of potential risk” in the Block 3F schedule, that the “removal of test points occurs only after a thorough and disciplined review of what is required to deliver the promised capabilities,” and that “the objective is to deliver full Block 3F capabilities” at the end of SDD. Also, “critical must-fix deficiencies” were remedied before Block 2B was delivered, the JPO says, and “the final determination whether to fix deficiencies immediately, fix them in later increments, or not fix them at all, rests with the warfighters.” (Blocks 2B and 3i are due to be retired after 3F is available.)
But Block 3F is buggy and expected to get worse, Gilmore says, and the schedule does not take account of this. Development of this critical software—which marks the end of the system development and demonstration program and delivery of the capabilities contracted for in 2001—“ends far too early,” with the planned release of Block 3FR8 in mid-2016. “Additional Block 3F releases will clearly be needed to address critical deferred deficiencies and the new discoveries which will inevitably occur between 2016 and the end of developmental testing, as well as the discoveries occurring during operational testing,” Gilmore writes.
The JPO disagrees on the need for more 3F releases, and says that it will be up to the customers to decide which“critical deficiencies” that might emerge during testing must be fixed, most likely in Block 4. “There is ample opportunity to correct deficiencies from Block 3F IOT&E in the early stages of Block 4,” says the JPO, adding that “safety-critical deficiencies will take priority.”
At the root of the problem, Gilmore says, is an incremental software development process. First, Block 2B—used exclusively on a single squadron of Marine Corps F-35Bs—was fielded with “hundreds” of operational deficiencies. Block 3i was then created by rehosting 2B capabilities on new processes, leading to “avionics instabilities and other new problems [and] poor performance during developmental testing.” The JPO acknowledges deficiencies in 3i but says the latest version is being tested with “improved results” and that “future must-fix deficiencies” will be dealt with by porting changes back from 3F. Finally, the JPO chose to develop 3F by adding capabilities incrementally to the deficient 3i software. Block 3F is already “demonstrating poor performance,” Gilmore says, bolstering his prediction that more changes and revisions will be needed.
Another overarching problem concerns the mission data reprogramming laboratory which produces mission data file (MDF) software that allows the F-35’s sensors and processors to identify and display threats and targets. “The lab does not and will not have the required equipment to adequately develop and test the mission data loads” to support the Air Force’s IOC configuration (Block 3i) and IOT&E of Block 3F. This, Gilmore says, is because the JPO has not completed the work needed to order, build and install the specialized equipment that the labs need, “a process that will take at least two years after the equipment is ordered.” Gilmore has been highlighting the slow progress with the labs in reports since 2014: The delays can be traced to holdups in development, which meant that key software and hardware was three years late in being transferred from Lockheed Martin to the government.
The JPO responds by saying that one Block 3i MDF package will be delivered in time for the Air Force IOC objective date (August 2016) and that it has accelerated the development of MDF packages for Block 3F.
Planning for Block 4, the start of the intended rolling upgrade program, also comes in for criticism. For example, there is a four-year gap between the fielding of Block 3FR8 (intended to be the final Block 3 release) and the service entry of Block 4.1. Incremental Block 3 releases will be needed to smooth the transition, Gilmore suggests. The Block 4 plan is at once too aggressive and underresourced, Gilmore writes. The content of 4.1 and 4.2 is due to be finalized in the first half of this year, with development contracts being issued in 2018 while IOT&E of Block 3F is still underway. This, Gilmore says, means that the first Block 4 packages will not fully reflect lessons learned from 3F development. At the same time, however, the Block 4 plan does not “accurately depict the schedule and resources for operational testing.”
Gilmore’s annual report on Pentagon development programs is due within weeks and is likely to include elements of this criticism, as well as recapitulating the DOT&E’s commentary during the year. In July, for example, Gilmore issued a scathing memo on the Marines’ at-sea Operational Test 1 that took place in May.
“The event was not an operational test in either a formal or an informal sense of the term,” Gilmore wrote. “It did not and could not demonstrate that the F-35B is operationally effective or suitable for use in any type of limited combat operation.” OT-1, according to Gilmore, relied on extensive contractor support, did not test weapons or many sensors, and did not use standard support equipment, and public Marine statements included unusual terminology in which, for example, one flight event, from engine start to shutdown, would have been counted as six sorties.
Blocks by the Numbers
Under the revised JSF schedule announced in 2013, there are three operational software blocks leading to the end of the system development and demonstration program.
Block 2B will be used exclusively on a single squadron of Marine Corps F-35Bs. It is hosted on an early processor configuration (Technology Refresh 1, or TR-1). It does not support external weapons or a gun, and includes three internal weapons: the AIM-120C air-to-air missile, the GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munition and the GBU-12 Paveway. IOC was declared in July 2015.
