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F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

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F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

Old 1st May 2015, 15:33
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Originally Posted by Turbine D
Neat how they have separated out the engine from the aircraft when it comes to cost divulgence. Add in the engine and total package cost is closer to $120 million. Hopefully the automobile folks won't pickup on this pricing technique.
Aye. The separation of the engine seems to be a systemic thing that goes back a few decades. Might be due to the modularity of systems, not sure.
I do know that during a mishap investigation in the 80's we were dealing with an engine replacement (in flight fire) that cost of the engine wasn't figured into the "Is it a class A, B, or C" mishap, only the cost of repairing the skin/airframe components. The engine was treated as a separate entity.

I am with you on the "they are playing games with this" angle.
The cost to get the weapons system as whole has to include the engine, since without it the thing won't fly.
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Old 1st May 2015, 18:12
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In the "dear dead days beyond recall" , we used to demand/return airframe and engine as separate items from/to RAF Stores.

As if that wasn't inviting enough trouble, (2xNumber of Pots) spark plugs were on Inventory as separate entities, too.

Keeping the Squadron Inventory up to date was great fun (so long as you weren't the Holder).

D.
 
Old 1st May 2015, 19:48
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Interesting to see the VTOL engine is almost twice as reliable as the CTOL engine. Counter intuitive. I wonder why that is.
Statistics. Ratio of one airframe type to the other.
Nope; of the first 100 F-35's delivered by 2013, 44 were the A and 42 the B.

Besides that, if it was a down to a small sample size the noise would be like the start of the program, up and down.

The B engine really must be much more reliable than the A model.
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Old 1st May 2015, 19:56
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The flight regime of B is less extreme than the A.
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Old 1st May 2015, 20:07
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I may be mistaken, but aren't engines classified as GFE (Government Furnished Equipment) at least in American military procurement programs?
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Old 1st May 2015, 20:40
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Turbine, JF, Glad, Others,

Firstly, my apologies for the gap in posting - I've been on foreign travel, catching up on all the holidays I never got to do when I was working. The other reason is that I've been reading the two reports (DODIG and GAO) that have sparked off the recent thread activity.

Usual disclaimer - I've been off the F-35 programme for some time, and I have no special access, so this reply is based on 'best guess' and informed opinion'.

A common thread across the two reports is the engine, so I'll address those issues.

DODIG Report:

In the early days of the JSF project, the aim was to go for a more streamlined and less intrusive way of procuring military kit in the USA. The old compliance systems tied up literally thousands of staff reading papers, checking lists, writing specs that couldn't be complied with, and getting contractors to spend millions on mountains of paper trying to comply with a huge list of requirements.

The idea was to try to put the onus on the contractors to do the job as best they saw fit, while keeping the key requirements of performance, safety and cost in place. (I was told this lot by a fairly senior JPO type some years back).

This report reads to me as if the JPO have fallen squarely between two stools, and by trying this 'lighter' approach have not held P&W down to the letter of the contract, or in some cases, haven't reflected the full extent of DoD regulations into the contract. Some of the omissions the report picks up are frankly surprising, especially the lack of a dedicated Quality Plan for the F135 engine. That's a basic building block of any contact I was involved in, but I have seen recent MOD DE&S contracts with US companies opt for the 'generic' type of plan that is reported here.

I do note that this report is not about the engine's quality 'per se', but about the systems being used to control and manage the quality and any risks in achieving the required quality. The only 'effect' I could find in the report was the failure by P&W workers to wear goggles.

But I don't want to even try to sugar coat this. The findings, including of out of calibration test kit and FOD in the final assembly area are bad news. These are basic issues that have to be put right. This isn't a good report, and I'd expect some JPO staff to carry the can for it.

GAO Report:

The GAO has, for some time, majored on two key issues' with the JSF/F-35 programme. The first was insufficient technical maturity (or excessive technical risk) at the start of the programme. The second was excessive 'concurrency' (overlap) between the development phase and the production phase.

My view is that GAO have good points here - LM certainly underestimated the technical risk associated with designing a powered lift aircraft, especially the risks associated with designing a low weight but rugged airframe with lots of big holes in it. They also underestimated the risks involved in stuffing an LO aircraft with a huge number of mission critical systems. That said, I would offer the thought that designers have to take risks to achieve the improvements in performance demanded by customers.

