F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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Ken,
Thank you for that. This thread was in danger of slipping into a "Cat calling diatribe".
I have never been known for my diplomacy, as those who know mw will attest!
Can we now (all parties) leave the insults, however guarded, behind and concentrate on the details of this project.
I understand that the F35 is a very polarizing topic, I just hope we can all remain civil.
Thank you for that. This thread was in danger of slipping into a "Cat calling diatribe".
I have never been known for my diplomacy, as those who know mw will attest!
Can we now (all parties) leave the insults, however guarded, behind and concentrate on the details of this project.
I understand that the F35 is a very polarizing topic, I just hope we can all remain civil.
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I contend that the ASTOVL program resulted in McDonnell Douglas being forced to merge with Boeing.
At that time of ASTOVL both P&W’s F119 engine and GE’s F120 engine were in competition also. There were two main propulsion concepts that were submitted. McDonnell Douglas submitted concepts for both gas-coupled lift fan and shaft-coupled lift fan which were both rated as top proposals, while Lockheed submitted a shaft-coupled lift concept. DARPA awarded two contracts, one to McD for the gas-coupled lift system for the F120 and one to Lockheed for the shaft coupled lift fan for the F119. That decision sealed the fate for McD as the F119 was selected to power the JSF and McD was told it would have to include the development cost of the F120 in its JSF cost estimate. As a result McD had to find lower cost alternative lift system and eventually teamed with Northrop who had developed a separate mid-mounted lift engine. The separate engine was considered unacceptable by the Marines.
With the loss of the JSF program, McD was left with no new fighter program and felt it had to merge with Boeing.
At that time of ASTOVL both P&W’s F119 engine and GE’s F120 engine were in competition also. There were two main propulsion concepts that were submitted. McDonnell Douglas submitted concepts for both gas-coupled lift fan and shaft-coupled lift fan which were both rated as top proposals, while Lockheed submitted a shaft-coupled lift concept. DARPA awarded two contracts, one to McD for the gas-coupled lift system for the F120 and one to Lockheed for the shaft coupled lift fan for the F119. That decision sealed the fate for McD as the F119 was selected to power the JSF and McD was told it would have to include the development cost of the F120 in its JSF cost estimate. As a result McD had to find lower cost alternative lift system and eventually teamed with Northrop who had developed a separate mid-mounted lift engine. The separate engine was considered unacceptable by the Marines.
With the loss of the JSF program, McD was left with no new fighter program and felt it had to merge with Boeing.
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t43562,
Yes, I would expect that would be the case. Here are a couple of papers relative to Concurrent Engineering, the first being the development leading to production of the Navy F/A-18 E/F and F414 engine that dates to 1997.
http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td1801/white.pdf
The second US Government report discusses the role of Concurrent Engineering in weapon systems acquisition that dates to 1988. I think there is no rigid model of Concurrent Engineering structure that every company has to follow, but there are certainly some very good control and measurement processes that need inclusion for the overall process to work its best. There must be an ironclad commitment to the process from the organization top down and the people in the process must be the most knowledgeable of the product, processes and technologies required for the program to be successful.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA203615
Is "Concurrent Engineering" a well understood practise in the production of military jets that anyone could be expected to have experience in?
http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td1801/white.pdf
The second US Government report discusses the role of Concurrent Engineering in weapon systems acquisition that dates to 1988. I think there is no rigid model of Concurrent Engineering structure that every company has to follow, but there are certainly some very good control and measurement processes that need inclusion for the overall process to work its best. There must be an ironclad commitment to the process from the organization top down and the people in the process must be the most knowledgeable of the product, processes and technologies required for the program to be successful.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA203615
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F135 engine, 28,000lbf military with a TSFC of .9lb/lb/hr.
F-35B internal fuel, 14,000lbs, likely reduced to 10-12,000lbs when they realize they cannot put GBU-53 in and have to go with the old cheap stuff (GBU-12/38/49/54) lying around in the dump or even newer kit (Brimstone/JAGM/APKWS) which happen to all be forward fire.
Pylon kits cost weight and drag and so a 2,000lb fuel penalty may be generous, especially hot'n'hi, when you consider that gas is also a refrigerant for the extremely hot EHAs and various other heat exchanger goodies.