Block 3i has the same functions and weapons as 2B (apart from supporting the 2,000-lb. GBU-31), but is hosted on the current standard TR-2 processor. It is due to reach IOC with the Air Force between August 2016 (the objective date) and December 2016 (the threshold date).
Block 3F includes external weapons and the gun (for all three versions). It is the IOC standard for the U.S. Navy and export customers and is due to be operational between August 2018 (objective) and February 2019 (threshold).
Block 4 is the first of a continuing series of upgrades. Early in 2015, it was announced that Block 4 would be divided into four segments, 4.1 through 4.4. Block 4.1, mostly software, arrives in late 2019, and will include fixes from Block 3F. Block 4.4 is due for IOC in mid-2025. The contents of the first two segments, 4.1 and 4.2, are to be defined by mid-2016.
Don't worry, A1Bill will be along in a minute to tell us it's all fantastic and that the people quoted in the article don't know what they're talking about. Then everything will be alright.
Note that the full memo is linked in the story. It contains at least one OMG IMHO (as they say on the 'tubez).
Note too (before someone reminds us that Gilmore predicted a slip to Marine IOC, that didn't happen) that the program has stayed on schedule by cutting tests...
JSF Program Ditches Tests To Protect Schedule | Defense content from Aviation Week
... but don't worry, they are doing it responsibly and in cooperation with stakeholders.
It also looks increasingly as if most of Block 4.1 will be fixes to 3F, with no new capabilities until 4.2 in 2021.
Note too (before someone reminds us that Gilmore predicted a slip to Marine IOC, that didn't happen) that the program has stayed on schedule by cutting tests...
JSF Program Ditches Tests To Protect Schedule | Defense content from Aviation Week
... but don't worry, they are doing it responsibly and in cooperation with stakeholders.
It also looks increasingly as if most of Block 4.1 will be fixes to 3F, with no new capabilities until 4.2 in 2021.
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Ahhhh when life was simpler: The British Purchasing Commission stipulated to North American an armament of four .303 in machine guns, the Allison V-1710 liquid-cooled engine, a unit cost of no more than $40,000, and delivery of the first production aircraft by January 1941 The prototype NA-73X was rolled out in September 1940, just 102 days after the order had been placed; it first flew on 26 October 1940, 149 days into the contract. The first Mustang Mk Is entered RAF service in January 1942, the first unit being 26 squadron. Yes it needed to be re-engined – but it was operational.
And that included all the wind tunnel testing of two possible aerofoils resulting in the new laminar-flow wings. It was a mathematically designed aircraft and the wing foil that was to be classified as a "semi-empirical venture" by the British was cleared for adoption on the new design.. So for its day it was high-tech.
And that included all the wind tunnel testing of two possible aerofoils resulting in the new laminar-flow wings. It was a mathematically designed aircraft and the wing foil that was to be classified as a "semi-empirical venture" by the British was cleared for adoption on the new design.. So for its day it was high-tech.
Rhino power wrote:
Well, don't quote me, but I hear on the grapevine that it's something formerly known as Windows 8......
Apologies if this has already been covered but, what software block are UK F-35B's likely to have initially, that is, the ones apparently "on schedule" to enter service in 2018?
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Hmm. I seem to remember being subjected to a virulent campain [yes it's spelt like that for a reason] when I previously highlighted the issues with the all encompassing engineering software.
Well blow me MSOCS, if it ain't happened again!!
Well blow me MSOCS, if it ain't happened again!!
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Flight Global - Fleet-wide F-35 fix targets fuel tank over-pressurisation
On the other hand, Flight also have rather more positive news as well.
F-35 training at Luke AFB gathers pace with 34 jets
On the other hand, Flight also have rather more positive news as well.
F-35 training at Luke AFB gathers pace with 34 jets
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Well I suppose that's one way to try and win a fight.
I am intrigued by the, "enabling close-in platform self-defence and penetration into contested anti-access/area denial environments with little to no impact to payload capacity".
Taking into account that penetration will assume no external pylons/munitions for stealth maintenance, and the small size and capacity of the internal bay (especially on the B), just how small would the MSDM have to be to allow a decent number to be carried - and have no impact on payload?
F-35 fires AIM-9X as Raytheon snags next-gen weapons contract
The US Air Force has for the first time successfully test fired a Raytheon AIM-9X passive infrared missile from a Lockheed Martin F-35A over the Pacific Sea Test Range.According to a statement from Edwards AFB, the 461st Flight Test Squadron’s AF-1 flight sciences aircraft fired the short-range weapon on 12 January at an altitude of 6,000ft.