On concurrency, GAO have a valid point, but a degree of concurrency is inevitable in any real combat aircraft programme to meet real world schedules. LM's problem (and the JPO's) was that they thought that the X-35 programme had delivered a design that could be easily translated into a production aircraft. It hadn't, and that mistake led LM to assume very optimistic dates for 'design freeze'. They missed those dates by a mile, and ended up with a massive list of changes to incorporate into LRIP aircraft.

Turbine's list is interesting - it looks quite old, some items on there date from around 2003. The thing I would offer is that downstream change is inevitable on any aircraft project, and lots of it. It's engineer s**t, and needs to be handled in an organised and methodical (i.e. boring) way. LM didn't do that, and ended up playing 'catch up' late in the game. As I've often posted, life isn't perfect, designs aren't perfect, and stuff happens. What matters is how well you handle the stuff.

Engine Issues:

The headline is the 'poor reliability' of the F135. Again, here I feel that the F-35 are being held hostage to over optimistic promises. The reliability figures are certainly well below the forecast curve, but quite honestly I've seen far worse figures for far less advanced engines at a similar state of entry to service. (RR gem and RB199 spring easily to mind).

That doesn't make the F135 any better, but i do think it puts it in some context. These engines are fiendishly hard to design and make. They are at the very cutting edge of technology, and being worked hard. Again, stuff will happen. On the F135, stuff is happening. My guess is that they will work the issues and get the figures into line. But it will be hard. (By the way, I have NO idea why the STOVL engine is performing better than the CTOL).

Having looked again at the graph in the GAO report, and done some searching on the Net, I'm not sure that there is a strong link between declared F135 reliability and the cancellation of the F136. The F136 was effectively stopped in July 2011, and fully stopped in Dec 11. The GAO graph shows a jump in reliability in early 12, followed by a major fall in late 12.

Second engine cancellation - my own views, informed by some first hand knowledge while in DC. The F136 was under strong attack from 2005 onwards, mainly by Congress, who were looking for cost savings. The DoD were divided on the issue - the technocrats who ran engine tech programmes reckoned the F135 was great, while USAF and USN programme managers who were scarred by the 1970s PW100 saga wanted the second engine.

The Uk Govt and MoD were, in my view, sadly deficient in not pushing for the F136 to continue. The US Government expected them to push, and were amazed when they didn't. Again my view - F136 would have given business to RR, helped export more F-35s, and provide an engine with more thrust and a much better compressor.

Result was an open target for Congress, no push from DoD or JPO, and help from the other nation involved, UK, arrived far too late to make a difference. The rest is history.

Hope this lot helps a little, best regards as ever to those running the numbers again, and again , and again, and again, and again, and.....

Engines
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Old 2nd May 2015, 02:46
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Outstanding insight as always Engines.


And yes, the F135 is Govt Furnished Equipment, and therefore cannot be factored into the aircraft's unit cost ex-LM.


Shoulda stuck with the F136 which showed considerably more (bench) power and growth potential.
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Old 2nd May 2015, 07:32
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Having looked again at the graph in the GAO report, and done some searching on the Net, I'm not sure that there is a strong link between declared F135 reliability and the cancellation of the F136. The F136 was effectively stopped in July 2011, and fully stopped in Dec 11. The GAO graph shows a jump in reliability in early 12, followed by a major fall in late 12.
Lag between production and in service use. The spike would have been with the last engines produced in the final push to get the F136 cancelled. The stats thereafter with engines manufactured after the cut off.....
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Old 2nd May 2015, 07:43
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ORAC,

Honestly, and with respect, i really do think you might be lining events up and seeing patterns that aren't there.

The JPO were, by around 2008/9, ready to can the second engine. The full costs of the redesign in 2004/5 were coming in, as were the real software development costs, and Congress had already tried to get the second engine canned. On the political side, both P&W and GE had well organised and very effective teams lobbying Congress. Steady production of F135 engines wasn't, as far as I saw, a factor in canning the F136. it was a pure budget drill, and in the end driven more by the DoD and the politicians than by P&W.

I don't know the details behind the reliability graphs, and I honestly can't explain the large 'spike' improvement in 2012, or the subsequent drop. I'd be interested to see what the graphs looked like before 2012 - I know that these figures were being closely watched by the JPO as well as the rest of the DoD.

Like I said, I won't even try to sugar coat these reports - the figures are poor and will need to be improved. That said, I've seen at least two, possibly three, UK aircraft programmes that showed similar trends.

Best regards as ever to those tendin' the engine'

Engines
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Old 2nd May 2015, 08:06
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IIRC it took the Saudi order and cash to sort out the RB199.