Flight Idle = 60% IRT. 28 X .6 = 16,800lbf X .9 = 15,120lbs per hour. Twelve thousand pounds divided by two hundred fifty two pounds per minute = 47.61 minutes of flight time. If you assume you need at least 5 minutes of naval reserve at the boat, and 10 minutes over the target area, that's a total of 16 minutes each way.
Sixteen minutes at 400 knots (which is beyond generous for a jet with external stores at flight idle) = 107nm radius of action.
The very notion that the aircraft is going to be useful, even to a beachhead or SPOD seizure mission thus requires the acceptance of the idea that 8 jets delivering 1 mission per hour as a 'detachment' on an LHD is somehow a better investment than the modern equivalent of this-
LCT(R)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...28R%29_459.png
Equipped with Spike-NLOS, Netfires/Jumper or even Hoplite.
The F-35 is not a 440nm machine. Even if you assume a 100% error in my math due to changing cycle effects on TSFC as the throttle is pulled off, it is going to be a 200nm jet, at best.
Add to this the fact that it cannot take off while helicopters are spotted, bringing back casevac and loading second wave assaulters (both more important than CAS to sustaining ops tempo as the prevention of being shoved back into the waves) and that the V-22T and LHA-6 class as 'CVE not LHD' are _unpaid for_. And you have a royal mess.
Because the Marines want to be a replacement Air Force for the Nuclear Navy (having realized the end of SWA meant the end of funding SUW for bush beating wombat hunts while tacair is a goldplate glory hound mission 'all the time') but the Marines cannot figure out how they are going to do that without TWO carriers in their ARG, one a gator freighter and the other an SCS wannabe with all of 25 jets onboard.
Which is to say, each deployment will cost more with the USMC solution to airpower than the USN/CVN equivalent and will be MORE vulnerable to ICD/A2AD because the minidecks have to come that much closer in to deliver effects (barely over the radar horizon if you want to seriously stage an amphibious assault, say 35-50nm in the greenwater).
If this isn't a 'shortfall' I don't know what is because you would NEVER equip an interdictor with a .9 TSFC engine. That overfanned monstrosity is in the jet, sucking fuel and fattening the fuselage, solely because they need the torque generator to run the SDLF lift module.
And with the SDLF and no tanker (and likely no EFT, given how the thing wobbles, sinks and then climbs back up off the Wasp in clean configured videos) the F-35B has less legs than the Harrier II /even accounting for/ the fan water to boost landing thrust.
What a joke.
F-35B internal fuel, 14,000lbs, likely reduced to 10-12,000lbs when they realize they cannot put GBU-53 in and have to go with the old cheap stuff (GBU-12/38/49/54) lying around in the dump or even newer kit (Brimstone/JAGM/APKWS) which happen to all be forward fire.
Pylon kits cost weight and drag and so a 2,000lb fuel penalty may be generous, especially hot'n'hi, when you consider that gas is also a refrigerant for the extremely hot EHAs and various other heat exchanger goodies.
Flight Idle = 60% IRT. 28 X .6 = 16,800lbf X .9 = 15,120lbs per hour. Twelve thousand pounds divided by two hundred fifty two pounds per minute = 47.61 minutes of flight time. If you assume you need at least 5 minutes of naval reserve at the boat, and 10 minutes over the target area, that's a total of 16 minutes each way.
Sixteen minutes at 400 knots (which is beyond generous for a jet with external stores at flight idle) = 107nm radius of action.
The very notion that the aircraft is going to be useful, even to a beachhead or SPOD seizure mission thus requires the acceptance of the idea that 8 jets delivering 1 mission per hour as a 'detachment' on an LHD is somehow a better investment than the modern equivalent of this-
LCT(R)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped...28R%29_459.png
Equipped with Spike-NLOS, Netfires/Jumper or even Hoplite.
The F-35 is not a 440nm machine. Even if you assume a 100% error in my math due to changing cycle effects on TSFC as the throttle is pulled off, it is going to be a 200nm jet, at best.