The test firing moves integration of the AIM-9X forward, with introduction across the F-35 fleet expected in Block 3F in 2017. Block 2B and 3i aircraft carry only the basic complement of GPS- and laser-guided bombs and Raytheon's medium-range AIM-120C. Approval has also been granted by the US Navy for full-rate production of the latest AIM-9X Block II version, adding a new electronics package and datalink for lock-on-after-release engagements.
Meant for close-in kills at high off-boresight angles, the AIM-9X is a heat-seeking alternative to the radar-guided Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM, which is susceptible to advanced electronic countermeasures, such as digital radio frequency memory jammers. The F-35 is designed to carry two AIM-9X missiles on its wings and four AIM-120s internally.
The navy wanted to extend the range of the AIM-9X by 60% under a Block III programme for beyond-visual-range engagements, but the project was cancelled in the fiscal year 2016 budget, with only an “insensitive munitions warhead” side project carried forward.
Separately, under a $14 million contract awarded on 20 January, Raytheon will begin exploring new missiles under a research and development programme called Small Advanced Capability Missile (SACM).
A second project, called Miniature Self-Defense Munition (MSDM), is perhaps more game-changing – giving fighter aircraft the ability to target incoming missiles, like a ballistic missile defence system. The air force has said that these small self-protection munitions could be a bridging capability as it develops 360° laser shields for future fighters and bombers, targeted for rollout in the late 2020s.
“SACM will support affordable, highly lethal, small size and weight ordnance with advanced air frame design and synergistic control capabilities for air dominance, enabling high air-to-air load-out,” the contract notice says. “The MSDM will support miniaturised weapon capabilities for air superiority by enabling close-in platform self-defence and penetration into contested anti-access/area denial environments with little to no impact to payload capacity.”
I am intrigued by the, "enabling close-in platform self-defence and penetration into contested anti-access/area denial environments with little to no impact to payload capacity".
Taking into account that penetration will assume no external pylons/munitions for stealth maintenance, and the small size and capacity of the internal bay (especially on the B), just how small would the MSDM have to be to allow a decent number to be carried - and have no impact on payload?
F-35 fires AIM-9X as Raytheon snags next-gen weapons contract
The US Air Force has for the first time successfully test fired a Raytheon AIM-9X passive infrared missile from a Lockheed Martin F-35A over the Pacific Sea Test Range.According to a statement from Edwards AFB, the 461st Flight Test Squadron’s AF-1 flight sciences aircraft fired the short-range weapon on 12 January at an altitude of 6,000ft.
The test firing moves integration of the AIM-9X forward, with introduction across the F-35 fleet expected in Block 3F in 2017. Block 2B and 3i aircraft carry only the basic complement of GPS- and laser-guided bombs and Raytheon's medium-range AIM-120C. Approval has also been granted by the US Navy for full-rate production of the latest AIM-9X Block II version, adding a new electronics package and datalink for lock-on-after-release engagements.
Meant for close-in kills at high off-boresight angles, the AIM-9X is a heat-seeking alternative to the radar-guided Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM, which is susceptible to advanced electronic countermeasures, such as digital radio frequency memory jammers. The F-35 is designed to carry two AIM-9X missiles on its wings and four AIM-120s internally.
The navy wanted to extend the range of the AIM-9X by 60% under a Block III programme for beyond-visual-range engagements, but the project was cancelled in the fiscal year 2016 budget, with only an “insensitive munitions warhead” side project carried forward.
Separately, under a $14 million contract awarded on 20 January, Raytheon will begin exploring new missiles under a research and development programme called Small Advanced Capability Missile (SACM).
A second project, called Miniature Self-Defense Munition (MSDM), is perhaps more game-changing – giving fighter aircraft the ability to target incoming missiles, like a ballistic missile defence system. The air force has said that these small self-protection munitions could be a bridging capability as it develops 360° laser shields for future fighters and bombers, targeted for rollout in the late 2020s.
“SACM will support affordable, highly lethal, small size and weight ordnance with advanced air frame design and synergistic control capabilities for air dominance, enabling high air-to-air load-out,” the contract notice says. “The MSDM will support miniaturised weapon capabilities for air superiority by enabling close-in platform self-defence and penetration into contested anti-access/area denial environments with little to no impact to payload capacity.”
$14 million is two PowerPoints, coffee and donuts.
But I'm intrigued by the MSDM. I guess it's supposed to defeat all the AAMs that can't home on the F-35, which were launched by the adversary fighters that it shot down BVR before they knew it was there.
But I'm intrigued by the MSDM. I guess it's supposed to defeat all the AAMs that can't home on the F-35, which were launched by the adversary fighters that it shot down BVR before they knew it was there.
Completely wrecks it, Wander. Hence the desire to cram everything inside. External stores are for when the F-35s have killed everything else in the air and all the SAMs on day one (as they call it).