Aimed at the JPO, not Engines!!!!

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Old 2nd May 2015, 08:52
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ORAC,

True on the impact of the Saudi order - RB199 was a very sick puppy for a long time. I remember being ordered in 1994 to remove 25% of RN funds from Sea Harrier Pegasus engine support (already very very taut) to divert funds to RB199. We were promised a repayment the following year from RAF funds. (Just to set the record straight, we weren't being singled out - as I remember, similar demands were made on just about every aircraft engine support budget at the time).

Still waiting....

Great cartoon - made me larf. But I'd ask PPruners not to be too hard on the JPO al the time - they have got a lot of things right, and have been subject to a level of political and public oversight that would have crushed any DE&S PT by now. My dealings with them at Fort Worth were generally marked by mutual respect and lots of intelligent hard work from DC.

Best regards as ever to all those making a difference

Engines
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Old 2nd May 2015, 09:31
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Originally Posted by Engines
I'd ask PPruners not to be too hard on the JPO al the time - they...have been subject to a level of political and public oversight that would have crushed any DE&S PT by now
With all due respect, how do you think JPO would be traveling right now without the oversight? It seems to me that it's the only thing stopping the whole project going completely off the rails.

I imagine that people immersed in projects like this tend to forget who is actually paying the bills sometimes..
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Old 2nd May 2015, 10:52
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Thanks Engines, that was a succinct write up.

Having worked on "final assembly" lines I can understand the alarm over the FOD issues but the process itself WILL generate FOD. It's the need for it to be addressed immediately during the process along with the time and resources made available that so many "managers" just don't get IMHO....
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Old 2nd May 2015, 11:45
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Glad,

Thank you. You are bang on the money there. FOD is certainly generated on traditional airframe final assembly lines, but having seen and worked around a number of US and UK examples, I'd say that overall US lines tended to be cleaner and more FOD free. There were also big variations between UK companies.

One measure that I know helped was having assembly jigs and fixtures equipped with built in vacuum cleaners and FOD bins so that locking wire cut off and swarf could be safely removed as it was generated. I once tried to get this idea installed on a UK assembly line, only to be told that it would cause a strike as only union approved cleaners could operate vacuum cleaners.

Engine final assembly lines should, in my view, be absolutely FOD free. Unless locking wire is being used (rare these days) there should be NO material left over from assembly, and the place should be surgically clean. I was appalled to see that a UK engine assembly line (RR East Kilbride) had open bins of nuts and bolts next to the Pegasus assembly line, with no control over how many were used. Plus scarf and locking wire scrunching under our feet. Both RAF and RN assembly lines used 'kit control', where the right number of nuts and bolts were issued to build teams when required, and no additional items were issued without a very good explanation.

When challenged, RR's explanation as that FOD control 'wasn't as important', as they had a just had the MoD pay for a new stand to turn the engines over and listen for FOD. Gawd.

Hempy, I can absolutely assure you that the JPO know who is paying the bills. This is a massive and highly complex project, not helped by the fact that it has to serve two customers (USAF and USN/USMC) who have very different views on how this aircraft is to enter service and be supported. Add in three variants, a good few export customers, and you should get an idea of the challenges they face.

Yes, I know that this is what they are supposed to be doing, and it's what they planned - but as I've often posted, unexpected stuff happens, and mistakes get made. The JPO has had excellent leaders, and some less than excellent - for what it's worth. I think Bogdan's doing a good job.

The really onerous oversight they are subjected to is that from Congress and organisations like the GAO. I'd be more than happy to see a similar level of attention paid to UK defence projects, plus a similarly informed defence press. It might help stop some of the really epic fails the UK Armed Forces have had to put up with. Sadly, most defence reporting in this country doesn't get much past the 'Beano' level.

Best regards as ever to those actually cleaning up the FOD

Engines
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Old 2nd May 2015, 12:29
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Engines -- LM certainly underestimated the technical risk associated with designing a powered lift aircraft, especially the risks associated with designing a low weight but rugged airframe with lots of big holes in it. They also underestimated the risks involved in stuffing an LO aircraft with a huge number of mission critical systems. That said, I would offer the thought that designers have to take risks to achieve the improvements in performance demanded by customers.
I believe therein lies the issue with many new, technically challenging, military programs. The big issue is the government’s ability to properly evaluate the technical proposals presented by the contractors.