Add to this the fact that it cannot take off while helicopters are spotted, bringing back casevac and loading second wave assaulters (both more important than CAS to sustaining ops tempo as the prevention of being shoved back into the waves) and that the V-22T and LHA-6 class as 'CVE not LHD' are _unpaid for_. And you have a royal mess.
Because the Marines want to be a replacement Air Force for the Nuclear Navy (having realized the end of SWA meant the end of funding SUW for bush beating wombat hunts while tacair is a goldplate glory hound mission 'all the time') but the Marines cannot figure out how they are going to do that without TWO carriers in their ARG, one a gator freighter and the other an SCS wannabe with all of 25 jets onboard.
Which is to say, each deployment will cost more with the USMC solution to airpower than the USN/CVN equivalent and will be MORE vulnerable to ICD/A2AD because the minidecks have to come that much closer in to deliver effects (barely over the radar horizon if you want to seriously stage an amphibious assault, say 35-50nm in the greenwater).
If this isn't a 'shortfall' I don't know what is because you would NEVER equip an interdictor with a .9 TSFC engine. That overfanned monstrosity is in the jet, sucking fuel and fattening the fuselage, solely because they need the torque generator to run the SDLF lift module.
And with the SDLF and no tanker (and likely no EFT, given how the thing wobbles, sinks and then climbs back up off the Wasp in clean configured videos) the F-35B has less legs than the Harrier II /even accounting for/ the fan water to boost landing thrust.
What a joke.
I am deeply suspicious of any aircraft which needs a $400K pilot helmet....
I wonder how much in-life servicing these expensive helmets will require.
As for believing Lockheed-Martin, I recall a Brit on the C-130J programme resigning in disgust from a well-paid job with L-M, "Because I'm not prepared to carry on telling lies for you lot!", or so we were told...
View manufacturers' statements with caution!
I wonder how much in-life servicing these expensive helmets will require.
As for believing Lockheed-Martin, I recall a Brit on the C-130J programme resigning in disgust from a well-paid job with L-M, "Because I'm not prepared to carry on telling lies for you lot!", or so we were told...
View manufacturers' statements with caution!
Glaar, you run the risk of making me look like an optimist. We do know that the Marine combat radius spec is all high-altitude - see this chart, old as it is:
F-35KPP20070402.jpg Photo by SpudmanWP | Photobucket
We do know that the F-35B has about the same internal fuel fraction as most other FJ types (around 0.3).
The status of drop tanks has been a little uncertain. They were shown in early briefs but were certainly dropped for the F-35A service-entry configuration around 2007. However, Israel indicated that they wanted tanks, and Elbit's Cyclone subsidiary had a design - but that's gone quiet lately.
There's been no recent visible activity regarding tanks for the F-35B, but FWIW, there is this:
F-35 external fuel tanks.... ? FighterControl ? Home to the Military Aviation Enthusiast
F-35KPP20070402.jpg Photo by SpudmanWP | Photobucket
We do know that the F-35B has about the same internal fuel fraction as most other FJ types (around 0.3).
The status of drop tanks has been a little uncertain. They were shown in early briefs but were certainly dropped for the F-35A service-entry configuration around 2007. However, Israel indicated that they wanted tanks, and Elbit's Cyclone subsidiary had a design - but that's gone quiet lately.
There's been no recent visible activity regarding tanks for the F-35B, but FWIW, there is this:
F-35 external fuel tanks.... ? FighterControl ? Home to the Military Aviation Enthusiast
To be fair, Nitro, some of the high-end "PC games" can crunch data as fast and in much the same way as military-grade sims of a couple of decades ago, and I know of at least one defense company that has used H3MilSim quite seriously. One advantage is that you can perform a reasonable campaign-level sim and avoid the huge secret-squirrel complications that arise at a national level.
It does all come down to open sources and some educated guesswork - but then, that's what you have on at least one side, unless you are very high in the secret squirrel tree.
It does all come down to open sources and some educated guesswork - but then, that's what you have on at least one side, unless you are very high in the secret squirrel tree.
Re Sims. If it was me, I'd want to see how the results changed when you perturbed the parameters slightly. You'd want to know if the outcome was very dependent on any of the variables that you've had to make guesses about.
Speaking of Command, BAE has just signed a deal with the developers.
Matrix Games - Slitherine and BAE Systems to start collaboration
Matrix Games - Slitherine and BAE Systems to start collaboration
The sim on question is available for purchase on the Internet. It is a very interesting game and allows the player to try all sorts of tactics in all sorts of environments with all sorts of aircraft and all sorts of weapons, etc, etc. It costs about €80 and is a beautifully designed piece of software.
It models the aerodynamic performance (not the aerodynamics) of the aircraft, their fuel, number of weapons and such.
It models missile flyouts.
It models loads of stuff and makes me think I could spend a few hours on a rainy Sunday afternoon running loads of engagements against my favourite enemies with a glass of wine in my hand.
IT DOES NOT model the full 3D RCS of all players dynamically (or in any way really, given the availability of such data, not to mention their sensitivity). It does not model missile datalink during flyout, exhaust plume interference, differences between skid-to-turn and Roll-to-turn, command link roll off due to the position of the missile relative to radar scan, anaprop..... And that's just stuff during post launch command and guidance.
So what assumptions does the simulation make? A single RCS figure for and aircraft based on "it's the size of a marble"? I don't know. But I can promise you all the dynamics of an active, long range, radar and command guided missile are NOT modelled in this simulation.
So how credible is it? If you are simulating this type of engagement with the above limitations, not very.
It models the aerodynamic performance (not the aerodynamics) of the aircraft, their fuel, number of weapons and such.
It models missile flyouts.
It models loads of stuff and makes me think I could spend a few hours on a rainy Sunday afternoon running loads of engagements against my favourite enemies with a glass of wine in my hand.
IT DOES NOT model the full 3D RCS of all players dynamically (or in any way really, given the availability of such data, not to mention their sensitivity). It does not model missile datalink during flyout, exhaust plume interference, differences between skid-to-turn and Roll-to-turn, command link roll off due to the position of the missile relative to radar scan, anaprop..... And that's just stuff during post launch command and guidance.
So what assumptions does the simulation make? A single RCS figure for and aircraft based on "it's the size of a marble"? I don't know. But I can promise you all the dynamics of an active, long range, radar and command guided missile are NOT modelled in this simulation.
So how credible is it? If you are simulating this type of engagement with the above limitations, not very.
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Simulation indeed..
Indeed, CM.
I noticed, from the simulation screen shot, that those F-35 were to return to HMS QE2?
I wonder, in that simulation scenario, who would have got there first, those F-35 or a swarm of BrahMos...
I noticed, from the simulation screen shot, that those F-35 were to return to HMS QE2?
I wonder, in that simulation scenario, who would have got there first, those F-35 or a swarm of BrahMos...
Ken and SSSETOWTF,
Personally I have a toe in the against camp. I don't doubt the majority of what you say- and I'm sure the aircraft will do a good job for a while- If the stealth, networking and sensors work as advertised it will be a "game changer"
But what I can't shake is the thought that the energy performance of the aircraft is not what it should be - and this comes directly from the compromises made to make a common VSTOL version.
If I had had the chance of playing god and was program director I would have:
1) Killed the B at birth and recommended a separate lower tech VSTOL machine for the Marines
2) improved the air/air capability of the aircraft - at the expense of its air/ground capability if necessary.
Would you have produced the 3 versions just as they are today or how would you have changed the specs?
I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on this?
Cheers
TR
Personally I have a toe in the against camp. I don't doubt the majority of what you say- and I'm sure the aircraft will do a good job for a while- If the stealth, networking and sensors work as advertised it will be a "game changer"
But what I can't shake is the thought that the energy performance of the aircraft is not what it should be - and this comes directly from the compromises made to make a common VSTOL version.
If I had had the chance of playing god and was program director I would have:
1) Killed the B at birth and recommended a separate lower tech VSTOL machine for the Marines
2) improved the air/air capability of the aircraft - at the expense of its air/ground capability if necessary.
Would you have produced the 3 versions just as they are today or how would you have changed the specs?
I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on this?
Cheers
TR
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Would you have produced the 3 versions just as they are today or how would you have changed the specs?
But it's rather easy to say what might have been. And totally pointless. It seems to me the point now is so to focus an what we have and make the most of it. And by that I mean what we really have, and not the cripple that a few folks insist we have.