For a short time I was one of the competing programs and had a chance to see the some of the interaction between the government technical folks and the contractor’s engineers. One of the issues was the relationship between the Air Forces technology development arm and the proposal evaluation. For example, at the time of the JSF selection process, the engineers from Wright-Patterson were heavily into developing hydro-electric actuators. Our design engineers thought that the maturity of the design for those actuators were too high of a risk, however, come proposal time, some of the same engineers from the Air Force technology development side were part of the proposal evaluation. They had a vested interest in seeing hydro-electric actuators on this aircraft and took issue with our risk evaluation.

As with many programs, the seeds of future problems can be traced to the technical proposal evaluations.
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Old 2nd May 2015, 15:41
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Bevo,

Thanks for coming back, and with an excellent input.

Yes, the USAF were very heavily involved with hydro-electric actuators (or electro-hydrostatic actuators (EHAs)) via the F-16 'AFTE' trials, and certainly had a vested interest in getting 'their' technology on to the F-35.

The sums seemed to show very good through life advantages, but as the F-35 programme developed some of the integration drawbacks manifested themselves. Heat dissipation was a big issue - on conventional hydraulic actuators, most of the heat generated is carried away down the return lines and dumped in the fluid reservoirs. Not so with 270V DC. The aircraft also had to carry a big 270V DC battery in case of a total elec failure, although this was partially offset by the ability to do away with lots of hydraulic system components. The EHA guys also claimed that volume and weight would be saved by eliminating hydraulic lines, but the 270V DC lines weren't exactly slender.

The actuators themselves got very big, but I'm not sure that conventional ones would have been a lot smaller. When the weight reduction plan was under way, there was a proposal to look at reverting to conventional hydraulics, but it was (in my view correctly) judged to be a step too far. Interesting to note that the outboard ailerons on the F-35C are hydraulically powered, not electrically.

This does highlight another area where F-35 is breaking new ground - it is a far more 'electric' jet than anything fielded so far.

You make an excellent point about the ability of the customer to independently and knowledgable verify a technical proposal - sadly, in the UK most of the MoD's ability to do this has been discarded over the past 10 years or so. Not good.

Best regards as ever to those racking and stacking the figures

Engines
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Old 2nd May 2015, 17:08
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Unhappy The Fox Guarding The Chicken Coop

Engines,

Thanks for all your thoughts they are interesting observations. I do have some observations that differ from yours as you might expect. It seems to me, no matter how you cut it, the JPO is totally responsible for the management of a program, complex or not. It is their job to assure that the program is carried out in such a way that the key parameters are met, which among other things includes program timing and milestones, program costs, reliability and risk analysis/risk abatement, just to name a few.
The idea was to try to put the onus on the contractors to do the job as best they saw fit, while keeping the key requirements of performance, safety and cost in place. (I was told this lot by a fairly senior JPO type some years back).
So, just looking at this from an engine perspective, that idea is awful. The key component of any new project, once identified, is the question: "What can possibly go wrong?" So if you are depending on your sole source supplier to provide you with a risk analysis/risk abatement program, you have hired the Fox. Do you think for a moment UTC/P&W would share real risk data when they advertised low risk in the first place?
This is where I blame the US DoD leadership all the way to the SoD. IMO, this is why the engine program as well as the entire program is in such disarray, decisions as you point out here. It has been my understanding that the SoD, at the time, promoted these changes to save money and that included the elimination of funding for the F136 engine even although directed by Congress to continue on. There is history that defines how stupid this decision was:

From Congressional Research Service
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Historians trace the Air Force’s interest in pursuing an alternate engine for the F-16 to Air Force frustrations in the 1970s with Pratt and Whitney’s management of the effort to develop the F100, and to Air Force concerns about using a single type of sole-sourced engine to power its entire fighter fleet of F-15s and F-16s. The use of annual competitions for procuring engines for an aircraft procurement program was unprecedented and controversial. Proponents believe it produced better engines, on better terms, for less money than would purchasing from a single company facing no competition. Other observers believed it “unjustifiably jeopardized combat effectiveness and pilot survivability.” Most of the studies have concluded that contractor responsiveness—not dollar savings—was the primary benefit of the competition. Testimony presented at a 1984 hearing suggested that requiring General Electric and Pratt and Whitney to compete for annual production and O&S work generated benefits for DOD in areas such as better contract terms and conditions, better warranties to ensure engine quality, consistency, and long-term stability of support.160 A 1987 assessment stated that after competition was introduced, the incumbent (Pratt and Whitney) offered “engine improvements to the Air Force earlier than the Air Force had been led to expect without the competition.”
So lets move to today's situation. When General Bogdan took over the F-35 program he was very loud and clear with both LM and P&W as to the lousy job they were both doing and that he expected more for both. He also identified, for the first time, the shortcomings of the aircraft and engine and lowered expectations. Then came the engine failure and fire that basically destroyed one aircraft. Bogdan was emphatic that P&W would get at the root cause of this failure and P&W would cover whatever cost incurred required to fix the problem. In other words, not at taxpayer expense. So here are the results of that:
From Defense News:

Pentagon, Pratt Cut Deal for F-35 Engines, Modifications

The newly identified root cause? “Prolonged rubbing into the material in the stator,” the JPO said in a statement. That “decomposed and superheated the titanium rotor, leading to excessive heating which started very small cracks in a titanium seal and then led to failure of the 3rd stage fan rotor.”

The office is working with Pratt to implement a plan to modify the fielded engines while also putting through a long term solution for newer copies of its F135 engine.

The cost of the modifications are included in the contract for LRIP 7, which was also awarded Tuesday. That award was for $592 million. When added to a previously awarded sustainment contract from last December, the total cost for LRIP 7 comes in at $943 million in funding for Pratt.

The lot covers 36 engines, as well as associated management and support. Pratt submitted its initial offering for LRIP 7 and 8 together; the announcement notes a contract for LRIP 8 is expected in the “near future.”
So my take on General Bogdan is that he has talked the walk very well, but walked the talk very poorly.

BTW, the Congressional delegation from Connecticut says:
(Source: John B Larson) Blumenthal, Murphy, Larson, Courtney, DeLauro, Esty Issue Joint Statement on $592 Million Pratt & Whitney Contract for F135 Engines HARTFORD -U.S. Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), U.S. Senator Chris Murphy...

"We applaud Pratt & Whitney for its continued commitment to driving down the cost of the F135 engine,"
Now if you are an engine person, you and I both know that rubbing of a titanium blisk seal is not the root cause of the F135 engine problem but a symptom of a more significant problem which must be resolved if the flight envelope is to be maintained. We will see how long, how many ($$$s) it will take and what the performance hit will be. It won't be pretty…

TD
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Old 2nd May 2015, 19:57
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AFTI was definitely an area where someone managed to get their pet rock accepted as part of the technology baseline. More-electric and 270VDC was part of that, as was the integrated powerpack.

Part of this may have been the belief that electric was the way of the future, and that developments like electric cars would drive better battery, power management and motor technology. This was certainly the view of Boeing on the 7E7/787.

I must say that I was boggled when I saw the JSF actuators on the Parker stand at Farnborough. They reminded me of the engine on my garden tractor, rather than something you'd put in the wing of a high-performance jet. Maybe the promised cost advantages will happen, but there's little sign of that so far.

The engine reliability issues will be a challenge - and sorry, but "better than 1970s British products" is not exactly a supercalifragilisticexpialadocious endorsement - and a repeat of the SBSDD "the GAO report is based on old data" is unreassuring.
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Old 2nd May 2015, 20:29
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Turbine,

Thank you for taking the time to respond.

I can't argue with the points you make - happy to differ in conclusions, but that's the point of an open forum - long may it continue.

Ownership of risk, identification of risk and management of risk are always contentious issues. What I was trying (badly) to get across was that by the 1990s the DoD had realised that the previous (largely humungously bureaucratic paper based processes) had not delivered the improvements in performance that were required.

The JPO were trying to move towards a more streamlined requirement process, and putting more onus on the contractor to perform, rather than spend millions of dollars getting the contractor to produce paper trails proving it.

The clip you showed on the background to the F135/136 decision is very familiar - it was shown to a DoD panel we supported in 1998 to review the F136 programme, and represented the views of the DoD engine programme managers who desperately wanted it to continue. The panel concluded that it should, and strongly recommended that to the DoD.

Just a few years later, it was canned, and I fully agree that it was a dumb decision. I don't know enough of the technical detail to judge P&W against GE, but I really do agree that competition is the best way to ensure best performance - if you can afford it. The US decided that they couldn't.

Best regards as ever to those making the tough calls,

Engines
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Old 2nd May 2015, 22:45
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The engine reliability issues will be a challenge - and sorry, but "better than 1970s British products" is not exactly a supercalifragilisticexpialadocious endorsement
You are no Engineer.
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