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Yes, I would expect that would be the case. Here are a couple of papers relative to Concurrent Engineering, the first being the development leading to production of the Navy F/A-18 E/F and F414 engine that dates to 1997.
The JSF on the other hand used NOTHING that was fully developed, much less mature. Not even such "simple" things like comm radios and data links were developed, never mind mature. Even its APG-81 radar was based on the APG-77 which was still not fully developed when JSF became the F-35 program. Concurrent Engineering is very high risk when developing a new technology airframe, never mind when simulataneously developing a new tech airframe, new engine, new stealth tech, and new systems.
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Perhaps I can add a couple of observations that would assist the discussion.
First is the presumed role of 'Congress'. In my direct experience in DC, the people pushing the JSF concept were not 'Congress' - is was the Office of the Secretary for Defense, known as OSD. This is essentially the 'Centre' staff for the Pentagon, and they had, and still have, real power in the area of programme decisions and even more importantly, budgeting. In truth, Congress don't have the depth of technical analysis required to reliably develop their own programme assessments - they rely heavily on what they get from OSD via the Oval Office.
The concepts for JAST and JSF were, in large part, developed within and promoted by OSD. And the main driver for this push was a perception that trying to go forward with single service programmes for large, twin engined tactical aircraft (mostly with two seats) was always going to be unaffordable. I heard senior OSD staff refer to the F-22 as a 'failed program', and looking at the original versus actual ISD and costs for the aircraft, I couldn't disagree. (I would add that the F-22 is (in my view) a great design and a fabulous performing aircraft - but unaffordable, even for the USAF).
OSD, USAF and USN technical assessments, based on ASTOVL and many other test programmes, was that engine and airframe technology wasn't capable of producing a viable twin engined, two seat, STOVL airframe. As a result, OSD staffs prepared the briefs that pushed for a single engined, single seat, aircraft, using STOVL as the prime reason for that configuration. All these years on, some posting on this thread will disagree with that assessment. All I can say is that is what I saw happen.
OSD, the USAF and the USN had also studied (and modelled at some length) the relative impacts of airframe and avionics systems on combat efficiency. The USMC had also seen what the RN were doing in the mid 90s with the Sea Harrier FA2 - a badly limited airframe given a massive combat efficiency boost via an excellent radar/missile combination. All of that fed into the early iterations of what eventually became the JSF requirements set. This has led to the sort of aircraft that has emerged from the programme. Again, OSD people were key players in this process.
Second, concurrent engineering. I was at Fort Worth in the early days of the programme, and I didn't detect any huge focus on 'concurrency'. I did pick up that the programme had set itself some incredibly ambitious goals (and dates) for freezing the airframe and systems design. In part, this optimism was based on the depth of the X-35 programme, and the other precursor technology programmes the US had carried out. Finally (and in hindsight mistakenly) there was an assumption that new CAD systems would give LM's design team a much higher 'right first time' figure.
All that unravelled in 2004, when the customer told LM that the aircraft was badly overweight. What followed was a huge structural redesign, but the schedule screws were kept firmly 'on' - my own assessment of what followed( and that's all it is) is that LM were simply not able to get the aircraft to the level of design maturity (stability) in the time allotted. I'd also add that LM had some weaknesses in the slightly arcane areas of configuration control and change management. (I'd further add that they were by no means alone in this - BAES had learned some hard lessons on Typhoon by this time).
In my view, concurrency was something that happened to the programme, but was not planned. With hindsight, they should have slowed the move to production more than they did. But then LM Fort Worth are an outfit who are dominated by their production people. (again, my own view).
The key point (at least in my view) is that the US has 'bet the farm' on the F-35. It will be made to work, and (again my own view) it will be a very successful aircraft, mainly due to its highly advanced sensors, communications, displays and weapons systems - things that (for obvious reasons) don't often get very detailed attention on this forum.
I hope these musings help a little - and I very much endorse the pleas from other (better) contributors for civility and patience. None of us know it all. Some of us know a little. Some know a lot (not me, by the way). On an open forum, we all get a chance to contribute. We can all learn. Bad manners and sarcastic points scoring will deter those (like me) who just try to help. Let's keep it nice, shall we?
Best Regards as ever those who are working the hard stuff in the free world under the scrutiny of a free press,
Engines
First is the presumed role of 'Congress'. In my direct experience in DC, the people pushing the JSF concept were not 'Congress' - is was the Office of the Secretary for Defense, known as OSD. This is essentially the 'Centre' staff for the Pentagon, and they had, and still have, real power in the area of programme decisions and even more importantly, budgeting. In truth, Congress don't have the depth of technical analysis required to reliably develop their own programme assessments - they rely heavily on what they get from OSD via the Oval Office.
The concepts for JAST and JSF were, in large part, developed within and promoted by OSD. And the main driver for this push was a perception that trying to go forward with single service programmes for large, twin engined tactical aircraft (mostly with two seats) was always going to be unaffordable. I heard senior OSD staff refer to the F-22 as a 'failed program', and looking at the original versus actual ISD and costs for the aircraft, I couldn't disagree. (I would add that the F-22 is (in my view) a great design and a fabulous performing aircraft - but unaffordable, even for the USAF).
OSD, USAF and USN technical assessments, based on ASTOVL and many other test programmes, was that engine and airframe technology wasn't capable of producing a viable twin engined, two seat, STOVL airframe. As a result, OSD staffs prepared the briefs that pushed for a single engined, single seat, aircraft, using STOVL as the prime reason for that configuration. All these years on, some posting on this thread will disagree with that assessment. All I can say is that is what I saw happen.
OSD, the USAF and the USN had also studied (and modelled at some length) the relative impacts of airframe and avionics systems on combat efficiency. The USMC had also seen what the RN were doing in the mid 90s with the Sea Harrier FA2 - a badly limited airframe given a massive combat efficiency boost via an excellent radar/missile combination. All of that fed into the early iterations of what eventually became the JSF requirements set. This has led to the sort of aircraft that has emerged from the programme. Again, OSD people were key players in this process.
Second, concurrent engineering. I was at Fort Worth in the early days of the programme, and I didn't detect any huge focus on 'concurrency'. I did pick up that the programme had set itself some incredibly ambitious goals (and dates) for freezing the airframe and systems design. In part, this optimism was based on the depth of the X-35 programme, and the other precursor technology programmes the US had carried out. Finally (and in hindsight mistakenly) there was an assumption that new CAD systems would give LM's design team a much higher 'right first time' figure.
All that unravelled in 2004, when the customer told LM that the aircraft was badly overweight. What followed was a huge structural redesign, but the schedule screws were kept firmly 'on' - my own assessment of what followed( and that's all it is) is that LM were simply not able to get the aircraft to the level of design maturity (stability) in the time allotted. I'd also add that LM had some weaknesses in the slightly arcane areas of configuration control and change management. (I'd further add that they were by no means alone in this - BAES had learned some hard lessons on Typhoon by this time).
In my view, concurrency was something that happened to the programme, but was not planned. With hindsight, they should have slowed the move to production more than they did. But then LM Fort Worth are an outfit who are dominated by their production people. (again, my own view).
The key point (at least in my view) is that the US has 'bet the farm' on the F-35. It will be made to work, and (again my own view) it will be a very successful aircraft, mainly due to its highly advanced sensors, communications, displays and weapons systems - things that (for obvious reasons) don't often get very detailed attention on this forum.
I hope these musings help a little - and I very much endorse the pleas from other (better) contributors for civility and patience. None of us know it all. Some of us know a little. Some know a lot (not me, by the way). On an open forum, we all get a chance to contribute. We can all learn. Bad manners and sarcastic points scoring will deter those (like me) who just try to help. Let's keep it nice, shall we?
Best Regards as ever those who are working the hard stuff in the free world under the scrutiny of a free press,
Engines
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KenV,
I would like to point out a couple of things:
The development of the F-18 E/F did come from the earlier F-18 airframes. But, there were changes. The length increased 4 feet, the height by a 1 foot and the wing span by 4 feet (a new wing). The maximum gross take off weight increased by 14,100 pounds and the range increased by 200 miles. This is from the US Navy Fact File. Also, from the file:
This was written in 2009. There always are some problems but seemingly no serious snags on the F-18 E/F program.
As far as the engines are concerned, the F414 is a derivative engine of the F404 but with significant changes to gain an extra 4,300 pounds of thrust per engine.
One of the changes made in the F414 engines was to use one piece blisks in the LP compressor, similar to what P&W did on the F135 engines to save weight.
The F135 engine is a derivative engine from the F119 engine used on the F-22. The F135 engine is not a completely new from scratch engine. There are differences in the rear end due to afterburner configurations and total engine length due to engine placement in the airframe. The F135 engine is about 135 pounds heavier than the F119 engine due to the addition of a second stage added to the LP turbine. The F135 was designed to provide 8,000 pounds additional thrust compared to the F119 engine. So we can discuss whether or not the F119 engine was/is mature or not, but it seems to be performing pretty well with no serious snags in terms of problems.
I would like to point out a couple of things:
The development of the F-18 E/F did come from the earlier F-18 airframes. But, there were changes. The length increased 4 feet, the height by a 1 foot and the wing span by 4 feet (a new wing). The maximum gross take off weight increased by 14,100 pounds and the range increased by 200 miles. This is from the US Navy Fact File. Also, from the file:
The F/A-18 E/F acquisition program was an unparalleled success. The aircraft emerged from Engineering and Manufacturing Development meeting all of its performance requirements on cost, on schedule and 400 pounds under weight. All of this was verified in Operational Verification testing, the final exam, passing with flying colors receiving the highest possible endorsement.
The first operational cruise of Super Hornet, F/A-18 E, was with VFA-115 onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) on July 24, 2002, and saw initial combat action on Nov. 6, 2002, when they participated in a strike on hostile targets in the "no-fly" zone in Iraq.
The first operational cruise of Super Hornet, F/A-18 E, was with VFA-115 onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) on July 24, 2002, and saw initial combat action on Nov. 6, 2002, when they participated in a strike on hostile targets in the "no-fly" zone in Iraq.
As far as the engines are concerned, the F414 is a derivative engine of the F404 but with significant changes to gain an extra 4,300 pounds of thrust per engine.
One of the changes made in the F414 engines was to use one piece blisks in the LP compressor, similar to what P&W did on the F135 engines to save weight.
The F135 engine is a derivative engine from the F119 engine used on the F-22. The F135 engine is not a completely new from scratch engine. There are differences in the rear end due to afterburner configurations and total engine length due to engine placement in the airframe. The F135 engine is about 135 pounds heavier than the F119 engine due to the addition of a second stage added to the LP turbine. The F135 was designed to provide 8,000 pounds additional thrust compared to the F119 engine. So we can discuss whether or not the F119 engine was/is mature or not, but it seems to be performing pretty well with no serious snags in terms of problems.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The key point (at least in my view) is that the US has 'bet the farm' on the F-35. It will be made to work, and (again my own view) it will be a very successful aircraft, mainly due to its highly advanced.... communications,
I could go on, and the problem is similar to that of the F-22 which prevented it being deployed on joint ops for decades ( and the 30 year saga of rolling out L16 etc). But to boast about it as a success.....
Very accurate post, Engines.
By the way, I was rooting around in the 'tubez the other day and found this:
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA292094
It also locates key decisions (including the single engine) within the OSD. However, one antecedent that is easy to overlook receives little attention in this document: the export angle.
Back in 1987, I recall, Weinberger memoed the Navy and AF to the effect that their new stealth aircraft (ATF, NATF, ATA) would all be too costly and too classified to replace the Viper and Hornet on the export market. That kicked off a series of studies that led to the Japanese F-2 and the Super Hornet... But neither was really expected to be the full replacement. That became part of the JAST plan.
By the way, I was rooting around in the 'tubez the other day and found this:
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA292094
It also locates key decisions (including the single engine) within the OSD. However, one antecedent that is easy to overlook receives little attention in this document: the export angle.
Back in 1987, I recall, Weinberger memoed the Navy and AF to the effect that their new stealth aircraft (ATF, NATF, ATA) would all be too costly and too classified to replace the Viper and Hornet on the export market. That kicked off a series of studies that led to the Japanese F-2 and the Super Hornet... But neither was really expected to be the full replacement. That became part of the JAST plan.
